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Botho Strauß, source for polemic and target of vitriol over three decades, proposes an 
unsettling understanding of the poetic in his prose works, from his earliest writing to 
most recent publications. The thesis contends that this understanding of the poetic is 
deeply indebted to the late thought of Martin Heidegger: it investigates the nature of the 
debt, highlighting Strauß’ adoption and adaptation of ideas central to the philosopher, 
including his thinking on the work of art, technology, language and poetry. The body of 
the thesis examines Strauß’ views through detailed exegeses of Beginnlosigkeit, Wohnen 
Dämmern Lügen and Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, while drawing extensively on other 
works and writing. The readings identify and elucidate a number of key terms critical to 
Strauß’ proposed poetic. Underpinning these terms, the thesis contends, and bound to the 
understanding of the poetic, is an ontological concern for philosophical truth derived 
from Heidegger. The thesis concludes that far from a retreat by Strauß into obscurantist 
mysticism and resignation from a putative cultural, social and political collective, 
accusations repeatedly levelled at him and here grouped under the rubric of fatalism, 
Strauß offers in and through his works a dynamic engagement with this conception of 
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CHAPTER ONE 
OUT FROM THE CHARGE OF FATALISM 
1.1 A question of politics 
The prose writer, essayist and dramatist, Botho Strauß (1944-) is as renowned now for the 
controversies that are consistently, inextricably associated with his work as he is for his 
writing. The question of politics, of assumed implicit or explicit political and ideological 
sympathies, is now given almost equal consideration in responses to each publication 
within the press and in the scholarly literature as evaluations of the literary and 
philosophical qualities and merits of his work. Politics has, at times, come to eclipse all 
other considerations in understanding of this writer. 
The publication in 1993 of his essay, ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’ undoubtedly marks 
a turning point in critical opinion, as issues surrounding the balance between politics and 
literature come sharply into focus.1 From that moment the question of the political 
identity and nature of Strauß’ writing moves to the fore, although the debate has a long 
precedent.2 As Parry notes unequivocally, a number of years after the controversy first 
erupted, ‘Mit dem Spiegel-Essay […] hat Strauß die Grenze zwischen poetischem und 
politischem Diskurs verwischt’.3 Each of Strauß’ successive works is considered, albeit 
                                                 
1 Strauß, B. ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’, in Der Pfahl. Jahrbuch aus dem Niemandsland zwischen 
Kunst und Wissenschaft VII (1993), pp.9-25. References are to the extended published version of the essay, 
which went largely unnoticed, rather than the abridged copy in Der Spiegel 6 (1993) or re-issue of the 
former in Schwilk, H and Schacht, U. (eds.) Die selbstbewußte Nation  (Berlin: Ullstein, 1994). 
2 See, Anz, T. ‘Modern, postmodern? Botho Strauß’ Paare, Passanten’, in The German Quarterly 63 
(1990), pp. 404-411 for one of the earliest critical reviews of Strauß. 
3 Parry, C. ‘Botho Strauß zwischen Kulturkritik und Poetik. Zur Aktualität des konservativen Diskurses’, in 
Jahrbuch für finnisch-deutsche Literaturbeziehungen 28 (1996), p.186. 
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with diminishing ferocity and accompanying vitriol, in reference to the essay and against 
the background furore of criticism, accusation, claim and counter-claim made after the 
initial publication and each subsequent version issued.4 
It is, therefore, appropriate to suggest of ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’, as Strauß’ most 
prominent work, that it retains the greatest influence on critical reception – to say nothing 
of public understanding – of the author and his writing. As such the essay remains 
particularly important, aside from questions over its relative position in Strauß’ overall 
œuvre and the actual distinctiveness of the arguments presented therein, against which to 
determine the main viewpoints and approaches that have come to define the critical 
literature. 
In the essay Strauß makes a number of claims to support his critique of contemporary 
Western society, culture and politics. The various arguments and occasional densely 
cryptic assertions that he makes in support of this critique are not, though, the principal 
trigger for the hostile response to the essay. Rather, it is his self-description as a writer of 
and from the Rechte and the connotations of this designation that form the centre of the 
controversy.5 This term, in particular, both arouses the instinctive ire of critics and gives 
rise to uncertainty surrounding his status as a writer.6 Strauß’ refusal to clarify or develop 
this provocative declaration in the period immediately after issuing the essay in Der 
                                                 
4 Harbers provides a summary of the more substantial and serious contributions to the debate up to the re-
issue in Die selbstbewußte Nation. See, Harbers, H. ‘Botho Strauß’ “Bocksgesang”. Oder: Wie die Literatur 
im Essay ihr Gleichgewicht verliert’, in Labroisse, G. & Kapp, G. (eds.) Amsterdamer Beiträge zur neueren 
Germanistik 38/9 (Amsterdam, 1995), pp.583-608. See also Schneider, I. ‘Reiz und Reaktion’, in Weimarer 
Beiträge 2 (1994), pp.309-315. 
5 See Strauß, ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’, p.13. 
6 See, Strauß, B. ‘Am Rand. Wo sonst. Ein Zeit-Gespräch mit Botho Strauß’, in Die Zeit 23, 2001. The re-
issue of the essay in Die Selbstbewußte Nation, in particular, prompted feverish speculation on the question 
of Strauß’ status as a serious writer. 
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Spiegel, followed by its subsequent revised publication in which the term is again used – 
though with different emphasis – only serve to consolidate the question of politics as the 
first, and sometimes only, interpretative issue around Strauß.7 
The critical reception of ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’ and its legacy, as these relate to 
the weighting of politics, play a more important role than the essay itself. Given the 
deluge of précis, bearing various relationships to the original, there is little value in 
setting out again the positions Strauß advances in the essay. Other contributions to the 
debate on ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’ can be judged on the success or otherwise of 
attempts at systematic expositions of the work and its distinctive, asymmetrical 
structure.8 
Moreover, the stimulus for and context of the essay’s publication have, as Strauß himself 
suggests, long passed. In a prescript to the essay written for its re-issue in Figal and 
Schwilk’s Die selbstbewußte Nation, and which again intensified the public polemic, 
Strauß writes: ‘Ich habe dem Text weder etwas hinzuzufügen noch etwas abzustreichen. 
Nur seinen Impuls empfinde ich als vergangen’.9 Other references by Strauß to 
‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’ and its reception are clearly intended to create distance 
from both, and serve to underscore the contention that the immediate context of the essay, 
                                                 
7 Strauß, B. ‘Refrain einer tieferen Aufklärung’, in Figal, G & Schwilk, H. (eds.) Magie der Heiterkeit. 
Ernst Jünger zum Hundertsten (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1995). This essay and the interview in Die Zeit 23, 
2001 develop the idea of the intellectual Rechte where he pointedly declares its non-political nature, 
including most recently in Strauß, B. Der Untenstehende auf Zehenspitzen (Munich/Vienna: Hanser, 2004), 
p.112. The sense of provocation, though, is not helped by publication of essays with such declarative titles 
as ‘Wollt ihr das totale Engineering?’. Lack of any reaction to this essay suggests again the contrived 
nature of the polemic surrounding ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’. 
8 See Harbers, ‘Botho Strauß’ “Bocksgesang”’ and Berka, S. ‘Botho Strauß und die Debatte um den 
“Bocksgesang”’, in Weimarer Beiträge 2 (1994), pp.165-178. 
9 Strauß, B. ‘“Kardinal Ratzinger ist der Nietzsche unserer Zeit”. Ein Brief von Botho Strauß,’ in 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 October, 1994. 
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and Strauß’ identification with it, have lost some of their currency. For example, in the 
strongly auto-biographical work of 1997, Die Fehler des Kopisten, in which Strauß 
engages in reflections on his then recent retreat to the rural Uckermark from his home in 
Berlin, he writes: ‘Ich sah den hellen Sprüngen der Lämmer zu. Der Bocksgesang, den 
ich einmal unvorsichtig berief, war vorgerückt bis an mein Haus. Ein heiteres Mecker-
Konzert mit obstinaten Bässen’.10 The collective stampede of critical opinion, for Strauß 
at least, appears in retrospect analogous to – and seemingly as important as – the 
gambolling of local wildlife. 
Instead, it is the legacy of the essay on the critical reception of Strauß’ work that informs 
the present introduction. The following remarks are intended to offer the basis for a 
critical assessment of Strauß’ reception to date. These consider the growing critical pre-
occupation with a distinct set of questions and themes here designated as the charge of 
fatalism – a misguided charge, according to this thesis – arising from politically-oriented 
readings of Strauß’ work that overlook its philosophical intent. The immediate focus, 
then, of the remaining section is on reactions to the essay, rather than examining directly 
the sustainability of views directly or indirectly attributed to Strauß. 
Harbers’ study is representative of such politically-weighted responses to the essay and to 
Strauß’ wider writing.11 As such, his argument is useful to introduce the nature of the 
various accusations and what is at stake in the charge of fatalism. Harbers argues that in 
                                                 
10 Strauß, B. Die Fehler des Kopisten (Munich/Vienna: Hanser, 1997), p.36. 
11 Harbers is, however, more even-handed than many and concludes: ‘Zusammenfassend ergibt sich 
folgendes Bild: Strauß’ Argumentation ist in sich nicht unschlüssig. Ausgehend von der Prämisse einer 
gefährlichen Bedrohung unserer Gesellschaft durch einen alles verschluckenden aufgeklärt-liberalen 
Diskurs sind die Hervorhebung des Nicht-Rationalen und der Schritt ins Außenseitertum nicht unlogisch’, 
in Harbers, ‘Botho Strauß’ “Bocksgesang”’, p.601. 
 4
‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’, in contrast to his dramas, Strauß’ writing has lost what 
he terms its Gleichgewicht. The idea of Gleichgewicht is frequently applied in 
interpretations of his theatrical work, because it remains a recurring motif and is also the 
title of one of his dramas published in the same year as the ‘Anschwellender 
Bocksgesang’.12 Harbers, though, uses the term to evoke the specific balance between 
politics and literature, or rather, as he claims, the lack of it in the prose works and essays. 
This imbalance lies, for Harbers, in a disjuncture between the target of Strauß’ critiques, 
whether of contemporary society or the political system, and the self-consciousness of the 
relative position of any proposed alternatives. A balance is lost, for Harbers 
spectacularly, when Strauß invokes terms derived from certain past literary or 
philosophical sources and applies them to the contemporary context in Germany for 
political and social comment.13 Thus, one example is Strauß’ use in the essay of the term 
Fremde. Viewed in conjunction with Strauß’ posited category of a cultural collective, 
Unsere, it is viewed as politically problematic.14 The putative alternatives that Strauß 
proposes, according to Harbers, are sought in mysticism and are premised on what he 
terms non-rational views of the world. In the plays, where these viewpoints are subverted 
ironically within the framework of the drama, this presents no political difficulty for the 
Gleichgewicht of his work. However, in ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’, Harbers 
suggests, the lack of such balance, and weighting given to such seeming irrational ideas 
veers his work into intellectual terrain with undesirable political consequences. As a 
result of Strauß’ loss of literary Gleichgewicht, Harbers reasons: 
                                                 
12 Strauß, B. Das Gleichgewicht, (Munich/Vienna: Hanser, 1993). 
13 Other critics make the same argument citing different examples. See Krajenbrink, M. ‘Das 
Mißverständnis als Privileg des Kunstwerks’, in Weimarer Beiträge 2 (1994), pp.297-309. 
14 See Strauß, ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’, p.11. 
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werden andere als rationale Erkenntnis- und Erfahrungsweisen gesucht, […]. 
Die prinzipielle Gefahr, die einer solchen Literatur droht, die immer ans 
‘Dunkle’, und das Nicht-Rationale rührt, ist, daß sie regelrecht ins Irrationale 
umkippt […] so endet sie entweder in mystisch-gläubigem Gefühlskitsch oder 
in einer Verherrlichung von unbewußten Trieben und Gewalt (genau das wird 
jetzt, explizit oder implizit, über Strauß gesagt).15 
As this thesis contends, such accusations both misunderstand the nature of Strauß’ 
philosophical proposal for his work, and overlook the intellectual antecedents of his 
views. Harbers concludes that such literary imbalance signals Strauß’ final renunciation 
of ‘der liberal-demokratischen Aufklärungstradition’.16 His writing, therefore, advances 
counter or anti-enlightenment ideology. In making this claim, the shadow of the political 
is cast firmly over Strauß. 
Of course, Strauß himself invokes the idea of a ‘Gegenaufklärung’ in ‘Anschwellender 
Bocksgesang’ in terms that are less than transparent.17 Its usage only reinforces the 
further applications of the counter-enlightenment epithet in the secondary literature.18 
This particular designation is the basis for several studies, each taking a different stance 
on the political implications of what is, therefore, possibly suggested by his writing.19 
However, use of the term is of questionable interpretative purchase in evaluating Strauß 
without exploring in detail which particular thinkers or ideas Strauß is supposed to be 
countering. (Strauß’ paean to Lessing supports the contention that his relationship to 
                                                 
15 Harbers, ‘Botho Strauß’ “Bocksgesang”’, p.604. 
16 Harbers, ‘Botho Strauß’ “Bocksgesang”’, p.584. 
17 Strauß appears to define the term in opposition to activities of far-right youth groups following re-
unification. He claims: ‘Daher handelt es sich auch bei den Schändungen, die Neonazis jetzt begehen, im 
besonderen ihren antisemitischen Ausschreitungen, keineswegs um militante Akte der Gegenaufklärung. 
Diese, im strengen Sinn, wird die oberste Hüterin des Unbefragbaren, des Tabus und der Scheu sein […] ’, 
in Strauß, ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’, p.22. 
18 See, for example, contributions by Herwig, Kaußen and McGowan, in Weimarer Beiträge 2 (1994). 
19 For such different readings see Herwig, H. ‘Der Zusammenbruch der profanen Eschatologie. Zum 
Begriff der Gegenaufklärung bei Botho Strauß’, in Weimarer Beiträge 2 (1994), pp.282-288 and Wiesberg, 
M. Botho Strauß. Dichter der Gegen-Aufklärung (Dresden: Edition Antaios, 2002). 
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representatives of the Enlightenment is more involved than is suggested by critics).20 
There are, after all, as many different positions of counter-enlightenment as there are 
projects associated with the broad tradition of European Aufklärung.21  Such detailed 
approaches are largely absent from the studies on Strauß. The term, then, serves as 
shorthand for a particular form of denunciation. 
Against Strauß’ critiques of contemporary politics and culture, levelling of accusations of 
Gegenaufklärung encompasses a number of criticisms. These include: Strauß’ distancing 
from a functioning social collective, the adoption of marginal positions outside this 
mainstream grouping and the renunciation of rational principles of communication by 
which to articulate these motifs. These individual criticisms, for some commentators on 
Strauß, have their intellectual roots in the Conservative Revolution of the inter-war 
period.22 By drawing this association the issue of politics is taken in a specific direction. 
McGowan, for example, outlines a group of writers from the Twenties and Thirties with 
whom Strauß shares isolationist traits. His work, he suggests, reveals: ‘Parallelen zu einer 
Reihe konservativer Dichter […], von der christlichen Mystik von Ernst Kreuder, 
Elisabeth Langgässer oder Ina Seidel über Ernst Jüngers Kulturkritik zur formalen und 
                                                 
20 See Strauß, B. ‘Der Erste, der Letzte. Warum uns der große Lessing nicht mehr helfen kann’, in Die Zeit, 
37, 2001. 
21 For such a review see Lilla, M. ‘Was ist Gegenaufklärung?’ in Merkur 5 (1996), pp.400-411. 
22 ‘In mehreren Beiträgen wird überzeugend die […] Nähe seiner Auffassungen zu den antiliberalen, 
rationalitätskritischen Positionen der “Konservativen Revolution” dargelegt’, in Harbers, ‘Botho Strauß’ 
“Bocksgesang”’, pp.598-599. The first full-length study of this issue by Thomas shows the complexity and 
problematic nature of Strauß’ inheritance from writers of the period. It rightly draws attention to the non-
practically conceived, non-political nature of the movement. See Thomas, N. ‘Der Aufstand gegen die 
sekundäre Welt’. Botho Strauß und die ‘Konservative Revolution’ (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 
2004). 
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oft brutalen Radikalität Gottfried Benns’.23 And Hagestedt also notes the similarity to the 
literary and philosophical tradition of the Conservative Revolution, raising what he sees 
as certain inevitable political implications for Strauß’ work. Citing the legacy of the 
philosophically conservative movement as, in part, laying the intellectual foundations for 
National Socialist ideology, he suggests that ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’ too, has 
recourse to metaphors and language that, ‘zum großen Teil […] aus dem 19. Jahrhundert 
stammen’.24 Such ideas, Hagestedt notes, finally reach their political extreme in their 
application, ‘in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus’.25 Parry goes further, suggesting that 
Strauß negates the specific responsibilities of certain writers for the collapse of Weimar 
in the 1930s. He argues that, ‘Strauß verdrängt […] auch die Mitverantwortung der 
deutschen Intelligenz für die historische Katastrophe’.26 Thus, by intellectual and literary 
association, the combination of certain identified themes and politically-weighted 
evaluation move Strauß into areas of deep contention. 
Such contributions to the debate surrounding ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’ are 
significant because they provide scholarly background for the more vituperate political 
characterisation of Strauß’ work. Given the generally accepted view that regards the 
Conservative Revolution in varying degrees as a mental and spiritual staging post for the 
subsequent political extremism of the Thirties and Forties, for some critics Strauß’ essay 
fulfils a similar function in post-unification Germany. Such views further contribute to 
                                                 
23 McGowan, M. ‘“Die schwache Stimme in der Höhle unter dem Lärm”. Gedanken zur Büchnerpreisrede 
von Botho Strauß und zur Politik des Unpolitischen’, in Weimarer Beiträge 2 (1994), p.199. 
24 Hagestedt, L. ‘Botho Strauß: Literatur als Erkenntnis. Reflexionen aus dem beschädigten Leben der 
Postaufklärung’, in Weimarer Beiträge 2 (1994), p.266. 
25 Hagestedt, ‘Botho Strauß: Literatur als Erkenntnis’, p.266. 
26 Parry, ‘Botho Strauß zwischen Kulturkritik und Poetik’, p.186. 
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the critical climate that weights interpretation towards an exclusive consideration of the 
political in the essay and his writing. 
Görner, for example, compares ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’ with Strauß’ dramatic 
works and suggests that the ‘neo-reaktionären Thesen’ put forward by the figure of 
Markus Groth in Das Gleichgewicht are ‘nahezu identisch mit der Essenz des 
“Bocksgesangs”’.27 The difficulty arises, claims Görner, in a parallel argument to 
Harbers’, when in Strauß’ essay these views are not undercut or relativised within the 
work. Strauß is thus implicitly portrayed as positioned on the extreme wing of politics. 
As he notes: ‘die kalkulierte Undeutlichkeit des Botho Strauß ist umgeschlagen in einen 
Jargon mythisierender Eigentlichkeit […] um politische Naivität vorzuspiegeln’.28 
Similarly, Weilnböck suggests that the structure of ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’ 
betrays what he suggests are its potential political affiliations. In a reading of the narrator 
figure in the essay, who distances himself from the society he describes, Weilnböck’s 
psycho-analytically influenced reading seeks to determine, ‘wo und inwiefern diese Texte 
von jenen Wirkungen einer narzißtischen Beziehungs-Pathologie gezeichnet sind, die in 
teilweise anderer Form bereits das soziokulturelle Milieu der historischen Faschismen 
auszeichnete’.29 Such associations with political extremes and the rise of Nazism or neo-
fascism, although seen by such critics as latent in the essay, culminate in critical 
                                                 
27 Görner, R. ‘Im Schatten des Mythos. Botho Strauß und die Prägnanz der Undeutlichkeit’, in Knapp, G. P. 
1945-1995. Fünfzig Jahre deutschsprachige Literatur in Aspekten (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1995), p.559. 
28 Görner, ‘Im Schatten des Mythos’, p.559. 
29 Weilnböck, H. ‘Die frühe Untertöne des “Bocksgesangs” in Botho Strauß’ ‘Der Park’’, in Weimarer 
Beiträge 2 (1994), pp.205-206. 
 9
reception of ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’ in Winkler’s apparently serious question, 
‘Ist Botho Strauß ein Faschist?’30 
The climate of such political denunciation, in turn, feeds through to other studies in the 
critical literature. Anz, for example, argues of Strauß’ conception of tragedy in 
‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’ that it too has its origin in the period of National 
Socialism. It is a startling observation, more so for its conjectural tone. Anz mentions the 
hypothesis, with its damning implications, almost as an aside: 
Zu prüfen wäre freilich, wie weit Strauß’ Rekurs auf kultische Ursprünge der 
Tragödie jenen klassizistischen Wendungen zur Tragödie gleicht, die, 
inspiriert von der Tragödientheorie und -praxis Paul Ernsts, […] durch 
Autoren wie Curt Langenbeck, […] vertreten wurden. Begriffe wie 
‘Verhängnis’ und ‘Opfer’ sind hier von ähnlich zentraler Bedeutung wie bei 
Strauß.31  
Moreover, he argues that Strauß’ understanding of the tragedy facing contemporary 
society in ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’ negates the associated experience of collective 
and individual ‘Schuld’ and so elides the magnitude of National Socialism and its legacy 
for modern democratic Germany. Concluding with what he contends are the implications 
of the essay he notes: ‘auch der Nationalsozialismus, so läßt sich folgern, ist nicht die 
Schande der modernen deutschen Geschichte, sondern der die Erschütterung angeblich 
mäßigende Umgang mit ihm in der aufgeklärt-kritischen Öffentlichkeit’.32 
The association of Strauß’ writing with political extremism warrants brief consideration, 
not least because it has gained such currency. Arguments that hold Strauß either as 
representative of, or responsible for, re-emergent right-wing political extremism are in 
                                                 
30 Winkler, W. ‘Ist Botho Strauß ein Faschist?’ in die tageszeitung, 13 February, 1993. 
31 Anz, T. ‘Sinn für Verhängnis und Opfer? Zum Tragödien-Verständnis in Botho Strauß’ Anschwellender 
Bocksgesang’, in Jahrbuch der deutschen Schillergesellschaft 40 (1996), p.387. 
32 Anz, ‘Sinn für Verhängnis und Opfer?’, p.386. 
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profound error, primarily because they entirely over-inflate the nature of literary effect.33 
It is worth underscoring that Strauß’ pronouncements on the period of National Socialism 
are unequivocal, as are the reflections in ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’ on the political 
violence of far-right groups prevalent in the mid-1990s, and are consistent from his early 
to his most recent publications.34 That these criticisms should continue despite his 
explicit condemnation seems close to defamatory. It demonstrates though, how 
consideration of the political has the potential for interpretative myopia that obscures the 
question of literary or philosophical intent entirely. 
These various accusations, although representative of differing types of scholarship, 
make ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’ both a defining moment in reception of Strauß and 
his work, and skew the significance of this particular essay for his overall writing. Many 
of the arguments and ideas put forward in the essay are already manifest in his early work 
but have either gone uncommented, or are interpreted differently. What comes to the fore 
in respect of the essay’s legacy is an interpretative consensus within which his works 
come to be viewed politically, an impetus that has spread to reception of his other 
writing. Aside from marking a turning-point in reception of subsequent publications, 
‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’ has also led to re-evaluations of Strauß’ early work in 
relation to politics. Strauß himself suggests this as the inevitable consequence of the 
essay. Writing in a letter to the editors of Die selbstbewußte Nation he claims:   
                                                 
33 Ignatz Bubis, then Chairman of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, accused Strauß of being 
directly responsible for the intellectual climate that led to acts of arson and anti-semitism following re-
unification. He subsequently withdrew his comments. See, Bubis, I. ‘Wegbereiter wie Nolte’, in Der 
Spiegel 16 (1994), p.170. 
34 See, amongst others, Strauß, B. Der junge Mann (Munich/Vienna: Hanser, 1984), p.186; Strauß, B. 
Niemand anderes (Munich: DTV, 2nd Edition 1994), p.149 and Strauß, B. ‘Bekenntnisse eines 
Unpolitischen?’ and the interview with Hage, V. ‘Schreiben ist eine Séance. Begegnungen mit Botho 
Strauß (1980 und 1986)’, in Radix, M. (ed.) Strauß lesen (Munich/Vienna: Hanser, 1987), pp.214ff. 
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Man hat mich schon so viele Male geächtet und verpönt, […] jetzt kann als 
Steigerung nur noch die damnatio memoriae folgen: diesen Mann hat es als 
Schriftsteller nie gegeben; er ist von Anfang an immer eine Nichtswürdigkeit 
gewesen.35  
McGowan acknowledges just such a re-evaluation of the early work in his 
characterisation of Strauß’ ‘Politik des Unpolitischen’.36 Accordingly, Strauß’ 
presentation of the figure of writer-poet in his writing is regarded, prior to the publication 
of ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’, as firmly apolitical. As McGowan argues, such motifs 
are: ‘eine Verweigerung ideologiekritischer Stellungnahme zugunsten einer reflexiven 
Schreibweise, charakterisiert durch ständige Bewegung, Entzug, Bruch, Fragment’.37 
However, he posits a number of consequences of what he sees as the denial of ideological 
conviction in ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’ and concludes retrospectively of the early 
works that: ‘Die Texte der achtziger Jahre wären demnach eine durchaus politisch zu 
verstehende Suche nach entsprechenden Formen’.38 Seen through the prism of 
‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’, preceding publications too are similarly viewed in the 
glare of the political. 
Indeed, of the five main articles of the Weimarer Beiträge special edition dedicated to 
consideration of ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’, four evaluate previous work in relation 
to the essay.39 This is, of course, a legitimate methodological premise and interpretative 
approach. However, to place undue emphasis on this single and distinct work – in an 
                                                 
35 Strauß, B. ‘“Kardinal Ratzinger ist der Nietzsche unserer Zeit”. Ein Brief von Botho Strauß.’ 
36 McGowan, ‘ Gedanken zur Büchnerpreisrede von Botho Strauß’, p.190. 
37 McGowan, ‘ Gedanken zur Büchnerpreisrede von Botho Strauß’, p.199. 
38 McGowan, ‘ Gedanken zur Büchnerpreisrede von Botho Strauß’, p.199. 
39 See Weimarer Beiträge 2 (1994). 
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interview Strauß called it a one-off ‘“journalistischer” Text’40 – distorts reception. 
‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’ thus not only has an impact on critical understanding but 
becomes the primary and defining interpretative key to all of Strauß’ work. 
The present argument suggests that the impetus towards the political has a broader 
consequence. The motifs and ideas in the writing that cause the most consternation in 
terms of their political implications are Strauß’ apparent renunciation of a functioning 
social collective, his motif of the poet as a necessary marginal figure and his adoption of 
an exclusive idiom and language. At their root, all of these individual accusations suggest 
a form of intellectual resignation as his putative response to the ills of late modernity.41 It 
is this criticism, which the present thesis contends amounts to a charge of fatalism and 
leads to a misunderstanding of the philosophical ambition and reach of Strauß’ works. 
1.2 Strauß: ‘zutiefst fatalistisch’?42 
Discussion of Strauß’ apparent disdain for and rejection of the social collective is not new 
in the secondary literature. Anz, for example, is amongst the first commentators to 
develop a critique noting what he views as supposed anti-democratic tendencies. In his 
reading he brings together an aspect of fatalism relating to the political implications of 
                                                 
40 ‘Für ihn ist das ein “journalistischer” Text, wie er ihn so bald gewiß nicht wieder schreiben werde’. 
Hage, V. ‘Der Dichter nach der Schlacht. Eine Begegnung mit Botho Strauß im Sommer 1993’, in 
Weimarer Beiträge 2 (1994), p.182. 
41 The designation of a period of late modernity is suggested by Strauß, for example, in Strauß, B. 
Beginnlosigkeit. Reflexionen über Fleck und Linie (Munich/Vienna: Hanser, 1992). 
42 Parry, ‘Botho Strauß zwischen Kulturkritik und Poetik’, p.186. 
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Strauß’ isolationism.43 This specific accusation dominates responses to ‘Anschwellender 
Bocksgesang’. Despite sometimes acknowledging the apparent opening homage to 
contemporary society in the essay, where Strauß comments on his, ‘große Bewunderung 
für die ungeheuer komplizierten Abläufe und Passungen, für den grandiosen und 
empfindlichen Organismus des Miteinander’, commentators focus on the critique of 
society.44 At issue are Strauß’ claims that modern social forms and institutions are 
fundamentally threatened; that they are systemically flawed, reform futile, that obsessive 
pre-occupation with materialism only exacerbates the inherent tensions in society and 
that norms and values are eroding. A significant number of these critical reactions 
concentrate on Strauß’ contention that the so-called ‘kritisch Aufgeklärten’, his 
designation of the left-leaning political culture in post-war Germany, utterly dominates 
both public life and discourse.45 Harbers, for example, argues that his totalising 
arguments on all institutions of civic society, such as the media, lead inevitably, ‘zu einer 
intoleranten Verachtung’.46 
Strauß’ adoption of marginal positions, critics suggest, comes from his elitist espousal of 
the remote writer-poets who occupy positions outside the mainstream. In this vein Vogel, 
for example, criticises him for his celebration of the isolated figure of the individual set 
against the majority, which culminates in what he labels the ‘Apotheose des magischen, 
                                                 
43 As he argues: ‘[…] so haften Botho Strauß’ kulturkritischen Beobachtungen und Reflexionen latente, 
zuweilen aber auch offene antidemokratische Ressentiments an’, in Anz, ‘Modern, postmodern? Botho 
Strauß’, p.407. 
44 Strauß, ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’, p.9. Harbers, in turn, notes, ‘Da er im folgenden die heutige 
Erscheinungsform dieser Gesellschaft in Deutschland nur noch kritisiert, haben manche Kritiker diesen 
Anfang als rein rhetorische captatio benevolentiae aufgefaßt’, in Harbers, ‘Botho Strauß’ “Bocksgesang”’, 
p.586. 
45 See Strauß, ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’, p.15. 
46 Harbers, ‘Botho Strauß’ “Bocksgesang”’, p.597. 
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sakralen Einzelgängertums’.47 McGowan too stresses Strauß’ extolling of a poet-figure, 
in particular the writer’s self-imposed isolation. It is precisely this idea that leads 
McGowan to question Strauß’ political affiliations and intellectual heritage: ‘Auch an 
sich ist dieses Bild des Dichters als eines mutigen Einsiedlers, der seine Kraft und seine 
Fähigkeit zum Widerstand gerade aus seiner Abgeschiedenheit von der lärmenden 
Informations- und Medienwelt zieht, keineswegs unproblematisch’.48 Schmidt echoes the 
claim, noting the anti-social tendencies of the poet-figure standing outside the collective. 
He claims of such a figure: ‘das bleibt eine ästhetische Elite, will und kann keine 
gesellschaftliche sein’.49 Going even further Parry suggests that Strauß’ poet figure, 
viewed in the context of post-war democratic Germany, is the expression of 
marginalisation characterising all of Strauß’ work not just ‘Anschwellender 
Bocksgesang’. Writing of the discrepancy between Strauß’ poets and the social milieu he 
claims: ‘Im realen Kommunikationszusammenhang, in dem sich Strauß befindet, erweist 
sich seine “Erinnerungspoetik” in Wirklichkeit als eine Poetik der Verdrängung’.50 This 
thesis argues, on the contrary, for a specific philosophical implication to Strauß’ conceit 
of the poets. 
A further component underpinning the fatalism charge lies in critics’ contentions 
regarding Strauß’ renunciation of rationally-based principles of communicative action, 
manifested through obscurantism of his language and prose.51 There is, the argument 
                                                 
47 Vogel, J. ‘Tragödie eines Einzelgängers’, in Der Spiegel 10 (1993). 
48 McGowan, ‘Gedanken zur Büchnerpreisrede von Botho Strauß’, pp.193-194. 
49 Schmidt, T. E. ‘Wen betört der Bocksgesang? Über Botho Strauß’ metaphysischer Kulturkritik’, in 
Merkur 48 (1994), p.739. 
50 Parry, ‘Botho Strauß zwischen Kulturkritik und Poetik’, p.186. 
51 It is an unrecognised irony surrounding reception of the essay that Strauß acknowledges the likely 
difficulties arising from the language and structure of ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’. Strauß observes: 
‘Vielleicht hat hier auch die Form, der sprachliche und gedankliche Manierismus, dafür gesorgt, daß die 
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runs, little or no systematic, inductively-established foundation to the declarations put 
forward in ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’. Weilnböck, for example, reasons that its tone 
is the necessary outcome of that aspect of Strauß’ fatalism already noted, namely the 
pathological isolation of the writer from the world. He argues: 
Der Unwille darf jedoch nicht davon ablenken,  daß jedes peinliche oder 
unstimmige Adjektiv, jeder der manchmal ambivalenten oder bezugslosen 
Begriffe und eifernden Sätze Zeichen einer diffus ersehnten und gescheiterten 
Beziehungsaufnahme des Autors zu seinen Worten und seiner Worte 
zueinander und zu ihrer Welt ist.52 
Görner levels the same accusation at Strauß’ prose suggesting a tendency towards 
linguistic abstraction and a pointed opacity to his ideas. This culminates, for him, in the 
prose work Beginnlosigkeit, with its transformation of scientific terminology into literary 
form: as a result his work becomes ‘immer “dunkler”, nebulöser, undeutlicher’.53 This 
particular objection to the prose work is considered in detail in the conclusion to Chapter 
Five. Once such a style is established Görner continues, ‘konnte dies in die peinlich 
genau-verschwommene Provokation des “Anschwellenden Bocksgesgangs” 
umschlagen’.54 McGowan too places the issue of obscurantism at the centre of his study. 
For him, Strauß’ vagueness is defining and is raised to underlying principle. His work, he 
argues, exhibits: ‘Definitionslosigkeit und Undeutlichkeit als poetologisches 
Programm’.55 Such language is evidence of the non-rational and antiquated origins of his 
thought and writing. Hagestedt agrees with this view, remarking: ‘Bemerkenswert ist die 
Stilisierung der Rede, die im sprachlichen Gestus an die dunkle, auslegungsbedürftige 
                                                                                                                                                 
Sache nicht so glatt durch den Tag rutschte’, in Strauß, B. ‘Der eigentliche Skandal’, in Der Spiegel 16 
(1994), pp.168-169. 
52 Weilnböck, ‘Die frühe Untertöne des “Bocksgesangs”’, pp.218-219. 
53 Görner, ‘Im Schatten des Mythos’, p.549. 
54 Görner, ‘Im Schatten des Mythos’, p.549. 
55 McGowan, ‘Gedanken zur Büchnerpreisrede von Botho Strauß’, p.198. 
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Rabulistik der Orakel erinnert: Es wird nicht offen gesagt, worum es dem Sprecher geht, 
sondern es wird verschwörerisch verklausuliert.’56 It is, though, this thesis argues, 
precisely this indeterminacy, so central to Strauß, that grounds the radical unsettling force 
and philosophical reach of his writing. 
These brief reflections on ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’ are intended as an introduction 
to and an illustration of aspects of his writing that have come in the literature to constitute 
Strauß’ putative fatalism. The thesis contends that the charge underlying the different 
accusations is that Strauß’ writing shows only an intellectual resignation and elite 
aestheticism. It is to a more detailed consideration of this charge and its presentation in 
the secondary literature on Strauß, that the argument now turns. 
1.3 Fatalism and the secondary literature  
While responses to ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’ illustrate the accusations that 
constitute the charge of fatalism, the motif of the individual subject detached from and 
having renounced a wider cultural and social context, and the question of obscurantism 
remain constant in the three broad identifiable stages of the secondary literature. 
Although these are often informed by different critical premises and theoretical 
frameworks, the larger, important studies share certain thematic pre-occupations. These 
three stages broadly correspond also to Strauß’ writing of the Seventies and early 
Eighties, the subsequent works up to German re-unification and, thirdly, those 
publications, including ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’, to the present. The different 
                                                 
56 Hagestedt, ‘Botho Strauß: Literatur als Erkenntnis’, p.266. 
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monographs and studies are loosely grouped around preoccupations of ‘Neue 
Subjektivität’, the postmodern and, lastly, aesthetics. Some of these are engaged 
exclusively with Strauß’ plays and dramatic work, however, and fall outside the scope of 
the immediate argument.57 Instead, the focus here is restricted to reviewing the secondary 
literature on the prose works – which has tended anyway to remain marginalized within 
Strauß criticism – in relation to the fatalism charge.58 
The studies pre-occupied primarily with the early prose work concentrate on the 
presentation of the individual human subject and its apparent disintegration in the face of 
alienating social mores and the disorientating effects of contemporary culture.59 Damm, 
for example, highlights the thematic emphasis of such approaches in the secondary 
literature:  
Als Themenschwerpunkt wird dabei überwiegend der Zustand des isolierten, 
beziehungslosen Individuums in der modernen Gesellschaft ausgemacht, das 
in seiner “Daseinsverzweiflung” und “Daseinsverfehlung” nach Perspektiven 
suche, ohne freilich einen Ausweg aus seiner Misere finden zu können’.60  
These interpretations of the eroding stable subject follow in the footsteps of Schneider’s 
early identification of ‘jener melancholischen Erkrankung, von der Strauß’ Protagonisten 
                                                 
57 Such studies include: Herwig, H. Verwünschte Beziehungen, verwebte Bezüge. Zerfall und Verwandlung 
des Dialogs bei Botho Strauß (Tübingen: Stauffenberg, 1986); Kapitza, U. Bewußtseinsspiele: Drama und 
Dramaturgie bei Botho Strauß (Frankfurt-am-Main: Literarhistorische Untersuchungen 9, 1987);  
Kazubko, K. Spielformen des Dramas bei Botho Strauß (Hildesheim: Goerg Olms Verlag, 1990) and 
Plümer, V. Zur Entwicklung und Dramaturgie der Dramen von Botho Strauß (Frankfurt-am-Main: 
Europäische Hochschulschriften Vol.942, 1987). 
58 Lämmerman highlights the concentration in the secondary literature on the plays rather than the 
‘vernachlässigten erzählerischen Prosa’. See, Lämmerman, S. Für unser Werk mein Liebster. Die 
Thematisierung von Produktion im Erzählwerk von Botho Strauß. (Frankfurt-am-Main: Peter Lang, 1996), 
p15ff. 
59 These include his first short stories Strauß, B. Marlenes Schwester (Munich: DTV, 3rd Edition, 1989) 
originally published in 1975, Strauß, B. Die Widmung (Munich: DTV, 9th Edition, 1993) published in 1977 
and Strauß, B. Rumor (Munich: DTV, 3rd Edition, 1994), which came out in 1980. 
60 Damm, S. Die Archäologie der Zeit. Geschichtsbegriff und Mythosrezeption in den jüngeren Texten von 
Botho Strauß (Wiesbaden: Opladen, 1998), p.27. 
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allesamt affiziert sind’.61 A sense of melancholy, he argues, pervades all his characters 
who are negotiating loss, whether material, spiritual, emotional or that of identity. The 
characters in Strauß’ prose are thus seen as figures isolated from society, collective bonds 
or individual ties. 
Strauß’ short novel of 1977 and first major success, Die Widmung, is read in these 
interpretations as emblematic of this motif. The fatalism charge is therefore reflected in 
critical responses to this work in evaluation of the physical decline and mental 
disintegration of Richard Schroubek, but is also shown by Strauß’ figures in other early 
writing, including Marlenes Schwester and Theorie der Drohung. As Förster reflects on 
the apparent collapse of the individual ego: ‘Im Zentrum der Erzählungen stehen 
Protagonisten, denen der Prozeß der Individuation zur […] selbständigen Monade versagt 
bleibt, die sich selbst permanent verlieren, deren personale Konturen in den Sog des 
Fragmentarischen geraten’.62 
A pre-occupation with the subject and its relationship to society obviously forms the 
central thrust of studies interpreting Strauß’ early works in relation to the literary trend of 
‘Neue Subjektivität’. Thus Adelson, in the first major monograph on his prose, identifies 
a sense of ‘diachronic longing’ in his characters.63 This is a response to what she terms 
‘the crisis of subjective agency’, a corollary of the so-called ‘Ausdrucksnot’ arising from 
                                                 
61 Schneider, M. ‘Botho Strauß, das bürgerliche Feuilleton und der Kultus des Verfalls. Zur diagnose eines 
neuen Lebensgefühls’, in Schneider, M. Den Kopf verkehrt aufgesetzt oder Die melancholische Linke 
(Darmstadt: Neuwied, 1981), p.236. 
62 Förster, J. ‘Der falsch verstandene Aufklärer? Die Prosa Botho Strauß und ihre Rezeption’, in Diskussion 
Deutsch 107 (1989), p.240. 
63 Adelson, L. A. A Crisis of Subjectivity: Botho Strauß’ Challenge to West German Prose of the 1970s 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1984), p.60. 
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the perceived failures of the student movement of the 1960s in West Germany.64 
DeMeritt, in turn, takes the designation of ‘Neue Subjektivität’, which she concedes is a 
term ‘derived from the discourse surrounding it and not from the literature itself’, and 
considers the treatment of ‘alienation’ and ‘the disconnection of societal reality’ in 
Strauß’ figures.65 These, she suggests, are all ‘motivated by separation or abandonment’: 
through their ‘new subjective confrontation with self’, characters find their way in the 
object world against the dominating influence exerted by the ‘reason of contemporary 
society’.66 A recent study has raised the issue of ‘Neue Subjektivität’ again but thrown 
into question the static application of this periodizing category.67 Leal reads Die 
Widmung, along with other texts of the time, in order to question some of the theoretical 
and interpretative orthodoxies that have arisen around the classification. In respect of the 
immediate focus though, the issue of marginal figures, illustrated in Strauß’ depiction of 
the subject in decline or crisis, is seen in these early studies as central to interpretation 
and understanding of his writing. 
In what way does the second broad stage of criticism denoted by the issue of the 
postmodern show those accusations constitutive of fatalism? A recurring pre-occupation 
in the literature on Strauß, shown in the accusation of obscurantism in ‘Anschwellender 
Bocksgesang’, is the self-referential nature of his writing. Willer develops his definition 
of this literary self-consciousness as: ‘Strauß markiert das literaturtheoretische Potenzial 
seiner Schrift-Arrangements in den Texten selbst. Seine Erzählungen und Romane sind 
                                                 
64 Adelson, A Crisis of Subjectivity, p.60. 
65 DeMeritt, L. C. New Subjectivity and Prose Forms of Alienation. Peter Handke and Botho Strauß 
(Frankfurt-am-Main: Peter Lang, 1987), p.1. 
66 DeMeritt, New Subjectivity and Prose Forms of Alienation, p.238. 
67 Leal, J. ‘Neue Subjektivität’ in German Fiction: A Reassessment of a Literary Tendency (Ph.D. thesis, 
King’s College, University of London, 1999). 
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hochgradig theoriebewusst’.68 He suggests the influence of theories of post-structuralism 
and postmodernism on reception of Strauß, generic classifications applied to thinkers as 
diverse as Foucault, de Man and Derrida, in spite of Strauß’ overt and repeated distancing 
from associated systems of thought, what he terms, ‘das Imperium der Abschwörung und 
der Leugnung mit seinen unzähligen radikalen Provinzen und subversiven Satyrspielen 
des Intellekts’.69 Nonetheless, the presence of such theories and theorists persists: these, 
in turn, have remained influential in developments within the secondary literature.70 
These interpretations, in turn, continue to emphasise aspects of Strauß’ putative fatalism, 
namely the elision and loss of the subject as a source of meaning, and the difficulties 
experienced by the individual in attempting to fill the central absence that mankind 
experiences, however this is theoretically defined: whether of history, time or knowledge. 
An early study by vom Hofe and Pfaff is representative of such a theoretically influenced 
interpretation, going on to argue that Strauß’ writing is deeply self-referential in its use of 
language.71 Any correspondence between subject and external object-world is, for these 
critics, shown to be fragmented: characters are interpreted as lost, and only on occasion 
as they sense the apparently arbitrary nature of meaning, whether of their identities or the 
external world, can they transcend their relativity. So, for example, in Die Widmung 
                                                 
68 Willer, S. Botho Strauß zur Einführung (Hamburg: Junius, 2000), p.63. 
69 Strauß, B. ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt. Bemerkungen zu einer Ästhetik der Anwesenheit’, 
in Steiner, G. Von realer Gegenwart. Hat unser Sprechen Inhalt? (Munich: Hanser, 1990), p.310.  
70 Strauß laments the influence of, and decries engaging with theories of deconstruction as early as Paare, 
Passanten: ‘Stattdessen begleiten uns nun einige jüngere Denker-Satiriker, die Ethno- und Anarcho-
Essayisten, bei denen wir etwas unentwegt Naßforsches in Kauf nehmen müssen, […]. Wider das sich 
selbst erledigende Dämliche so viel Kraft zu vergeuden, das zeugt nicht von einem starken eigenen 
Wissensbegehr. Man macht keine eleganten Fechtübungen an Vogelscheuchen’, in Strauß, B. Paare, 
Passanten (Munich: DTV, 7th Edition, 1994), p.115. 
71 vom Hofe, G. & Pfaff, P. ‘Botho Strauß und die Poetik der Endzeit’, in Radix, (ed.) Strauß lesen, pp. 37-
63. 
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Richard Schroubek’s attempts to write about his enforced segregation from the outside 
world are representative of this subjective condition. Vom Hofe and Pfaff contend of 
Schroubek’s activities that: ‘Solche verkehrte Tätigkeit ist der Grundzug der Kunst, die 
ihr Ende akzeptiert’.72 The treatment of the theme of writing, they suggest, in turn 
reflects the postmodern crisis of signification and the end of the truth-value of poetry. As 
they reason, the work lays bare: ‘die Ohnmacht der Kunst, an irgend etwas außer an sich 
selbst zu rühren’.73 This thesis argues against such implied nihilism. 
                                                
Berka’s important monograph develops the idea of the process of signification. She 
argues that ‘Strauß’ Texte registrieren freilich nicht nur lediglich, “wie ausgelöscht 
Geschichte im Bewußtsein ihrer Figuren ist”, sondern erschreiben sich zugleich das 
Wissen um die Bedingungen des Verlusts […] ’.74 Drawing on deconstructive thought, in 
particular the theories of de Man and Derrida, she argues that Strauß’ work seeks to 
address head-on the breach between signifier and signified central to the so-called crisis 
of the postmodern.75 He does this, she suggests, by means of allegory. Such allegories are 
invariably those of writing, particularly as shown in the focus of her study Der junge 
Mann. As she concludes of Leon Pracht, the main figure of that novel: ‘alles werde ihm 
zur Allegorie des Schreibens und verweise so nur auf sich selbst’.76 Through the literary 
device of allegory, which for Berka signifies the absence of the very thing to which it 
refers, she contends that Strauß seeks to re-inscribe the now marginal power of myth in 
the contemporary world while accepting its original absent meaning. She goes on to 
 
72 vom Hofe, G. & Pfaff, P. ‘Botho Strauß und die Poetik der Endzeit’, p.58. 
73 vom Hofe, G. & Pfaff, P. ‘Botho Strauß und die Poetik der Endzeit’, p.57. 
74 Berka, S. Mythos-Theorie und Allegorik bei Botho Strauß (Vienna: Passagen, 1991), p.39. 
75 See, for example, Bertens, H. The Idea of the Postmodern. A History (London: Routledge, 1995) and 
Harvey, D. The Condition of Postmodernity. An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1995). 
76 Berka, Mythos-Theorie und Allegorik, p.97. 
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argue that Strauß does this on the basis of reference to and quotation from the 
romantics.77 In this, Berka maintains, Strauß is of the postmodern yet retains a lineage to 
writers in the modern tradition: as she claims, ‘Strauß ruft die Moderne zurück, um sie als 
abwesend zu bezeichnen’.78 Berka’s thesis is the stimulus for a large number of studies 
that take the issue of myth, and the literary and inter-textual allusions of Strauß’ work as 
their central focus.79  
Such approaches, which are themselves deeply influenced by post-structuralist 
developments in literary theory, reach their logical conclusion, and height of abstraction 
in the literature, in Hárs’ dense study ‘Singularität’.80 Taking various selective theories of 
deconstruction and the postmodern as the starting point, he pushes the theoretical 
postulate of subjectivity and literary and authorial elision to its extreme. With rhetorical 
flourish, he throws off the perceived methodological constraints of previous studies 
engaged with these issues: ‘Warum, so kann man […] fragen, bleibt für viele Versuche, 
die ja aus gegebenem Anlaß über Poststrukturalismus und Dekonstruktion, discours und 
                                                 
77 A number of studies consider this specific aspect of Berka’s thesis further. See, for example, Jost, R. 
‘Botho Strauß’ “regressive Universalpoesie”. Von der Erzählung Die Widmung zum Roman Der junge 
Mann’, in Jost, R. & Hansgeorg, S. B. (eds.) Im Dialog mit der Moderne. Zur deutschen Literatur von der 
Gründerzeit bis zur Gegenwart (Frankfurt-am-Main: Athenäum, 1986), pp.481-500; Krajenbrink, M. 
‘Romantiker der elektronischen Revolution? Zur Verwendung romantischer Elemente in Botho Strauß’ Der 
junge Mann’, in Tunner, E. (ed.) Romantik – Eine Lebenskraftige Krankheit. Ihre literarischen 
Nachwirkungen in der Moderne (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1991), pp.159-185 and Sommerhage, C. ‘Odeon 
oder der verschollene Krug. Über Botho Strauß’ romantische Poetik der Erinnerung’, in Sinn und Form 43 
(1991), pp.177-196. 
78 Berka, Mythos-Theorie und Allegorik, p.207. ‘Eine ganze Serie moderner Autorien (von Baudelaire und 
Genet bis zu Thomas Mann und Proust) gehören dementsprechend in Strauß’ postmodernes Revier’, in 
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écriture handeln, die zentrale Position des Autornamens “Strauß” selbst 
unproblematisch?’.81 His thesis is concerned, as he suggests, ‘letzten Endes nicht um 
Fragen der Interpretationstheorie bzw. des Œuvre von Strauß’.82 For him the issue of a 
literary interpretation is of secondary importance to showing instead what Strauß’ works 
can suggest about the process of literary interpretation itself. Hárs works from the 
premise of the total removal of any authorial figure, whether Strauß himself or implied, in 
either individual works or across Strauß’ writing. His approach is based on a strict 
refusal, ‘nach auktorialen Vorgaben – die Ganzheitlichkeit des Œuvres mit 
eingeschlossen – zu fragen’.83 The prose works become, from this exclusively theoretical 
perspective, simply ‘text’ and are read only, ‘durch deren (manchmal heuristische) 
intertextuelle Vernetzung mit anderen – in Strauß’ Texten oder in der Forschungsliteratur 
zu Strauß nicht vorgesehenen – Texten’.84 The prose works, according to such a reading, 
in their pure literary focus, are ultimately about nothing but their own status as literary 
works. 
However, as already suggested, Strauß’ explicit rejection of theories associated with the 
postmodern and deconstruction, whether popularised or not, the programmatic character 
of his writing and the arguments he offers for the primacy of art and his own ideas of an 
Anwesenheit in the work – the focus of Chapter Two – present these studies with 
interpretative difficulties for all but Strauß’ early prose. Nevertheless, they each present 
in different ways aspects of what is here termed the charge of fatalism, both in the 
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erosion of the subject figure per se and through preoccupation with the self-conscious 
absence of an immanence to meaning, or the truth-value of the work of art. 
The interpretative challenge posed by Strauß’ later, philosophically more evocative 
essays dealing with questions on art and the poetic, rather than his earlier literary prose, 
forms the focus of the third group in the critical literature, concerned largely with 
aesthetics. Theoretically-inspired reflections and vignettes have, of course, remained a 
central feature from Strauß’ early work. For example, the section ‘Schrieb’, in Paare, 
Passanten, a series of fragments on the nature of writing and language, assumes a pivotal 
position in that work. But it is the programmatic tone of the introduction to Der junge 
Mann and, more importantly, the essay ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’ where 
he develops his idea of Anwesenheit, that bring the issue of aesthetics sharply into focus 
for a number of influential monographs. This is an important development in 
understanding his writing, even if – as this argument goes on to show – the conclusions 
reached overlook the philosophical scope of Strauß’ work. 
Bollmann sets the groundwork for such studies with his description, ‘Kaum noch etwas’, 
which for him is ‘die Grundformel’ for Strauß’ writing.85 His reading of Die Widmung, 
amongst others, straddles the two interpretative approaches considered above: those 
relating to the erosion of the subject, and those focused on literary self-reflexivity. His 
designation ‘Kaum noch etwas’, thus evokes ‘die Situation des “erschöpften Autors”’, 
which in turn ‘fungiert als Paradigma schlechthin der aktualen Lage von Subjektivität’.86 
For Bollmann, the aesthetic underlying Strauß, then, is still formally, rather than just at 
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the level of character and narrative, concerned with elision and removal. It is an idea of 
aesthetic object premised on an absence. As Bollman remarks: ‘Allgemein, ließe sich 
sagen, daß die Formel des “Kaum-noch-etwas-seins” die resignative Reaktion auf die 
Emphase einer Ontologie des Noch-nicht-seins darstellt’.87 Noting of this spirit of all-
pervading resignation he concludes, articulating directly the charge of fatalism: 
‘Fatalismus und Determinismus sind nur die Kehrseite einer Naherwartung, die ständig 
von Enttäuschung bedroht ist’.88 
Kaußen, in her monograph on Strauß’ aesthetics, suggests that in the structure of his 
works and in the emphasis of his theoretical writings Strauß deliberately courts the 
margins of critical reception, in particular to avoid adoption by any mainstream grouping, 
whether of commentators or readership. In so doing he exhibits what she terms an 
‘Ästhetik der Verweigerung’.89 In the early writing this principle of denial arises from the 
inherent, ‘Irritationsstruktur’ of each work.90 The later publications – and here Kaußen 
draws on Berka’s thesis – also come to form, though differently, ‘eine hermetische 
Poesie’, constituted by ‘der Dichte und nicht systematisierbaren Fülle von Anspielungen 
und Verweisen’.91 These allusions and references in Strauß are reflections of an aesthetic 
principle of negativity towards the levelling effects on language of contemporary culture. 
As she describes it: ‘in ihrer äußersten Radikalisierung begründet die Ästhetik der 
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Verweigerung eine Metaphysik der Sprache, in der der Literatur die Rolle des letzten 
Grundes zukommt’.92  
The sense of physical renunciation, for example in Strauß’ characters’ sense of crisis and 
intellectual resignation, in turn, in appeals for an ostensibly elitist conception of the work 
of art, remain constant in the literature, whether in relation to Strauß’ writings on society 
such as ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’, the characters in his early works or his 
theoretical observations such as ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’ or 
Beginnlosigkeit. The basis of these accusations in both these prose works is thrown into 
question in the following chapters. 
Janke’s monograph, which considers Strauß’ writing in relation to Handke’s, continues in 
this vein but begins to signpost a route within the secondary literature out of some of the 
interpretative strictures of fatalism. For her, the leitmotif to his work – as in the study by 
Berka – is its articulation of a sense of ‘Abwesenheit’. This, she suggests, is a defining 
condition of the contemporary world, reflected in Strauß at different narrative and 
philosophical levels. She echoes much of the subject-oriented criticism noted above. 
Strauß’ characters are plagued, she argues, by a sense of loss and absence in relation to 
experienced reality felt, for example, in the erosion of memory and time. Taking her 
theoretical lead from Baudrillard she highlights in Strauß’ work: ‘Was abwesend ist, ist 
das lebendige Bewußtsein des Ursprungs. Durch den Verlust der Herkunft wird alles 
gleich gegenwärtig’.93 Similarly, implying an underlying fatalism, man’s relationship to 
the object-world is levelled, resigned and neutralised. In this, she argues, ‘beschreibt 
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 27
Strauß die Abwesenheit der produktiven Kräfte. Wunsch, Idee und Erinnerung werden 
getilgt. Doch das neue Bewußtsein ist letztlich passiv’.94 Isolated figures have lost their 
identity in modern society. ‘Der einzelne, der in einer sprachlich “geordneten” Welt lebt, 
hat jeden individuellen Halt verloren. Seine Persönlichkeit ist durch die Zerstörung des 
Geheimnisses abhanden gekommen’.95 
However, and here Janke departs from the interpretative constraints of Berka’s and 
Bollman’s respective studies: while Strauß’ figures are aware of this loss, it is something 
that is then shown to be transcended. His characters do not languish in a world with no 
orientation. The sense of absence in Strauß’ characters, ‘ist ihre Wunde, die die 
Sehnsucht nach einer anderen Form des Daseins weckt. Diese Abwesenheit wird als 
“Leere” empfunden, die schmerzt’.96 Here, Janke picks up the arguments advanced by 
Strauß in ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’ and points out the possibility of her 
own delineation of ‘Anwesenheit’. Janke’s idea highlights the limitations of critics that 
argue Strauß has either abandoned the subject to itself and its own terminal dissolution or 
taken flight in postmodern irony. Rather, in her reading, there is in ‘Anwesenheit’ some 
possibility beyond the crisis of the subject or emptying of linguistic signification. She 
posits the notion of an aesthetic transcendence. From out of the everyday arises an 
experience for Strauß’ characters that lifts the constraints of time, memory and identity 
sensed as absence and loss. This, she suggests, is found by Strauß through the act of 
writing: ‘Ausgangspunkt des Schreibens ist […] für Strauß das Bewußtsein einer 
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Abwesenheit, eines Mangels an Bedeutung’.97 It is the specifically ontological nature of 
this experience that this thesis explores further. Nevertheless, the epiphany is ultimately 
still defined negatively. As she goes on to claim: ‘Doch die “Leere” wird […] in Strauß 
Werken nicht affirmativ bestätigt, sondern ist […] die “Wunde”, die durch den 
poetischen Akt geheilt werden soll’.98 Thus, having pointed towards a possible move out 
of the constraints of fatalism Janke concludes by limiting the tangible possibilities of 
liberation and salvation in art and literature. Despite rescuing Strauß from the ‘Vorwurf 
einer […] eskapistischen Grundhaltung’, his work is nonetheless, she contends, still 
caught perpetually in its ‘Spiel mit Ambivalenzen’ and so in a ‘Gefahr einer 
“postmodernen” Nivellierung’.99 
Funke takes such arguments one stage further. In an influential study on Strauß’ 
aesthetics she too begins by conceding aspects of fatalism. Literature, for Strauß, is 
premised on the elitist withdrawal of the poet, the result of which she suggests, taking the 
idea from Kaußen, ‘ist nur für eine würdige, eine elitäre Auswahl von Lesern 
geschaffen’.100 Moreover, she notes, Strauß attempts: ‘sich als Dichterpersönlichkeit in 
dieser Verborgenheit einzurichten’.101 However, her argument seeks to suspend the 
‘klassischen Polarisierungen von Aufklärung und Gegenaufklärung, von Links und 
Rechts, von Progressismus und Konservativismus, und damit auch von Moderne und 
Anti-, bzw. Postmoderne’ that the present argument maintains characterise the secondary 
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literature.102 Funke locates her ‘Versuch zur Ästhetik’, like other studies, in an 
engagement with what she sees as Strauß’ inheritance from literary and philosophical 
modernism. For her ‘das “Erbe der Moderne”, auf das Botho Strauß sich beruft ist das 
Erbe der ästhetischen Moderne’.103 
The specific theoretical touchstones of her thesis are the philosophies of Lyotard and 
Lévinas. Though the array of references upon which she draws occasionally threatens to 
overshadow the argument, Funke points her interpretation of Strauß firmly out of the 
constraints and accusations of passivity that constitute fatalism.104 As in other studies, the 
transition to the postmodern is, she suggests, reflected in his work. She writes: 
Das Ästhetische kommt von der Moderne her in das Denken, das heute, da die 
Krise der Wirklichkeit in der postmodernen Leugnung der Wirklichkeit des 
Wirklichen gipfelt, in jenem realitätsneutralen Spielraum ansässig zu werden 
sucht, den die Ästhetik der Moderne erschlossen hat.105  
Critically, though, rather than seeing Strauß’ work as mired in political epithets or 
abandoned to postmodern relativity, she posits instead the idea of an ethics to his writing. 
Such an ethics is the centre-point of the transcendent, of the ‘other’, found in literature or 
the work of art. She argues, then, that the focus of Strauß’ work, what she terms, ‘das 
Höhere in der Literatur’ is to be found in an ‘Ethik der Ästhetik’.106 In the so-called 
‘playroom’ of the postmodern, which still for Funke defines Strauß’ view of 
contemporary society, where the relationship of mankind to reality is thrown into 
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question and made epistemologically problematic, literature and mankind’s response to it 
present the prospect of refuge. As she writes: ‘das Ethische im Ästhetischen ist eine 
genuine Erfahrung, die in ebenjenem Spielraum stattfindet und die […] mit 
Wahrnehmung und Empfindung zu tun hat’.107 Strauß’ writing is thus for Funke 
emblematic of an engagement with others as subjects and with the social environment, 
rather than the renunciation of either. She concludes her thesis with a description of 
Strauß’ implicit humanism: ‘Der Literaturbegriff, den Strauß […] verteidigt, […] Ethik 
als Verpflichtung zur Humanität, die Fragen der Erkenntnis und der Existenz’.108 
However, while Funke’s argument does much to show a way out from fatalism, Strauß’ 
writing is still constrained in such readings by a pre-occupation with ideas of the sublime 
or the good, thereby reflecting the two theoretical touchstones in Lyotard and Lévinas. 
Both of these notions, which see Strauß’ writing as an aesthetics or an ethics, or 
combination thereof, fall short however of the philosophical concern of Strauß’ work and 
are called into question by the following argument and readings offered in this thesis. In 
manifesting what is in Chapter Two termed ontological concern, Strauß’ writing is not to 
be understood as alone as offering prescriptions for social action or praxis. 
1.4 Thesis prospectus 
This thesis builds on these latter studies relating to Strauß’ so-called aesthetics. It 
proposes that the prose work has deep-lying affinities with the late thought of Martin 
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Heidegger (1889-1976). The affinities between writer and philosopher are wide-reaching 
and influence considerations regarding Strauß’ treatment of questions of time, history and 
death, and defining movements in the Western tradition such as the ancients, certain 
poets (Hölderlin and Rilke) and philosophers (Nietzsche and Descartes). Although some 
of these elements are considered, the focus of this thesis is however more defined. 
Through detailed readings of Strauß’ works the thesis identifies his adoption and 
adaptation of certain ideas and terms, including the philosopher’s critique of modern 
technological and scientific practice. This involves charting the parallels, for example, in 
the writer’s and philosopher’s respective disavowal of the legacy of Cartesianism for 
modernity on the relationship between mankind and world. However, the thesis 
concentrates on developing an understanding of the philosophical status of the work of 
art or poetic work founded on what is termed ontological concern. This is the guiding 
argument for the overall thesis. It explores Strauß’ portrayal of language, its current uses 
and effects, and delineation of mankind’s current condition as ontologically homeless. 
As a counter to this condition, the argument contends, Strauß proposes certain 
characteristics of language and particular gestures by mankind that offer grounds of 
possibility for an alternative experience with language. In turn, bound to this, Strauß 
stakes a claim for the ontological truth of the poetic work: it is in and through the 
language of the work that truth is manifest. The philosophical status of the poetic is 
shown to be dynamic and indeterminate while it is experienced and manifested only ever 
as enigma. An understanding of this informs the central hypothesis of a poetics of 
dwelling in Strauß’ work. 
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The aim of the thesis is, therefore, twofold. First, the readings offer a corrective to the 
widespread misunderstanding of the prose writing that either explicitly or implicitly 
ascribes to it fatalistic tendencies, both for its tone and in its use of language, and 
seeming renunciation of the broad, post-war, liberal-democratic social and political 
consensus. Far from a retreat to a nebulous world of myth, the thesis claims Strauß offers 
the prospect of what is termed dynamic engagement with the relationship between 
mankind and world understood ontologically. This proposition is grounded in the second, 
principal intent, which claims that Strauß, through the conceit of the truth of the poetic, 
proposed here as a poetics of dwelling, offers a view of the work of art that is profoundly 
destabilising and unsettling. 
The thesis is not, however, advancing the position that Strauß is a Heideggerian. In other 
words, his prose works are not merely a transposition of philosophy into literature, where 
certain terms are excerpted and placed into fictional settings. Nor are the works simply a 
reflection of the philosopher’s distinctive idiolect. The argument, therefore, has 
implications for the status and nature of what is allowed, or rather what is accepted by 
convention, as literature and philosophy. 
Moreover, in laying a particular emphasis on the affinity to Heidegger, the thesis does not 
deny the possible influence of other thinkers, poets and writers. The present hypothesis of 
a poetics of dwelling is not an argument for exclusivity: in consideration of Strauß, 
acknowledged as one of Germany’s leading polymaths, even by his detractors, such an 
interpretative path would be as prescriptive as it is myopic. It does, though, provide 
critical context, through a detailed comparative study of a specific example, of what 
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Strauß’ self-definition as a writer and thinker of and on der Rechte denotes. A claim in 
this thesis for exclusivity would, anyway, only limit the implications of its own 
conclusion. Instead, by charting the philosophical antecedents of Strauß in Heideggerian 
thought, an interpretative framework emerges that provides not only corrective but also 
fruitful and occasionally unexpected readings of Strauß’ challenging and unsettling prose 
works. 
1.5 Heidegger in the secondary literature 
Notwithstanding the contentious critical responses to ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’ and 
their legacy for understanding Strauß, the work otherwise seen as defining is Paare, 
Passanten. As Förster notes in a retrospective evaluation of the work: ‘Mit dem 
Prosaband “Paare, Passanten”, […], avancierte Strauß zu einem äußerst kontrovers 
diskutierten deutschen Schriftsteller’.109 It is from this publication that the emergence of 
the underlying, albeit latent, disputes in relation to the charge of fatalism can be dated. 
Förster goes on to highlight the key features of Strauß’ writing and its reception: 
an die Stelle jener uneingeschränkt positiven Resonanz […] die vornehmlich 
[…] im Umkreis der ‘Neuen Subjektivität’ angesiedelt wurde, trat von nun an 
der Disput. Ans Licht der literarischen Öffentlichkeit geriet damit indessen 
nichts anderes als Strauß’ eigentliches Generalthema […] nämlich: die 
Pathogenese des aufgeklärten Zeitalters, seines Subjekts und seiner 
Vernunft.110 
This was, in part, due to the work’s form, which comprises fragments, vignettes on 
contemporary life in Germany, essayistic reflections and philosophical aphorisms ordered 
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into five distinct sections. The work thereby departs from the recognisable, established 
narrative structure of his very early fiction.111 Such an episodic or fragmentary style has, 
of course, now become one of the defining characteristics of Strauß’ writing even in his 
most recent return to works that have some, however limited, degree of recognisable 
narrative continuity and integrity. A number of critics on this basis view Paare, 
Passanten as a work pre-occupied principally with theory, whether of writing, politics or 
society and have consequently neglected the literary elements: a similar skewing of 
interpretative emphasis to the eclipsing by politics of the aesthetic following 
‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’. 
One fragment in particular has attracted attention and led to such critical weighting, 
namely Strauß’ apparent distancing from the figure of Theodor Adorno (1903-1969) and 
negative dialectics. The focus of contention, typical of Strauß’ more provocative remarks, 
is the parenthetical sentence: ‘(Ohne Dialektik denken wir auf Anhieb dümmer; aber es 
muß sein: ohne sie!).112 This seeming signal for an intellectual breach with the precepts 
of Critical Theory is attributed added significance with comments made only shortly 
before publication in a rare interview in which Strauß avows his continuing debt to the 
Frankfurt School and associated thinkers.113 The remark on dialectics remains a defining 
moment in the larger studies on Strauß. The different perspectives on the abandonment of 
Adorno are interesting both for what they show of the focus of critical reception and for 
what they fail to mention. 
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Berka, for example, suggests that Strauß maintains an intellectual debt to Adorno despite 
the tenor of his comments in Paare, Passanten. Adorno’s Ästhetische Theorie is central 
to Strauß’ Rumor, which develops a dialectical alternative to the strictures of identical 
thought and positivism. Noting of the tone of decline, of the ‘Verfallsdiagnosen’ 
permeating Rumor, she claims it is a conceit: ‘die sich dem philosophischen Konzept von 
Adornos ästhetischer Theorie verpflichtet weiß’.114 One manifestation of the non-
identical as inspired by Adorno, Berka argues, is the loss of self in Strauß’ characters 
experienced by them as loss. Moreover, it is through the non-identical, also illustrated in 
Strauß’ use of allegory and irony, that she develops her thesis about the re-instatement of 
myth in contemporary society. The influence of negative dialectics manifest in Rumor is 
not suddenly cancelled out by the single proclamation in Paare, Passanten. Further, 
Adorno’s legacy continues through to the introduction in Der junge Mann where the idea 
and experience of history for the narrator and individual characters is relayed and felt in 
its absence. Berka thus contends that Rumor and Der junge Mann reflect Adorno’s 
statement that there can be: ‘Keine Wahrheit […] ohne bestimmte Negation. Ästhetik 
heute hat diese zu exponieren. […] Ohne Beimischung des Giftstoffes, virtuell die 
Negation des Lebendigen, wäre der Einspruch der Kunst gegen die zivilisatorische 
Unterdrückung tröstlich-hilflos’.115 
Other studies also take the apparent repudiation of Adorno as the start point of their 
respective interpretations and as an early defining moment in Strauß’ writing. In a 
sympathetic reading, von Becker suggests that the theoretical reflections in Paare, 
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Passanten exhibit new relevance for those changed cultural and political conditions 
highlighted in the work compared to the post-war period, which provided the immediate 
context to and stimulus for Critical Theory. The work is, accordingly for him, ‘die 
Minima Moralia der achtziger Jahre’.116 
Jörg Drews, in contrast, suggests that Strauß retains a nominal lineage to Critical Theory 
but betrays the precepts of such thinking, caught instead in his homage to the anti-
democratic élitism of writers such as Stefan George. ‘Am verräterischsten in dem Buch 
erscheinen mir Ausrufe wie “Verfluchte Passanten-Welt!”, wo der […] Georgesche 
Gestus der Abwendung von der “feilen Menge” Urständ feiert’.117 Bauer takes a different 
perspective arguing for the putative misogyny of Paare, Passanten. She sees Strauß’ 
distancing from his intellectual roots in Critical Theory as a symptom of, ‘einem 
allgegenwärtigen Bewußtsein schmerzlicher Verluste, die – im Gegensatz zur Dialektik 
der Aufklärung – mit nostalgischem Bedauern registriert werden’.118 
In an important study, Anz anticipates some of the criticisms levelled against Strauß in 
relation to his supposed counter-enlightenment, elements of which combine in the charge 
of fatalism. He laments Strauß’ distancing from ‘die zivilisatorische Moderne bzw. gegen 
Traditionen der Aufklärung’.119 Strauß’ prose, Anz suggests, sympathetically evokes 
what he calls a tradition of aesthetic modernism, which in contrast as the preceding 
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review notes, comes particularly ‘aus dem “geistesaristokratischen” Umfeld der 
“konservativen Revolution”’.120 
It is surprising, then, in view of the attention paid to the changing relationship of Strauß’ 
writing to the Frankfurt School, that repeated references to Heidegger in Paare, 
Passanten have not received more than scant notice.121 For example, even though 
disagreements between Heidegger and representatives of the Frankfurt School – and 
Adorno in particular – are sometimes overstated, it is strange that the latter’s engagement 
with and critique of Heidegger’s style is not considered.122 The oversight is still more 
unusual given the questions raised over Strauß’ own obscurantism and since large 
sections of Paare, Passanten are concerned directly with language and writing.123 
Anz is one of a few commentators to note the presence of Heidegger in Paare, 
Passanten. He suggests that Strauß invokes Heidegger’s idea of ‘das Man’ and ‘Gerede’ 
in his ‘Gegenüberstellungen des einsamen, bedeutenden einzelnen auf der einen Seite und 
der kruden, belanglos “plappernden” Menge mit ihrem Gerede, ihrer Mittelmäßigkeit auf 
der anderen’: although he mis-represents the morally-neutral imperative of Heidegger’s 
argument.124 Similarly, emphasising Strauß’ apparent pre-occupation with the subject in 
dissolution, plagued by inauthenticity, Anz goes on to suggest a parallel with Heidegger’s 
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‘Existenzphilosophie’ and reflections on the significance of the motif of death for 
mankind.125 
One other study on Paare, Passanten notes the presence of Heidegger but the reference is 
fleeting and undeveloped: Förster summarises the subject matter of all the fragments and 
vignettes in the work as, ‘Die Generalformel […] lautet: Mangel an Kultur, Mangel an 
Moral, Mangel an Sein (Heidegger)’.126 These few citations present the sum 
consideration given to the possible influence of early Heidegger in early Strauß. 
Further references to the philosopher in the secondary literature are predominantly 
restricted to citing aspects of his philosophy derived mainly from Sein und Zeit. For 
example, Wiesberg, like Anz, refers to the notion of ‘das Gerede’ in his brief discussion 
of Strauß’ views on journalism, and the proliferation of such forms of writing and their 
influence on contemporary culture, remarking in passing: ‘Anklänge an Heideggers 
Begriff des “Geredes” sind hier unschwer zu erkennen’.127 Dunn, in turn, in a study of 
Groß und Klein, highlights such an influence too. He notes of Lotte’s mental state while 
abroad in Greece: ‘The term “Sorge” evokes the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, […] , 
and Heidegger’s distinction between language as a speaking-out […] and language as 
“Gerede” addressed to interchangeable components of the impersonal world’.128 
Such selective and brief reference to Heidegger’s presence culminates in Berka’s reading 
of the second section of Strauß’ novel, Der junge Mann, entitled ‘Der Wald’, in which 
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the figure of the ‘Bankkauffrau’ comes into contact with the ‘Seelengroßbesitzer’, 
guardian of the ‘Turm der Deutschen’.129 This grotesque figure, custodian of language 
and speech is, Berka argues, in allegorical form, the figure and thought of the 
philosopher: ‘Heideggers Lehre lebt im Donnergrollen seines Doppelgängers weiter, 
allerdings in kaum kenntlicher allegorischer Verzerrung’.130 Although she correctly notes 
the allusion to Heidegger in the monstrous figure’s declaration – ‘Ich zeite’ – Berka’s 
discussion falls short in considering the implications of the reference, and also whether 
Strauß’ citation moves beyond a concern with ideas of time to other elements of the 
philosopher’s thought. 
The contributions to what is here termed the third group in the critical literature, engaged 
with defining Strauß’ aesthetics and its sources have, however, begun to broaden the 
frame of reference to Heidegger. Funke highlights aspects of Heidegger’s philosophy 
developed after the 1930s and 1940s. For example, she documents an allusion at the end 
of Rumor to Foucault’s Les Mots et les Choses, as part of her discussion of the crisis 
afflicting the human subject and its erosion. As she remarks: ‘Die Figur des Menschen 
scheint nach kaum 200jähriger Geschichte im Begriff, wieder aus dem Feld unseres 
Denkens zu verschwinden’.131 She suggests that this allusion also echoes Heidegger’s 
Über den Humanismus: ‘Man denkt hier auch an die Philosophie Heideggers, das Ich als 
Gast im “Haus des Seins”’.132 Funke makes two further references to the eponymous 
‘house of Being’.133 It is clear though that in her emphasis on a philosophically centred 
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 40
guest, she has misconceived a core tenet of Heideggerian thought. In arguing that Strauß 
seeks to portray the subject taking up refuge in ‘the house of Being’ she seeks to counter 
those critics that present Strauß as celebrating the decline or crisis of the centered-subject. 
However, one of the main bed-rocks of the metaphysical tradition that Heidegger seeks to 
overcome – and which Strauß adopts directly – is the ego of Cartesian philosophy, 
posited as independent of its ‘being-in-the-world’ or ‘being-with’. This is considered 
further in Chapter Three below. Furthermore, as part of her argument to ground Strauß’ 
aesthetic in Lévinasian ethics, what she calls the ‘Gastlichkeit im Ästhetischen’, she 
overlooks the fundamental philosophical divergence of Lévinas’ philosophy from 
Heideggerian ontology.134 
Bellman also considers an aspect of Heidegger’s late thought. He sees in his reading of 
Strauß’ Beginnlosigkeit an irreconcilable tension between language’s capacity for 
revelation and its role in maintaining a stable relationship between mankind and the 
experience of the world at any given moment. As he reasons: ‘Insofern also Sprache der 
Möglichkeit nach Organ neuer flüchtiger Einsichten ist, bleibt sie mit der Haltung des 
Gegenwärtigens verbunden’.135 A contextualised reading of the connection to Heidegger 
in respect of the term Gegenwärtigen is also developed in Chapter Three. This is based, 
he argues, on the idea developed by Heidegger in the essay Gelassenheit. In Strauß’ 
portrayal of the relationship of language to time in Beginnlosigkeit he claims: ‘ […] geht 
es in den Reflexionen über den Zusammenhang von Sprache und Zeitsinn um das, was 
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 41
Heidegger als “Offenheit für das Geheimnis” bezeichnet’.136 This gesture of mankind’s 
being open to enigma plays a central role in the present hypothesis of a poetics of 
dwelling but not merely, as Bellman proposes, by simply reflecting the motif in Strauß’ 
work. Finally, Willer, in one of the more suggestive invocations of Heidegger, which this 
thesis develops in Chapter Four, refers to his ideas on language in relation to a search for 
a more originary experience of language in Strauß’ Rumor.137 
However, these fleeting references, though of occasional interest in consideration of 
specific aspects of Strauß’ works, remain undeveloped in their broader implications for 
the philosophical foundation and ambition of his understanding of the poetic.138 Nor are 
these references to Heidegger rooted back in the breadth of the philosopher’s thought, or 
contextualised within the development of the Western tradition. Bollmann, for example, 
makes the claim that: ‘“Die eigentlich bewegende Frage” des Dichters Strauß berührt sich 
mit derjenigen des Denkers Heidegger’ without going on to develop any comprehensive, 
substantive indication as to what this might be.139 He provides no sustained analysis of 
the possible impact Heidegger has on Strauß’ work and thinking. Furthermore, given the 
contentiousness of the question of politics in Strauß and the imputation of fatalism, 
critical association with Heidegger appears by some commentators as an attempt to damn 
Strauß by association with the controversy surrounding the philosopher in the late 1980s. 
For example, writing about reception of the language of ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’ 
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Harbers notes: ‘dazu gehört der immer wieder erwähnte Einwand, daß die Sprache des 
Essays eher ‘raunende’ Beschwörung etwa in Heideggerscher Weise sei’.140 
There is only one sustained study that considers the relationship between Strauß and 
Heidegger in the secondary literature.141 Windrich takes the influence of Adorno’s 
thought as his opening focus, in particular Strauß’ later unequivocal critique of Die 
Dialektik der Aufklärung in the programme notes to Ithaka. Schauspiel nach den 
Heimkehr-Gesängen der Odyssee. It is, he suggests, a notable development from the view 
articulated in Paare, Passanten. Strauß writes: 
Beim Wiederlesen des Odysseus-Kapitels in der Dialektik der Aufklärung 
besticht ein gedankliches parlando, […]. […] Wenn ein modernes Bewußtsein 
sich einem wesen- und zeitfernen Gegenstand derart schamlos nähert, birgt 
das die Gefahr von unfreiwilliger Komik. Doch stößt man bald auf den 
tieferen Witz des Dilemmas: die Unfähigkeit, den Buchstaben des Mythos 
stehen zu lassen; zu glauben, was des Glaubens – zu kritisieren, was der Kritik 
würdig ist.142 
Windrich argues that this deeper critique of Adorno represents a further transformation of 
Strauß’ aesthetic, which for him falls into distinct stages. These he classifies as ‘vom 
Begehren zur Verlusterfahrung, von den binären Zeitigungen bis hin zur […] Erinnerung, 
von der diesseitigen hin zur theologischen Andersheit’.143 Central to each stage are 
questions of meaning and the failure – whether in utopian thought, ideas of time or the 
notions of otherness – of what are conceived within the Western tradition as moments of 
‘Sinnstiftung’. 
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Through a reading of Strauß’ use of the terms ‘Erinnerung’ and ‘Erwartung’, indebted in 
his early works to Adorno, Windrich charts Strauß’ changing aesthetic positions showing 
how these come to touch on elements of Heidegger’s late thought, including ideas 
associated with the terms ‘das Geschick’, ‘der Riß’ and ‘die Möglichkeit’ respectively. 
The final stage of Windrich’s argument draws, like Funke, on Lévinasian ethics, though 
unlike her he acknowledges the irreconcilable philosophical differences between Lévinas 
and Heidegger, suggesting the importance of otherness in art for an understanding of 
‘jene tiefere Wahrheit’ that underlies his postulate for a Straußian aesthetic. He writes: 
‘In dieser Tendenz trifft sich Strauß sowohl mit Heidegger also auch mit Lévinas, so 
verschieden die beiden Denker ansonsten auch sein mögen’.144 Through a reading of 
Ithaka and Strauß’ prose work Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, Windrich seeks to delineate the 
status of the work of art in his aesthetics and concludes: ‘daß Strauß die Kunst und die 
Möglichkeit für wahrer als alle Wirklichkeit erachtet’.145 It is an insight into the 
relationship of poetic work to truth that this thesis develops further. 
The proximity of Strauß’ writing to Heidegger and distance from Adorno are set out by 
Windrich in summary: ‘Strauß’ philosophische und poetologische Ansätze [beruhen] – 
anders als im Poststrukturalismus oder in der Kritischen Theorie – nicht auf der Negation, 
sondern auf der Bejahung der sprachlichen Überlieferung’.146 Although at times the 
argument lacks coherence – it is unclear, for example, how Strauß’ poetic ambition aligns 
with Heidegger’s philosophical purpose – and becomes blurred in repeated 
methodological digressions in support of the posited stages to Strauß’ aesthetics, 
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Windrich’s is an important study on Strauß. Like Funke, the argument points a way out 
of the strictures of fatalism by highlighting instances in the works that count ‘als Felder 
positiver Sinnstiftung’.147 However, its focus is restricted to a fleeting review of aspects 
of the philosophy in isolation, and excludes wider reflections on the work of art, 
technology and the understanding of truth: these limitations are considered further, 
particularly in Chapter Four, in respect of certain terms, including the central role of 
Ereignis for Strauß. It is the extent of Strauß’ adoption of Heideggerian thought, echoing 
of such terms and a particular lineage of the Western philosophical tradition that the 
present thesis considers closely; most importantly, it assesses the implications for the 
philosophical status of Strauß’ work arising from adaptation of certain Heideggerian 
precepts. 
The consistency of reference to Heidegger in the secondary literature, albeit largely 
superficial, undeveloped or selective, lends force to the premise of this thesis that the 
relationship between Strauß and Heidegger warrants consideration. More intriguingly, the 
affinity between writer and thinker is also entering critical perspectives in Heidegger 
scholarship. So, for example, Young’s discussion of Heidegger’s philosophy of the 
Twenties and Thirties, in particular the controversial connection between the 
governmental-state and idea of Gemeinschaft cites Strauß for a comparable – what Young 
terms – ‘“communitarian” critique of the modern, liberal-democratic state’.148 Stumpe, in 
turn, in an important argument on the underlying logical structure to Heidegger’s 
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language, makes reference to Strauß’ use of the philosopher’s terminology in, for 
example, ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’, claiming: 
So werden die beiden Begriffe des ‘Menschen’ und der ‘Anwesenheit’ 
innerhalb eines Diskurses über die zu erinnernde Vergangenheit 
hervorgehoben, was auf die Heideggersche Provenienz hinweist, zumal auch 
der Name zweimal in diesem Text fällt.149 
These references to Strauß’ works in both English- and German-language commentaries 
on Heidegger, though circumspect, are further confirmation of this most stimulating and 
provocative of influences. 
1.6 Considerations of method 
The readings in each of the following chapters are of individual Strauß works, though 
they also draw widely on his other prose writings for supporting evidence. Each takes its 
methodological inspiration from Heidegger’s transformative hermeneutic, where close 
attention is given to certain individual terms and phrases upon which larger claims are 
overlaid. Strauß himself echoes such an approach. For example, in ‘Der Aufstand gegen 
die sekundäre Welt’ Strauß invokes the immanent presence of the poetic work, its 
Anwesenheit and the parallel constraints under which works of art are conventionally 
interpreted: 
Die Kunstwerke sind da. […] Verborgen, verhindert, verlegen ist allein der 
Empfänger, der Beschenkte, der Angesprochene. Er hat sich aus der Ver-
antwortung gestohlen und in ein methodisches Drumherumreden 
150geflüchtet.   
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Instead, as an alternative, Strauß opens up the idea of a site of refuge within the work – 
‘im Kunstwerk Asyl genießen’ – and, critically, of being attendant to, waiting upon its 
suggestive force so that it can again be experienced, as he describes it, as ‘unenthüllt’.151 
This echoes the sense of Heidegger’s encounter with certain poets, in what he terms 
Warten. Heidegger writes: ‘Warten heißt […]: Ausschau halten und zwar innerhalb des 
schon Gedachten nach dem Ungedachten, das sich im schon Gedachten noch verbirgt’.152 
The significance of these gestures in respect of the work of art and their characteristics is 
examined throughout the thesis and their implications evaluated in the concluding 
chapter. 
The approach taken does not imply, though, that what follows imitates Heidegger’s 
distinctive philosophical heuristic. This would lead inevitably at best only to poor 
pastiche. There are two approaches taken here to the readings. The first places Strauß’ 
direct quotation of Heidegger within a context that shows the significance of such citation 
at important positions or moments in his writing. Thereafter, the principal approach 
examines critically the many implicit allusions to and adoptions of the philosopher’s 
thought made by Strauß. These allusions take the form of certain terms and ideas pivotal 
in his overall writing, or to the specific work under consideration. Thus, for example, in 
Chapter Two, Strauß’ views on the nature of the work of art in delineation of 
Anwesenheit and the emphasis on Logos are shown to be close to ideas Heidegger 
advances in relation to these terms. Others are more tangential, including, for example, 
the designations indebted to Heidegger for the conceit of a site for experience of the 
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poetic work, noted above, and denoted by Wohnen, Zwischen and Dimension. The 
affinity of their respective invocations in Heidegger and by Strauß forms part of the 
exegesis. 
The intention of these readings is first to provide supporting evidence for the premise that 
the prose writer and essayist Strauß shares affinities with the thought and ontology of 
Heidegger. Secondly, on the basis of these affinities, the aim is then to deepen 
interpretative understanding of Strauß: to get, not to a single definable meaning for his 
writing, but rather, closer to an understanding of the ‘rational nicht erschließbaren Sinn’ 
that he claims for the work of art.153 This is done by following the development of certain 
ideas to bring cumulatively into consideration certain philosophical questions at stake in 
Strauß’ work. It is an approach, therefore, of detailed exegesis and cumulative iteration. 
Such a circumspect way forward, given the writer under consideration, and the influence 
of Heidegger, seems not only inevitable but also methodologically desirable. 
The early section of this chapter raises the question of Strauß’ obscurantism, an 
accusation, of course, also infamously levelled at Heidegger by Adorno.154 The 
delineation of Heidegger’s thinking in this thesis and Strauß’ adaptation thereof, 
therefore, requires two main caveats. 
The first relates to the breadth and reach of Heidegger’s thought. It is practically 
impossible and intellectually less than desirable to provide succinct expositions of 
Heidegger’s individual ideas let alone evaluate the importance of certain phrases and 
words to his overall thought and philosophy. Each term and its articulation are inflections 
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of others; of supplementary arguments and suggestions. His writings are, as one critic 
notes, ‘connected fugally’.155 The metaphor rightly conjures up the idea that taking 
individual movements in his thought unbalances the integrity and harmony of the whole. 
Nevertheless, the readings here of necessity concentrate on individual paths taken by his 
thought, while where possible alluding to related concerns.156 Leaving elements of 
Heidegger untouched does not, though, undermine the dual intention of the thesis in 
relation to Strauß’ works, and importantly goes beyond the restricted consideration of 
Heidegger’s presence in the majority of existing secondary literature. 
The second caveat concerns Heidegger’s philosophical style. It is difficult to discuss his 
thought, or develop readings from individual monographs and essays, without having 
recourse also to his terms and language. Not to do so would inevitably risk the possibility 
of distortion.157 This has consequences for the tone of the present thesis, which are here 
acknowledged and must be accepted at the outset. That this thesis is written in English, a 
language inherently resistant to articulating the etymological force and compacted 
revelation of the Heideggerian original, and therefore by implication the claims made of 
Strauß, is only a further justification for the exegetical approach to readings taken and the 
language in which this is advanced.158 Moreover, as the endnote to the thesis proposes, 
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such language is unavoidable if there is to be an understanding appropriate to the 
philosophical force of Strauß’ proposal for the Undeutlichkeit of the poetic work.159 
Moreover, in referring specifically to Heidegger’s late thought in the title the thesis 
acknowledges the substantial and contentious debate surrounding different classifications 
of his philosophy.160 The question of periodization, though, seems secondary to whether 
the various elements comprising his thought are reconcilable. It is hoped that treatment of 
those terms arising during the readings of Strauß makes it clear that this thesis assumes 
an underlying continuity to Heidegger’s thought manifested, for example, in the 
persistence of engagement with ideas of Logos, language and, most importantly, άλήθεια 
(alētheia), which explains why each exegesis returns to similar intellectual and linguistic 
terrain. In making judgements on Heidegger the present thesis draws particularly on the 
two seminal monographs on the late philosophy: those by Bruns on the relationship to 
poetry and White on language.161 This is not, however, to overlook the changes in tone 
through which his thought moves. Notably, it is Heidegger’s own inflection of the central 
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concern of this thought – die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein – that is influential for the 
main hypothesis of a poetics of dwelling in Strauß. In Vier Seminare he describes three 
inter-related emphases that he designates respectively as, ‘Frage nach dem Sinn von 
Sein’; ‘Frage nach der Wahrheit des Seins’ and, lastly, ‘Frage nach dem Ort oder der 
Ortschaft des Seins’.162 It is this idea of a ‘Topologie des Seins’ of the truth of Sein that is 
particularly influential for Strauß’ prose and his invocation of certain terms noted above. 
Similarly, the thesis is not blind to the continuing controversies concerning the extent of 
Heidegger’s personal involvement with the National Socialist regime and the 
implications both for the biography of the man and the thought of the philosopher.163 
These questions, although they lie outside the immediate focus of this thesis, are in part 
implicitly addressed in the projected defence undertaken here against the accusations of 
Strauß’ implied fatalism. This implies that a distinction is intellectually sustainable 
between Heidegger’s thought, which is not finally philosophically bound to Nazism and 
its legacy for Western and German thought, and the undoubted personal shortcomings of 
the individual. 
As indicated, it is impossible to do full justice to the scope of Heidegger’s thought in the 
context of such a thesis, which inevitably requires that selection be made from essays and 
works. There is no Heidegger text with a single, systematic exposition of his ontology. 
Rather, in his writings, thought is continually in movement: a suggested motto for his 
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collected works being ‘ways not works’. As a result, the thesis draws for its touchstones 
primarily on the collection of essays, Vorträge und Aufsätze, though it also considers 
other works, including Sein und Zeit, the collection of essays in Unterwegs zur Sprache, 
Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes and, critically for the argument, Beiträge zur Philosophie 
(Vom Ereignis), which each inflect terms of the late thought vital for the thesis. The 
individual essays in Vorträge und Aufsätze relate, in turn, to technology, language, poetry 
and the poets. As Heidegger himself suggests in the preface, as a collection of essays it 
opens perspectives that the individual lectures alone do not provide.164 
With regard to Strauß, the thesis focuses almost exclusively on his prose writing, in 
particular works that have received less critical attention than others, including recent 
publications. The argument does not, however, disagree specifically with any one 
contribution to the secondary literature, although the readings draw attention to 
limitations in current perspectives. Anyway, what follows is not conceived as a polemic 
against any of the three groups of secondary literature identified above. The final 
intention is only to revise the underlying perspective – in the view of this thesis based on 
an oversight regarding the philosophical claims of his writing and a misunderstanding of 
its implications – occasioned partly by Strauß’ essays, as indicated in respect of 
‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’, and by less well-disposed critics, around the charge of 
fatalism. 
The individual works under consideration in the following chapters include, in order of 
exegesis ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’; Beginnlosigkeit. Reflexionen über 
                                                 
164 Heidegger writes: ‘Für den Leser könnte es zu einer Sammlung werden, […]. Der Leser sähe sich auf 
einen Weg gebracht, den ein Autor vorausgegangen ist, der im Glücksfall […] ein Gedeihenlassen auslöst’, 
in Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze, p.7. 
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Fleck und Linie; Wohnen Dämmern Lügen and lastly Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit but 
the argument also draws on other works, from the early Die Widmung, through the 
longest, Der junge Mann to the most recent Der Untenstehende auf Zehenspitzen. Each 
chapter, though, concentrates on developing a coherent reading of a single prose work. 
The underlying assumption is of an integrity to each individual work, which moves 
against a tendency in the secondary literature to excerpt selectively in relation to a 
specific argument or idea. This often exacerbates the perception of Strauß’ work as 
fragmented and lacking unity.165 The intention is to argue for just such a unity in each 
work. Furthermore, the selection implies that there is also overall continuity to Strauß, in 
particular through his engagement with Heideggerian philosophy, in contrast to some 
interpretations, which argue for either radical ruptures or discrete periods.166 
Finally, the thesis draws on Strauß’ essays. These have risen steadily in number since the 
1980s and have, as the discussion of ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’ shows, an important 
– if, at times, undue – influence on the tenor of discussion surrounding Strauß. The essays 
act as reference points in the thesis and place the author and interpolation of his views at 
the centre of the argument. The question of Strauß the author features prominently in the 
secondary literature, beyond discussions of his putative relationship to the postmodern, 
particularly since the programmatic and suggestive introduction to Der junge Mann. But 
while studies that elide the figure of Strauß or conjecture on the endless self-referentiality 
of his works undoubtedly find textual support and have interpretative legitimacy, the 
                                                 
165 To see the consequences of such an approach see Funke, Über das Höhere in der Literatur, pp.204 and 
216. 
166 See, for example, Oberender, T. ‘Die Wiedererrichtung des Himmels. Die “Wende” in den Texten von 
Botho Strauß’, in Arnold, H. L. (ed.) TEXT+KRITIK 81 Botho Strauß: Neufassung (Munich: text + kritik, 
1998), pp.76-99. 
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assumption of this thesis, though critically unfashionable, is one grounded in interpretive 
common sense, suggesting that in the essays Strauß shows the primacy of certain ideas 
and that these flow through to the longer prose works. In this way, the thesis seeks to 
avoid the approach to the work of art lambasted in one such essay where he writes of 
much contemporary theory: 
Diese Poetik hat den esoterischen Poetisten hervorgebracht, dessen familiäres 
Mitreden am Werk den Poeten von seiner Poesie trennt und in minutiösen 
Schnitten Zeit, Ort, Sinn, Autorschaft vom Werk abspaltet, um es zu einer 
autonomen Textualität zu verarbeiten. Die Metapher vom Parasiten ist 
altgedient, und sie wiegt mehr als ein umwelt-, ein ‘logos-bewußter’ Protest 
gegen die Übermacht der sekundären, medialen, indirekten Sprechweisen, die 
die atmende Sprache ebenso erstickend bedecken wie die Flächenversiegelung 
den fruchtbaren Boden.167 
In trying to delineate a poetics of dwelling and answer the charge of fatalism, this seems 
an indispensable pre-requisite if, as a piece of secondary writing par excellence, this 
thesis is to do any justice to the originating force of the primary works. 
1.7 Thesis overview 
Having established a background to the thesis in respect of the general tendencies in 
reception of Strauß and the latent intent, to cast doubt on the efficacy of accusations 
making up the charge of fatalism, this introduction moots its principal ambition, namely 
to propose an understanding of Strauß’ philosophical claims for the truth of the poetic 
work. In anticipation of this, Chapter Two goes on to develop further the underlying 
premise of the affinity with Heidegger through a close reading of Strauß’ essay ‘Der 
Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’. The reading suggests that in taking on George 
                                                 
167 Strauß, ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundären Welt’, p.312. 
 54
Steiner’s thesis of an ‘Ästhetik der Anwesenheit’ Strauß raises certain ontological 
concerns over the relationship between language and world shared with the philosopher. 
The reading concentrates on understanding of the terms Anwesenheit and Logos in Strauß 
and Heidegger respectively. The chapter concludes by considering briefly the structural 
similarities between Strauß’ arguments and Heidegger’s on the consequences for 
mankind of what Strauß terms the ‘secondary’ world of late modernity. 
Chapter Three, in turn, considers one pervasive feature of this condition of late modernity 
in greater detail, namely technology, with a reading of Beginnlosigkeit. Reflexionen über 
Fleck und Linie, and posits that Strauß’ view of a fundamental distortion to mankind’s 
dominant experience of the everyday object-world in the application and use of scientific 
and technological methods has its antecedent in Heidegger. It suggests that the secondary 
literature misconceives the nature of Strauß’ engagement with technology and its 
particular philosophical basis. The chapter highlights parallels with Heidegger’s 
exposition of the ancient Greek τέχνη and Ge-stell, the world-enframing characteristic of 
metaphysical thought presented in modern technology to show how Strauß agrees with 
the philosopher’s critique of the danger that is posed to mankind. The reading concludes 
by highlighting certain terms in the work, including Fleck, Zwischen and Wohnen, 
through which characteristics are proposed by which an alternative engagement or 
experience with an ontological understanding of world becomes possible. 
Counter to the world-distorting and dominating background of technology, Chapter Four 
re-visits the issue of language, its uses and abuses, and central for Strauß to the secondary 
condition of late modernity, which are aligned with precepts of science and technology. 
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The argument highlights the effects on mankind of a degraded, now lost, experience of 
what is termed originary language. It introduces the idea that mankind is ontologically 
homeless. Again the intellectual antecedents to Strauß’ prose are shown to reside in 
Heidegger’s thought, in particular the underlying concerns of his essay ‘Bauen Wohnen 
Denken’ and Strauß’ complex reinscription of these ideas in the work Wohnen Dämmern 
Lügen where he develops what is characterised as grounds of possibility for a retrieval of 
such originary language. 
In response to the portrayal of mankind’s current homelessness in language Strauß offers 
the ontological conceit of the poetic work. Chapter Five is the nexus of the thesis. The 
close reading of Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit considers the significance of the poets 
based on the example of Robinson Jeffers (1887-1962). In a dense series of allusions to 
Heidegger, in particular the philosopher’s delineation of άλήθεια, the argument contends 
that Strauß conceives of the truth of the poetic and the work as Undeutlichkeit. The 
chapter concludes by setting out the hypothesis of the thesis, a poetics of dwelling, and 
the alternative offered thereby for mankind of a dynamic engagement with the world, in 
contrast to that circumscribed by the secondary language of science and technology. 
Rather than withdrawing and resigning, the poet and the work are shown as the site of 
active ontological concern for the world and so contrast with those accusations that 
underlie the charge of fatalism. 
The thesis concludes by briefly noting the implications of the argument, particularly for 
an understanding of the philosophical status of Strauß’ prose writing. 
CHAPTER TWO 
FROM AESTHETIC PRESENTATION TO ONTOLOGICAL CONCERN: 
‘BEMERKUNGEN ZU EINER ÄSTHETIK DER ANWESENHEIT’ 
2.1 Von realer Gegenwart 
Strauß’ reflections on the status and nature of the work and art are one of the enduring 
features of his writing and lead variously to consternation and adulation. His essay ‘Der 
Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’, published as a postscript to George Steiner’s Von 
realer Gegenwart presents an exclusive engagement with such considerations and is 
distinctive amongst his writing.1 It is widely viewed by commentators as a key text. 
Oberender, for example, sees it as a transition point, part of what he calls ‘ein reinigender 
Prozeß’ for development of ‘diese Straußsche Gegenaufklärung’.2 Bellmann, in contrast, 
interprets the essay principally as representative of an underlying ‘ästhetische Kategorie’ 
defining for all his subsequent writing.3 According to him Strauß experiments in the 
essay with experiences of time from which a new form of poetic expression is to be 
found. Bellmann reasons that in this, ‘[…] scheint Strauß die genuine Chance und 
Aufgabe literarischen Sprechens zu sehen. […] um die Sondierung und Ermöglichung 
neuer fiktiver Zeiterfahrungen’.4 
                                                 
1 Strauß, B. ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt. Bemerkungen zu einer Ästhetik der Anwesenheit’, in 
Steiner, G. Von realer Gegenwart. Hat unser Sprechen Inhalt? (Munich: Hanser, 1990). Steiner’s book was 
originally published in English as Real Presences: Is there anything in what we say? (Faber and Faber: 
London, 1989). This thesis refers to the German edition. 
2 Oberender, ‘Die “Wende” in den Texten von Botho Strauß’, pp.79 and 76. 
3 Bellmann, ‘Poetologie und Zeit-Kritik in Botho Strauß’, p.45. 
4 Bellmann, ‘Poetologie und Zeit-Kritik in Botho Strauß’, p.45. A parallel in this new experience of time, 
Bellman argues, is derived from Paul Ricœur and the particular emphasis he places on literature’s role in 
transforming the dominant ‘Zeitbewußtsein’. 
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Aside from the different arguments and ideas that Strauß puts forward in the essay, what 
distinguishes it amongst his writing is its explicit engagement with both an individual 
author and the arguments of a specific work. Although other Strauß essays are, for 
example, concerned with figures such as Robinson Jeffers or Ernst Jünger they do not 
consider individual works by these writers, or present the same detailed discussion and 
augmentation of their ideas and viewpoints.5 Even the introduction to Rudolf Bochardt’s 
Das Gespräch über Formen und Platons Lysis Deutsch, does not engage specifically with 
the arguments of the work alongside which it is released.6 More importantly, ‘Der 
Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’ is the one Strauß essay in which he explicitly 
reflects upon and gives expression to the development of a set of views denoted as 
Ästhetik. 
It is significant, however, in contrast to most commentators’ suggestions, that Strauß does 
not at any stage designate his own essay as a tract on aesthetics. The subtitle to the work 
suggests – as is so often the case with Strauß’ essays and works – the intention of 
philosophical revision. Strauß’ parenthetic ‘Bemerkungen zu einer Ästhetik der 
Anwesenheit’ of the title relates to Steiner’s thesis on aesthetics, not a declaration of his 
own. These reflections, then, serve as commentary on and also evoke the idea that 
Steiner’s postulate of an aesthetics of real presences is the subject of a re-evaluation in 
the essay. 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Strauß, B. ‘Jeffers-Akt’, in Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit and Strauß, ‘Refrain einer 
tieferen Aufklärung’. 
6 Strauß, B. ‘Die Distanz ertragen’, in Borchardt, R. Das Gespräch über Formen und Platons Lysis Deutsch 
(Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1987). 
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Strauß’ initial alignment with some of the arguments developed by Steiner in Von realer 
Gegenwart is suggested in a number of ways. He begins his essay by placing the 
argument on real presences against the background of the collapse of the Eastern Bloc. 
Steiner’s book, he suggests, sets out powerful arguments with a force analogous to the 
massive social and political transformations affecting continental Europe in the late 
Eighties. As the Wallace Stevens epigram with which Strauß prefaces his essay directly 
indicates, these represent a caesura in Western European and German history.7 The 
collapse of communism, and specifically German re-unification, signals a deep 
transformation in the established social and political order. Moreover, Strauß suggests, 
these changes are a good comparison for the impact that ought to attend Steiner’s thesis. 
The work has the force of Emergenz, a term Strauß adopts from the natural sciences – 
and which he elsewhere brings into close association with a possible alternative way of 
approaching the world or Wahrnehmung in Beginnlosigkeit – but which here denotes the 
unexpected force of an original thesis. In its attempt to articulate the unmediated power 
of meaning in the aesthetic, what Strauß goes on to describe as the ‘Erfahrung des 
Unmittelbaren’, Steiner’s Von realer Gegenwart is a ‘Schneisenschlag’ against the 
established intellectual and aesthetic order.8 
For Strauß, the argument of Von realer Gegenwart has a dramatic tenor that signals a 
breach with an implied status quo. The title of Strauß’ essay, in turn, also suggests an 
analogy to the revolutionary fervour of 1989: the ideas of real presences are an 
‘Aufstand’ and are directly linked with a counter movement to what the essay argues are 
                                                 
7 ‘The prologues are over. It is a question, now/ Of final belief’, in Wallace Stevens’ Asides on the Oboe. 
Oberender interprets the Stevens epigram to suggest that Strauß’ ‘bisheriges Denken als ein langer und 
vielgestaltiger Prolog erscheint’, in Oberender, ‘Die “Wende” in den Texten von Botho Strauß’, pp.76-77. 
8 Strauß, ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’, pp.317 and 313 respectively. 
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the dominating conventions of the ‘secondary’ world. It is not, though, equivalent to a 
manifesto.9 Strauß writes of Steiner’s daring in challenging prevailing orthodoxies and 
traditions in contemporary aesthetics: ‘Ein Wagnis, ja, jetzt noch, ist diese Schrift, da der 
Autor fast allem, was auf dem Gebiet der ästhetischen Theorie gegenwärtig tonangebend 
ist, den Rücken kehrt’.10  
A further indicator of Strauß’ particular, partial alignment with Steiner’s thesis comes 
from his positing of a group of writers who he suggests share a collective creative 
endeavour, as he labels them ‘Bekennern und praktizierenden Gläubigen’, of real 
presences.11 And although, as this thesis suggests, Strauß develops his own more 
profound resonances for real presences from Steiner’s principal focus on aesthetics, for 
the moment it is noteworthy that he defines Steiner’s argument in reference to a shared 
idea. 
Strauß begins his understanding of real presences with the challenge posed by Steiner at 
the conclusion to the second part of his book, ‘Der gebrochene Vertrag’.12 Before 
considering what this broken contract denotes and suggesting how Strauß inflects and 
develops Steiner’s arguments, however, it is worthwhile first to set out the central thesis 
of real presences. The contract Steiner invokes, and around which his argument pivots, is 
that of a correspondence relationship between language and the world. For him, the 
guarantor of the word – of language – is the world and vice versa, with the world 
understood here as the totality of everyday objects as they are experienced by mankind. 
                                                 
9 Oberender claims that what is new about the essay is its ‘Manifest-Charakter’, in Oberender, ‘Die 
“Wende” in den Texten von Botho Strauß’, p.77. 
10 Strauß, ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’, p.307. 
11 Strauß, ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’, p.310. 
12 Steiner, Von realer Gegenwart, pp.75-179.  
 60
A further digression on the respective understanding of this central notion of world is also 
instructive for the forthcoming argument, not least for the present consideration of 
Strauß, his specific interpretation of real presences and departure from Steiner’s thesis. 
Strauß’ view has its basis in the differentiation made by Heidegger in Sein und Zeit. 
There Heidegger establishes an understanding of world in a number of senses, of which 
three are germane to the present case. First, the world is conceived as the general sum of 
everyday graspable objects; second, the term denotes such objects as they are found in a 
particular situation or context; lastly, understood ontologically, world refers to the 
conditions or grounds that bring about or make possible the appearance of the world in 
the first two senses.13 Thus, throughout this thesis a distinction is made between the 
empirical or ontic object-world and the ontological understanding of world. The present 
argument contends that Steiner’s understanding of world is an amalgam of the first two. 
Strauß, in contrast, shifts the argument onto language and the literary work’s capacity and 
mankind’s engagement with it, to bring about, or make manifest, the third sense of world. 
This forms the ontological concern for his proposal of the poetic. This delineation is 
developed in more detail over the course of the present reading. 
To return to Steiner’s central premise: in the terms of Von realer Gegenwart word and 
world bring about and instantiate the real. This, Steiner argues, is the ultimate 
metaphysical sanction of meaning; that there is sense in language and our use thereof 
rather than non-sense. This belief – and for him it is finally a matter of faith – is a deeply 
intuited, long-held conviction in the Western tradition running back to Plato. As he 
                                                 
13 See Heidegger, M. Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 17th Edition, 1993), pp.64-65. 
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argues of the direct relationship between experience of world and its expression in 
language: 
Der Vertrag zwischen Wort und Gegenstand, die Voraussetzung, daß das Sein 
in seinem praktikablen Maße ‘sagbar’ ist und daß das Rohmaterial der 
Existenzialität sein Analogon in der Struktur von Erzählung hat – wir erzählen 
Leben, wir erzählen es uns selbst –, hat immer wieder Ausdruck gefunden.14 
The power of language to have meaning lies in its immediate relationship to the things 
making up the object-world around us, a contract – or, to use his term, a covenant – that 
remains immune to different versions of scepticism until its rupture in the middle of the 
nineteenth century. As Steiner puts it: 
Traditioneller Skeptizismus, die poetische Herausforderung an die 
‘Sagbarkeit’ der Welt sind selber Sprachakte und verbale Konstrukte. Sie 
nehmen den Zugang zu Nachvollziehbarkeit, zu (narrativer) Kohärenz, zu den 
Mitteln der Überredung, der lexikalischen, grammatischen und semantischen 
Werkzeuge, durch die sie ihre Zweifel und Negationen vermitteln wollen, voll 
in Anspruch.15 
Until this major fissure, mankind’s understanding continues to remain ‘in trust’ to 
language’s capacity to denote the world. 
Although Steiner does not locate the origin of this relationship of trust he places the term 
Logos at the heart of the metaphysical correspondence between word and world. For him, 
the term represents the breadth of language’s capacity to denote, to mean and the possible 
resonances thereof: 
In jedem anderen Bereich ist die Phänomenologie des Sagens seit […] den 
Vorsokratikern die einer unerläßlichchen Beziehung zur Gegenwart […] des 
Seins und der Welt gewesen. Es war diese Unerläßlichkeit, die sich ganz 
                                                 
14 Steiner, Von realer Gegenwart, p.124. Despite the Heideggerian tone of the argument, this thesis argues 
that Steiner is still bound to a realist, platonic account of the relationship between language and world. 
15 Steiner, Von realer Gegenwart, p.127. 
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zentral im Begriff und in der metaphorischen Reichweite des logos dargestellt 
hat.16 
The principal stimulus for Steiner’s argument of real presences comes from a break in 
the hypothesised, metaphysically sanctioned, contract. Steiner asserts that the fissure 
corresponds to the advent of modernity. The fundamental defining feature of this 
modernity is, he suggests, the split of word from world; objects and how they are 
represented in language. The guarantee of trust provided by the contract, Steiner 
suggests, is now absent and erased. In Western thought, this comes to form the period of 
what he calls ‘epilogue’, the after-word, or after-logos, which now characterises 
contemporary culture, philosophy and art. Strauß also adopts this conceit directly in the 
title of his essay designating the contemporary period as ‘die sekundäre Welt’. 
The challenge of modernity, for which Steiner seeks to delineate an answer, is how, in 
light of the broken contract, there can still be meaning in what is said and written. If 
words no longer guarantee the existence of world in the ontic sense, no longer correspond 
to things, on what basis, Steiner asks, is meaning – which clearly retains an ongoing 
epistemological legitimacy as a conception underpinning philosophical reason, in spite of 
the continuing best efforts of sceptics – expressed in language? 
Steiner begins his response from the assumption of the pre-eminence of primary forms of 
expression: of works of art. Notwithstanding the breakdown between the word and that 
which it represents, Steiner develops his thesis by considering different aesthetic forms, 
on the basis of a continuing conviction in meaning. Despite the relativity of meaning in 
theories of the postmodern, or the celebration of its absence amongst deconstructionists, 
                                                 
16 Steiner, Von realer Gegenwart, p.122. Emphasis in original. 
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both theoretical postulates for Steiner of the age of epi-logue, works of art retain a 
limitless potential to mean. Something that corresponds to meaning is present in works of 
art. The sense of something other – whether of an insight glimpsed or a feeling intuited –
is given form in a painting, sculpture or piece of music, an unknown lying outside 
normalised comprehension. It is, claims Steiner, the experience of the aesthetic. Much of 
Von realer Gegenwart is pre-occupied with returning this elusive sense of meaning to the 
realms of intelligibility, communicating it by the thesis of real presences. 
In support of Steiner, Strauß evokes a suggestive image: real presences is the work of 
art’s ‘theophane Herrlichkeit’ and in its experience, mankind resides within its 
‘transzendentalen Nachbarschaft’.17 The choice of a term that evokes place or a site, in 
conjunction with real presences, is significant in bringing the work of art into association 
with an idea of dwelling. 
For Steiner, though, in the manifold of real presences, lies the foundation of what it 
means to mean. What Steiner aims for in posing the question of meaning is a re-discovery 
of the sense of awe and astonishment in works of art. As he puts it, the amazement at 
original creation, of the existence of real presences, must be sensed anew: 
Meine Parabel soll eine fundamentale Frage auf den Punkt bringen: die Frage 
der Gegenwart (oder Abwesenheit) von poiesis in unserem individuellen 
Leben und in der Politik unseres Gesellschaftswesens, also der Gegenwart des 
Schöpfungsaktes und der Erfahrung des Schöpfungsaktes in seiner vollen 
Bedeutung. Welches ist der ontologische Status (kein anderes Epitheton wäre 
treffend), der ‘Seinsstatus’ und der ‘Bedeutungsstatus’ der bildenden Künste, 
der Musik, des Gedichtes […]? Diese Frage kann und muß in erster Instanz in 
Begriffen der Ästhetik […] gestellt werden.18 
                                                 
17 Strauß, ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’, p.307. 
18 Steiner, Von realer Gegenwart, pp.39-40. Emphasis in original. Steiner’s comparison with a deistic 
notion of a first creation, namely mankind’s impetus to create, or re-create the actions of God is pointedly 
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Amongst all aesthetic forms, Steiner argues, it is the status of the linguistic that has 
particular significance. There is something in language that constitutes, or is suggestive 
of, real presences. It is, he maintains, the specific, ‘“Ins-Dasein-Kommen” des 
Ästhetischen’.19 As Steiner urges in support of his argument, the poem or novel is the 
something, the sense of meaning given or made form: ‘das sind abstrakte 
Verbalisierungen dessen, wie energie- und bedeutungsgeladene Form aus dem Inneren 
zum ersten Mal ins Sein tritt’.20 The language is unmistakeably Heideggerian, even if 
Steiner is not philosophically consistent and finally seeks recourse for his explanation in 
theology. 
However, critically, language struggles to convey the encounter in the work of art with 
real presences. The question of how meaning means always remains somewhere beyond 
comprehension. Nevertheless the question persists for mankind: how, Steiner asks, can 
meaning, as real presences, mean? It is with this particular philosophical challenge that 
Steiner concludes the section on the ‘Broken Contract’ and with which Strauß begins his 
own ‘Bemerkungen zu einer Ästhetik der Anwesenheit’. Strauß himself quotes the 
challenge to the second part of Von realer Gegenwart in full: 
Was würde geschehen, wenn wir unsere Schulden gegenüber […] der 
Metaphysik […] bezahlen müßten? Was wäre, wenn die dem Glauben 
entnommenen Anleihen an Transzendenz, die wir seit Platon und Augustinus 
hinsichtlich bedeutungserfüllter Formen erhalten haben, fällig würden? Was 
wäre, wenn wir die Annahme explizit machten und konkretisierien müßten, 
daß alle ernstzunehmende Kunst und Literatur, und nicht nur die Musik, auf 
die Nietzsche diesen Begriff anwendet, ein opus metaphysicum ist?21 
                                                                                                                                                 
rejected by Strauß elsewhere in his writing. The significance of this for his proposal of the poetic is 
considered in the concluding Chapter Five. 
19 Steiner, Von realer Gegenwart, p.205. 
20 Steiner, Von realer Gegenwart, p.281. 
21 Steiner, in Strauß, ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’, p.306. Emphasis in original. 
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For Steiner the question remains unanswerable without recourse to a transcendental 
underwriting for real presences. Ultimately, as he inexorably concedes: ‘Die Bedeutung 
von Bedeutung ist ein transzendentales Postulat’.22 That meaning has meaning is a claim 
necessarily of belief or faith, not one that can be shown philosophically: 
Ohne eine solche Voraussetzung hinsichtlich der erlebten Kontinuitäten 
zwischen dem Schaffen von Dichtung und Kunst auf der einen Seite und dem 
Residuum oder einer neuen Umsetzung der voraufgegangenen Daseins-
schöpfung auf der anderen kann es, so behaupte ich, keine nachvollziehbare 
Auffassung von unserer inneren Erfahrung des Ästhetischen und unserer 
freien verantwortlichen Erwiderung auf diese Erfahrung geben.23 
Steiner contends that the central postulate of his thesis ultimately rests, ‘auf der Annahme 
einer Gegenwart Gottes’, the theological implications of which are considered below.24 
Strauß, though, while accepting the challenge of the hypothetical broken contract, 
significantly broadens its designation beyond the purely theological. For him the 
persistence of meaning too evokes a presence, though not solely of the Deity, but rather, 
as he terms it, of ‘Logos-Gottes’.25 Moreover, as Strauß summarises Steiner’s argument, 
he inscribes a further notable revision to Steiner’s language. Describing that sense of 
meaning that elides rational proof or empirical validation, he writes: ‘Das Unbeweisbare 
in der Krone jenes Erkenntnisbaums, der durch den Roman, die Skulptur, die Fuge 
emporwächst, ist Zeugnis Seiner Anwesenheit’.26 Thus, Steiner’s deity is aligned by 
Strauß with Logos; and the ‘Gegenwart’ of the former’s object-world becomes for the 
latter a question of Anwesenheit. 
                                                 
22 Steiner, Von realer Gegenwart, p.282. 
23 Steiner, Von realer Gegenwart, p.278. 
24 Steiner, Von realer Gegenwart, p.13. 
25 Strauß, ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’, p.307. My emphasis. 
26 Strauß, ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’, p.307. My emphasis. 
 66
The creative force of the real presences thesis, for Strauß, revolves around these two 
terms: Logos and Anwesenheit. Central to both Steiner’s and Strauß’ respective overall 
arguments are questions of meaning, of how world is created in and through language – 
in other words, of understanding – and how this is made manifest by the work of art, in 
particular the poetic. For Strauß, such philosophical questions are the inevitable 
consequence of a condition in modernity. However, while the majority of critics read the 
postulate of Logos as one finally and only of transcendental theological belief, this thesis 
contends that, for Strauß, through the revisions of ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre 
Welt’, it becomes, in contrast, one of ontological concern. The breakdown of the contract 
between word and world posed by Steiner, of the Sassurean fissure of signifier from 
signified, becomes in Strauß’ essay a philosophical problem of the relationship between 
mankind and an ontological understanding of world. The support for this claim is 
developed through a detailed exegesis of Strauß’ essay. 
2.2 Anwesenheit and a move from ‘Ästhetik’ 
A consensus has grown in the secondary literature that reads Strauß’ essay on real 
presences, based on his partial alignment with a number of Steiner’s premises, as his own 
theologically-founded delineation of an aesthetics. Oberender, for example, defines the 
work as representative of a ‘Kunstreligion’, while Parry argues that Strauß understands 
the thesis of real presences only ‘in einem religiösen Sinne’.27 Funke suggests that 
                                                 
27 See Oberender, ‘Die “Wende” in den Texten von Botho Strauß’, p.79 and Parry, C. ‘Der Aufstand gegen 
die Totalherrschaft der Gegenwart. Botho Strauß' Verhältnis zu Mythos und Geschichte’, in Arnold, H. L. 
(Ed.) TEXT+KRITIK 81 Botho Strauß: Neufassung (Munich: text + kritik, 1998). p.63. 
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Strauß is a ‘gläubiger Christ’ and draws direct parallels between his arguments for 
meaning in the aesthetic and, ‘das christlich-religiöse Denkmodell’.28 And Willer 
maintains that Strauß’ arguments on aesthetic forms read like, ‘die christlich-
metaphysische Verschärfung der hermeneutischen Prämisse’, namely that, ‘hinter den 
Zeichen verberge sich ein transzendentales Signifikat’, although he does go on to soften 
the view that Strauß’ ‘sakrale Poetik’ is based solely on theological precepts.29 
                                                
These individual interpretations, though, are often partial and are used selectively in 
conjunction with other works. They thus, amazingly, leave the specific illustrations of 
real presences that Strauß includes in his essay and, in particular, the question as to 
whether or how these examples inflect Steiner’s postulate unexamined. Moreover, the 
terms that Strauß emphasises and adapts from Steiner’s book, particularly the 
philosophical implications of Anwesenheit in contrast to the empirical emphasis of 
‘Gegenwart’, in relation to the issue of world, remain equally overlooked. 
It is noteworthy in respect of Steiner that although he has recourse to the language of 
theology he does, in fact, attempt to distance his position from adherence to any specific 
credo. Real presences, regardless of the divine transcendental postulate he proposes, is 
‘jenseits irgendeiner liturgischen oder theologischen Spezifizierung’.30 Nonetheless, the 
motif of creation, as is noted above, is central to the argument for real presences.31 The 
implicit argument underpinning the claim runs that because there is origin or creation, 
 
28 Funke, Über das Höhere in der Literatur, p.121. 
29 Willer, Botho Strauß, pp.115-116. 
30 Steiner, Von realer Gegenwart, p.283. 
31 The importance of the motif creation; of origin and originary experience for Strauß’ writing and its 
adoption of this aspect of the approach in Heidegger’s ontology is developed in detail in Chapter Three in 
relation to the threat to mankind of science and technology. 
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therefore, there must be God. In Von realer Gegenwart Steiner initially concentrates on 
the issue of artistic creation and poses a specific question that resists just such an 
exclusively theologically oriented interpretation. It is not the act of artistic creation itself 
but rather the existence at all of such a creative act that is the stimulus to answering the 
challenge posed by the broken contract between word and world. Rather than asking after 
the meaning of a particular aesthetic object – for example, whether of an image in poetry, 
a brush stroke in a painting, or for that matter, the influence of a thinker on a writer – at 
issue is the struggle to articulate that there is meaning at all. Steiner distils his argument 
to a concern prior to the question of artistic creation: Das Axiom, daß es poiesis gibt, 
‘weil’ es Schöpfung gibt, ist vermutlich ein Gemeinplatz. Doch es ist dieses ‘weil’, das 
für das Verstehen eine Herausforderung darstellt’.32 This important premise, curiously 
eventually lost in Steiner’s recourse to a theological guarantee, points in the direction of 
what Strauß understands of real presences. 
Thus, the question of real presences is suggested – even by Steiner – to be more 
philosophically fundamental than an interrogation of the persistence of meaning within 
the aesthetic, in spite of the erasure of guarantees provided in linguistic signification. The 
reflections on this deeper issue of the existence at all of meaning in the work of art 
culminate in the question: ‘Warum soll es Kunst geben, warum dichterisches 
Schaffen?’.33 This is, of course, an analogue of the founding question in Heidegger’s 
thought as he infamously concludes Was ist Metaphysik? and opens his Einführung in die 
Metaphysik with the question: ‘Warum ist überhaupt Seiendes und nicht vielmehr 
                                                 
32 Steiner, Von realer Gegenwart, p.267. 
33 Steiner, Von realer Gegenwart, p.263. 
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Nichts?’.34 The echo is suggestive and moves the emphasis of real presences firmly away 
from issues of representation in aesthetics to questions of ontological concern. 
Strauß develops his view of real presences with examples not offered by Steiner in Von 
realer Gegenwart. Although the first of these is theologically inspired – Strauß suggests 
that the idea of real presences has its counterpart in the sacrament of the Eucharist and 
doctrine of transubstantiation – his further illustrations move ‘Der Aufstand gegen die 
sekundäre Welt’ definitely away from such an exclusive interpretation. 
Strauß cites the early twentieth-century Welsh poet David Jones (1895-1974) and his epic 
poem, Anathémata.35 The grounds of real presences here shift firmly to anthropology; in 
other words, the world is god-less. Mankind and his world, rather than the divine, is the 
subject of the poem. According to Strauß, for Jones it is in man’s daily engagement and 
through his gestures that meaning is created, to which the poem then gives expression 
and form. In the Anathémata man alone is what he calls ‘Zeichensetzer’.36 Whatever the 
specific activity, and Strauß highlights two very different examples of building a ship and 
                                                 
34 Heidegger, M. Was ist Metaphysik? (Frankfurt-am-Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 15th Edition, 1998), p.45 
and Heidegger, M. Einführung in die Metaphysik (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 6th Edition, 1998), p.1 respectively. 
35 Jones, D. The Anathemata: Fragments of an Attempted Writing (London: Faber, 1952). Intriguingly, in 
the preface to the poem, in outline of the term Anathemata Jones describes his intent in unmistakably 
Heideggerian language, which is explored in the following section in consideration of Heidegger’s Logos. 
‘My intention has not been to “edify” […], nor, I think, to persuade but there is indeed an intention to 
“uncover”; which is what a “mystery” does, for though at root “mystery” implies a closing, all “mysteries” 
are meant to disclose, to show something forth. So that, in one sense, it is meant to “edify”, i.e., “to set 
up”’, in Jones, D. The Anathemata: Fragments of an Attempted Writing (London: Faber, 1952), p.33. 
Emphasis in original. For more detail of the influence on Jones of German thought from the turn of the last 
century, particularly that of Spengler, see Miles, J. Backgrounds to David Jones. A Study in Sources and 
Drafts (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1990). Strauß places an accent in Jones’s title. 
36 Strauß, ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’, p.308. 
 70
writing a poem, mankind is the origin of creation: the poem happens through man.37 The 
choice of Strauß’ terms is significant. 
Alles, was er schafft, ist Darbringung, Opfergabe. Zuerst geben wir etwas ab, 
dann einander, dann weiter. Die erste Richtung des Werks ist die vertikale, 
[…]. Die ‘Anathémata’ sammeln […] in tausend Benennungen und Anrufen 
Votive einer abendländischen Poiesis.38 
In Jones’s poem, a complex dynamic of real presences comes to the fore. According to 
Strauß, the ‘Anathémata’ gathers gestures of mankind’s creation and names them. The 
invocation of the verbs sammeln and nennen are developed in the following section, and 
chapters Three and Four respectively. Through such gathering, the gestures of the figures 
are brought into existence, or created, again in the poem: it is an instantiation of 
mankind’s gestures through language. Furthermore, the rest of mankind can also 
experience the original sense of this gathering and naming. As Strauß writes 
suggestively: ‘der heutige Leser wiederum sammelt diese Benennungen selbst als 
kostbare Gedächtnisstücke’.39 The gestures of creation in the poem are then also gathered 
in the way the poem is read and experienced. 
It is a strange, intangible and elusive notion of real presences and the work of art that is 
suggested here by Strauß, but one developed through subsequent illustrations and 
throughout this thesis. The sense, though, of how Strauß’ claim for the poetic unsettles, of 
how it proposes to uncouple well-entrenched conceptions of the relationship of reader to 
object-world – in this example, a poem – to retrieve an ontologically more fundamental 
understanding of the relationship between mankind and world, is here introduced. 
                                                 
37 Strauß, ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’, p.308. Strauß writes: ‘Für ihn ist der Mensch […] ein 
Zeichensetzer in allen seinen Werken, gleich, ob es sich um die Kunst des Schiffsbaus oder eines 
walisischen Feenmärchen handelt’. 
38 Strauß, ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’, p.309. My emphases 
39 Strauß, ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’, p.309. 
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Strauß concludes the reflections on Jones’s ‘Anathémata’ with a seemingly unrelated 
example not taken from the poem. However, it provides a succinct and suggestive 
illustration of his philosophical emphasis in real presences and indicates the next step in 
moving the notion from the purely aesthetic to considerations of ontological concern. 
The example he provides is of a painting of a girl, which is itself notable as the visual arts 
are not considered by Steiner in Von realer Gegenwart. Morever, the emphasis Strauß 
makes in his description, in particular the verbal stress, is significant. 
Die Kunstlehre von der realen Gegenwart […] is davon überzeugt, daß das 
Bildnis des Mädchens nicht ein Mädchen zeigt, sondern daß es das Mädchen 
ist unter der Gestalt von Farbe und Leinwand.40 
The painting, Strauß contends, does not represent the girl at all, and in this anti-mimetic 
characterisation he pushes the terms of reference beyond those enlisted by Steiner.41 
Instead the girl actually is in the painting. This cryptic formulation does not suggest, as 
one critic maintains, ‘das Bedürfnis nach dem authentischen Erlebnis’.42 Rather, it brings 
into consideration of real presences questions on the nature of the object in the work of 
art, as well as its own philosophical status as object. What is Strauß suggesting by the 
example of the painting and that of the girl? 
The painting is also interesting for an understanding ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre 
Welt’ because it is the only example that is not attributed to any creating artist. Strauß 
does not describe or provide any information about its origins, which invites 
consideration of this characteristic of the painting. 
                                                 
40 Strauß, ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’, p.309. Emphasis in original. 
41 Parry also suggests that with this particular example Strauß drives Steiner’s thesis, ‘auf die Spitze’, in 
Parry, ‘Der Aufstand gegen die Totalherrschaft der Gegenwart’, p.61. 
42 Parry, ‘Botho Strauß zwischen Kulturkritik und Poetik’, p.184. 
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For the contention advanced here the example evokes that put forward by Heidegger in 
Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes of van Gogh’s portrayal of a pair of peasant shoes and of 
the ancient-Greek temple. In the latter example, Heidegger describes a painting of a deity 
that Strauß echoes precisely. Noting of ‘das Bildwerk des Gottes’ he writes: 
Es ist kein Abbild, damit man an ihm leichter zur Kenntnis nehme, wie der 
Gott aussieht, aber es ist ein Werk, das den Gott selbst anwesen läßt und so 
der Gott selbst ist.43 
Moreover, the  analysis that Heidegger offers of van Gogh’s painting and its implications 
for traditional philosophical aesthetics appear close to what Strauß is suggesting by his 
further examples and reading of real presences as Anwesenheit. 
In the essay on the origin of the work of art, which introduces many important ideas for 
his late thought, Heidegger asks after the essence of the work rather than the meaning of 
individual aesthetic objects and forms. Heidegger opens his essay declaring: ‘Die Frage 
nach dem Ursprung des Kunstwerkes wird zur Frage nach dem Wesen der Kunst’.44 In 
this, it is worth noting that for Heidegger the mystery of the work of art’s existence, ‘das 
einfache “factum est”’ of its there-ness or happening at all, is fundamentally of concern.45 
Heidegger is motivated by wonder at the creation of the work of art, but not in a 
theological sense. The central mystery in any consideration of art is, he writes, in a 
parallel question to that asked of an ontological understanding of world: ‘daß solches 
Werk ist und nicht vielmehr nicht ist’.46 
                                                 
43 Heidegger, M. Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1960), p.39. Emphasis in 
original. 
44 Heidegger, Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, p.8. 
45 Heidegger, Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, p.66. 
46 Heidegger, Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, p.66. Emphasis in original. 
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The answer to the question of the essence of art is, for Heidegger, bound up with his 
guiding overall concern, namely die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein. However, the 
conclusion to his argument on the relationship between the work of art and truth, and 
Heidegger’s re-interpretation of this as άλήθεια or ‘Unverborgenheit’ fall outside the 
present argument. This is developed more fully in Chapter Five and is shown as critical to 
Strauß’ poetics of dwelling. For the present, it is instead the first section of Heidegger’s 
essay, and the relationship between the work of art and the object or thing, that bears 
most immediately on Strauß’ example of the painting of the girl. 
Heidegger begins his essay sketching a view of the aesthetic object based, as he puts it, 
‘nach der gewöhnlichen Vorstellung’.47 This so-called ‘familiar’ view of the work of art 
is, he suggests, conceived in relation to the meaning or insight derived from it. This is a 
recognisable theoretical standpoint suggesting interpretation of aesthetic forms. Such 
meaning is, he claims, something beyond its attributes, whether of paint, sound or words 
associated with the canvas, sonata or poem respectively. Thus the work of art, whether as 
symbol or allegory, refers to some thing other than itself. It is in this other thing, this 
sense of otherness, that it is distinguished from other objects. This ‘familiar’ view of the 
work of art is close to Steiner’s basic proposition of real presences where he articulates 
the otherness of the aesthetic, which he then seeks to explain. However, it is precisely this 
distinction, this thing in the work, that Heidegger – and Strauß following him – overturns. 
Importantly, Heidegger argues, the meaning of the work of art in the ‘familiar’ view of 
aesthetics is understood either as something inherent to it, what he calls its ‘Unterbau’, or 
                                                 
47 Heidegger, Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, p.1. 
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something bestowed on it by artist or perceiving subject, its ‘Oberbau’.48 Conceived in 
these terms, the work of art is either a reflection of some ideal or objective truth, or the 
expression of subjective insight. In this Heidegger is alluding to two broad traditions in 
German aesthetics going back to Hegel and Kant respectively. Heidegger seeks to 
redefine the prevailing aesthetic framework by which the work is interpreted in terms of 
ontology. 
His exposition focuses on the work of art as object and excludes from consideration its 
origins in or through a creating artist. Whilst accepting the contention of the distinctive 
something of the work of art as its defining attribute – its meaning in the ‘familiar’ view 
of aesthetics, pace Steiner – Heidegger suggests that this does not itself show what this 
something or, as he puts it, its thing-like quality, is. Why, or in what way, is the thing-like 
quality in art different from other things or objects? From his analysis Heidegger brings 
into consideration the otherwise irreconcilable: he has narrowed the focus on the 
characteristics of certain objects and broadened the implications to general attributes. He 
does this by asking after, ‘das Dinghafte des Dinges’.49 In so doing, he moves the 
argument into the realm of ontology. Pattison summarises the implications of 
Heidegger’s ontological approach: the discussion ‘calls into question what it means to 
represent or to perceive anything at all, or, more precisely, to represent or to perceive 
anything as anything’.50 
In order to determine the thing-like quality of the work of art Heidegger traces different 
conceptions of the thing dominant in Western thought. His focus though is on one notion 
                                                 
48 Heidegger, Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, p.10. 
49 Heidegger, Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, p.11. 
50 Pattison, The Later Heidegger, p.81. Emphasis in original. 
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in particular whereby the thing – including, therefore, any work of art – is viewed as 
formed-material: ‘das Ding ist geformter Stoff’.51 Heidegger’s exegesis of this 
conception of the thing is complex and involves the shifting emphases of Greek terms as 
they are mediated by latinate and Christian thought in the Middle Ages, and is tangential 
to the present argument. What is interesting, though, is that the idea of formed-material 
has become indeterminately associated for mankind with utility and a rationalistic-
scientific view of the thing, which has in turn also led to its distortion. The significance of 
the relationship between mankind and object-world and its philosophical basis and 
implications in relation to Strauß’ conception of science and technology is considered in 
Chapter Three. For the moment, Heidegger argues that the original thing-like quality of 
the work of art can, however, still be sensed in van Gogh’s painting. What then is it that 
is shown or comes to be present in this painting? 
Heidegger sees the painting as a way into thinking about the thing-like quality of the 
work of art that suspends the distortions of mankind’s conception of the thing as 
instrumental object. The painting by van Gogh is distinguished not by its representation 
of a pair of shoes. Viewed in mimetic terms the painting and its subject-matter are 
similarly constrained by questions of utility. Judgements by this aesthetic measure 
suggest that if the work represents the object faithfully then it may be evaluated as good 
or of artistic merit. Conversely, a work that fails in its representation of the object – and 
clearly, this does not just refer to the artistic movements of Realism – is deemed to have 
little aesthetic value. What is in the painting, its thing-like distinction, actually has 
nothing to do with whether the shoes in the painting are like or capture the quality of the 
                                                 
51 Heidegger, Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, p.19. 
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original, or for that matter, any other pair of peasant shoes. Thus, pushing against an 
understanding of aesthetics and conception of art running back to Plato, Heidegger 
writes: ‘Meinen wir, das Gemälde entnehme dem Wirklichen ein Abbild und versetze 
dies in ein Produkt der künstlerischen […] Produktion? Keineswegs’.52 And it is the echo 
of precisely this line of thought in Strauß’ assertion that the girl in the painting actually is 
the girl that re-casts real presences outside the interpretative framework of the aesthetic 
traditions noted above, and mimetic conceptions of the work of art. Faithfulness, fidelity 
of work to original is not, either for Heidegger or Strauß, a basis for an understanding of 
its distinction. 
Strauß gestures toward his attempt to conceive of the work of art beyond the measures of 
subjectivity, utility and mimesis in the lengthy narrative excursus in Der junge Mann; 
‘Die Geschichte der Almut’.53 Her story is one in the tableau that makes up the fourth 
book ‘Die Terrasse’, in which questions concerning philosophical aesthetics are given 
particular prominence. 
Originally, Almut is initiated into the artisan craft of restoration involving, as she 
narrates, ‘die selbständige Restaurierung von ganzen Kirchengewölben, von 
Ratszimmerdecken und Landschlössern’ by her father who is versed in the ‘Ikonographie 
des ausgehenden 18. Jahrhunderts’.54 At his death she abandons her previous calling and 
apprenticeship, plagued by ‘eine krankhafte Scheu, mit irgendetwas Kunstschönem in 
                                                 
52 Heidegger, Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, p.31. 
53 Such an emphasis undercuts arguments by commentators who maintain that Almut’s story directly 
reflects Strauß’ own aesthetic. Instead, the present line of thought contends that in the excursus Strauß 
offers a satire on emotive, purely theoretical, or realist notions of art rather than endorsing Almut’s 
‘Schönheitssinn’. For example, Parry argues that, ‘Die ästhetischen Ansichten der Almut im Jungen Mann 
sind denen des Verfassers auffallend ähnlich’, in Parry, ‘Botho Strauß zwischen Kulturkritik und Poetik’, 
p.184. See also, Thomas, ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’, pp.116-121. 
54 Strauß, Der junge Mann, p.254. 
 77
Berührung zu kommen’.55 Only when she is again confronted by chance with a painting 
by Simone Martini on a visit to Florence does the original yearning return. As a result of 
viewing the work she reflects: ‘entkleidete mich der braven Hülle, der bürgerlichen 
Bedeckung meiner Existenz’.56 After this encounter she resolves that her 
‘Unempfänglichkeit für das Schöne durfte nicht wieder erneuert werden’.57 
The circumstances of her return to restoration projects allow Strauß to point towards the 
limitations of a subjectivist response to the work of art, or one constrained by utility or 
mimetic realism. Drawn to an ‘Ausstellung amerikanischer Malerei’, Almut narrates how 
she is again physically overwhelmed after considering a painting; on this occasion a work 
by Morris Louis. Her response is to attack the canvas, consoled that her act of vandalism 
cannot destroy a truly creative work. 
Ich verspürte keinen Haß auf das Werk. Ich mußte mich nur zur Wehr setzen. 
Der dunkle übermächtige Puls wollte mich erschlagen. Ich hatte ja nur diese 
kleine Nagelschere in meiner Handtasche. Und so lächerlich es auch war, ich 
mußte mich aufbäumen bis zuletzt. Ich nahm die Schere in meine Faust und 
lief mit erhobener Spitze gegen die Leinwand. […]. 
Ich kämpfte um mein Leben. Es hieß, ich hätte versucht, eine großartige 
Schöpfung der amerikanischen Malerei zu zerstören. Aber eine wahre 
Schöpfung kann niemand zerstören.58 
Absolved of formal punishment and sentence, Almut joins the group of restorers charged 
with repairing the damaged painting. Unlike her father they implement the latest, 
scientifically-based technologies in their practices. Almut is initially impressed by their 
systematic, procedural approach: ‘Der Zustand eines Gemäldes wurde nicht minder 
penibel untersucht als ein menschlicher Organismus. Es gab unzählige 
                                                 
55 Strauß, Der junge Mann, p.261. 
56 Strauß, Der junge Mann, p.264. 
57 Strauß, Der junge Mann, p.265. 
58 Strauß, Der junge Mann, p.270. 
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Röntgenaufnahmen, Labortests und Früherkennungsdiagnosen’.59 However, the more 
Almut learns of these techniques, the more she is drawn back to the response to works of 
art she learnt from her father. She laments the effect of the restorers’ instrumental, 
positivistic approach to the aesthetic object. She eventually confronts them with her 
objections: 
‘Mir scheinen unsere Arbeiten […] je minuziöser sie ausgeführt werden, 
zugleich auch immer oberflächlicher zu geraten. […]. Immer weniger 
bemühen wir uns, ihre gewichtige Gegenwart zu erkennen, ihre Schönheit zu 
würdigen’.60 
However, in an attempt to persuade her of their methods the restorers give her a project to 
complete on her own, according to her more immediate anti-theoretical precepts. Here 
Strauß shows that neither the technologically-conceived methodologies, nor Almut’s 
motive, ‘Schönheit zu würdigen’, by attempting to re-create the work faithfully, are 
adequate to the original creation of the work. Having stripped back the object of 
restoration, she finds herself unable to copy or re-present it. The artifice of ‘die 
modernste Entwicklung der Kopistentechnik’ leaves her with nothing – no quality or 
sense – of the original. Almut reflects on her efforts at restoration: 
Es war weg. Vor mir war nichts mehr – und ich war nichts. Ich dachte: du 
kannst nichts dafür geben, du kannst nichts an seine Stelle setzen. […]. Ich 
konnnte nicht länger in diesen Nichts-Spiegel blicken.61 
The implications of this rejection of platonic aesthetics are considered in the concluding 
chapter. 
In ‘die Geschichte der Almut’, neither the subjective excesses of Almut’s emotional and 
physical response, even when tempered by her father’s sober approach, nor the 
                                                 
59 Strauß, Der junge Mann, p.278. 
60 Strauß, Der junge Mann, p.282. 
61 Strauß, Der junge Mann, pp.287ff. 
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rationalistic detachment of the restorers and their mimetic endeavour to copy paintings 
back into their original forms, are shown as adequate to the work of art. The narrative 
thus highlights, in brief, Strauß’ delineation of the limitations to some traditional 
conceptions of and pre-occupations with the aesthetic. What, then, is it that Strauß 
suggests is in the work? 
Heidegger’s analysis of the van Gogh painting provides the hint of an answer. The 
portrayal of the shoes oscillates between articulating what is on the canvas and drawing 
associations from beyond the work, including the life and experiences of the user of the 
shoes. It is described as showing, ‘was im Werk am Werk ist’.62 What is in the painting 
can, then, come to light when it is not considered in reference to the form-material 
designation of utility. Through what Pattison calls, ‘the thick, analytically accentuating 
articulation’ of his essay, Heidegger’s description brings out the non-instrumental sense 
of the thing in the work of art.63 
Unter den Sohlen schiebt sich hin die Einsamkeit des Feldweges durch den 
sinkenden Abend. In dem Schuhzeug schwingt der verschwiegene Zuruf der 
Erde, ihr stilles Verschenken […] und ihr unerklärtes Sichversagen in der 
öden Brache des winterlichen Feldes. 
[…]. 
In der Nähe des Werkes sind wir jäh anderswo gewesen, als wir gewöhnlich 
zu sein pflegen.64 
Thus, Heidegger claims, the van Gogh painting shows the shoes as they are. As with 
Strauß’ suggested example of the girl in the work of art, the stress on the verbal element 
is critical. Heidegger claims of the shoes in the painting: ‘Hier erst sind sie, was sie 
                                                 
62 Heidegger, Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, p.33. 
63 Pattison, The Later Heidegger, p.98. 
64 Heidegger, Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, pp.27 and 29. 
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sind’.65 Only in the work of art can the object of the painting be said to be, recalling also 
Jones’s poem from Strauß’ illustrations of real presences. 
The painting is thereby uncoupled from established senses of meaning in the work of art 
as either inherent to it, its ‘Unterbau’, or read into it, its ‘Oberbau’. The distance from 
such aesthetic considerations finds echo in Strauß’ suggestion that real presences is not 
the expression of an underlying artistic vision. The work of art is, he writes, ‘weder […] 
ein utopisches Humanum noch ein höherer ästhetischer Gemütsreflex’.66 Nor is real 
presences for Strauß the articulation of a subject’s intuition or mood. As he puts it: 
‘irgendwelchen Befindlichkeits- und Betroffenheits-Verifikationen im Umgang mit 
Kunst’.67 The romantic notion of genius and the conceit of an ennobled subject 
responding to art are ruled out of his real presences; just as they are mocked in Der junge 
Mann. It is an important idea in understanding Strauß’ unusual delineation of the poets 
and claims for what it means to be a poet, and the relationship between biography and 
work are also explored fully in Chapter Five. Instead, in rejecting these aspects of 
aesthetic interpretation and in articulating what is distinctive in the work, Strauß shares 
with Heidegger what is here termed ontological concern for how real presence is 
disclosed. 
Heidegger introduces the ontological understanding of world in his investigation of the 
thing and the work of art, which Strauß also draws out and emphasises in his final 
illustration of real presences. It denotes an inflection to the third sense of world noted in 
the previous section to this chapter: the ontological conditions making the creation of 
                                                 
65 Heidegger, Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, p.27. 
66 Strauß, ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’, p.317. 
67 Strauß, ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’, p.311.  
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world possible are drawn together with and resonate with the idea of truth and the work 
of art. As Gadamer writes in summary of Heidegger’s description of van Gogh’s 
painting: ‘Die ganze Welt des bäuerlichen Lebens ist in diesen Schuhen’.68 This leads to 
the startling conclusion that the world comes-into-being, or is made manifest, in the work 
of art. This does not, of course, mean that the painting literally brings a world into being. 
The artist as God, reconstituting the Creation in the work, or conceptions of art as a 
theologically-sanctioned source for an absolute deity, as argued above, stand outside the 
idea of ontological concern. But the work does open the world of the painting to us, 
rather as in Strauß’ view, Jones’s poem does for his readership. Gadamer, in his essay on 
Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes elegantly summarises the idea in relation to the van Gogh 
painting: ‘Das Kunstwerk eröffnet seine eigene Welt’.69 
This characterisation of the work of art as ‘das Welt-Eröffnen’ is important for the 
remaining reading.70 Heidegger’s use of the term world is not, like the accepted 
conception of the thing-like object, something useful that can be classified, described and 
determined. It is not the world understood, for example, by science as the aggregate of 
objects in any given or specified environment, or for that matter the world as Steiner 
conceives it. Instead, he claims, world is the coming-into-presence or disclosure of 
something true.71 Heidegger describes the work of art thus: 
                                                 
68 Gadamer, in Heidegger, Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, p.104. 
69 Heidegger, Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, p.105. 
70 Heidegger, Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, p.105. 
71 See Gadamer, in Heidegger, Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, p.105. The question of Heidegger’s radical 
interpretation of truth as άλήθεια lies outwith the immediate argument, although it plays an important role 
in discussion of Strauß’ views on language, and particularly the poetic. It is, however, important to note 
that the idea of coming-into-presence or disclosure of the work of art is understood as distinct from the 
revelation of meaning that Steiner conceives of the aesthetic object. Bruns provides a succinct formulation: 
‘The work of the work is disclosure, but strangely so: call it disclosure as estrangement. […]. We must 
shake the idea that disclosure means revelation. […]. In its self-standing, solitary, nonhuman character, the 
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die gewohnten Bezüge […] verwandeln und fortan mit allem geläufigen Tun 
und Schätzen, Kennen und Blicken ansichhalten, um in der im Werk 
geschehenden Wahrheit zu verweilen. Die Verhaltenheit dieses Verweilens 
läßt das Geschaffene erst das Werk sein, das es ist.72 
By this measure the work is not a concern with revelation or presentation. Its coming-
into-presence or disclosure is an intangible, unsettling idea but that is precisely the intent 
both of Heidegger’s and Strauß’ respective ontologically-understood concern for the 
work of art. 
How does Strauß himself introduce his related idea of world in real presences? Again, 
the terms deployed by Strauß are significant, particularly for their dense invocation of 
Heideggerian thought. 
Strauß’ final illustration of real presences comes from writings by the Russian 
philosopher Florenskij on icon paintings. Florenskij, he notes, argues against any 
representative or symbolic understanding of painting. For him such aesthetic conceptions 
of a work do not encapsulate its distinctive quality, its meaning. Moreover, for Florenskij, 
the category of the work of art itself, its status as an object, is deeply suspect. The 
painting, whilst unable to transcend its physical character – the work of art still actually 
has to exist, of course – is conceived as an opening to a vision. Strauß’ invocation of 
Florenskij’s writing, though more condensed than Heidegger’s lengthy exposition on van 
Gogh, is recognisable and similarly disconcerting. 
                                                                                                                                                 
work of art is very like the thing. […]. The work is not an object of art, not an aesthetic object made up of 
formal properties, but something whose “createdness” reserves the work to itself’, in Bruns, Heidegger’s 
Estrangements, pp.151-152. 
72 Heidegger, Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, p.67. 
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Strauß emphasises the importance of light for the vision in the work of art, suggesting 
that it is the basis for creation in the painting. He distinguishes his use of the term ‘light’ 
from notions of light and shade associated with traditional categories of aesthetics. Strauß 
describes that the painting: 
[…] wird mit Licht gemalt, und Licht meint keine Form der Beleuchtung und 
nicht das Eigenleuchten der Dinge: das Licht gründet überhaupt erst die 
Dinge, es ist ihre Ursache.73 
Light is conceived here as originary. The work of art, in this example, becomes not the 
site where an object is shown, or the sublime expressed. Instead, for Strauß, it forms the 
fluid boundary to the existence of, as he describes it, die Dinge: just as in the previous 
example of the girl in the painting, or Heidegger’s exposition on a pair of shoes. Things 
are sensed as they are in truth, rather than as they are represented. Furthermore, making 
the link to Heidegger’s argument complete, Strauß goes on to describe the painting as 
‘der Ort, wo […] das Urlicht hervortritt, es bildet die Grenze zwischen sichtbarer und 
unsichtbarer Welt’.74 For Strauß, like Heidegger, the painting opens an ontological 
concern for world. 
Finally, Strauß transposes the term upon which his own ‘Bemerkungen’ and essay 
regarding real presences is founded. Towards the end of ‘Der Aufstand gegen die 
sekundäre Welt’ he touches on the question of what is sensed in the work of art. He 
dispenses, as already indicated, with both idealist conceptions and the idea of artist-
creator. He writes that the work of art is sensed; ‘unabhängig davon, welchen 
historischen oder biografischen Interessen sich die Entstehung eines Romans oder eines 
                                                 
73 Strauß, ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’, p.309. 
74 Strauß, ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’, p.310. My emphasis. 
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Gemäldes verdankt’.75 Crucially, Strauß’ term for this enigmatic sense is different from 
Steiner’s. What comes forth in the work of art is not, as Steiner maintains, Gegenwart – 
the presentation of things as objects – but instead Strauß suggests: ‘vielmehr klingt in ihr 
an oder schimmert durch: […] Anwesenheit’.76 
Elsewhere, Strauß highlights the manifestation of Anwesenheit and introduces a further 
term to his version of real presences. The sense of the work of art’s distinctiveness arises, 
he asserts: ‘zumindest für lichte Augenblicke, in denen Anwesenheit, […] Logos offenbar 
werden’.77 Anwesenheit and Logos and the manner of their manifestation, this argument 
contends, are thus the primary concern of Strauß’ essay. 
Although Strauß shares with Steiner the same emphasis on the importance of works of art 
for an age and culture dominated by the secondary, he moves, through his illustrations of 
real presences, away from the aesthetic pre-occupations of Von realer Gegenwart 
towards concern for the ontological possibilities of the work that share affinities with 
Heidegger. Indeed, the terms Anwesenheit and Logos are, this thesis suggests, taken 
directly from an essay by Heidegger, the argument of which supports the contention 
regarding their inflection for Strauß’ own understanding of real presences.78 
                                                 
75 Strauß, ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’, p.317. 
76 Strauß, ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’, p.317. My emphasis. 
77 Strauß, ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’, p.316. My emphasis. 
78 Strauß identifies the influence on Steiner’s thesis, suggesting how large tracts, ‘streckenweise an der 
Seite Heideggers zurückgelegt werden’, in Strauß, ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’, p.312. Steiner 
also acknowledges the unmistakable origin for his terminology, but it is clear that he envisages a distinction 
between his endeavour for a theology of the aesthetic and the implications of Heideggerian ontology: ‘[…] 
schon der Begriff einer Bedeutungshaftigkeit, einer Bedeutungsfülle, einer Kongruenz, und sei sie auch 
problematisch, zwischen dem Bezeichnenden und dem Bezeichneten ist theologisch oder onto-theologisch 
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2.3 Logos: ‘das Anwesen des Anwesenden’ 
Strauß’ delineation of real presences culminates in Anwesenheit and Logos, and 
introduces a number of further terms – for example, Sammeln, Nennen and Licht – to 
suggest the manner in which these become manifest in the work. The following shows 
how these are also central to Heidegger’s thought. In his essay, ‘Logos’, the latter is 
brought into a consideration of the central question of his philosophy.79 Under 
consideration are questions of how in and through language – for Strauß of course, the 
pre-eminent form of the work of art – world comes-into-presence. The aim, 
notwithstanding the obvious differences separating Strauß’ suggestive prose images from 
Heidegger’s longer re-interpretation of pre-Socratic fragments, is to highlight the 
intellectual parameters in which their respective discussions of the terms Anwesenheit 
and Logos are conducted and, importantly, what is at stake in this. 
The reading has a two-fold proposition. First, it suggests that Strauß’ inflection of these 
specific terms in his essay owes a debt to Heidegger that is not merely one of semantic 
adoption. Strauß is concerned in his inscription of these terms in ‘Der Aufstand’ with the 
same philosophical question regarding the ontological in respect of the relationship of 
language to world and how meaning is created, in the sense outlined by the preceding 
section of its becoming manifest. Second, the reading contends that Strauß’ arguments on 
the secondary world of late modernity share structural sympathies with Heidegger’s on 
originating language, a possibility of experience – what in Strauß’ writing is here termed 
                                                                                                                                                 
(der Heideggersche Begriff ist irritierend, verdeutlicht aber wie kein anderer die notwendige 
Übereinstimmung zwischen der epistemologischen und existenziellen Annahme einer substantiellen 
Bedeutung auf der einen Seite und einer theologischen Bestätigung auf der anderen)’, in Steiner, Von realer 
Gegenwart, p.160. Emphasis in original. 
79 Heidegger, M. ‘Logos (Heraklit, Fragment 50)’, in Vorträge und Aufsätze, pp.199-221. 
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originary language – that has fallen away from modernity, the loss of which brings with 
it defining consequences for mankind.80 
2.3.1 Heidegger and Logos 
Heidegger’s reading of the fragment by Heraclitus intends, like all his essays, to retrieve 
an aspect of thought forgotten since the pre-Socratics. Heidegger’s intention is thereby to 
approach the overarching question of his philosophy, die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein. 
It is important to underscore the sometime distinction Heidegger makes between the 
concern of his thought, Sein (Being), and his view of all, for him erroneous, 
metaphysically-constrained philosophy pre-occupied with the being of beings, or beings 
in their being. Pattison describes this distinction well. He writes: 
Heidegger is not concerned with particular issues in the problem of 
knowledge but with Being itself, […], the presencing of what is present. The 
[…] intuition of fundamental ontology thus becomes […] a leap into vision, a 
letting-lie-before and taking-to-heart of […] Being. In thinking we see what it 
is for Being to be, for presence to be present.81 
                                                 
80 This thesis uses the terms originating and originary respectively in relation to Heidegger’s and Strauß’ 
understanding of a possible alternative experience with language. The terms do not specify a period or style 
of language that has a fixed, determinate or purer meaning. As the discussion comes on to show, neither 
thinker nor writer postulate an eden of unalloyed immanently present meaning, whether in the pre-Socratics 
or an unspecified Teutonic past. Originating and originary are intended to invoke the sense of the 
ontological reach, as possibility, in language that both thinker and writer propose. 
81 Pattison, The Later Heidegger, p.152. Sheehan delineates the distinctive question thus: ‘Heidegger’s 
focal topic was not “being” (das Sein) in any of its traditional philosophical meanings. That is, it did not 
coincide with the three overlapping ways in which classical metaphysics had treated being, namely as a) 
ontological: any entity’s thatness, whatness, howness; b) transcendental: any entity’s status as something, 
one, distinct from others; c) theological: the highest entity’s state of perfect self-coincidence […]’, in 
Sheehan, ‘Kehre und Ereignis’, pp.5-6. The validity of the question of Anwesenheit lies absolutely at the 
heart of this thesis, accepted that Strauß’ poetic is motivated by the same ontological imperative. As Bowie 
observes: ‘Given the success of the scientific method in generating more and more truths on the basis of the 
presence of entities, what reason is there to ask further questions about this presence, which seems only to 
lead to an unnecessary obscuring of what is in one sense self-evident?’, in Bowie, A. From Romanticism to 
Critical Theory. The Philosophy of German Literary Theory (London: Routledge, 1997), p.167. The 
discussion involves the legitimacy, philosophically, of such understanding. 
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What is shown in the reading is how Logos, as the focus of an enquiry into Sein, is 
brought into close association with the ontological consideration of Anwesenheit. 
Heidegger attends on the original sense of the word Logos as expressed in the Hercalitus 
fragment; as he writes, in a place ‘wo wenigstens dieser eine Spruch frag-würdiger zu uns 
spricht’.82 His reading is not concerned with developing or renewing a dictionary 
definition of Heraclitus’ ό λόγος (Logos) that updates, or revises classical philology. Nor 
is it trying to re-establish some lost correspondence between the word and object, 
whether from antiquity or now still current. In his transformative interpretation, ό λόγος 
does not correspond or refer to a different object or action from our accepted meaning of 
the word. To think about the word, λόγος, as the essay proposes, is not to use or deploy a 
critical idiom that will unearth a lost meaning. What he aims to do is re-think what was 
originally thought by the pre-Socratics in the word. It breaks apart the very understanding 
and use of propositional language that Strauß proposes by his view of the poetic as 
Chapter Five concludes. Thus, Being does not speak in language, but is in language as 
Logos. In this the emphasis differs from that made by Steiner in Von realer Gegenwart. 
Heraclitus’ ό λόγος names something fundamental to, or brings to light an original 
characteristic of, Western understanding of language, its relationship to the world and 
how this is conceived by mankind. 
Over the essay a range of terms is introduced, some as noted also raised in Strauß’ 
writing, including Legen, Sagen, Hören and Sammeln. Through their inflected usage and 
resonance in the essay the sense and experience of the worldly manifestation in language 
are brought into consideration. 
                                                 
82 Heidegger, ‘Logos’, p.199. 
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The guiding word in Heraclitus’ thought, ό λόγος, is transformed by Heidegger into ‘die 
lesende Lege’.83 Such an interpretation is at first bewildering, Heidegger accepts, but this 
disorientation itself demonstrates that the power of the original word is lost. This 
transformation to understanding of ό λόγος leads, Heidegger claims, into a new 
constellation of ideas in which the force of the ancient Greek is re-created through the 
reading.84 Such ideas and associations were in the past attendant on the word. 
What does Heidegger bring into consideration in his interpretation of Logos? The 
conclusion to the essay brings together the terms and concerns already highlighted: 
Das Wort ό λόγος nennt Jenes, das alles Anwesende ins Anwesen versammelt 
und darin vorliegen läßt. ό λόγος nennt Jenes, worin sich das Anwesen des 
Anwesenden ereignet. […] wir sagen: das Sein des Seienden. […]. Im Denken 
Heraklits erscheint das Sein (Anwesen) des Seienden als ό λόγος, als die 
lesende Lege.85 
This is a densely suggestive passage not only within Heidegger’s essay but also in respect 
of his overall thought. What is suggested is that Logos names the coming-into-presence 
of Sein, as the presencing of presence. This complex formulation brings the argument to 
the heart of Heidegger’s endeavour. For the moment, it is necessary to consider only how 
the term is thought in the Heraclitus fragment: to show, in relation to Strauß, how in and 
through the word Logos, Anwesenheit is manifest. 
                                                 
83 Heidegger, ‘Logos’, pg. 218. 
84 This thesis describes Heidegger’s readings of the pre-Socratics as transformation rather than translation 
as this better evokes the manner in which such lectures open a sense of the strange and unsettling nature of 
the original that Heidegger aims to prospect. It is precisely such a disconcerting experience with originary 
language that Strauß too wants to open up. Heidegger’s interpretation of the pre-Socratics is not without its 
detractors. Pöggeler, though, provides a persuasive defence, which delineates exactly what is intended by 
the readings of Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides, distinguishing his transformative exegeses from 
the precepts and disciplines of philology: ‘[…] his concern is not […] to provide the “historically correct” 
interpretation; it is rather to wrest from original Greek thinking the matter which is in accordance with the 
most seminal aspect of thinking. […]. Heidegger does not intend to contribute to historical research which 
yields what is objectively demonstrable; he would rather like to point to an event, to the event of the other 
beginning’, in Pöggeler, O. Martin Heidegger’s Path of Thinking (New York: Humanity Books, 1996), 
pp.163ff. 
85 Heidegger, ‘Logos’, pg. 219. 
 89
But Heidegger also claims that in Heraclitus ό λόγος is designated by terms evoked by 
‘die lesende Lege’. Before returning the argument to Strauß and ‘Der Aufstand gegen die 
sekundäre Welt’, particularly the concern with language that the present exegesis is 
trying to bring to light, it is necessary first to understand what Heidegger suggests by his 
transformation of ό λόγος as ‘die lesende Lege’. 
Heidegger commences the essay by setting out the sense of Heraclitus’ fragment and 
each of the words as traditionally translated. 
Der Spruch spricht von άκούειν, hören und gehört haben, von όμολογείν, das 
Gleiche sagen, vom Λόγος, dem Spruch und der Sage, vom έγώ, dem Denker 
selbst, nämlich als λέγων, dem redenden. […]. Der Spruch des Heraklit 
scheint nach jeder Hinsicht verständlich zu sein.86 
From this conventional interpretation two motifs in particular emerge, namely that of 
Sagen and Hören: ‘Heraklit bedenkt hier ein Hören und ein Sagen’.87 This is important as 
it concentrates the interpretation through these two motifs onto consideration of language 
and mankind’s experience thereof. A consideration of ό λόγος, therefore, necessarily 
involves thinking on language. What though, to return to the question, is ‘die lesende 
Lege’? 
Heidegger dispenses with the sense of ό λόγος conceived as reason and logic.88 These 
interpretations do not consider the originating sense of the term. To do this, Heidegger 
pushes back etymologically to previous, now unheard, resonances of the word. One such 
original sense of ό λόγος comes instead from λέγειν (legēin). This, he argues, instead 
denotes saying: ‘Was λόγος ist, entnehmen wir dem λέγειν. Was heißt λέγειν? 
                                                 
86 Heidegger, ‘Logos’, p.199. 
87 Heidegger, ‘Logos’, p.199. 
88 Heidegger, ‘Logos’, p.200. 
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Jedermann, der die Sprache kennt, weiß: λέγειν heißt: sagen’.89 Thus, Heidegger initiates 
his exegesis around the first of the above two motifs. 
Leaving aside the question of whether this understanding of λέγειν is philologically 
accepted, Heidegger divines yet more etymological antecedents. There is a deeper, barely 
noticed sense of the word that he seeks to draw out. Rather than just sagen, λέγειν is akin 
to the German verb ‘legen’, which also suggests, from its corresponding latinate root, 
‘lesen’. Heidegger writes: ‘Damit wir den Anhalt für eine Antwort finden, ist ein 
Nachdenken darüber nötig, was im λέγειν als legen eigentlich liegt. Legen heißt: zum 
Liegen bringen. Legen ist dabei zugleich: eines zum anderen-, ist zusammenlegen. Legen 
ist lesen’.90 What understanding is Heidegger moving toward? It is important to 
recognise the emphasis: in the exposition of these terms it is not specific actions or 
behaviour that are under consideration, but rather the manner of mankind’s relationship 
to the world: how things come about for him. 
                                                
Lesen, in turn, evokes ideas of gathering together: as in, for example, gathering a thought 
or a collection of objects. Here Heidegger introduces the term Sammeln. His usage is 
similar to that considered in Strauß’ invocation of the term in Jones’s poem 
‘Anathémata’, where mankind gathers its creative acts and names them. In order to make 
this suggestive linguistic leap more tangible Heidegger, rather unusually, illustrates with 
examples, on this occasion from harvesting of nature. The analysis is densely evocative 
in its exposition of related root terms but suggests the idea of gathering or bringing 
together. Heidegger describes the inter-connection of Lesen and Sammeln: 
 
89 Heidegger, ‘Logos’, p.200. 
90 Heidegger, ‘Logos’, p.201. 
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Die Ährenlese hebt die Frucht vom Boden auf. Die Traubenlese nimmt die 
Beeren vom Rebstock ab. Auflesen und Abnehmen ergehen sich in einem 
Zusammentragen. […]. Das einbringende Verwahren hat schon den Beginn 
der Schritte des Sammelns.91 
Clearly, the example is not meant literally as an action. Heidegger is gesturing at the 
ontological significance of the world of the pre-Socratics. Sammeln is to be understood in 
a way, similar to how the work of art is approached, that determines its distinctive thing-
like quality. The original sense of λέγειν evokes how mankind relates to the world: how 
things are and that they are at all. Heidegger expresses it in his distinctive idiolect: 
‘Allein das λέγειν, legen, meint in seinem “beisammen-vor-liegen-Lassen” gerade dies, 
daß uns das Vorliegende anliegt und deshalb angeht.92 
There is one further step Heidegger takes after suggesting how things are in the world 
and their import for mankind. What he proposes to bring to language, even if only 
parenthetically, is that which brings about the presence of things. Sheehan offers a 
concise formulation. For him, Heidegger is concerned with: ‘what enables being as […] 
Anwesen to be given at all.’93 Heidegger writes: ‘Dem λέγειν liegt bei seinem gesammelt-
vor-liegen-Lassen an dieser Geborgenheit des Vorliegenden im Unverborgenen’.94 
Thought about, first as Legen and then as Lesen, λέγειν suggests how things are disclosed 
for and to mankind. Heidegger is tracing etymologically how words come to denote 
things. What is to be understood by this? 
                                                 
91 Heidegger, ‘Logos’, p.201. My emphasis. 
92 Heidegger, ‘Logos’, p.203. 
93 Sheehan, ‘Kehre und Ereignis’, p.7. 
94 Heidegger, ‘Logos’, p.203. As with the work of art, a discussion of truth as άλήθεια falls outside the 
focus of the immediate argument. It is, however, vital to this thesis and is developed fully in Chapter Five 
where the idea is shown as central to understanding of Strauß’ writing. 
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Heidegger concludes the threads of his exegesis: of how things come to be disclosed to 
mankind using the term already familiar from the earlier discussion of Strauß’ adoption 
of arguments from Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes. As he writes of the evocative 
originating meaning of λέγειν: ‘Das […] ist nichts Geringeres und nichts Höheres als das 
Anwesen des Vorliegenden’.95 Thus, in the transformative understanding of λέγειν, 
Heidegger claims, he has again considered what Pattison describes as the presencing of 
presence. The associative, fugal connections amongst the terms are now developed to 
bring out the full sense of λέγειν. As he declares in summary: ‘Λέγειν ist legen. Legen ist: 
in sich gesammeltes vorliegen-Lassen des beisammen-Anwesenden’.96 
With this dense delineation, the present argument draws towards the first of the above 
propositions. In his transformation of λέγειν as Sagen to λέγειν as Lesen and Legen, and 
all that attends on these evocations, Heidegger suggests something fundamental about 
language, its relationship to things and, more importantly, about the potential disclosure 
adhering therein for mankind.97 The conclusion to the first part of his essay sets out the 
proximity to the issue of Anwesenheit clearly: 
Daß es λέγειν ist als legen, […] enthält den Hinweis auf die früheste und 
reichste Entscheidung über das Wesen der Sprache. […]. Denn als 
sammelndes vor-liegen-Lassen empfängt das Sagen seine Wesensart aus der 
Unverborgenheit des beisammen-vor-Liegenden. Die Entbergung aber des 
Verborgenen in das Unverborgene ist das Anwesen selbst des Anwesenden.98 
                                                 
95 Heidegger, ‘Logos’, p.203. Emphasis in original. 
96 Heidegger, ‘Logos’, p.203. 
97 Clark describes the intent well: ‘Heidegger is trying to draw out of the Greek words, legein and logos a 
legible trace of the pre-representational, holistic realm […] presupposed in all understanding. Legein/ logos 
names the pre-rational sense of order in the world of the Greeks, […], that pre-analytical synthesis whereby 
the world gave itself as non-chaotic, […]. Such gathering is not the methodized sequencing of deduction or 
of analysis, but a more originary and holistic sense of the order of things’, in Clark, T. Martin Heidegger 
(London: Routledge, 2002), p.83. 
98 Heidegger, ‘Logos’, p.204. 
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The earliest conception of language brings about, through a gathering of things in the 
world, the presencing of presence. Thus, for Heidegger, the very question of Sein, of its 
disclosure and, critically, of truth, comes to light for the pre-Socratics in language. This is 
closely aligned, in the terms used and their philosophical import, to the argument 
developed in relation to the thing-like quality of van Gogh’s painting and Strauß’ notion 
of Anwesenheit and the making manifest of world in the work of art. This aspect, the 
relationship of Logos to truth, though for the moment latent to the argument, is critical in 
development of Strauß’ poetic set out in Chapter Five.99 
Heidegger’s reading returns to thought the lost sense of Heraclitus’ Logos and aligns this 
with language and how things in the world come-into-presence. What, then, of the second 
motif that Heidegger argues is important to Heraclitus, namely Hören? As he continues 
the essay: ‘Was ist dann, wenn es so mit dem Wesen des Sprechens steht, das Hören?’.100 
This term, as it evokes the immanent ontological relationship whereby the world is 
disclosed to mankind, is also central to Strauß’ conceit in Beginnlosigkeit and is 
considered further in Chapter Three. Again, Heidegger distances his reading from the 
traditional and inherited sense of the word. Hören is not here conceived as aural 
sensation. Such an understanding only elides the suggestions attendant on the word. 
Heidegger is pushing a different intonation in Hören. In a recognisable inversion, he asks 
instead after ‘das eigentliche Hören’.101 The sense of Hören is developed first in relation 
to Sammeln: ‘Das Hören ist erstlich das gesammelte Horchen’. The term is then brought 
                                                 
99 For Heidegger logos is also truth: ‘Insofern der Λόγος das Vorliegende als ein solches vorliegen läßt, 
entbirgt er das Anwesen in sein Anwesen. Das Entbergen aber ist die Άλήθεια. Diese und der Λόγος sind 
das Selbe. […]. Der Λόγος ist in sich zumal ein Entbergen und Verbergen. Er ist die Άλήθεια’, in 
Heidegger, ‘Logos’, pp.212-213. 
100 Heidegger, ‘Logos’, p.205. 
101 Heidegger, ‘Logos’, p.205. 
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into association with language and Logos. As he writes: ‘Wir haben gehört, wenn wir 
dem Zugesprochenen gehören’.102 What is suggested hereby is not how mankind relates 
to things in the manner, for example, that the dictates of science and technological theory 
and practice require. In Heraclitus’ sense of Hören the world is not denoted according to 
concepts or mankind’s ability to grasp it. Hören invokes rather an immanent relationship 
between mankind and things or world. The sense is close to the manner in which the 
quality of the thing in the work of art comes-into-being for mankind. Strauß describes the 
same dynamic when he writes in another essay about ‘die einfache Öffnung zum Licht’ 
as the condition from which works of art are experienced.103 For Heidegger, the 
originating sense of Hören for mankind arises in conjunction with language and under 
certain specific conditions. 
Dem Sprechen gehören – dies ist nichts anderes als: jeweils das, was ein vor-
liegen-Lassen beisammen vorlegt, beisammen liegen lassen in seinem 
Gesamt. […]. Es legt dieses als es selbst. Es legt Eines und das Selbe in Eins. 
Es legt Eines als das Selbe.104 
The relationship to language suggested entails letting things come-into-presence for 
mankind as they are: like the world of the shoes in van Gogh’s painting or the girl in 
Strauß’ illustration of real presences. This does not denote a philosophical question of 
existence, but rather a fundamental concern for the fact that there is something and not 
nothing. 
With this final etymological excursus all the terms of this involved transformation of 
Heraclitus’ Logos are drawn together. 
                                                 
102 Heidegger, ‘Logos’, p.207. Emphasis in original. 
103 Strauß, ‘Zeit ohne Vorboten’. 
104 Heidegger, ‘Logos’, p.207. 
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Damit wird der Λόγος schlichthin genannt: ό Λόγος, das Legen: das reine 
beisammen-vor-liegen-Lassen des von sich her Vorliegenden in dessen 
Liegen. […]. Der Λόγος ist die ursprüngliche Versammlung der anfänglichen 
Lese aus der anfänglichen Lege. ό Λόγος ist: die lesende Lege und nur 
dieses.105 
For Heidegger, this is a dramatic insight, or as he puts it an unthought secret.106 It is a 
view overlooked in traditional theorisations of Logos, conceived only as the practice of 
language as either communication or in terms of utility, as these develop throughout 
modernity from the pre-Socratics. Instead, and this returns understanding of Logos to the 
heart of ontological concern: in language as Logos, Sein as Anwesenheit is made 
manifest. Fóti, although mainly critical of Heidegger’s postulate, states that the 
conclusion on Logos does not: 
constrain it in conformity with any project (such as the mathematical-
metaphysical project of modernity). It is concerned, rather, to safeguard, […], 
the unconstrained spontaneity of presencing. […] logos, as this gathering and 
gathered letting-lie-before does not create or impose the configurations of 
presencing but rather responds to the (epochal) spontaneity of un-
concealment.107 
What such declarations offer are the beginnings of a radically unsettling and 
disconcerting view and experience: of language, world and mankind’s relationship and 
place that counter the dominance and weight of the Western tradition. 
Where Strauß offers intense poetic fragments and illustrations of real presences, 
Heidegger develops lengthy philosophical essays. The proposition suggested in the 
reading of ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’ is that in these illustrations, and 
specifically the emphasis on the terms Anwesenheit and Logos, they are intimately bound 
                                                 
105 Heidegger, ‘Logos’, pp.207-208. 
106 Heidegger, ‘Logos’, p.205. 
107 Fóti, V. Heidegger and the Poets: Poiesis, Sophia, Techne (Atlantic Highlands NJ: Humanities Press, 
1992), p.8. 
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to the delineation by Heidegger. At this stage in the thesis, the terms and ideas and their 
invocation point towards an ontological concern in Strauß that is more philosophically 
fundamental than Steiner’s correspondence ascription of meaning between word and 
world, and the mimetic premise of his aesthetic. Before these are explored and grounded 
in detailed readings of Strauß’ works, what then of the second proposition noted above 
and the structural framework upon which Strauß’ and Heidegger’s respective conceits are 
founded? 
2.3.2 ‘aus dem Verlust des […] Urvertrauens in die Sprache’108 
Heidegger accepts that the transformation of Heraclitus is disconcerting to established 
sense. One of the reasons why the understanding of the fragment and the word ό λόγος 
appears so removed from established interpretative reason is, he argues, that the Western 
tradition has forgotten the originating power of disclosure in the word.  
In the fragment by Heraclitus, Sein and the truth of its disclosure are made manifest in 
language through the word Logos. The pre-Socratics were thus able in thought, 
Heidegger argues, to experience the originating power in language: 
Einmal jedoch, im Beginn des abendländischen Denkens, blitzte das Wesen 
der Sprache im Lichte des Seins auf. Einmal, da Heraklit den Λόγος als 
Leitwort dachte, um in diesem Wort das Sein des Seienden zu denken.109 
However, the force of disclosure is not something of which Heraclitus is aware in the 
fragment. Pre-Socratic thought does not reflect that it was bringing to expression the 
                                                 
108 Strauß, ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’, p.316. 
109 Heidegger, ‘Logos’, p.221. 
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essence of language and, through this, offering the experience of the truth of Sein. Rather, 
the flash of insight in Logos, for Heraclitus, is a consequence of how the Greeks then 
related to and thought in language. But, even at this moment, at the outset of Western 
thought, the originating power of the word becomes lost. Critically for the onward path of 
Western thought, the illuminating disclosure then attendant in and on language is passed. 
It is something forgotten that remains now outside the conventions of thought. As 
Heidegger writes: ‘dieser Aufblitz des Seins bleibt vergessen’.110 The amnesia of 
language in relation to this is a defining characteristic of modernity. 
Instead of continuing to experience Logos as the presencing of presence – ‘Bedenken wir 
erst, daß “Sein” anfänglich “Anwesen” heißt’ – language is in a process of falling away 
from its originating state.111 It comes to be regarded in terms associated with 
communication, is codified and correspondingly objectified. As Heidegger notes of this 
inexorable development: 
statt dessen wurde die Sprache […] von der Verlautbarung her vorgestellt […] 
als Laut und Stimme, phonetisch. […]. Dies besagt: die Sprache gelangt zum 
voraus in den Grundcharakter, den wir dann mit dem Namen ‘Ausdruck’ 
kennzeichnen.112 
Language, like the conceptualisation of the object-world developed over the course of 
Western thought, instead comes to be seen in terms of utility. 
Heidegger sketches three main periods in this forgetting of Sein as Logos.113 The first is 
the transition from Greek to Roman languages, particularly in the translation of key 
philosophical terms and ideas. This was the decisive step in the forgetting of the 
                                                 
110 Heidegger, ‘Logos’, p.219. 
111 Heidegger, ‘Logos’, p.221. 
112 Heidegger, ‘Logos’, pp.220-221. 
113 The structure of Heidegger’s argument applies not just to ό Λόγος but also to φυσις and τέχνη. 
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originating essence of thought experienced by the pre-Socratics. A further stage comes 
about during the Christian Middle Ages. This is followed by the advent of modernity, in 
particular in the philosophies of Descartes and Nietzsche and the legacy of their systems, 
which remain for Heidegger the predominant characteristics of the present age.114 
Strauß too adopts the same structure of argument for real presences; of an originary 
condition of language replete with revelatory possibility followed by a period of its 
darkening. His writing is infused by a retrospective gaze towards a first beginning. 
Although he doesn’t quite isolate a single caesura in intellectual history as the precise 
instance in Western thought of this fading away, his view of language is also that of a 
state of post-lapsarian degradation. The delineation of this is considered in Chapter Four. 
Strauß summarises Steiner’s argument, already noted, in ‘Der Aufstand gegen die 
sekundäre Welt’, that the break in the relationship of language to the world began at the 
end of the nineteenth century. Before this moment there exists an assumed 
correspondence between word and world reflected by conviction in the signification of 
meaning. Steiner marks this breach in the poetry of Mallarmé and his assertion that the 
word ‘rose’, designates, ‘l’absence de toute rose’.115 This places Western thought, as 
Steiner argues, ‘an der Quelle philosophischer und ästhetischer Moderne, am Punkt, an 
dem mit der Ordnung des Logos gebrochen wird’.116  It is the defining point at which the 
era of an immanence between word and world breaks apart, although of course, Steiner’s 
philosophical touchstones are different from Strauß’. Interestingly, underscoring the 
                                                 
114 For a summary account see Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik, pp.10-11. 
115 Steiner, Von realer Gegenwart, p.131. Emphasis in original. For a contrary reading in respect of 
Mallarmé that takes issue with Steiner’s thesis, see Bischof, R. ‘Das Buch nach dem Buch – Figuren des 
Widerrufs’, in manuskripte 32, Vol. 115, (1992), pp.115-125. 
116 Steiner, Von realer Gegenwart, p.131. Emphasis in original. 
 99
specific Heideggerian emphasis of Logos, Strauß too describes the previous unchallenged 
immanence of word and world as, ‘die Logos-Stiftung der Sprache’.117 
In ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’ Strauß offers his own broader influence for 
the linguistic and philosophical fissure, suggesting a shared central premise with 
Heidegger over the development of modernity. Although its consideration falls outside 
the present defined focus, Strauß highlights Nietzsche’s declaration of the death of God 
as a defining legacy for the current age, thereby inflecting Steiner’s dating of the period 
of ‘epilogue’. According to Strauß ‘dieser setzte zwar mit Nietzsches Todesurteil für den 
Logos-Gott schon früher ein’, a view he has articulated elsewhere in his writing.118 What, 
then, are the consequences of this falling away of an immanence in language for Strauß 
and Heidegger, and to what extent do they share the same premises? 
In the rupture between the word and world, an ontological affinity is unbalanced. 
Although the philosophical bases for his argument differ from those of Strauß, Steiner 
describes the linguistic agnosticism in the era of the secondary in terms with which he 
agrees:  
[…] gibt es in den Worten und Sätzen keine prästabilisierte Affinität mit 
Gegenständen, gibt es nicht das Mysterium eines Einklangs mit der Welt. 
Keine persona der Dinge, ob wahrgenommen oder noch der Offenbarung 
harrend, haftet der (rein willkürlichen) Artikulation der Syntax an.119 
                                                 
117 Strauß, ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’, p.316. 
118 Strauß, ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’, p.310. Strauß places a similar emphasis on Nietzsche 
in other works. In ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’ he writes of his hope for a ‘Wechsel der Mentalität’ from 
that which, ‘im Gefolge Nietzsches unseren geistigen Lebensraum mit unzähligen Spöttern […] übervölkert 
und eine bigotte Frömmigkeit des Politischen, des Kritischen und All-Bestreitbaren geschaffen hat’, in 
Strauß, ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’, p.15. In Beginnlosigkeit the sentiment is similar: ‘Der Mime, 
Nietzsches Histrione, Trickster der modernen Bewußtseins, dem es gelang, sich der Affekte früherer 
Epochen zu bedienen, deckt eine Weile noch seinen zerrissenen Zustand mit gerissenen Gebärden ab’, in 
Strauß, B. Beginnlosigkeit. Reflexionen über Fleck und Linie (Munich/Vienna: Hanser, 1992). p.25. 
119 Steiner, Von realer Gegenwart, p.143. 
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A radical scepticism is brought into play: the change signals an alteration in the way the 
world is viewed. As Strauß suggests: ‘Die Sprache verläßt uns nicht im Schweigen, 
sondern nur im A-Logos, in der Entbundenheit von Form, Sinn, auctoritas der 
Bedeutung’.120 
The fall away from an originating or originary language suggested by Heidegger and 
Strauß respectively, has consequences in modernity for our relationship to the object-
world. The falling away from language, and a forgetting of the originating essence of 
language – both aspects of the same dynamic – have a distorting effect on mankind’s 
ontological concern for world. Strauß describes this as: ‘Nichts ist unmittelbarer mit dem 
Schicksal der Erde verbunden als die Sprache’.121 Heidegger, in turn, details the 
consequences of this change for the relationship to the object world: 
Wir aber überspringen jetzt diesen ganzen Verlauf der Verunstaltung und des 
Verfalls und suchen die unzerstörte Nennkraft der Sprache und Worte wieder 
zu erobern; denn die Worte und die Sprache sind keine Hülsen, worin die 
Dinge nur für den redenden und schreibenden Verkehr verpackt werden. Im 
Wort, in der Sprache werden und sind erst die Dinge. Deshalb bringt uns auch 
der Mißbrauch der Sprache im bloßen Gerede, in den Schlagworten und 
Phrasen um den echten Bezug zu den Dingen.122 
Strauß expresses the same distorted relationship, and draws the implication: ‘In der 
Sprache können wir Tag für Tag weniger Welt bewältigen’.123 What is thereby evoked is 
an erosion of the possibility of experience in and of the work of art. This is, he claims, an 
inexorable process whereby the very structures of mankind’s experience of world, his 
Wahrnehmung are dismantled. Strauß’ idea of mankind’s Wahrnehmung in relation to the 
                                                 
120 Strauß, ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’, p.317. Emphasis in original. 
121 Strauß, ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’, p.317. The thesis considers in the development of 
Strauß’ poetics of dwelling how the idea of nature and the earth is important, and is bound up with the issue 
of poetic language in Chapter Five. 
122 Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik, p.11. 
123 Strauß, ‘Zeit ohne Vorboten’. 
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use and practice of science and technology and proposal of an alternative are considered 
in Chapter Three. Strauß notes of the un-coupling of language from the sense of world: 
‘Aber die Worte entfernen sich unaufhaltsam von dem, was Gestalt ist an uns’.124 
For Strauß, the changed ontological status of language defines the present period of late 
modernity where the primary position of language is replaced by a state of the secondary, 
and its continual mediation. Competing discourses and idioms – understood as Heidegger 
conceives language as formalised after the pre-Socratics – are ceaselessly articulated and 
disseminated, making it difficult to distinguish or experience any substantive sense of an 
originary alternative. Journalism, Strauß contends, is the pre-eminent form of this 
language for the period. As Steiner, in turn, remarks of such language in the era after 
logos:  
Jeden Tag werden durch den Journalismus, durch das Journalistisch-
Akademische der inhärente Wert, die Produktivkräfte, die in einer 
schöpferischen Währung, nämlich in der Vitalität des Ästhetischen 
verkörperten Ersparnisse entwertet.125 
For Strauß, everyday discourses are similarly dominated by practitioners of the secondary 
such as the media. The effect on language is corrosive, its power absolute, and it alters 
the way the world comes to be viewed. Its very success means that this is not called into 
question. As Strauß declares:   
Der uns beherrschende Text, die tagtägliche Zeitung, entlarvt indessen überall 
das scheinhafte Wort, er macht das Gewebe der Welt fadenscheinig. Nichts 
anderes ist freilich ihre Aufgabe, und man brauchte kein Wort darüber zu 
verlieren, wären die Dienstleistungen des Durchschauens und des Mißtrauens 
                                                 
124 Strauß, ‘Zeit ohne Vorboten’. 
125 As Steiner goes on to write: ‘Der Papierleviathan sekundäre Gesprächs schluckt nicht nur das 
Prophetische (in aller ernsten dichterischen und künstlerischen Erfindung gibt es Prophezeiung und die 
Prophezeiung von Erinnerung): er spuckt es wieder aus, und zwar reduziert und zerkleinert’, in Steiner, 
Von realer Gegenwart, p.71. It is against this particular challenge that the present thesis on Strauß’ primary 
works is in continual tension. 
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nicht beinahe das alleingültige, konkurrenzlose Angebot, das heute allem 
öffentlichen und privaten Verstehen der Welt aufgenötigt wird, in und 
vermittels der Sprache.126 
Heidegger too has argued for the inevitability of certain consequences on modern society 
and culture of such a use of language. His description of language as communication, 
conceptualised in terms of its utility and a corresponding specialisation of intellectual 
labour, bears the early hallmarks of Strauß’ classification of the secondary as a distinctive 
approach to language from the primacy of the work and the poetic. Heidegger describes 
the consequences thus: 
Sobald diese werkzeugliche Mißdeutung des Geistes einsetzt, rücken die 
Mächte des geistigen Geschehens, Dichtung und bildende Kunst, 
Staatsschaffung […] in den Umkreis einer möglichen bewußten Pflege und 
Planung. Sie werden zugleich in Gebiete aufgeteilt. Die geistige Welt wird zur 
Kultur […]. […] Die Kultur-Werte sichern sich im Ganzen einer Kultur nur 
dadurch Bedeutung, daß sie sich auf ihre Selbstgeltung einschränken: 
Dichtung um der Dichtung, Kunst um der Kunst, Wissenschaft um der 
Wissenschaft willen.127 
It is noteworthy that this conception of language and its uses also has consequences for 
mankind in both Heidegger’s and Strauß’ writing, although they clearly refer to and 
describe very different historical contexts. 
Strauß shares a deep conviction in the consequences. Aside from the characterisation in 
‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’ of a tragic trajectory for Western culture and society, the 
tone in which the secondary condition of late modernity is couched is unmistakable:  
Vom Finger bleibt nichts als der Fingerzeig. Der Körper verflüchtigt zum 
Digital, der Sozialkörper zum Medial. Ein geschlossener Austausch von 
Täuschungen […]. Was ist das Blau des Himmels anderes als eine 
Lichtbrechung, was der Kummer mehr als ein Mangel an Serotin … ? Die 
                                                 
126 Strauß, ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’, p.312. My emphasis. 
127 Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik, p.36. Emphasis in original. 
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Erde mehr als ein Ort immer höher steigender Abstraktion? Der Wissenswille 
ist als Fluch nicht einschränkbar, der ewige Rückenwind vom Paradies 
128[…].  
Heidegger’s thought, of course, is stimulated by a conviction in the myopia of Western 
thought, a myopia he regards as nearing its apotheosis, leading to a bleak characterisation 
of modernity. 
en wie Pessimismus und Optimismus längst lächerlich 
geworden sind.129  
The consequences of these considerations is of a danger to mankind arising from the 
relationship to world manifested in language. The philosophical nature and origin of this 
threat is considered in the following chapter. This is the main characteristic of modernity, 
its legacy, and it is viewed by Strauß and Heidegger in similarly critical terms. 
For Strauß there is much more at stake in the discussion of real presences and the 
dominant and distorting influence of a secondary conception of language than a loss of 
status and position of the aesthetic. In a telling image he delineates the consequences of 
the lost immanence, which places the ontological primacy of Anwesenheit under erasure 
and elides the power of disclosure in Logos. Mankind is, Strauß maintains, reminded by 
the arguments concerning these terms, ‘daß nicht nur das natürliche, biologische Haus der 
Erde, sondern ebenso das geistige beschädigt und bedroht ist und nicht minder dringend 
                                                
Der geistige Verfall der Erde ist so weit fortgeschritten, […] denn die 
Verdüsterung der Welt, die Flucht der Götter, die Zerstörung der Erde, die 
Vermassung des Menschen, der hassende Verdacht gegen alles Schöpferische 
und Freie hat auf der ganzen Erde bereits ein Ausmaß erreicht, daß so 
kindische Kategori
 
128 Strauß, ‘Zeit ohne Vorboten’. 
129 Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik, p.29. Strauß uses the same image of the absence of the Gods 
in an essay published after ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’. See Strauß, ‘Wollt ihr das totale 
Engineering?’. 
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der Erhaltungs- und Schutzmaßnahmen bedürfte’.130 In Heidegger’s ‘Logos’ essay a 
cognate of the image of home plays a defining role in suggesting how language is 
originally experienced. Describing the manner of the pre-Socratic disclosure of Sein in 
language he writes: 
Ό Λόγος wäre dann der griechische Name für das Sprechen als Sagen, für die 
Sprache. […]. In der Tat: die Griechen wohnten in diesem Wesen der 
Sprache.131 
The Greeks, according to Heidegger, dwelt in language and in dwelling come to 
experience the luminous presencing of presence, as Anwesenheit. It is a characterisation, 
or rather conceit, particularly in relation to the work of art and the potential salvation 
from the pervasive threat of modernity offered specifically by the poetic, that is central to 
this thesis. The poetic is the site for mankind of an alternative approach to the world. 
Before evaluating the characteristics of originary language and the poetic as Strauß 
brings them to light, it is necessary to consider further the nature of the threat arising 
from the disappearance of such language and its philosophical basis. As Strauß writes in 
another essay: 
Die Moderne geht keineswegs mit Parodie oder Postmoderne zu Ende, 
sondern sie verschwindet im Bruch mit der Poesie unseres Denkens 
insgesamt. Mit der Ablösung der Reflexion durch ein technisch-
informatorisches Wissen, dem Wissen mit der geringsten geschichtlichten 
Ekstatik und dem universellsten Anspruch.132 
                                                 
130 Strauß, ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’, pp.312-313. Steiner too anticipates Strauß’ particular 
critique and formulation: ‘Ich meine, daß wir uns nicht einrichten können mit den Tatsachen unserer 
Unbehaustheit, unserer Vertriebenheit aus einer zentralen Humanität, angesichts der flutartigen 
Provokationen politischer Barbarei und technokratischer Sklaverei, wenn wir nicht das Lebendige der 
Bedeutung in Text, in Musik, in Kunst neu definieren, neu erfahren. Wir müssen zur Erkenntnis, recht 
eigentlich also zur Weidererkenntnis einer Bedeutungshaftigkeit gelangen’, in Steiner, Von realer 
Gegenwart, p.73. My emphasis. 
131 Heidegger, ‘Logos’, p.220. Emphasis in original. 
132 Strauß, ‘Zeit ohne Vorboten’. 
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The demise of language first arises, Strauß maintains, through the dominion of 
technological knowledge and, second, from its distorting effects. It is to Strauß’ treatment 
of science and technology in late modernity, its transformation of the object-world and 
mankind’s Wahrnehmung, and the philosophical foundations for this that the argument 
now turns. 
CHAPTER THREE 
IN NEED OF ORIGIN: REFLECTIONS ON BEGINNLOSIGKEIT 
3.1 The enigma of beginning 
The bibliophile’s conflicting sense of fascinated wonder and confused frustration at the 
thought and experience of a book without end is conveyed in the short story by Jorge 
Luis Borges (1899-1986), ‘The Book of Sand’.1 In the short work, the first-person 
narrator exchanges his treasured ‘Wycliff black-letter Bible’ and presumably less 
valuable pension for the enigmatic book of the title.2 After repeatedly confirming that his 
new acquisition indeed has no end – and therefore no beginning – he marvels: the 
‘number of pages in this book is literally infinite. No page is the first page; no page is the 
last’.3 However, at this realisation, the attractive prospect of prose without limit shades 
into the obsessive anxiety of narrative without beginning. 
The idea of beginning – whether of a cause to events or an origin for things – lies deeply 
embedded in the Western tradition. The philosopher David Hume (1711-1776), for 
example, argues in his challenge to the generally accepted principle of causality that the 
impression of a causal relation, and therefore of an explanatory beginning for 
experienced phenomena, has no necessary basis in formal logic, but is rather the 
experience of what he terms a ‘constant conjunction’.4 Hume provides various 
illustrations, one infamously of striking billiard balls. A parallel example is fitting for the 
                                                 
1 Borges, J. L. ‘The Book of Sand’, in Collected Fictions (London: Penguin, 1999), pp.480-485. 
2 Borges, ‘The Book of Sand’, p.482. 
3 Borges, ‘The Book of Sand’, p.482. 
4 Hume, D. The Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: OUP, 2000), in particular the section ‘Of Knowledge 
and Probability’. 
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conclusion to Strauß’ challenging prose work Beginnlosigkeit. Reflexionen über Fleck 
und Linie. It is noteworthy for unsettling convention and accepted beliefs regarding the 
object-world. Hume reasons that, just because in the past sunrise follows night, and the 
latter event is, in turn, preceded by sunset, there is no reason why this should continue to 
be so in the future.5 There is no philosophically necessary connection between the end of 
one event and the beginning of another. It is simply the experience of such a 
‘conjunction’ in the past that gives rise to the supposition that it will be so in the future. 
Leaving to one side the implications for scepticism and the precepts of inductive reason 
of Hume’s argument, the principal point here is that the conceptual tenets of cause-effect, 
of beginning and end, are profoundly rooted in the Western tradition’s view and 
understanding of the world and mankind’s place in it. Consequently, its questioning is de-
stabilising for long-held, seemingly self-evident truths. This is critical to Strauß’ plea for 
the persistence of an idea of beginning as origin. Other thinkers too experience such a 
confusion arising from its questioning. In his Frankfurt lectures, Peter Sloterdijk, for 
example, reflecting on the status of beginning in narrative, expresses a similar 
bewilderment. He reflects: ‘Das Anfangen ist eine seltsame Sache. Wenn ich nicht 
darüber nachdenke, weiß ich, was anfangen ist, denke ich aber darüber nach, weiß ich es 
nicht’.6 
                                                 
5 Strauß ends Beginnlosigkeit with a fragment where the boundaries between night and day are suspended. 
See section 3.3. below. 
6 Sloterdijk, P. Zur Welt kommen – zur Sprache kommen. Frankfurter Vorlesungen (Munich: Suhrkamp, 
1988), p.31. 
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The uncertainty engendered by Borges’s story and Sloterdijk’s succinct articulation of the 
disorientation arising from thinking about beginning, and the beginning of beginning, are 
a good place to commence a reading of Strauß’ Beginnlosigkeit.7 
3.1.1 The demise of beginning: Linie 
Published in 1992 shortly after ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’, Beginnlosigkeit 
shares a number of characteristics with that essay. The parenthetic addendum to the title – 
‘Reflexionen über Fleck und Linie’ – suggests a philosophical engagement with its 
subject matter and indicates too that the work is not conventional, either as a work of 
fiction or in creation and delineation of recognisable character and narrative. Moreover, 
in its many explicit scientific and technological touchstones, which in turn evoke 
continuity with Niemand anderes published a year before ‘Der Aufstand’, 
Beginnlosigkeit raises again an idea with which Strauß begins the essay, namely 
Emergenz noted in the preceding chapter. In ‘Der Aufstand’, Strauß uses Emergenz, 
which he derives from the biological sciences, to convey the idea of the original creation 
of the art work and, more fundamentally, of ontological categories such as world.8 In 
Beginnlosigkeit, Strauß explores these concerns further, specifically in relation to current 
intellectual, scientific and technological paradigms. 
                                                 
7 Sloterdijk playfully argues for the ‘Unterschied zwischen Anfangen und Amanfanganfangen’. The 
distinction is useful in thinking about Strauß’ argument for a retrieval of an originary experience in 
Beginnlosigkeit. See Sloterdijk, Zur Welt kommen – zur Sprache kommen, p.35. 
8 ‘Was geschah, besaß vielmehr etwas von jener Ereigniskraft, die man in den biologischen Wissenschaften 
mit dem Ausdruck, “Emergenz” bezeichnet: etwas Neues, etwas, das sich aus bisheriger Erfahrung nicht 
ableiten ließ, trat plötzlich in Erscheinung und veränderte […] die Welt’, in Strauß, ‘Der Aufstand gegen 
die sekundäre Welt’, p.305. Emphasis in original. 
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Another distinctive attribute of Beginnlosigkeit is the plethora of writers and allusions 
littering the work. While such referencing is a well-documented feature of Strauß’ 
writing, the frequency of citations reaches new heights here. The role of cited authors and 
their respective theories has come to dominate the relatively limited reception of this 
prose work. 
Lämmerman draws particular attention to these references, cataloguing writers by 
intellectual discipline.9 Drawing on this, Hárs, in turn, highlights the associated scientific 
and technological theories. As he remarks: 
die Liste der anvisierten Theorien ist an sich erstaunlich: Chaosforschung 
(Fraktale), kosmologische Theorien (Steady-State-Theorie; anthropisches 
Prinzip), Kybernetik, Neurobiologie, Radikaler Konstruktivismus, Theorien 
physikalischer Zeit, Wahrnehmungspsychologie etc.10 
These studies are noteworthy because they concentrate interpretations of Beginnlosigkeit 
on its incorporation of scientific and technological theory, with each commentator 
emphasising one particular referenced discipline.11 
Furthermore, a number of studies argue that in Beginnlosigkeit Strauß is attempting to 
merge scientific disciplines and precepts with literary practice to create a distinct fusion 
of science and poetry. Thus, Daiber in his full-length monograph, which aims, ‘so schnell 
wie möglich einen Bezug zwischen der naturwissenschaftlichen Theorie und den Strauß-
Texten zu schaffen’, shows how Strauß incorporates different theories, including the 
‘enorme Komplexität’ of ‘Quantenmechanik’ and ‘Chaostheorie’ respectively, across his 
                                                 
9 She includes German, French and British writers, painters, composers, theatre producers, film makers, 
philosophers (curiously she excludes Heidegger from her original list even though he is mentioned 
explicitly at three points in Beginnlosigkeit), scientists including physicists and cosmologists, psycho-
therapists and cognitive psychologists. See Lämmerman, Für unser Werk mein Liebster, pp.78ff. 
10 Hárs, Singularität , p.170. 
11 Accordingly, Lämmerman highlights cybernetics, Neumann emphasises chaos-theory while Daiber 
focuses on steady-state cosmology. See Hárs, Singularität , p.176. 
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plays and prose works.12 At one stage in his argument though, Daiber questions whether 
some of the scientific and technological theses he presents are in fact highly speculative. 
Of one such theory, which he argues is adopted by Strauß for Die Zeit und das Zimmer, 
he writes: ‘Eine Vorstellung, die nach Science-fiction klingt (aber) von einigen 
Naturwissenschaftlern für durchaus plausibel gehalten wird’.13 Overall, in spite of the 
ambitious breadth of Daiber’s reference, none of these disparate, mathematically complex 
models is really adequately considered. Although Daiber and others undoubtedly 
illustrate that Strauß uses such theories as reference points in his writing, the implication 
of each idea and its incorporation in his work remains open. It isn’t sufficient to address 
questions of how or why theories are mediated in Beginnlosigkeit by fleeting reference 
only to non-specialist monographs. On technical explanations of general relativity theory 
or bio-genetics, for example, Literaturwissenschaftler are perhaps best silent.14 
Nonetheless, Daiber’s overall conclusion that ‘Botho Strauß bildet Analogien zwischen 
den getrennten Sphären von Wissen und Mythos’, which picks up on the relationship 
with the Romantics, remains influential for commentators. Thomas, for example, 
contends that Strauß aims for a ‘Verschmelzung von Wissenschaft und Glaube’.15 Funke 
makes much the same claim and suggests that the work represents a ‘Verschmelzung von 
Poesie und Wissenschaft’.16 And finally, Bellmann follows suit, arguing that 
                                                 
12 Daiber, J. Poetisierte Naturwissenschaft. Zur Rezeption naturwissenschaftlicher Theorien im Werk von 
Botho Strauß (Frankfurt-am-Main: Peter Lang, 1996), p.21. 
13 Daiber, Poetisierte Naturwissenschaft, p.111. 
14 See Daiber, Poetisierte Naturwissenschaft, pp.62 and 116. Berka makes a similar point about what 
substantive contribution, if any, is made by literary critics to the understanding of the science in discussing 
the very short contribution by Riemer on Beginnlosigkeit whom she describes as ‘einer der wenigen 
Germanisten mit einem Doktor in Physik’. See Berka, ‘Botho Strauß und die Debatte um den 
“Bocksgesang”’, p.175.  
15 Thomas, Botho Strauß und die ‘Konservative Revolution’, p.220. 
16 Funke, Über das Höhere in der Literatur, p.78. 
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Beginnlosigkeit signals a possible ‘Versöhnung von Mythos and Wissenschaft’.17 These 
commentators are pre-occupied in their respective readings with Strauß’ incorporation of 
scientific and technological theory by the validity or otherwise of each referenced 
epistemology, rather than their possible philosophical implications.18 
Those commentators who do chase the sources in greater detail indicate that although 
Strauß’ references to such theories are precise and scholarly, he often either simplifies or 
distorts the intent or argument of the original.19 Such observations are interesting and 
indicate that Strauß’ adoption of referenced theories may not, after all, be primarily 
concerned with either the development of a technologically-grounded form of writing, or 
a poetic reconciliation of Naturwissenschaft and Literatur. 
Conversely, other more hostile critics condemn what they regard as Strauß’ unconsidered 
or naïve subsumption of scientific and technological theory, and in this variously echo the 
charge of fatalism. Drews, for example, asserts that his reckoning with ‘den allerneuesten 
Denkmodellen und Weltentstehungstheoremen’ in Beginnlosigkeit is negated by 
developments within the discipline of modern physics.20 As he argues: ‘Strauß […] hat 
sich an ein rasch vorübergehendes – […] gerade in Mode befindliches – 
astrophysikalisches Theorem gehalten, und nun fehlt seinem Buch eigentlich die 
                                                 
17 Bellmann, ‘Poetologie und Zeit-Kritik in Botho Strauß’, p.42. 
18 This thesis refers to theories and epistemologies to indicate that what are under consideration are not 
individual, specific scientific or technological theses but, rather, the assumptions and precepts underpinning 
the range of such intellectual disciplines. 
19 Lämmerman, for example, highlights citation of Keidel’s work on cybernetics (see Beginnlosigkeit, 
p.74), extracts from which are taken almost verbatim, as well as Strauß’ quoting from Prigogines and 
Hofstadter respectively (see Beginnlosigkeit, pp.40 and 48). 
20 Drews, J. ‘Ein bißchen erschüttert, aber immer liebenswürdig’, in Neue deutsche Literatur 9 (1992), 
pp.141-142. 
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Grundlage’.21 Furthermore, he asserts that Strauß’ referencing is uncritical, noting of 
Beginnlosigkeit: ‘zum Teil macht sich […] eine Art depressive Ratlosigkeit breit’.22 This 
criticism is also made by von Randow who states that the work, ‘ist ein Typ 
unvermittelter Übersetzung von Naturwissenschaft in Sozialphilosophie, ein naiver 
Szientismus, von dem man eigentlich glauben durfte, er sei endgültig überwunden’.23 
Hagestedt, in his study, echoes such sentiment and argues, in line with the different 
aspects of fatalism outlined in the preceding chapters, that the work, ‘einen 
Vertiefungsweg nach innen beschreitet’, retreats into subjectivism and so fails to 
incorporate or refer to the social and political context of its creation, and its status as art 
work.24 As he writes, Strauß, ‘negiert […] die Möglichkeit, die Emergenz von Kunst aus 
sozialen und kulturellen Bedingungen herzuleiten’.25 Raising the political implication 
suggested by fatalism he claims Strauß’ prose thus reflects views, ‘die als “rechts” 
eingestuft werden’.26 
Finally, Bergfleth, in one of the most favourable readings of the work, pushes beyond the 
dominant interpretative emphasis on Strauß’ adoption of science and technology. He 
describes Beginnlosigkeit principally as ‘philosophische Theorie’, arguing that Strauß 
posits a post-technological world where the intellectual constraints arising from the 
                                                 
21 Drews, ‘Ein bißchen erschüttert’, p.141. 
22 Drews, ‘Ein bißchen erschüttert’, p.143. 
23 von Randow, G. ‘Postmodernes Wortgeklingel’, in Die Zeit 30 December, 1994. 
24 Hagestedt, ‘Botho Strauß: Literatur als Erkenntnis’, p.279. The philosophical provenance of this 
subjectivism and its implications, manifested, for example, in Strauß’ treatment of theories of ‘radical 
constructivism’, is dealt with in section 3.2 below. 
25 Hagestedt, ‘Botho Strauß: Literatur als Erkenntnis’, p.279. 
26 Hagestedt, ‘Botho Strauß: Literatur als Erkenntnis’, p.279. Hagestedt also argues that the ‘Reflexionen’ 
of the work’s subtitle alludes to Adorno’s Minima Moralia and confirms ‘Strauß’ anti-aufklärerische 
Wende’. 
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general application of science and technology are lifted.27 However, although he raises 
the issue of an implicit critique of modern technology running through the work, 
Bergfleth leaves this important issue undeveloped. Moreover, the emphasis of the study 
on a projected post-technological utopian environment leaves the dynamic potential of 
Strauß’ re-conceptualisation of origin marginalized. It takes the idea of ‘Beginnlosigkeit’ 
as telos, rather than the manifestation of an intellectual condition that is actually lamented 
by Strauß and subjected to critique. Bergfleth, in his argument for a ‘statische Welt’, 
although recognising the outline of Strauß’ radical counter-postulate in Beginnlosigkeit 
nevertheless furthers the idea of the subject’s renunciation of object-world embodied by 
fatalism. 
In conjunction with the focus on scientific theory, some commentators also claim other 
themes as central to Beginnlosigkeit, such as the treatment of ‘time’, ‘production’, or the 
work’s status as literature.28 However, leaving the partialities of interpretive emphasis 
aside, all commentators concur on the pervading sense of crisis in the work, and the view 
that the loosely drawn character only referred to as ‘Er’ (any biography is left oblique and 
it is noteworthy that the ‘Er’ is at no point conceived as an individual character), 
experiences or is the focus of that crisis.29 The second very short fragment to 
Beginnlosigkeit evokes this clearly: 
In der Ferne tuten die kleinen Signalhörner und melden, daß eine Sprengung 
in der Schlucht bevorsteht.30 
                                                 
27 Bergfleth, G. ‘Die statische Welt und die Technik. Überlegungen zur Beginnlosigkeit von Botho Strauß’, 
in Der Pfahl. Jahrbuch aus dem Niemandsland zwischen Kunst und Wissenschaft VI (1992), p.250. 
28 See Bellmann, Lämmerman and Hárs’ studies respectively. 
29 Further references in this thesis to this ‘Er’ are to the ‘Er’-figure to emphasise that ‘he’ should not be 
regarded as embodying a single person or set of attributes but instead stands, more generally, for mankind. 
30 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.7. 
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However, the crisis is not readily identifiable with any one of those themes noted by 
commentators. Just as subsequent fragments veer off in seemingly disparate directions – 
the next fragment begins ‘die Neuronenverbände feuern im Gleichtakt, bis zu vierzigmal 
in der Sekunde […] Wahrnehmung beginnt’ – so the ‘Er’-figure is also confined to an 
unstable world reflected in the overall fragmentary structure of Beginnlosigkeit itself.31 
As Strauß writes: ‘Mit einem Wort: sein Denken existiert gewissermaßen nur in der 
Gedankenflucht’.32 Thus, the disorientation felt by the ‘Er’-figure appears to have no 
readily identifiable cause or beginning. As the final fragment on the opening page of the 
work confirms, despite his best efforts the ‘Er’-figure remains caught – significantly – 
within a turmoil that pre-dates both the opening of the book and the specific 
announcement of ‘eine Sprengung’. What then is this crisis, and is there anything to point 
to its cause? 
One fleeting but suggestive instance of orientation comes mid-way through 
Beginnlosigkeit. Here Strauß writes: 
Kommen und Gehen, Auf und Ab, Wiege und stetes Schwanken. Dieselben 
Dinge nähern sich, entfernen sich. Dieselben Dinge sind heute ein 
Geheinmnis, morgen eine öde physische Gegebenheit. Das Erkennen 
schaukelt wie ein leerer Kahn auf den Uferwellen.33 
While this does not obviously suggest a cause of the crisis it hints at its experience: the 
disorientation relates, on one level, to perception. The present argument suggests 
however – picking up on the fragment quoted above where Strauß notes that 
‘Wahrnehmung beginnt’ – that at a more fundamental level the crisis is concerned with 
how the external world is, how it is manifested in the terms set out in the previous 
                                                 
31 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.7. 
32 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.8. 
33 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.57. 
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chapter, for the ‘Er’-figure. The thesis also calls this his Wahrnehmung. The following 
discussion sets out a number of Strauß’ terms, which lead to two distinctive structures or 
forms of Wahrnehmung postulated in Beginnlosigkeit. Key to each, though, is the 
relationship between mankind and thing: the cognisant ‘Er’-figure and the object-world, 
albeit ostensibly with few substantive points of orientation. The philosophical basis of 
this dualism, and the relationship of this schism to the critique of science and technology 
forms the focus of this chapter. In this, Beginnlosigkeit is not concerned with the detail, 
let alone empirical validity, of differing epistemologies but continues Strauß’ engagement 
with more fundamental ontological concerns. 
To suggest the disjuncture of subject and object, Strauß introduces neologisms in 
Beginnlosigkeit that disconcert some commentators and again reflect the criticism 
levelled at him following publication of ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’.34 Strauß writes 
concerning the ‘Er’-figure: ‘Ihm war nicht et-was, sondern ab-was vorhanden’.35 What 
do these charged and philosophically evocative terms suggest? The experience of Abwas 
is contradictory, with the object simultaneously absent and present to the subject. Thus, 
the world is present as Abwas yet, contemporaneously, signals its absence as thing. 
Strauß is here setting out the philosophical basis for Beginnlosigkeit. He describes Abwas 
furth
ität die eines Trichterlochs: es tilgt, es saugt, 
er: 
Das Abwas ist ein Ding der Abwesenheit und scheinbar ein Ding der 
Erinnerung. Doch ist seine Aktiv
                                                 
34 See Görner, ‘Im Schatten des Mythos’, pp.548ff and Chapter One. 
35 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.57. 
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es entwendet […]. Ein Abwas besitzt tausend Saugmünder, ist ein einziges 
36
Although these terms still provide no explanation as to the cause of the crisis, Strauß 
invites comparison with two precedents. He conjectures: ‘Müßte es ihn nicht in ebenso 
tiefe Unruhe versetzen wie einst den Dichter Kleist die Lektüre Kants?’
weltabsaugendes Plasmodium.  
the d ord 
Chan d: 
hen, as well as the relationship between subject and object-world also 
                                                
37 However, 
Strauß is not saying that the crisis is identical to that of Kleist, although the comparison 
supports the contention that it is ultimately concerned with Wahrnehmung and, therefore, 
the relationship between subject and object-world. Extending the philosophical reach of 
ichotomy, Strauß introduces another literary precedent in Hofmannstahl’s L
dos.38 The ‘Er’-figure experiences a similar dissolution between word and worl
Zuerst hatte er nichts mehr berühren wollen, dann nichts mehr benennen 
können. Er war vor den Dingen zu den Wörtern geflohen, dann von den 
Benennungen zu den Beziehungen, die die Wörter  untereinander herstellen.39 
The crisis, t
involves language. The implications of this are considered in the concluding section of 
this chapter. 
What is suggested by these two literary precedents for the ‘Er’-figure’s experience of 
intellectual turmoil and crisis is a development in his frames of reference. Thus, in these 
two examples, where the first relates to the relationship between subject and object-
 
36 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.57. 
37 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.13. Drews suggests that it is Strauß’ intent to precipitate a similar crisis in the 
reader: ‘Man hat den Eindruck, daß Strauß willentlich bei sich etwas herbeiführen will, was die sogenannte 
“Kant-Krise” bei Heinrich von Kleist […] war’, in Drews, ‘Ein bißchen erschüttert’, p.142. 
38 ‘Jener schmerzhafte Bewußtseinsschub, den Hofmannsthals Lord Chandos zu Beginn des 20. 
Jahrhunderts ertrug, da ihm die Wörter, die Dinge in Teile und diese wiederum in Teile zerfielen, erweist 
sich am Ende desselben als Gleichnis […] des komplexen Begreifens’, in Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.117. 
See also p.13 where Chandos is mentioned in connection with Valéry’s ‘Monsieur Teste’. 
39 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.128. 
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world, the second suggests the historically later fissure that Steiner takes as the central 
premise of his argument, namely a breach in covenant between word and world: both 
involve mankind’s experience of the world. For Strauß, as noted above, it is not the 
specific detail of each of these crises that is of immediate concern. Rather, they show a 
devel uß 
as pa
Mitteilungen, der unterschwelligen Verständigungen, die möglicherweise eher 
 ‘Er’-figure of differing 
episte  war 
er au ribe 
this conceptualisation of this form of mankind’s Wahrnehmung: 
Ging nicht also Entwicklung von Rund zu Rund, von Fertigsein zu Fertigsein, 
Weile, ein jeweils angemessenes Verstehen und Wahrnehmen der Welt, das so 
 a novel synthesis. 
                                                
opment in the ‘Er’-figure’s Wahrnehmung. This development is described by Stra
rt of mankind’s nature, a conceit central to Western civilisation, based on a Faustian 
impetus to grasp the world: 
Er wollte seinerseits keine Lücke bilden im fleißigen Gewebe der 
zum Innersten gehören, das die Welt zusammenhält […].40 
Strauß is suggesting that the moderation and negotiation between different intellectual 
structures or epistemologies, whether of Kantian metaphysics, Hofmannstahl’s scepticism 
or different technological theory, is a defining experience for the
mologies. As he notes of the figure: ‘In seiner spätmodernen Verfassung, […]
sgerüstet für das Absolute wie für das äußerst Relative’.41 Strauß goes on to desc
war nicht jede Etappe ein kleiner Kosmos für sich, eine kleine geschlossene 
lange beibehalten wurde, bis sich gewisse Unstimmigkeiten einstellten?42 
The fragment portrays a conceptual framework for knowledge premised on incremental 
development of different theories suggesting dialectical progression in Wahrnehmung 
toward enlightened, if impermanent, resolution: of movement between successive 
worldviews, their inherent partiality and subsequent resolution through
 
40 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.33. 
41 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.47. 
42 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.133. My emphasis. 
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This thesis argues that scientific and technological theory, as referenced and presented in 
Beginnlosigkeit, conforms to such a dialectic. The development is also imaged in Strauß’ 
prose work, like Borges’s ‘Book of Sand’, as necessarily without end. 
The significance of this implicit philosophy of science for the overall intent of 
Beginnlosigkeit and Strauß’ critique of technology is considered in detail below. At this 
Notw and 
object-world is suggested to be progressing, an unsatisfied, inexplicable intellectual 
longing endures. Strauß writes of this sense in the ‘Er’-figure: 
Etwa zwischen der Ahnung, daß sich das meiste in weit komplizierteren 
Skotomen, schützende Blindheiten, gegenwärtig erkennbar sein kann.  
Neither the dissolution nor momentary stasis offered by various explanatory scientific 
and technological epistemologies can obviate a yearning, innate to the figure and, 
therefore Strauß suggests, to mankind.  The ‘Er’-figure is drawn back by the persistence 
of an alternative Wahrnehmung, which doesn’t conform to the explanation and resolution 
embodied by empiricist and positivist theory. It is, however, neither easily definable, nor 
phical parameters. 
                                                
stage it is necessary only to note it, in order to introduce a number of other terms, in 
addition to Abwas, important in the understanding of the work, Strauß’ move to re-
inscribe origin and his adoption of Heideggerian ontology. 
ithstanding the proposed dialectic along which mankind’s knowledge of himself 
Formen bewegt und erhält, als es uns, deren Bewußtsein übersät ist mit 
43
44
ever satisfactorily contained by language. The experience draws close to the elusive 
quality set out in the previous chapter, and it is the aim of the present argument to 
delineate its philoso
 
43 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.47. 
44 This is developed further in the discussion of the ‘Nanos’ motif in section 3.3 below. 
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Impo ms or structures of Wahrnehmung are the basis for the two 
motifs central to Beginnlosigkeit. Strauß terms them Fleck and Linie respectively and 
defin
Er ist alles seelisch Gemeinte, nicht konturierbar, in mehrdeutiger Gestalt sich 
Sie ist die gebündelte Helle, und ihr Mysterium ist ihr offenes Ende, ihre 
uggestive in his delineation of the contradictory 
affinity between the two: ‘daß der undeutliche Fleck aufschlußreicher, die vereinfachende 
Linie jedoch erhellender ist. […]. Wir haben es hier also mit einem Verhältnis 
wechselseitigen Ausschlusses zu tun’.  
tructure – ‘das Gitter der Wahrnehmung’ as 
Strau ce 
and ung 
associated with Fleck. As Strauß comments: 
Wäre so manches nicht bis zum Ersticken komplett und zugespitzt 
dahingeschrieben, er hätte gewiß beim Lesen leichter atmen können, hätte  hin 
rtantly, these alternate for
es them thus: 
Der Fleck und die Linie. 
verlaufend. 
Unabsehbarkeit’.45 
It is notable that Fleck and Linie appear irreconcilable. Greiner, for example, argues of 
the two terms: ‘Dem Paradigma “Linie” wird das Paradigma “Fleck” entgegengesetzt’.46 
Lämmerman, in turn, claims that they are the ‘leitmotivischer Gegensatz des gesamten 
Textes’.47 Bergfleth, however, is more s
48
Each, though, retains a strong, ostensibly different influence on the ‘Er’-figure. In 
particular, Linie appears to be the dominant s
ß puts it –  and represents the manifestation of differing epistemologies of scien
technology.49 Moreover, it seems to elide that alternative, latent Wahrnehm
                                                 
45 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.70. Emphasis in original. 
46 Greiner, B. ‘“Beginnlosigkeit” – “Schlußchor” – “Gleichgewicht”. Der “Sprung” in der deutschen 
Nachkriegsgeschichte und Botho Strauß’ Jakobinische Dramaturgie’, in Weimarer Beiträge 2 (1994), 
nd die Technik’, p.251. Emphasis in original. The argument goes on to 
p.245. 
47 Lämmerman, Für unser Werk mein Liebster, p.77. 
48 Bergfleth, ‘Die statische Welt u
suggest the nature of this affinity. 
49 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.125. 
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Not only do the epistemologies embodied in Linie constrain the ‘Er’-figure but they are, 
Strauß is suggesting, deeply engrained, and reign as ‘der begradigte Menschenverstand’ 
against which all Wahrnehmung, including by implication that associated with Fleck, are 
measured.  Inevitably, though, any reading of Beginnlosigkeit, including the present 
argument, succumbs to the same inexorable tendency as that suggested by Linie-
structured Wahrnehmung. As Strauß describes the dynamic: ‘Alles Unübersichtliche läuft 
indessen Gefahr, eines Tages dem groben Schnitt, der begradigten Linie zum Opfer zu 
fallen’. Such a tendency arises, he suggests, from mankind’s, ‘tiefster Sehnsucht nach der 
Some commentators dismiss these terms entirely. Drews, for instance, suggests their use 
only confirms a suspicion that: ‘Strauß ist ein schwacher und wenig radikaler Denker; 
sein Denkgestus ist oft merkwürdig unsouverän und in den Formulierungen recht 
parfümiert’.  However, although disorienting – and given the crisis suggested by 
Beginnlosigkeit their effect is unlikely to be different – these terms have an important 
philosophical origin that is entirely overlooked in a move to condemn them as whimsy or 
dilettantism. For example, the term Linie and its evocation is an important motif in a 
tradition of German thought relating to the discussion of the nihilism of modern 
Linie’.52 
53
                                                 
50 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.17. 
51 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.61. 
52 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.61. 
53 Drews, ‘Ein bißchen erschüttert’, p.145. 
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technology during the inter-war period that it is not possible to elaborate further here, but 
that is richly suggestive given the ideas under discussion.54 
The above observations hint at the explanatory basis to the crisis that the ‘Er’-figure 
experiences within the parameters of Beginnlosigkeit; of a distortion between subject and 
object-world and an incapacity in language adequately to express that schism. The crisis 
is manifested between different irreconcilable forms of Wahrnehmung, one of which 
leads to the suspension of the other as Linie’s forward-moving project toward 
enlightenment casts the darker, indeterminate Fleck into shade. Strauß writes of this 
tendency: ‘die Linien und Gründe bedeckt der diffuse Fleck eines vielgestalten 
Verstehens’.  These tensions coalesce in an important fragment that introduces the 
defining motif of Beginnlosigkeit. 
Der Trichter, in dem all seine Gefühle und Gedanken abströmten: 
Steady state und Beginnlosigkeit.  
Strauß’ categorical assertion here returns the argument to the introductory observations 
on the enigma of beginning and origin. It is this enigma that the ‘Er’-figure appears 
unable to retrieve: reason is immune to its influence. It appears then that 
55
DER STERBENDE ANFANG 
56
‘Beginnlosigkeit’ is the cause of the figure’s crisis: or more precisely, the erosion of 
origin is its cause. 
                                                 
54 For example, Heidegger’s Zur Seinsfrage, originally published as Über ‘Die Linie’, a commemorative 
essay in honour of Ernst Jünger’s own commemorative essay for Heidegger entitled Über die Linie, sets out 
the philosophical potency of the term in relation to technology. As Heidegger writes: ‘Die Zone der 
kritischen Linie […] wäre sonach dort zu suchen, wo das Wesen der Metaphysik seine äußersten 
Möglichkeiten entfaltet […]. Das geschieht dort, wo der Wille zum Willen alles Anwesende einzig nur in 
der durchgängigen und einförmigen Bestellbarkeit seines Bestandes will, d.h. herausfordert, stellt’, in 
Heidegger, Zur Seinsfrage, p.34. Emphasis in original. See also Jünger, E. ‘Über die Linie’, in 
Betrachtungen zur Zeit (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1982). 
55 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.30. 
56 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.36. Strauß’ capitalisation of ‘DER STERBENDE ANFANG’ makes the notion a 
further subtitle to the work Beginnlosigkeit. 
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What, then, does Strauß intend of the term ‘Beginnlosigkeit’ and the work of the same 
title? How is it possible to overcome the crisis experienced by the ‘Er’-figure and the 
challenge articulated by Sloterdijk, namely to think about the beginning of beginning? 
Why does Strauß focus on certain epistemologies and theories, including steady-state 
cosmology, and how does he explain the persistence for mankind of a notion of a 
e, what he terms, ‘der heilige Urzustand oder 
dessen ersehnte Wiederherstellung’?57 
3.1.2 The beginning of enigma: Fleck 
to test the validity of the conceit and use of epistemologies by reference to current theory 
                                                
beginning in light of its apparent absenc
‘Beginnlosigkeit’ is not another theory of science or technology. Rather, it is a term 
denoting an hypothesised condition determined by the erosion of beginning in the ‘Er’-
figure’s Wahrnehmung. Its demise is the challenge, Strauß suggests, facing mankind in 
late modernity. Moreover, it is the different epistemologies – examples of Wahrnehmung 
associated with Linie – that result in the erosion of mankind’s ability to conceive origin, 
as Strauß suggests it. The question as to whether this is empirically verifiable, whether 
individual theories do indeed destroy origin is not, for the moment, at issue, nor is 
whether Linie indeed progresses along the admittedly slightly crude characterisation of 
dialectics proposed in the prose work. Beginnlosigkeit is a literary-philosophical work 
and not ultimately a treatise of science, an intellectual distinction most commentators 
neglect to consider. To consider the work, its dense network of images and metaphors, or 
 
57 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.36. 
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is, ironically, to conform to that very structure of Wahrnehmung represented by Linie 
with which the work takes issue. Although such an interpretive approach is entirely 
legitimate on one level, its deeper philosophical resonance is missed and it overlooks 
entirely Strauß’ overall objective in re-inscribing a different Wahrnehmung in Fleck and 
origin. It is a term of ontology not empiricism. 
eir inherent truth claims, nor with advancing some poetic fusion of a 
grand-unified theory.58 Anyway, the destruction of origin that is the fundamental premise 
of Beginnlosigkeit cannot be verified by reference to theory that is putatively responsible 
for the condition. 
ide, if Strauß’ challenge is to be met at all, the 
theories themselves represent a good starting point for considering what is at stake in 
Strauß’ notion of origin and if its absence – ‘das Dogma der Zeiten’ as he terms 
‘Beginnlosigkeit’ – is to be overcome.  
                                                
Each different scientific or technological theory represents the next thesis manifesting 
Linie, its negation or eventual dialectic synthesis. This explains, for example, why Strauß 
includes a theory of cosmology, e.g., steady-state, valid in the late 1940s but which was 
discredited less than a decade later. Strauß is not re-rehearsing a debate long obsolete in 
physics. Furthermore, his adoption of theories from entirely unrelated disciplines is not 
concerned with th
Nevertheless, such deductive fallacies as
59
 
58 Bergfleth is one of the few commentators to advance this view: ‘Es ist jedoch gar nicht die 
kosmologische Theorie als solche, die Strauß interessiert; sie dient ihm bloß als Beispiel, an dem er […] 
den Konflikt mit der alten Wahrheit, den die technische Realisierung dieser Welt heraufbeschwört’, in 
Bergfleth, ‘Die statische Welt und die Technik’, p.256. 
59 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.36. 
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Two theories ostensibly contributing to the crisis in Beginnlosigkeit are steady-state 
cosmology and cybernetics. Both correlate in their respective macro and micro frames of 
reference to the ‘Er’-figure’s pre-disposition, noted above, for absolutes and the 
absolutely relative. How do these two theories, though, necessarily lead to the condition 
of ‘Beginnlosigkeit’? Notwithstanding the comments above regarding sensible 
constraints on Literaturwissenschaftler, a very brief summary of each is necessary here to 
show how Strauß suggests these theories manifest Linie and the condition of 
‘Beginnlosigkeit’. 
rse is expanding from an original 
instance defining its beginning.60 In contrast, steady-state cosmology holds that ‘the 
number of galaxies’ in the universe remains at a constant; as such, the gaps formed as the 
universe expands are filled by new objects.  ‘New matter’ according to this thinking, as 
Hawking summarises, is ‘being continually created’.  
human agency. Strauß cites examples, of Oedipus, Ibsen and psychoanalysis, with its 
Steady-state cosmology posits a static macro model of the universe in contravention of 
the then nascent ‘Big Bang’ theory. The latter thesis is the necessary implication of the 
supposition, since empirically verified, that the unive
61
62
At the micro level of scientific study, Strauß highlights developments in cybernetics, 
although its general theory and application are not specifically relayed.63 Strauß’ 
postulate is clear: cybernetics leads to a suspension of deep-seated beliefs concerning 
                                                 
60 See Hawking, S. W. A Brief History of Time. From the Big Bang to Black Holes (London: Bantham 
nge Mann, and the play Trilogie des Wiedersehens. See 
chaft, pp. 137ff. 
Press, 1988), p.39. 
61 Hawking, A Brief History of Time, p.47. 
62 Hawking, A Brief History of Time, p.47. 
63 Daiber considers Strauß’ use of cybernetics in relation to his treatment of time in the prose works 
Kongreß. Die Kette der Demütigungen and Der ju
Daiber, Poetisierte Naturwissens
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methodological precepts of an explanatory foundation for behaviour. The enigma of 
motive, he writes, ‘verschwindet mit dem Reduktionismus im Weltbild der 
Kybernetik’.64 Instead, cybernetic models of behaviour postulate a theoretically infinite 
regression in explanation of human action.65 Accepting, as Beginnlosigkeit presents it, 
that cybernetic models are examples of Linie’s ‘offenes Ende’ then beginning – in this 
partic pect 
of en  cybernetic model of 
Bevor also […] ein Grund geboren wird, gehen zahllose zufallsgesteuerte 
Resultat langwieriger vor- und zurückfragender Selektionen.  
What are the implications of Strauß’ referencing of these two specific epistemologies? 
ybernetics, mankind’s view of the world is newly engendered: 
‘Dies alles gibt es nicht in der erkennbaren Wirklichkeit: prima causa, Urschuld, Erstes 
                                                
ular instance as human motive – is thrown into doubt by the hypothetical pros
dless explanatory possibility. As Strauß suggests, according to a
explanation: 
Entscheidungsprozesse voraus. Was wir den Anfang nennen, ist bereits das 
66
Both steady-state and cybernetic theories obviate the idea of a first-cause, however it is 
termed, whether as creation of the universe or as human agency. Strauß notes the 
implication: ‘Nicht im Anfang schuf Gott […], sondern irgendwann’.67 Similarly, as a 
result of theories such as c
 
schließt die Wechselbeziehung von 
pe, Geviert, Gestell, Geflecht, p.162.  
 ‘officially 
 with the Bible’, in Hawking, A Brief History of Time, p.47. 
64 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.38. 
65 Heidegger only considers the then emerging discipline of cybernetics briefly but his description captures 
the nature of such models: ‘Der Grundzug des kybernetischen Weltentwurfes ist der Regelkreis, in dem die 
Rückkoppelung der Information verläuft. Der weiteste Regelkreis um
Mensch und Welt’, cited in Stum
66 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.38. 
67 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.9. Interestingly, Hawking highlights the anti-theological impetus of steady-
state, in contrast to the ‘Big-Bang’, which was he says ‘seized on’ by the Catholic Church, which
pronounced it to be in accordance
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an sich’.68 The idea of beginning is, thus, at worst destroyed entirely, or at best left 
suspended in perpetuity.  
The consequences are far-reaching. For example, the philosophical concepts of ‘nothing’ 
and ‘becoming’, highlighted in the previous chapter as central to ontological concern, are 
rendered meaningless, subject to the same destruction as the ‘Er’-figure’s worldly 
disorientation. As Strauß remarks of a static universe without origin: ‘Hier fand sich kein 
Platz mehr, weder für ein Nichts noch für ein aus dem Nichts Geschaffenes’.69 The focus 
zlichtern, daß sie Nichts im Sein anwesend sein läßt, denn ohne das Nichts 
käme
It ap nie-
struc  of 
‘Beg superable. Strauß sets out the challenge facing 
Gedanken auf einen einzigen Gegenstand zu richten und daran festzuhalten, 
                                                
of the present argument means that it is not possible to consider the specific philosophical 
origin of these terms in Heidegger. Bergfleth, though, in his reading, suggests this 
influence. He writes of steady-state theory: ‘In metaphysischer Hinsicht gehört es zu 
ihren Glan
 kein Seiendes je zu seinem Sein’.70 
pears that models of science and technology, conceived in accordance with Li
tured Wahrnehmung of the object-world, the culmination of which is a condition
innlosigkeit’, are unavoidable and in
mankind: 
Alles, was er vorbringt, ist der unausgesetzt vergebliche Versuch, seine 
nicht nachzulassen in der Frage: Wie kann der Mensch mit der Erkenntnis der 
 
nschaft’ on ‘die 
 das es 
nwesen’, in Heidegger, Zur Seinsfrage, p.39. 
68 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.38. 
69 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.9. Similarly, commenting on the implications of cybernetics Strauß writes: 
‘Die Schöpfung wie das Verbrechen sind zwar emergente, plötzliche Akte, entstehen aber weder aus dem 
Nichts noch aus einer einzigen Ursache’, in Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.38. (My emphasis). Interestingly, in 
Was ist Metaphysik? Heidegger makes a similar claim regarding the impact of ‘Wisse
Ausarbeitung der Frage nach dem Nichts’. See Heidegger, Was ist Metaphysik?, pp.29ff.  
70 Bergfleth, ‘Die statische Welt und die Technik’, pp.255-256. There appears to be a similarity between 
‘das Nichts’ and Strauß’ idea of ‘Abwas’, of a present object-world that is absent as thing. Heidegger, for 
example, elaborates his conception of nothing: ‘Dieses Nichts, das nicht das Seiende ist und
gleichwohl gibt, ist nichts Nichtiges. Es gehört zum A
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absoluten Beginnlosigkeit, die eine Beginnlosigkeit nicht nur der Schöpfung, 
Beginnlosigkeit von allem und jedem sein muß – wie kann er in einem 
unweigerlich für alles und jedes?71 
sondern, davon ausgestreut metastatisch ins Geäder des Bewußtseins, eine 
solchen Erkenntnisstand sich und die Welt erleben und welche Folgen hat dies 
The ‘Er’-figure is abandoned to the experience of a fragmentary world, of which 
Beginnlosigkeit, the work, is itself a manifestation. Is there any basis upon which that 
alternative, latent Wahrnehmung sensed by the ‘Er’-figure, associated by implication both 
with Fleck and origin, can be retrieved in light of Linie’s all-encompassing ‘gebündelte 
Helle’? Does Strauß abandon mankind to the teleologically infinite dimension – a world 
without beginning – of contemporary scientific theory? 
rning a recognisable structure to the 
approximately two hundred and fifty individual fragments of Beginnlosigkeit.72 Riemer, 
for example, remarks that ‘es gibt kein zwingendes Ereignis, mit dem das Buch beginnt, 
kein offensichtliches Ende; die Abschnitte sind durch keine eindeutige Handlung oder 
Entwicklungslinie geordnet’.  It seems remarkable, however, to note in a critique of 
such a distinctive work, concerned with the absence of beginning, that it lacks the 
narrative conventions or form of beginning, middle and end. 
on in the work, including the 
‘Nan orm 
to his otherwise dissolute experience of himself and world. The intensity of his 
disintegration culminates in a corresponding physical breakdown. As Strauß writes: ‘Es 
                                                
Most commentators concede the difficulty of disce
73
Nonetheless, Strauß does offer certain points of orientati
os’ motif, considered in detail below, and an attempt by the ‘Er’-figure to give f
 
ber of fragments is problematic as it 
sprungs. Kosmos und Chaos in Botho Strauß’ Beginnlosigkeit’, in 
18. 
71 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.8. Emphasis in original. 
72 See Hárs, Singularität, p.170. He notes that even identifying the num
is unclear whether those running across pages have concluded or not. 
73 Riemer, W. ‘Problematik des Ur
Weimarer Beiträge 2 (1994), p.3
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versa ren 
Schwächung […]’.  The ‘Er’-figure’s response though is to embark on what 
commentators have come to call the ‘Sondenexperiment’. 
Er war jedenfalls bereit, der ‘Schwächung’ nichts entgegenzusetzen – außer 
Katheter, so wollte er nun ebenfalls im Selbstversuch die Sonde des 
, this would 
seem d in 
the S
Linie lusive as first appears. Moreover, as he conducts the 
unwiderstehliche Frequenz wiederkehrender Motive zu ermöglichen, jeder 
würde den sofortigen Sturz der gesamten Schwingung, den Abbruch der 
nslinie zur Folge haben.76 
Seco the 
disto ld. 
As th ment 
suggests: 
   
gte ihm die Position in den Knien. Vielleicht waren es Anzeichen einer tiefe
74
seinem empfindlichsten Bemerken. Wie Forßmann, der Arzt, einst seinen 
Gedankens einführen ins Herz der Unvernunft.75 
The Sondenexperiment is of crucial interest in getting closer to that alternative 
Wahrnehmung associated with Fleck for three reasons. First, on the surface the 
experiment follows the very methodological precepts associated with Linie in successive 
experimentation. Of course, accepting the dominance of such Wahrnehmung
 to be inevitable. But, Strauß in Beginnlosigkeit suggests that Linie, if re-trace
ondenexperiment, also opens up an alternative Wahrnehmung. The two – Fleck and 
 – are, then, not as mutually exc
experiment, the ‘Er’-figure becomes aware that the approach entails a threat. 
Jede Form für das Unformbare, das sich nur ausbreitet, um die unbekannte, 
Versuch, dem Fleck und der Diffusion eine andere Form aufzuzwingen, 
Lebe
nd, he emphasises the reason for undertaking the experiment at all; namely 
rted relationship to the object-world, and correspondence between word and wor
e second of the three fragments directly concerned with the Sondenexperi
                                              
74 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.45. 
75 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.45. 
76 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.56. The danger or threat in relation to the critique of modern technology is 
considered in section 3.2 below. 
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Er war inzwischen mit seiner Sonde zu den gezackten und fetzenreichen 
Widerstand: alles in ihm wehrte sich gegen die von festen Dingen 




Rändern des Bewußtseins vorgedrungen und stieß nur immer auf den einen 
sprechenden Worte. In seiner Unvernunft hielt er es für das Werk des 
Wort in all seine Begriffe gestreut hatte, ging auf.  
Lastly, the experiment brings to the fore further terms, including Gewärtigen, Gehör, 
Zwischen and Ereignis that are brought by Strauß into conjunction with Fleck.  Most 
importantly, the final fragment of Beginnlosigkeit represents the culmination of the 
‘Sondenexperiment’ and suggests the advent of that Wahrnehmung associated with Fleck. 
As Strauß writes: ‘Die Sonde war nun eingedrungen, der Gedanke stand im Herzen und 
maß den Druck der Unvernunft’.  At this point, the dominion of Linie is lifted and the 
The results of the Sondenexperiment bring the ‘Er’-figure nearer the Wahrnehmung in 
Fleck. The argument, thus, moves Beginnlosigkeit away from interpretations that see it as 
an engagement with science and technology. Nor does the work represent an alchemic 
combination of poetry with Naturwissenschaften. Instead, such epistemologies serve only 
‘Er’-figure experiences ‘das Unformbare’; origin; Fleck. Thus, the ontological grounds 
for what this thesis calls Strauß’ poetics of dwelling are glimpsed. But this is to anticipate 
the argument to follow. The reading requires greater circumspection. 
as a foil, providing a critique of a structure of Wahrnehmung that Strauß suggests is 
                                                 
 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.72. The other two fragments concerning the Sondenexperiment are on pp.45 
and 83. It is interesting to note, given the invocation of a mephistopholean ‘Durcheinanderwerfers’, the 
77
parallels in Beginnlosigkeit to Faust’s search for an order of knowledge distinct from that rational, 
graspable Verstand or form of understanding represented by Wagner in Goethe’s Faust. 
78 Hárs refers to others, including ‘der Nebel’, ‘das Netz’ and ‘die Witterung’ but confuses terms describing 
the crisis, and those associated with the alternative, non-linear Wahrnehmung, into which the experiment is 
attempting to draw him. See Hárs, Singularität, pp.178-179. A number of these terms, of course, echo those 
introduced in the discussion of the ‘Logos’ essay. 
79 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.133. 
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embedded in the Western tradition, and against which he seeks to bring an ontologically-
grounded alternative to light. 
Strauß, however, provides no ready definition of this alternative Wahrnehmung: to do so 
would, of course, succumb to the dominion of Linie. He offers instead an outline form, 
incor d of 
impo n’, 
Strau nts: 
to say ‘es öffnet sich’ instead of ‘es stimmt’ – conceived as formed formlessness, as a re-
consideration of origin, in contrast to the erosion of beginning by Linie. As Strauß writes 
of the counter-point: 
Ein wesentlicher Trug unserer Erfahrungs- und Sinneswelt besteht darin, daß 
Schlüssigkeit und Kontinuität herzustellen, als tatsächlich vorhanden ist. […]. 
gestaltloses oder ein gestaltoffenes Ding mit schnellen, festen Umrissen. Das 
diffuse Geschehen, für die unfertige Gestalt.  
Like the delineation of Heidegger’s Λόγος, the description defies convention and the 
constraints of formal logic. But, as Strauß contends, according to the terms of 
Beginnlosigkeit, such convention results from the dominion of Linie-structured 
of a different philosophical order. Moreover, he claims, ideas cannot be judged on the 
porating terms that suggest Fleck and arise from the Sondenexperiment. Instea
sing onto the object-world, arising from mankind’s ‘ausgeprägten Ordnungsin
ß evokes a complex and suggestive idea – as the ‘Er’-figure previously comme
sie eine kreatürliche Tendenz besitzt, stets mehr Ordnung, auf Anhieb größere 
Das Bewußtsein will sich etwas merkbar machen und überzieht ein 
Gewärtigen hingegen, […], beläßt es bei dem Gespür für das vorereignishafte 
80
Wahrnehmung. The experience of origin, or of an originary experience in Fleck, which 
Strauß proposes in the work, entails instead a dynamic engagement: its Wahrnehmung is 
basis of use or reason alone. Other criteria need to apply: ‘Die Schönheit einer Idee ist für 
                                                 
80 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.130. My emphasis. These terms are considered in more detail below. 
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Seele und Geist ebenso nützlich wie die rationale Erkenntnis für den Umgang mit dem 
Organismus’.81 
The chapter has begun iteratively to suggest the significance of Strauß’ elaborate conceit 
in Beginnlosigkeit. The remaining sections continue to deepen the argument of Strauß’ 
affinities, for example in his use of language and choice of terms, with Heidegger’s 
thought. Notably, Strauß’ critique of modern technology is shown to align with that 
which Heidegger develops, particularly in the lecture, ‘Die Frage nach der Technik’: 
although the argument suggests that Strauß intensifies the threat presented by modern 
technology in the current age of cybernetics. In this approach Strauß’ alternative, 
ontological Wahrnehmung is described, central to which is a re-consideration of origin: 
culminating in Strauß as Anfang, in Heidegger as Aufgang or Anfängnis. First, though, it 
is necessary to understand Strauß’ views on science and modern technology, how he has 
drawn on Heideggerian thought and why this is important for the proposed alternative in 
One feature of the crisis facing mankind that Strauß proposes in Beginnlosigkeit is the 
dissolution and re-establishment of a relationship between the ‘Er’-figure and the object-
                                                
Fleck. 
3.2 Modern technology: end or beginning? 
 
of the motifs advanced in Beginnlosigkeit: ‘Man möchte eine Verbindung herstellen zwischen dem Satz 
anderes, p.143. 
81 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.29. Strauß anticipates the idea in Niemand anderes, a work that proposes many 
Schwedenborgs: “Je mehr Engel, desto mehr freier Raum”, und der Frage des Teilchenphysikers, ob nicht 
das Zehnfache unserer Masse in Gestalt unsichtbarer Neutrinos uns umgibt. Der schöne Gedanke, daß 
Engel niemals raumfüllend, sondern stets nur raumschaffend sein können, erscheint widergespiegelt in der 
Hypothese, das Unsichtbare enthalte um vieles mehr Materie als die greifbare Welt’, in Strauß, Niemand 
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world. This manifests itself, for example, in the precarious connection to the objects the 
figure encounters, what is evoked by the sense of ‘stetes Schwanken’: things stand in flux 
between the tangible and the dissolute. The ‘Er’-figure is also shown constrained by the 
differing epistemologies associated with Linie. Each particular heuristic model posits a 
perceiving or theorising subject set against, or antagonistic to, the material world. The 
central premise in such theory is that of the independent and freely-observing subject: 
whether in cognitive psychology, radical constructivism, or for that matter cosmology, 
the subject is the defining foundation of cognition, experience or knowledge. In terms of 
philo auß 
conte  Ein 
Univ tte, könnte gar nicht existieren’.82 
This defining premise underlying Linie-structured Wahrnehmung is significant primarily 
for its effect on the relationship between subject and object-world. In one fragment 
Strauß describes the ‘Er’-figure’s reception of the object-world based on subjective data 
or sensation: 
Was wir als bewußte Wahrnehmung empfinden, ist in Wahrheit die 
besonders stimulierte interne Prozesse. […]. Nicht der Gegenstand löst die 
bild- und scheinlos streunende Empfindung sucht sich eine Selbsterfüllung, in 
scepticism in relation to the object-world. Moreover, such Wahrnehmung denotes a 
    
sophical understanding: without subject there is no object-world. As Str
nds: ‘Alle physikalischen Gesetze bedürfen des Beobachters, der sie formuliert.
ersum, das den Menschen nicht hervorgebracht hä
Fokuseinstellung des Gehirns auf eigene, in einem bestimmten Augenblick 
angenehme Empfindung aus, ihn betrachten zu wollen, sondern eine namen-, 
der ein Gegenstand betrachtenswert erscheint.83 
As he goes on to suggest, the absolute focus on existence of mind – or the brain, 
according to the particular theory of cognitive psychology cited – necessarily implies 
                                             
82 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.10. 
83 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.11. 
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tendency toward subjectivism, a weighting of the subject over and against the object-
world. Strauß notes of the consequences of such epistemologies: ‘Alles was überhaupt ist, 
geschieht unter der Schädeldecke’.84 Furthermore, according to the strict parameters of 
such epistemologies, the perceiving subject mirrors the dominion of Linie. The ‘Er’-
bject-world both in terms of its absolute existence, 
and how it appears to the perceiving subject. This dualism – of mind and object-world – 
has specific philosophical antecedents that bring Strauß’ prose work and its views on 
science and technology into line with the critique made by Heidegger of the Western 
philosophical tradition. 
3.2.1 ‘Res cogitans, res extensa’85 
Strau  in 
relation to the experience of the object-world as defining for mankind’s Wahrnehmung as 
structured by Linie. This withdrawal has its intellectual origins in the philosophy of René 
begriff er nicht’.  
He describes the philosopher as a critical influence in the bifurcation of mind and world. 
figure is conceived as controlling the o
ß describes the search for explanation of the ‘Er’-figure into mind or brain
Descartes (1596-1650), as it is propounded in both the Discourse on Method and 
Meditations. As Strauß builds to suggest the cause of mankind’s crisis in Beginnlosigkeit 
– the erosion of origin as ‘DER STERBENDE ANFANG’ – he places Descartes’ thought 
among the epistemologies that the ‘Er’-figure is seen to negotiate. 
Nun schon seit Descartes: res cogitans, res extensa. Und diese letztere eben 
86
                                                 
84 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.11. 
85 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.24. 
86 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.24. 
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The ‘Er’-figure’s inability to conceive properly the extended world of objects has a 
number of consequences. First, such scepticism of the object-world relativises it in 
relation to the subject. Second, by implication, as a result of the withdrawal into mind, 
the subject becomes the basis of all and any knowledge whether of itself or of the world. 
That the legacy of Descartes’ thought has enduring consequences for mankind’s 
conception of himself and world is a view held by thinkers that might otherwise not share 
the ontological presuppositions of either Strauß or Heidegger. Writing from the analytical 
Anglo-Saxon philosophical tradition Bertrand Russell, for example, points out: ‘There is 
thus, in all philosophy derived from Descartes, a tendency to subjectivism, and to 
regarding matter as something only knowable, if at all, by inference from what is known 
of mind’.  
artes and its implications for 
Western man’s intellectual frames of reference brings his affinity with Heidegger into 
focus. As is suggested in the previous chapter, Descartes represents, for Heidegger, a key 
moment in the forgetting of the Seinsfrage in Western thought, the development of 
modernity and corresponding dominance of what he eventually terms metaphysics, of 
which modern technology is a manifestation. Moreover, Strauß’ presentation of Cartesian 
dualism and its influence in Beginnlosigkeit is a re-statement of the problem and its 
legacy set out originally by Heidegger in Sein und Zeit.  
Heid sent 
argument it is necessary only to highlight the intent of Division I of the work rather than 
                                                
87
Strauß’ identification of the challenge posed by Desc
88
egger’s engagement with Cartesianism is, of course, highly involved: for the pre
 
87 Russell, B. A History of Western Philosophy (London: Allen & Unwin, 1984), p.548. 
88 See Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, pp.89ff. 
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the d urn, 
through the analysis of Dasein – the term for mankind’s being-in-the-world – the 
bifurcation of subject over and against the object culminating in dualism that runs 
through and defines the philosophical tradition. Heidegger sets out one of his 
fundamental objections to Descartes’ infamous sceptical premise: 
Mit  dem ‘cogito sum’ beansprucht Descartes, der Philosophie einen neuen 
unbestimmt läßt, ist die Seinsart der res cogitans, genauer der Seinssinn des 
‘sum’.89 
For Heidegger, the subject cannot be detached from object-world as Descartes 
hypothesises but is always already immanently involved in it as: ‘das In-der-Welt-sein 
überhaupt als Grundverfassung des Daseins’.  Polt summarises Heidegger’s objection to 
the binary postulate of dualism: ‘Human existence is not inside a private precinct at all, 
but is “in the world”, so we have to jettison the crude dichotomy of inner and outer’.  
trauß’ prose works and offers a 
re-as sm. 
The  in 
Beginnlosigkeit in the ‘Er’-figure, for example, but also in other works, is of what this 
assanten, for example, with its numerous 
etail of each engagement with Descartes’ Meditations. Heidegger seeks to overt
und sicheren Boden beizustellen. Was er aber bei diesem ‘radikalen’ Anfang 
90
91
Heidegger’s investigation of Dasein and its ontological status as ‘in-der-Welt-sein 
überhaupt’ raises an interesting interpretative path for S
sessment of the fatalism charge levelled, and his putative retreat into subjectivi
relationship between man and world that Strauß proposes by and inscribes
thesis terms a dynamic engagement. Paare, P
                                                 
89 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p.24. Emphasis in original. 
90 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, pp.52ff. 
91 Polt, Heidegger, pp.56-57. Heidegger offers a critique of a dualism between internalised perception and 
experience of outside world in the following terms: ‘Im Sichrichten auf […] und Erfassen geht das Dasein 
nicht etwa erst aus seiner Innensphäre hinaus, in die es zunächst verkapselt ist, sondern es ist seiner 
primären Seinsart nach immer schon “draußen” bei einem begegnenden Seienden der je schon entdeckten 
Welt. Und das bestimmende Sichaufhalten bei dem zu erkennenden Seienden ist nicht etwa ein Verlassen 
der inneren Sphäre, sondern auch in diesem “Draußen-sein” beim Gegenstand ist das Dasein im 
rechtverstandenen Sinne “drinnen”, d.h. es selbst ist es als In-der-Welt-sein, das erkennt’, in Heidegger, 
Sein und Zeit, pp.62ff. 
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vignettes, picks out an important Heideggerian phrase suggesting how individuals engage 
with, or are in their environments. There Strauß writes: 
[…] das Antlitz eines Gangs, und sogleich wird das ‘erfahrene Vermuten’ 
Sinnesdaten den gesamten Verhaltens-Raum eines Menschen plötzlich 
92
(Heidegger) tätig, durch das wir mit Hilfe weniger Blicke, weniger 
hochberechnen können.  
This immanent engagement contrasts with the philosophical detachment between subject 
and world postulated by Descartes. The interpretative suggestion here anticipates the 
philosophical basis or ontological grounds of what is later in this thesis termed Strauß’ 
Heidegger’s magnum opus engages with a range of questions defining the Western 
tradition.  However, the defined focus of this thesis precludes consideration of the 
treatment of space, understood as extension, and the problem of other minds – to say 
nothing of the nature of time – all of which are posed by Strauß in Beginnlosigkeit and 
                                                
poetics of dwelling, and implicitly revises readings that either see a discontinuity in the 
early prose work, or that hold to an exclusive indebtedness to precepts of Critical Theory. 
It is a hypothesis, though, that assumes and requires exploration of other Strauß works 
and their specific indebtedness to aspects of Heidegger’s thought as yet unconsidered. 
93
draw in different ways on Heidegger. Instead, the argument is restricted to consideration 
of that Wahrnehmung associated with Linie. What is the connection, then, between 
 
Was ist Metaphysik?, which describes the nature of mankind’s immanence in and experience of world. 
Heidegger argues: ‘[…] im Dienst der Frage nach der Wahrheit des Seins, wird eine Besinnung auf das 
92 Strauß, Paare, Passanten, p.68. The phrase ‘erfahrene Vermuten’ is taken by Strauß from Heidegger’s 
Wesen des Menschen nötig; denn die unausgesprochene, weil erst zu erweisende Erfahrung der 
Seinsvergessenheit schließt die alles tragende Vermutung ein, gemäß der Unverborgenheit des Seins gehöre 
der Bezug des Seins zum Menschenwesen gar zum Sein selbst. Doch wie könnte dieses erfahrene 
Vermuten auch nur zur ausgesprochenen Frage werden, ohne zuvor alle Bemühung darein zu legen, die 
Wesensbestimmung des Menschen aus der Subjektivität […] herauszunehmen?’, in Heidegger, Was ist 
Metaphysik?, p.14. My emphasis. 
93 See Dreyfus’ celebrated commentary on Sein und Zeit, which did much to attract interest in Heidegger 
within the analytical, Anglo-Saxon world and helped partially to dispel a view that sees his thought as un-
philosophical, at least by accepted, established measures. Dreyfus, H. Being-in-the-World: A Commentary 
on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1991). 
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Descartes’ experiment in worldly and material scepticism and the Wahrnehmung 
evidenced in scientific and technological theory? 
There are two stages to Descartes’ meditations from which he seeks to rebuild a basis for 
truth about the world faced with the destructive scepticism of his hypothesised evil 
demon. The first is the priority given to certain types of knowledge, the second is the 
cogito. In order to understand the impact of Cartesianism on science and technology, 
according to Strauß and Heidegger, these are best considered in reverse order. 
Descartes first seeks to establish a foundation beyond doubt and postulates the self-
certain mind of the subject. The implications of this, which both Strauß and Heidegger 
highlight, are already noted. For example, the cogito leads to a prioritisation of ego as a 
result of attributions of its own certainty. Furthermore, the certain mind standing over and 
against an uncertain object-world fosters a relationship of detachment between perceiving 
‘I’ and material thing. The significance of the sense of sight and Strauß’ emphasis upon 
alternative gestures as the grounds of possibility for an alternative Wahrnehmung are 
developed in Chapters Four and Five. When considering any substance in the object-
world, its attributes – in Descartes’s example, the resistance, colour, hardness of wax 
before a roaring fire – the subject always views by way of a dispassionate and 
objectifying gaze. The subject is thus always at a remove.94 
                                                 
94 Heidegger writes: ‘Descartes weiß sehr wohl darum, daß das Seiende sich zunächst nicht in seinem 
eigentlichen Sein zeigt. “Zunächst” gegeben ist dieses bestimmte gefärbte, harte, kalte, tönende Wachsding. 
[…]. Die Sinne lassen überhaupt nicht Seiendes in seinem Sein erkennen, sondern sie melden lediglich 
henwesen’, in Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, pp.96-97. Emphasis in original. 
Nützlichkeit und Schädlichkeit der “äußeren” innerweltlichen Dinge für das leibbehaftete 
Mensc
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Second, Descartes places a priority on certain forms of knowledge, in particular 
mathematics and geometry. These epistemologies offer him the promise of deductive 
certainty. Having doubted the existence of all things in the object-world, he hypothesises 
what is called, ‘the mathematism of nature’.95 There exists, he reasons, a correlation 
between the discipline of mathematics and reality because, ‘the external world is also 
mathematical in its structure’.96 The two disciplines provide – in conjunction with the 
certainty of the cogito –  the basis for mankind’s experience of world. From the 
application of mathematical sciences, mankind is able to establish certainty regarding the 
object-world. The consequences of these two aspects of Descartes’s answer to scepticism 
are far-reaching and give rise for mankind to what Dreyfus terms a ‘priority of 
disinterested knowledge’ and, therefore, a continuing weighting towards certain 
epistemologies.  
orhanden’. Things 
are re  are 
the theoretical frames of reference of this objectification of reality. Such a Wahrnehmung 
in relation to object-world, according to Heidegger, comes in turn to dominate both the 
97
For Heidegger, Descartes’s dualism and the posited certainty from mathematical 
knowledge alter mankind’s relationship to the object-world. On this view, things are 
conceived as ‘vorhanden’. It is noteworthy that for Strauß the Abwas, which denotes the 
distorted relationship of the ‘Er’-figure to thing, is also imaged as ‘v
garded as ‘present-to-hand’ for the rational mind.98 Mathematics and geometry
                                                 
95 Sutcliffe, F. E. in Descartes, R. Discourse on Method and The Meditations (London: Penguin, 1968), 
p.17. 
96 Sutcliffe, in Descartes, Discourse on Method, p.17. 
.59ff. 
97 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, p.45. 
98 ‘Present-to-hand’ is the standard translation of Vorhandenheit and contrasts with Dasein’s alternative 




in his detailed commentary on Heidegger’s philosophy of technology: 
Descartes claimed that for a thing ‘to be’ meant for it to be re-presented by the 
quest to formalize everything, to make everything totally present for 




 possible to arrive at knowledge 
which is most useful in life, and that, instead of the speculative philosophy 
the effects […] all the other bodies which surround us, as distinctly as we 
to all the uses for which they are appropriate, and thereby make ourselves, as 
all that there is, pace 
Desc ject-
world ntal 
benef esianism and its legacy: 
                                                
sophical tradition and mankind’s view of the putatively real.99 As Zimmerman no
self-certain subject. Descartes thus helped to define modern science as the 
knowledge.100 
The implications of such mathematically-based knowledge, Heidegger concedes, are 
already clear to Descartes. What offers the promise of certainty for Descartes, though, 
reveals the threat of instrumentalism for H
ledge of object-world with questions of utility. Descartes recognises the poten
cation of his view of science. Writing of the ‘principle’ of correspondence betw
y and object-world Descartes claims: 
I could not keep them hidden without sinning considerably against the law 
which obliges us to procure, by as much as is in us, the general good of all 
men. For they have made me see that it is
[…], a practical philosophy can be found by which, knowing the power and 
know the various trades of our craftsmen, we might put them in the same way 
it were, masters and possessors of nature.101 
Mankind comes to view itself first as the basis then as controller of 
artes’ experience and description of wax melting before the fire-place. The ob
 is thus conceived primarily in reference to the subject and what is of instrume
it. As Zimmerman again notes of Cart
 
ts this very argument in Real Presences: ‘Die Wissenschaften und Technologien, die die 
westliche Zivilisation des 20. Jahrhunderts dominieren, sind in exaktem Verhältnis zu ihrer 
mathematischen Formalisierung “modern” und beherrschend geworden’, in Steiner, Von realer Gegenwart, 





101 Descartes, Discourse on Method, p.78. 
 140
In effect, Descartes started the process whereby humanity came to conceive of 
Descartes enabled humanity to interpret the world […] the reality of which 
the productive-measuring subject.102 
itself as the God-like source of the reality, truth, and value of all things. 
was assessed according to how the image stood in relation to the standards of 
It is ern 
techn
For S  one example of the continuing influence of 
kybernetischen Symbolik wieder. […]. Unsere Wahrnehmung wird einseitig 
vorrangig gebrauchen. So folgt das mechanische, das organische, das 
bis zum nächst klügeren Modell.  
His description of mankind’s condition through the ‘Er’-figure at the outset of 
Begin its 
legac  The modern subject has turned 
Gehirn besitzt keinen unmittelbaren Zugang zur Welt. Es ist 
vollkommen auf sich selbst bezogen. Es liefert die selektiven Muster, 
konstruiert die Modelle […] das gesamte evolutionsgeprüfte Programm zur 
Herstellung einer uns verfügbaren Wirklichkeit.105 
                                                
but a short step to the development and application of such precepts in mod
ology. 
trauß, the theory of cybernetics is
Cartesian metaphysics. It represents the logical outcome of both the subjectivist turn and 
positivist-structured view of the world. As he writes in Niemand anderes: 
Die Vorstellung Descartes’ von der Maschine Tier kehrt eigentlich in der 
bestimmt von den Modellen, die wir technisch gerade selber herstellen und 
informationstheoretische Modell. Und jedesmal schlüssig und unwiderleglich, 
103
nlosigkeit echoes Heidegger’s critique of Cartesianism. Strauß suggests that 
y is that of a ‘harten anthropischen Solipsismus’.104
in on itself and so transformed the direct unmediated relationship to object-world, which 
is subsequently regarded as controllable and available for use. In Beginnlosigkeit Strauß 
describes the subjective emphasis and corresponding utilitarian conception of the world: 
Unser 
 
emand anderes, p.144. Strauß’ view on the philosophy of science is considered in section 
102 Zimmerman, Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity, p.172. 
103 Strauß, Ni
3.3.2 below. 
104 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.10. 
105 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.10. 
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Such instrumentalism, Strauß notes with acerbity, posits mankind, wrongly, ‘als Krone 
der Schöpfung’.106 What Strauß ultimately proposes and offers by his work is a more 
circumspect approach to and modest understanding of the relationship between mankind 
and world. 
3.2.2 The threat of modern technology 
nity in terms of the emphasis on the subject and the 
dominance of mathematically-based epistemologies. Moreover, the application of such 
theories leads to distortion of the object-world, which Strauß suggests of Linie, and 
Heidegger of modern technology. How, for Strauß and for Heidegger, does this 
dominance and distortion constitute a danger to mankind, and to what extent does Strauß 
adapt and develop this understanding of a threat for the post-industrial science and 
technology of late modernity? 
es from his 
thinking of Sein und Zeit and the critique of Descartes in the Twenties through to the 
engagement with the nihilism of technology in Zur Seinsfrage in the Fifties. Some of his 
pronouncements are not without controversy.  The present argument concentrates, 
therefore, on the lecture eventually published as ‘Die Frage nach der Technik’, included 
                                                
Strauß, then, shares Heidegger’s thesis on the continuing influence that Cartesian 
metaphysics exerts on moder
Heidegger’s thinking on technology and its influence on modernity evolv
107
 
d the extermination camps of 
106 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.10. 
107 See Young for a discussion of the first-version of ‘Die Frage nach der Technik’ presented in 1949, then 
entitled ‘Das Ge-stell’, in which detractors of Heidegger claim, erroneously, that he draws a moral 
equivalence between modern technology in agriculture, the atomic bomb an
National Socialism, in Young, Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism, pp.171ff. 
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in Vorträge und Aufsätze, widely acknowledged as the most succinct formulation of 





Heidegger’s essay begins by emphasising what he terms, ‘die instrumentale und 
anthropologische Bestimmung der Technik’, a phrase that Strauß adopts in describing the 
Cartesian legacy on the subject.  This, he writes, is ‘die gängige Vorstellung von der 
Technik, wonach sie ein Mittel ist und ein menschliches Tun’, and is, in turn, based on an 
understanding of causality inherited from Aristotle.  This conception of technology is 
utterly bound up with modern man’s impetus to control and dominate his environment 
and the object-world. For mankind, Heidegger claims: ‘alles liegt daran, die Technik als 
Mittel […] zu handhaben. Man will, wie es heißt, die Technik “geistig in die Hand 
bekommen”. Man will sie meistern’.  Heidegger proceeds in his exegesis, as in the 
essay on Λόγος, formulating arguments that draw technology back, through analysis of 
the ancient Greek conception of τέχνη, to truth as άλήθεια.  These suggestive inter-
connections between technology, truth and the poetic fall outside the immediate 
discussion but are considered fully in the final chapter. Rather, for now, it is the impetus 
underlying Heidegger’s argument for an originating return, whether in the pre-Socratics 
or an idea of Aufgang, to overcome the dominance and distortion of modern technology, 
                                                 
108 Heidegger, M. ‘Die Frage nach der Technik’, in Vorträge und Aufsätze, pp.9-40. 
109 Heidegger, ‘Die Frage nach der Technik’, p.10. As cited above, Strauß refers to the ‘harten 
anthropischen Solipsismus’ of Cartesian-based epistemologies. 
110 Heidegger, ‘Die Frage nach der Technik’, p.10. It is noteworthy that Strauß, like Heidegger, seeks to 
overturn this dominant view of causation. 
111 Heidegger, ‘Die Frage nach der Technik’, p.11. 
112 Heidegger’s exegesis touches on the related question of the poetic. Originally, in pre-Socratic thought, 
τέχνη invokes poetry: ‘Einmal ist τέχνη nicht nur der Name für das Handwerkliche Tun und Können, 
sondern auch für die hohe Kunst und die schönen Künste. Die τέχνη gehört zum Her-vor-bringen, zur 
ποίησις; sie ist etwas Poietisches’, in Heidegger, ‘Die Frage nach der Technik’, p.16. 
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and its echo in Strauß’ plea for a reflection on the necessity of Anfang that are under 
review. 
The conception of technology as anthropological utility, i.e., a subject-centered 
instrumentalism, is merely, Heidegger claims, a description of a particular set of 
historical circumstances – the conditions of modernity, for example – that do not reveal 
the true essence of technology. Instead, technology or its essence, as he proposes it, is 
regarded as a manifestation of the relationship between subject and object-world, and is 
fundamentally concerned with forms of dislosure. As Pattison notes of Heidegger’s 
conception of technology: ‘The fact is, Heidegger says, that technē, understood in the 
Gree e) at 
all. In chnē is “a mode of knowing”’.  The terms of the argument are shifting to 
Entbergens. Achten wir darauf, dann öffnet sich uns ein ganz anderer Bereich 
für das Wesen der Technik. Es ist der Bereich der Entbergung, d.h. der Wahr-
                                                
k sense, means neither art nor craft nor anything technical (in the modern sens
stead, te 113
questions of ontology. Based on an etymological analysis of the ancient Greek τέχνη, 
Heidegger maintains that technology, originally, is a form of disclosure, as Her-vor-
bringen. It is similar to that disclosure suggested in discussion of Λόγος: of the in-
gathering, in λέγειν, of what is in the world. As Heidegger sets out: 
Die Technik ist also nicht bloß ein Mittel. Die Technik ist eine Weise des 
heit.114 
Thus, more than any epistemology or theory, technology is rather the coming-into-
presence of truth. Thinking about the essence of technology, its antecedent as τέχνη, is 
thus also consideration of the same ontological concern articulated in the preceding 
 
113 Pattison, The Later Heidegger, p.49. 
114 Heidegger, ‘Die Frage nach der Technik’, p.16. 
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chapt ting 
τέχνη gest of modern technology? 
In modern technology, what is different, he claims, is the manner of the disclosure of 
things in the object-world. Here, the conjunction with the arguments on the defining 
influence of Descartes on modernity comes to the fore. The disclosure that characterises 
technology in modernity is a Herausforderung, rather than the gathering disclosure of 
Her-vor-bringen, as in Λόγος. Heidegger writes: 
n, 
das an die Natur das Ansinnen stellt, Energie zu liefern, die als solche 
Two 
disclo , he 
write ke it useful. However, ‘die Windmühle 
rld: it stands in relationship to nature. This is in contrast to ‘das 
Wasserkraftwerk’ where its presence is stamped onto nature for two ends only: for 
calculation and control. Heidegger denotes this way-of-being by the term stellen: 
Das Wasserkraftwerk ist in den Rheinstrom gestellt. […]. Das Entbergen, das 
der Herausforderung. Diese geschieht dadurch, daß die in der Natur 
Umgeformte gespeichert, das Gespeicherte wieder verteilt und das Verteilte 
umschalten sind Weisen des Entbergens.  
er. But to return to the immediate argument: if technology, conceived as origina
, is a form of disclosure, what does Heidegger sug
Das in der modernen Technologie waltende Entbergen ist ein Herausforder
herausgefördert und gespeichert werden kann.115 
examples are provided that illustrate the difference between these respective 
sures for mankind and the object-world in modern technology. The windmill
s, requires nature to make it function and ma
erschließt aber nicht Energien der Luftströmung, um sie zu speichern’.116 The windmill 
just is in the object-wo
die moderne Technik durchherrscht, hat den Charakter des Stellens im Sinne 
verborgene Energie aufgeschlossen, das Erschlosssene umgeformt, das 
erneut umgeschaltet wird. Erschließen, umformen, speichern, verteilen, 
117
                                                 
115 Heidegger, ‘Die Frage nach der Technik’, p.18. 
116 Heidegger, ‘Die Frage nach der Technik’, p.18. 
117 Heidegger, ‘Die Frage nach der Technik’, pp.19 and 20. 
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Every thing in the object-world is thus disclosed in relation to its applicability and 
usability for mankind. 
118
Technological practice though is often mistakenly emphasised as one of the principal 
objects of Heidegger’s critique.  The ultimate concern, however, of ontology is with 
how the world is; how it is manifest for Strauß or comes-into-presence for Heidegger. 
The latter develops his views on technology with an exposition of the form of disclosure 
in modern technology. It is, he writes: ‘Überall […] bestellt, auf der Stelle zur Stelle zu 
stehen, und zwar zu stehen, um selbst bestellbar zu sein für ein weiteres Bestellen. Das so 
Bestellte hat seinen eigenen Stand. Wir nennen ihn den Bestand’.119 Moreover, and 
What is remarkable in Heidegger’s analysis of modern technology is the exclusion of any 
description of those conditions of industrial technology that characterise the period of 
writing, in contrast to writers of the same era such as Spengler, Klages and Scheler.121 It 
                                                
importantly, in relation to how Strauß conceives of science and technology, Bestand 
entails the fundamental distortion of things in the object-world. Bestand for Heidegger: 
‘kennzeichnet nichts Geringeres als die Weise, wie alles anwest, was vom 
herausfordernden Entbergen betroffen wird. Was im Sinne des Bestandes steht, steht uns 
nicht mehr als Gegenstand gegenüber’.120 World, thus, does not come-into-presence on 
its own terms or its own right, but is viewed by mankind as available only for 
instrumental use and exploitation: it appears as object-world. 
 
gical practice, so the idea would then run, is uniquely 
.45. 
e Zeit (Frankfurt-am-Main: Fischer, 2001), pp.454ff. 
118 Young, for example, argues: ‘Modern technolo
violent’, in Young, Heidegger’s Later Philosophy, p
119 Heidegger, ‘Die Frage nach der Technik’, p.20. 
120 Heidegger, ‘Die Frage nach der Technik’, p.20. 
121 See, for example, Zimmerman, Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity, pp.3-34 and Safranski, R. 
Ein Meister aus Deutschland. Heidegger und sein
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is an approach Strauß’ presentation of science and technology echoes, where the detail of 
post-industrial or computer-based technological practice is largely absent. This absence 
again enforces the present contention that Strauß is not ultimately concerned with 
technology’s manifestations in practice or scientific theories themselves, but rather the 
underlying Wahrnehmung: in other words, their philosophical assumptions and 
determinations. 
The reason for the absence of specific examples in Heidegger – and at this point the 
substantive yet elusive, disconcerting core of his critique of modern technology emerges 
– is h cal. 
Rathe form of disclosure, 
herausfordert, das Wirkliche in der Weise des Bestellens als Bestand zu 
modernen Technik waltet und selber nichts Technisches ist.  
Heidegger intensifies his critique, which Strauß adopts directly and refines in 
Begin  the 
appli  von 
den m he 
                                                                                                                                                
is claim that the essence of modern technology is, in fact, nothing technologi
r, building on prior claims that technology is actually a 
Heidegger argues that the essence of modern technology is Ge-stell. Again, it is worth 
underscoring, these considerations are a matter of ontology rather than empirical 
observation. Ge-stell is that manner of disclosure from which the object-world is seen as 
Bestand. Heidegger writes: 
Ge-stell heißt das Versammelnde jenes Stellens, das den Menschen stellt, d.h. 
entbergen. Ge-stell heißt die Weise des Entbergens, die im Wesen der 
122
nlosigkeit. The real threat to mankind does not come from machines or
cation of theory. As he notes: ‘Die Bedrohung des Menschen kommt nicht erst
öglicherweise tödlich wirkenden Maschinen und Apparaturen der Technik’.123 T
 
Both commentators consider Heidegger’s thinking on technology in relation to the similarity of views to, 
but divergent approach from, such contemporaries. 
122 Heidegger, ‘Die Frage nach der Technik’, p.24. 
123 Heidegger, ‘Die Frage nach der Technik’, p.32. 
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proposal, therefore, does not falter by providing examples of science and technology’s 
benefits and successes. Instead, the threat of modern technology arises for mankind from 
the persistence and dominion of disclosure that is Ge-stell. Heidegger claims: 
Wo dieses herrscht, vertreibt es jede andere Möglichkeit der Entbergung. Vor 
ins Erscheinen her-vor-kommen läßt. […]. 
allem verbirgt das Ge-stell jenes Entbergen, das im Sinne […] das Anwesende 
So verbirgt denn das herausfordernde Ge-stell nicht nur eine vormalige Weise 
des Entbergens, das Her-vor-bringen, sondern es verbirgt das Entbergen als 
solches und mit ihm Jenes, worin sich Unverborgenheit, d.h. Wahrheit 
ereignet.124 
kind: Ge-stell, even though a 
manner of disclosure, precludes the experience of other, alternative disclosures – 
critically, as the thesis concludes, the disclosure of truth – of coming-into-presence of 
world as, for example, is brought to light in Λόγος and Anwesenheit. How does Strauß 
echo and develop this aspect of Heidegger’s thought in Beginnlosigkeit? 
3.2.3 The (increasing) threat of modern technology? 
 argument that he offers either an 
uncri ten. 
In ad the 
macr that a vital element to the inevitable 
disorientation the figure experiences is the speed with which such theories and 
corresponding Wahrnehmung develop in late modernity. This shows itself, in turn, in two 
Therein is shown the most fundamental threat to man
In Beginnlosigkeit, Strauß details an implicit philosophy of science in respect of Linie-
structured Wahrnehmung, which further counters the
tical celebration of science, or a poetic fusion of literature and Naturwissenschaf
dition to showing the ‘Er’-figure negotiating different epistemologies – from 
o to the micro – Strauß also suggests 
                                                 
124 Heidegger, ‘Die Frage nach der Technik’, p.31. 
 148
ways. First, new paradigms, which previously defined an age or epoch, for Strauß, now 
occur with regularity and lack the impact of the past. 
Sie sondern Weltbildtheorien ab wie die Raupe ihren Kokon. Wir haben die 
in der Physik, morgen ein neues Menschenbild der Neurobiologie, 
Geologie.
Alltäglichkeit der kopernikanischen Wende erreicht: heute ein neues Weltbild 
übermorgen die Auflösung der Erde in einem neuen Erkenntnisraster der 
dominant Wahrnehmung also has 
recou ted. 
Thus  
speci w in focus as opposed to a contrary tendency towards 
                                                
125 
Second, as well as the progressive accumulation of new theories and paradigms, scientific 
knowledge is also becoming ever more integrated. Strauß notes the propensity for an 
alignment in epistemologies with moves toward a so-called grand-unified theory, what he 
terms: ‘die Suche nach der einheitlichen Wechselwirkung, nach der Einheit der Natur’.126 
Again, the empirical validity of theories is not at stake in the present argument, but the 
intellectual purchase and philosophical implications of their underlying Wahrnehmung as 
Linie. These result, he suggests, in the suspension of significant intellectual disagreement 
beyond the surface squabble within disciplines, a condition he describes in a subsequent 
essay on technology. ‘Der Fausthieb der Gewißheit, plötzlich die Welt nicht mehr zu 
verstehen. […]. Der Derwischtanz sämtlicher Fixpunkte. Die  unzähligen Verknüpfungen 
zusammenhangloser Einzelheiten’.127 However, the 
rse to those paradigms and theories previously either discounted or discredi
, Strauß speculates of what he terms reductive theory – by which he means
alised epistemologies narro
‘Holismus’, or unified theories noted above – that, though presently marginalized, such 
conceptualisations will inevitably have a renaissance. 
 
125 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.14. Elsewhere he comments on this trend: ‘Das hermetische Wissen befindet 
sich im Spinnpunkt, in der unerforschlichen Gewebemitte all der 6000 heute ausgeübten Fachdisziplinen’, 
gineering?’. 
ineering?’. 
in Strauß, ‘Wollt ihr das totale En
126 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.39. 
127 Strauß, ‘Wollt ihr das totale Eng
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Nun verabschiedet man allerwege den Reduktionismus und setzt ihm das 
unvermeidlich ist, daß auch der Reduktionismus in irgendeiner 
‘Ganzheitliche’, den Holismus […] entgegen. Obgleich es gewiß 
Abwandlung 
sein Comeback erlebt, wie fast jede Großform in der Geschichte des Wissens 
Strau ent of that 
ng contexts 
and scientific and technological circumstances of their respective writing. As Strauß 
remarks, making the comparison and contrast with Heidegger explicit: 
In den Wörtern, den Wissensmodellen – Holismus, Selbstbezüglichkeit – liegt 
[…]. Die Netzwerk-Maschine ist hier bereits philosophisches Gerät.  
In what way does Strauß portray the threat of modern technology increasing? 
vement from novelty to stagnation, further innovation and (re)discovery 
followed by epistemological stasis, reflecting the dialectic outlined in the introduction to 
this chapter. Moreover, Strauß claims, the forward velocity of each such cycle is 
continually increasing. As he can’t help but note with irony: ‘Schon jetzt ist man geneigt, 
                                                
seit den Vorsokratikern.128 
ß, therefore, proposes a qualitatively different influence on developm
form of disclosure that Heidegger denotes by Ge-stell, reflecting the interveni
eine andere Witterung, als die Heideggerschen ‘Machenschaften’ besaßen. 
129
The accumulation and development of epistemologies and theories is imaged, in 
accordance with the Wahrnehmung associated with Linie, as an endless elliptical 
progressive mo
 
Beiträge zur Philosophie. (Vom Ereignis) (Frankfurt-am-Main: Vittorio 
128 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.118. 
129 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.49. By Machenschaften Heidegger intends to invoke the ontologically fallen 
condition, following the pre-Socratics, whereby truth becomes conceived by mankind as the ‘correct-ness’ 
of the state of the object-world of beings and man’s relationship thereto. He writes: ‘Machenschaft als 
Herrschaft des Machens und des Gemächtes. Hierbei ist aber nicht zu denken an menschliches Tun und 
Treiben und dessen Betrieb, sondern umgekehrt, solches ist nur möglich in seiner Unbedingtheit […] 
aufgrund der Machenschaft. Dies ist die Nennung einer bestimmten Wahrheit des Seienden (seiner 
Seiendheit). […]. Descartes’ Schritt ist bereits eine erste und die entscheidende Folge, die Folgeleistung, 
wodurch sich die Machenschaft als gewandelte Wahrheit (Richtigkeit), nämlich als Gewißheit, in die 
Herrschaft setzt’, in Heidegger, M. 
Klosterman, 2003), pp.131ff. 
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mit einer gewissen paläontologischen Neugier die Denk-Skelette des Marxismus zu 
betrachten’.130 
Such development in the Wahrnehmung associated with Linie as it shows itself in 
scientific theory, and the speed of its development – ‘Und morgen eine neue lichte 
Blindheit’ – is, Strauß suggests, far from the Popperian ideal of deductive falsification, 
 Poppers Kriterium der Falsifizierbarkeit) nach wie vor gültig und 
unive
A fra s the ageing representative of this 
ein, als der gute Karl, über sein Manuskript gebeugt, unter einer eigens 
angebrachten, niedrigen Tischlampe vorlas, was die Welt so und  nicht anders 
schon seit vielen Jahren von ihm gehört hatte.133 
 outdated and unable to reflect the pace of modern 
novation: ‘Die Heroen der Wissenschaftstheorie sprachen für 
influential in theorising exactly that incremental, progressive view of scientific-based 
knowledge.131 As Steiner, for example, notes of the continuing influence of Cartesian 
thought on such epistemological developments: ‘Physik, Molekularbiologie, Astrophysik 
gehen so vor, als sei der kartesianisch-kantianische Vertrag zwischen Theorie und 
Versuch (Karl
rsal’.132 
gment at the mid-point of Beginnlosigkeit portray
philosophy of science now struggling adequately to conceptualise the current nature and 
speed of change in science and technology. The vignette portrays an interlude in the 
prose work when the ‘Er’-figure travels to Venice to hear Popper lecture at a symposium. 
Strauß writes: 
Sir John, der Freund und Denkgefährte, saß in der ersten Reihe, nickte leicht 
Popper’s philosophy is imaged as
science and technological in
                                                 
130 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.82. 
131 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.93. 
132 Steiner, Von realer Gegenwart, p.100. 
133 Strauß Beginnlosigkeit, p.85. 
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Laien – es war aber nur ein verschwindend kleines Publikum anwesend und beiseite eine 
einsame regionale Fernsehstation’.134 The Popperian epistemology of science is itself 
thoroughly influenced by the legacy of Descartes.135 Of course, given the domination of 
Linie, any such philosophy of science would inevitably also succumb to its constraining 
influence. 
conceit: one cannot prove or disprove an 
inference concerning Linie with an appeal to verifiable evidence, itself a manifestation of 
Linie. Strauß writes of such theories: ‘Sie suchen nur: Dichte, Zerreißfestigkeit. Die 
Mathematik erstrebt die reine Stimmigkeit’.  
For S y so 
techn auß 
descr  similar to Heidegger:  
begegnet uns das Große Tier des Platon, das schon war: […]. Jetzt hockt es als 
However, Strauß suggests in Beginnlosigkeit that in late modernity, for the ‘Er’-figure, 
the frequency of scientific and technological transformation is intensifying and 
harmonising the previous clashes between competing paradigms. Asking after the 
validity of such a claim, though, in relation to scientific theories is again not the principal 
issue and overlooks the suggestion of Strauß’ 
136
trauß, just as scientific paradigms are generated at ever-increasing frequenc
ology also develops to obviate any alternative to the Wahrnehmung of Linie. Str
ibes the dominion in terms
Der technische Kult frißt auf Dauer jede Regung von Differenz. Noch einmal 
das Ganze in der Künstlichkeit … und wir können uns seinen nächsten Ort 
                                                 
134 Strauß Beginnlosigkeit, p.85. 
135 Writing in his autobiography Popper asserts: ‘I think that I was always a Cartesian dualist […]’. 
Moreover, his description of the basis for scientific method is unmistakably Cartesian in its emphasis on the 
subject standing over and against the object-world: ‘Experience is the result of active exploration by the 
organism. […] we have inborn expectations; we have latent inborn knowledge, in the form of latent 
imuli to which we react as a rule while engaged in active exploration’, in 
losigkeit, p.66. 
expectations, to be activated by st
Popper, K. Unended Quest. An Intellectual Autobiography (London: Flamingo,  1986), p.52. 
136 Strauß, Beginn
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nicht einmal mehr vorstellen! Unerfindlich, wohin es jetzt noch 
weiterwandern könnte.137 
Strau  as 
in the development of scientific theory, this affects technological progress too. There is a 
blurring of distinction and greater integration of technologically-founded epistemologies 
and views of the object-world, in the end leaving no space for any other approach to it.  
Die magische Welt: die technische in vollendeter Selbstbezüglichkeit. Ein 
plötzlicher Zusammenschluß, der uns ausschließt, in Verständnislosigkeit 
Magischer Begriff der consensus. Der emergente Zusammenschluß der 
s “Gestells”, der Vergegenständlichung 
und d
Strau ‘die 
Tech r Natur’.  Just 
Feingefühl. Entfernt die Schlote aus den Himmeln, läßt die Telegrafenmasten 
Glasfiber-Kabel. Heilt die Landschaft, verschönt die Städte, die Fabriken 
Krankheit und Häßlichkeit früher einmal in die Welt gesetzt hat.  
                                                
ß indicates an ever-narrowing bandwidth to Linie-structured Wahrnehmung. Just
zurückließe vor einem Wissen, das über sich selbst verfügt. […]. 
Systeme, der das Verstehen ausschließt, wäre der technologe consensus.138 
As Strauß comments in Beginnlosigkeit, in direct reference to Heidegger: ‘Der Igel der 
Technik ist längst am Ziel, bevor sich der Hase de
er Ausleibung auf den Weg macht’.139 
ß emphasises the adaptive qualities of technological innovation and change: 
nik konstruiert immer organischer und konvergiert am Ende mit de 140
as technology becomes ever-more integrated as theory so its practice, its imposition on 
the object-world, appears less invasive or violent. 
In ihrer romantischen Periode überbietet sich die Technik an Sanftmut und 
in den Wiesen und Tälern verschwinden und ersetzt sie durch unterirdische 
selbst werden kunstschön, sie nimmt alles zurück, was sie an Brutalität, 
141
 
mphasis in original. The allusion and relationship to Plato is considered 137 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.25. E
in Chapter Five. 
138 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.44. 
139 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.108. 
140 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.108. 
141 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.49. 
 153
Such descriptions of the development of technology are often seen by commentators as a 
positive endorsement by Strauß. Bergfleth for example, argues that Strauß is sketching 
the outlines of a post-technological utopia where the antagonisms of competing theory 
are suspended; what he terms Strauß’ ‘antikopernikanische Utopie’.142 Strauß 
acknowledges the impetus: ‘Man sehnt den doppelten Sprung herbei: Den Sprung in die 
Technik und den der Technik aus sich selbst heraus’.143 However, although such a 
condition could indeed theoretically lead to a ‘meta-, statt antitechnischen 
Betrachtungsweise’, it is conceived as part of that very Wahrnehmung ascribed to 
Linie.144 Such a structure would inevitably, Strauß notes, only lead to a ‘noch 
umfassenderen Technik-Modell’.145 Moreover, such a utopian condition, even if 
desirable as Bergfleth argues, is inconceivable, Strauß contends, within constraints 
imposed by Linie. He concludes the thought: ‘Vorerst allerdings verbietet sich die 
Floskel, da gegenwärtig dem Denken nichts Anspruchvolleres zugemutet wird als seine 
technische Selbstbegegnung’.  The threat posed by Linie is that it permits no alternative 
Wahrnehmung to itself. Strauß’ critique is that mankind is constrained utterly by 
technological thought; even where it hopes for its adaptation, such change still falls 
within the parameters of technology and Linie. 
ng of the defining influence on modernity of Descartes’ 
twinned postulated certainties. Nonetheless, the nature and experience of technology and 
science are currently such that the consequences for mankind – its threat – are of 
                                                
146
Strauß adopts Heidegger’s readi
 
142 Bergfleth, ‘Die statische Welt und die Technik’, p.253. Emphasis in original. 
143 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.89. 
144 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.91. 
145 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.91. 
146 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.91. 
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differing intensity to those that Heidegger suggests. Strauß then adapts the Heideggerian 
critique of Cartesian metaphysics and offers the particular changed characteristics of 
modern technology as he hypothesises them in Beginnlosigkeit. Is there, then, any 
foundation for its overcoming? 
 
The prognosis for the ‘Er’-figure and so for mankind that Strauß signals in 
Beginnlosigkeit appears constrained. Viewed in light of ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’, 
with its critique of cultural, political and social norms in Western society, Strauß seems to 
offer only a prospectus of a continuity to the ever-same. Such a reading is enforced by 
more recent essays characterised by apparently equally constrained terms of reference.  
This view underpins the more uncharitable critics and certainly contributes to the charge 
of fatalism. But this perspective overlooks Strauß’ explicit distancing from philosophies 
that propose the inexorable deterioration of Western civilisation. For example, in 
Sintflut unablässiger Weltbildstürze. Krise ist immer’.148 Such pessimism is, he claims, 
te der biederen Altersweisheit, daß jedwedes Ding sich zum 
3.2.4 Grounds of overcoming 
147
Beginnlosigkeit Strauß distinguishes his work from a long-established conceit of decline 
in the Western tradition, epitomised by thinkers such as Spengler. As he writes: ‘Nun, das 
Schema der Bewußtseinskrise ist wohl an sich schon ein überholtes, parodiert von einer 
‘letzlich eine feinere Varian
                                                 
147 See Strauß, ‘Wollt ihr das totale Engineering?’. 
148 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.13. 
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Schlimmeren wende’.149 Strauß’ view is instead ontologically conceived and not 
prescriptive or denotative of action. 
This is, of course, not to deny the obvious fundamental exposition Strauß makes of late 
modernity, namely the threat of mankind’s scientific and technological myopia 
established in the previous section. However, placing undue emphasis on a putative 
pessimism, whether in Beginnlosigkeit or other prose works, risks losing sight of those 
n Könnenverweigern’.150 Again, a comparison with Heidegger, which feeds a 
simil
Heid nse to the 
]. So halten wir uns 
schon im Freien […] auf, das uns keineswegs in einen dumpfen Zwang 
                                                
foundations of dynamic engagement and ontological concern present in Strauß’ prose 
writing. Even though his view of science and technology is far-reaching, its conclusion is 
not that of renunciation or despair. As he reasons in another essay: ‘Gegen das Können 
hilft kei
ar misunderstanding, is instructive. 
egger too differentiates his thought from the contention that the respo
threat of technology is to be found in its abolition. His critique of modern technology is 
not, Pattison rightly notes, that of ‘a philosophically articulate Luddite’.151 Heidegger 
argues: 
Wenn wir jedoch das Wesen der Technik bedenken […
einsperrt, die Technik blindlings zu betreiben, oder, was das Selbe bleibt, uns 
hilflos gegen sie aufzulehnen und sie als Teufelswerk zu verdammen.152  
 
149 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.120. In a subsequent essay, Strauß directly refutes the idea that he formulates 
a Verfallspessimismus: ‘Ich bin ein Sonderling, und der ist am wenigsten berufen, eine allgemeine 
Niedergangstheorie zu entwickeln. Ich sehe die Verluste und zähle sie’. See Strauß, ‘Am Rand. Wo sonst’. 
In ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’, Strauß makes the same distinction between ‘Der Kulturpessimist’ who 
engagement of ‘der Rechte’. 
ing?’. 
regards ‘Zerstörung für unvermeidlich’ and the 
150 Strauß, ‘Wollt ihr das totale Engineer
151 Pattison, The Later Heidegger, p.55. 
152 Heidegger, ‘Die Frage nach der Technik’, p.29. 
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After all, the threat of technology as Heidegger proposes it is not something 
technological, i.e., concerned with its practice, but instead arises from the particular form 
of disclosure that is Ge-stell. To seek to dismantle technology merely presupposes an 
instrumentally-conceived objective itself resonant of Ge-stell. 
Alle Versuche, das bestehende Wirkliche morphologisch, psychologisch auf 
 Untergang zu 
verrechnen, sind nur ein technisches Gebaren. Es operiert mit der Apparatur 
ermehrt und  
immer ne
If the ssed or overcome by some form of 
His a  Five 
show erlin. Heidegger contends: 
‘Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst 
Bedenken wir das Wort Hölderlins sorgsam.  
Heidegger claims that Ge-stell, which presents the greatest threat to mankind, also 
presents a glimmer of its salvation. As he goes on to suggest: 
Wenn das Wesen der Technik, das Ge-stell, die äußerste Gefahr ist und wenn 
stells nicht darin erschöpfen, alles Leuchten jedes Entbergens, alles Scheinen 
u verstellen.155 
However, Heidegger claims that the threat of Ge-stell is its dominion over other forms of 
disclosure between subject and world. Yet he appears also to suggest that this very 
                                                
Verfall und Verlust, auf Verhängnis und Katastrophe, auf
der Aufzählung von Symptomen, deren Bestand ins Endlose v
u variiert werden kann.153  
 threat posed by technology is not to be addre
direct action against technological practice, what does Heidegger propose as the 
foundation of a response? 
nswer to this has recourse, significantly, as the discussion in Chapters Four and
s, to poetry and a fragment by Höld
So ist denn, wo das Ge-stell herrscht, im höchsten Sinne Gefahr. 
Das Rettende auch’. 
154
zugleich Hölderlins Wort Wahres sagt, dann kann sich die Herrschaft des Ge-
der Wahrheit nur z
 
153 Heidegger, M. Die Technik und die Kehre (Stuttgart: Günther Neske, 1996), pp.45-46. 
154 Heidegger, ‘Die Frage nach der Technik’, p.32. Emphasis in original. 
155 Heidegger, ‘Die Frage nach der Technik’, p.32. 
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dominion does not entirely eclipse the disclosure of that truth attendant on the ancient 
Greek, τέχνη. The gesture is important to Heidegger’s ontology and critical for 
illustrating Strauß’ adoption of the tenor of his thought: from this emerges the more 
profo
than 
Salvation must, if Hölderlin’s epigram is taken as Heidegger intends, lie in the 
description of the threat of modern technology as Ge-stell. Though allusive, the suggested 
foundation is unmistakable:  
Die Herrschaft des Ge-stells droht mit der Möglichkeit, daß dem Menschen 
den Zuspruch einer anfänglicheren Wahrheit zu erfahren.  
The basis of salvation then, for Heidegger, lies in consideration of origin; in an 
originating disclosure of a truth, revealed, of course, in pre-Socratic thought. Heidegger, 
at the end of his essay, returns his analysis to the possibilities of his reading of 
technology in the ancient Greek term τέχνη: a structure of argument that touches on the 
tautological. The originating sense and experience of technology, as τέχνη, offers an 
                                                
und philosophical reach of Strauß’ engagement with modern science and technology 
most critics allow. 
versagt sein könnte, in ein ursprünglicheres Entbergen einzukehren und so 
156
opening through which to think about the possible salvation of mankind. Salvation lies 
for Heidegger, both at a moment of origin – from a source as indicated, ‘am Beginn des 
abendländischen Geschickes’ – and also in beginning to engage in thinking on this 
disclosure. Concluding his lecture on technology, Heidegger makes the claim: ‘Darum 
liegt alles daran, daß wir den Aufgang bedenken und andenkend hüten’.157 
 
156 Heidegger, ‘Die Frage nach der Technik’, p.32. My emphasis. 
157 Heidegger, ‘Die Frage nach der Technik’, pp.38 and 36. My emphases. 
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Just as Strauß intensifies Heidegger’s conception of the threat posed by modern 
technology to reflect the changed nature of its development so, unsurprisingly, the 
postulated salvation for mankind is also held at a remove. In a later prose work, his 
adoption of Heidegger’s Hölderlin epigram is direct, the adaptation unequivocal: ‘Nicht 
wo Gefahr droht, sondern wo vollzogene Zerstörung überhaupt erst entziffert werden 
kann, wächst auch das Rettende’.  The distancing of mankind’s possible salvation is 
portrayed, though more obliquely, in Beginnlosigkeit. 
arch for a theoretical explanation of ‘die 
erste Billionstelsekunde im Ursprung der Schöpfung’, Strauß maintains that the ‘Er’-
figure is still left with, ‘die Frage, nichts als die Frage … ’.  Empirical knowledge and 
related understanding have their limits. Strauß pointedly leaves the answer hanging in 
158
The argument returns to Strauß’ reflections on the cause of the crisis afflicting the ‘Er’-
figure: the erosion of origin, or as he puts it, ‘DER STERBENDE ANFANG’. The ever-
increasing frequency with which epistemologies are produced in accordance with Linie-
structured Wahrnehmung has reached into attempts to illuminate the very apex of 
mankind’s existence: its creation; the beginning of the beginning. Strauß sets out the 
ambition of such epistemologies: ‘Nun, sagen die einen, wenn es das Einzige gibt, so 
wird es auch zu finden sein. Der Beginn der Welt, der in ihr versteckt wurde und den 
niemand fand bis heute’.159 Yet, notwithstanding the forward propelling dialectic of 
Linie, its ‘gebündelte Helle’, or mankind’s se
160
                                                 
158 Strauß, Der Untenstehende auf Zehenspitzen, p.116. 
159 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.40. 
160 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.40. 
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silence. But what does Strauß suggest is the question? The ‘Er’-figure reflects: ‘Wozu 
dann die philosophische Plage des Seins?’.161 
162
Strauß, then, presents the ‘Er’-figure as drawn back to that alternative Wahrnehmung 
associated with Fleck. Crucially for the present argument, it is defined as beginning, as 
originary. He writes: ‘Auch die Frage des Anfangs wird eine Frage des Glaubens sein: 
lebensnotwendige Beibehaltung einer gedanklichen Wohltat’.  Even though the 
explanatory structure of Linie promises so much, it does not – Strauß, like Heidegger, 
contends it cannot – eradicate both mankind’s continuing constraint and ongoing 
unsatisfied need for reflection on originary possibility. Strauß, though, unlike Heidegger, 
does not specify a particular period or instance from the past. Rather, for him, the 
philosophical impetus is one of abstract intellectual necessity. As Strauß reflects: ‘wir 
bedürfen des Anfangs, der Geist bedarf dieser Gewißheit und wäre nicht lebensfähig, 
wenn sie nicht […] erhalten bliebe’.163 Having posited the necessity of an originary 
If the implications of Strauß’ Linie are accepted, his invocation of the necessity of an 
originary experience for mankind seems founded on a contradiction. The epistemologies 
                                                
possibility, how does Strauß portray the alternative Wahrnehmung of Fleck, and how 
does he suggest is it experienced by the ‘Er’-figure? 
3.3 ‘Was ist zwischen Schein und Sein?’164 
 
161 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.39. 
162 Strauß, Beginnlosigkei., p.29. My emphasis. 
163 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.29. My emphasis. 
164 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.68. Emphasis in original. 
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associated with Linie have, he claims, led to the eradication of beginning for mankind: 
‘DER STERBENDE ANFANG’. The explanation of this originary enigma through scientific  
and technological theory, whether of the Big Bang or the human genome, only further 
intensifies mankind’s crisis arising from the demise of beginning. What is different about 
Strauß’ Anfang? Surely, any attempt to re-inscribe the need of origin will inevitably 
succumb to the dominion of Linie, which, in turn, leads according to the conceit of 
Beginnlosigkeit to the very erosion of mankind’s experience of beginning? 
Linie, 
traced back to a singular cause. Origin conceived in this way, Strauß claims, does not 
arise, ‘aus einer einzigen Ursache’.  Instead, such an alternative retains the 
indeterminability of Fleck. He goes on to note: ‘Das Vielfältige strebt keiner Lösung 
entgegen. […]. Das Mannigfaltige war von Anbeginn, es ist irreduzibel’.  An originary 
experience is thus, for Strauß, always already ‘diffuse’ and ‘nicht  konturierbar’.  
                  
Strauß’ response is to conceive of this Anfang as the possibility of an alternative 
Wahrnehmung, as Fleck. Fleck, however, is not to be understood as a single idea or 
method: nor is it a term in isolation, but is continually redefined by Strauß in relation to 




Commentators differ in their respective interpretations of Strauß’ use of the motif of 
Fleck. Greiner, for example, associates the term with Chaos Theory in the sciences, but 
                               
gleiten’ and ‘Poesie’. See, for example, Hárs, Singularität, p.178 who 
n with either ‘Fleck’ or ‘Linie’, although he fails to account for some and 
165 Others include: ‘Nebel’, ‘Ent
categorises the terms by associatio
mis-classifies others. 
166 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.38. 
167 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.30. 
168 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.30. 
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thereby only serves to read Fleck in terms of an epistemology representative of Linie.169 
Bellmann, similarly, while acknowledging Strauß’ attempt to define anew ‘die 
unterschwellige Wahrnehmung, der Anklänge’ suggests that this ultimately remains a 
‘technisch inspirierte neue Einbildungskraft’.170 Most tantalising is Bergfleth’s reading, 
which notes the ‘Er’-figure’s continuing propensity for what he terms his 
‘metaphysisches Verlangen, das nach wie vor unstillbar ist’.171 The ‘Er’-figure, he 
claims, is reaching for something that lies outside the relentless progress of Linie; this 
may reside in ‘einer Umkehrung, die einer Wende zum Sein gleichkommt’.172 However, 
Bergfleth goes on to assert ‘daß diese lebensmäßige Fassung des Metaphysischen sich 
weder mit der traditionellen Metaphysik noch mit Heidegger vereinbaren läßt’.173 
Instead, for him, Fleck still reflects a theoretically structured view of the world: the term 
‘fungiert […] als der sprechende Name für Komplexität’.174 It is ironic, then, that Strauß 
disav xen 
Ablä
Nichtssagender geht es kaum. Solche Wörter sind uns nur im Weg’.175 In the end, 
Bergfleth’s posited, so-called meta-technical, ‘statische Welt’, an ‘antikopernikanische 
Utopie’, misses the dynamic nature of beginning for Strauß. Strauß argues: 
Irgendwo müssen wir dem Ersten und Bloßen begegnen in einem Raum, der 
ows that very comparison in a subsequent essay: ‘Wir sprechen von den komple
ufen im Hirn, im Gemüt, im endokrinologischen Bereich – […]: Komplexität. 
nur aus Ornamenten […] der einen Vielfältigkeit besteht. Gewiß, man wird 
                                                 
169 Greiner notes: ‘Was hier “Fleck” genannt wird, ist das Feld der Chaosforschung: nicht lineare Prozesse’, 
in Greiner, ‘“Beginnlosigkeit” – “Schlußchor” – “Gleichgewicht”, p.246. 
mphasis in original. 
k’, p.251. 
gineering?’ 
170 Bellmann, ‘Poetologie und Zeit-Kritik in Botho Strauß’, p.47. 
171 Bergfleth, ‘Die statische Welt und die Technik’, p.262. E
172 Bergfleth, ‘Die statische Welt und die Technik’, p.259. 
173 Bergfleth, ‘Die statische Welt und die Technik’, p.262. 
174 Bergfleth, ‘Die statische Welt und die Techni
175 Strauß, ‘Wollt ihr das totale En
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sich damit abfinden: alles schwelgt, webt und bezieht sich, aber der Einschlag 
176der Unlösbarkeit –  
The alternative Wahrnehmung that Strauß seeks to describe is not passive or static, both 
of which Bergfleth and other commentators suggest and which, of course, combine into 
r an Asebie’.177 Strauß acknowledges the provisional nature 
and f ternative Wahrnehmung to 
light.
Das Wasser sprengt den Fels, das Wasser rollt den Stein, es zerkleinert ihn zu 
fruchtbares Ackerland.  
This description serves two functions. Wahrnehmung associated with Fleck is 
distinguished from that structured by Linie where: ‘alles Denken ist ein 
   
implicit ascriptions of fatalism. Whatever the experience of origin in Fleck it is not, 
Strauß suggests, understandable by conventional measures. Elsewhere in Beginnlosigkeit, 
for example, he notes of attempts ‘das Unbegreifliche in Erfahrung zu bringen’ that ‘die 
endlosen metaphorischen Versuche, das Numinose einzuberaumen in unsere Sprache, 
grenzen ans Lächerliche ode
raught difficulty of bringing the intangibility of this al
 How, then, does he inscribe his revision of Anfang? 
First, Strauß’ reflections on Fleck do not proceed systematically by syllogistic exposition 
– Fleck is not, after all, propositional – but move, like Beginnlosigkeit itself, through 
iterative increment. The alternative spirit of reflection is delineated through a network of 
water imagery in the work. Wahrnehmung associated with Fleck, for the ‘Er’-figure 
moves slowly but precisely. 
Der Geist bohrt unendlich langsam sein Verstehen […]. 
Geröll, es rollt ihn weiter und schleift ihn ab, zerreibt ihn zu Kies, er wird 
178
                                              
176 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.30. 
177 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.45. 
178 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.110. 
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Begradigungsdelirium’.179 It is negatively defined. As Strauß notes of the ‘Er’-figure: ‘er 
sehnte sich nach […] der Botschaft vor dem Code, dem Fleck vor der Linie, er sehnte 
sich nach einem Verstehen von nicht absehbarem Entgleiten’.180 Strauß’ description of 
mankind’s need for Fleck offers an interesting contrast to the sense of bewildered 
disorientation – so symptomatic of crisis – imposed by the ever-increasing speed of 
change of Linie. Fleck is Wahrnehmung liberated from the requirements of innovation, 
progress and unshackled from a first cause. Strauß describes the ‘Er’-figure’s longing: 
‘auf dessen Welle das Bewußtsein dahintreiben konnte ohne Ziel und Schlußfolgerung, 
ohne verfrühte Figürlichkeit’.  This characteristic of the experience, its sense of 
Moreover, Strauß suspends the metaphysical dualism underpinning the ‘Er’-figure’s 
dominant Wahrnehmung that is, in turn, structured and controlled by Linie. Things are 
manifested differently. As Strauß describes, using a metaphor central to Steiner’s 
postulate regarding the fissure between mankind and world: in Fleck ‘das vor den Augen 
stillsteht, der ganz und gar geäußerte, (wieder) einfältig gewordene, wunderliche 
Gegenstand – die Rose unter den Dingen’.  
                                                
181
attunement and lassitude, is developed over the following chapters. 
182
Second, Strauß offers a succession of related, mutually-reflexive terms to describe the 
suspension of Cartesian metaphysics indebted to Heidegger’s thought. Once the ‘Er’-
figure gives himself up to the indeterminacy of Fleck, largely as a result of the 
Sondenexperiment and his approach ‘ins Herz der Unvernunft’, the forward-moving 
 
179 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.65. 
20.  180 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, pp.19-
181 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.20. 
182 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.29. 
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structure of Wahrnehmung in Linie becomes unstable. As Strauß notes: ‘Menschen, 
Handlungen und Gegenstände verloren ihre festen Umrisse, er sah nur noch Flecken und 
Hupfer’.183 On the surface, the experience of Fleck is similar to the disorientation of 
Linie n in 
the re , the 
exper ferent. Instead, the transformation in Wahrnehmung of 
Jede Fähigkeit, eine stetige Abfolge zu begreifen, war ihm zerstört. Aber war 
unterdrückten Sinnesvermögens, das keine Erklärungen, Zusammenfassungen, 
Gewärtigen umrüstete?  
The introduction of Gewärtigen brings the argument back to Heidegger’s critique of 
Cartesianism in Sein und Zeit where it refers to an originating experience of world or 
thing as Gegenwärtigen. The term also draws together the argument of Chapter Two 
regarding the similarity of ontological concern in Heidegger’s Λόγος and Strauß’ 
Anwesenheit. 
High  he 
claim  – Heidegger 
                                                
. His Wahrnehmung appears unsettled just as in the description of the break-dow
lationship between subject and world. However, as Strauß goes on to describe
ience is fundamentally dif
Fleck affects both subject and environment. Rather than a means-end conception of 
object-world: ‘bemerkte er ein Bewegungsmuster von ziellosen, sprunghaften 
Veränderungen sowohl seiner Umgebung wie seiner inneren Konzepte’.184 The positive 
characteristics of this Wahrnehmung are portrayed along with the ancillary terms for 
Fleck:  
es eine Zerstörung? War es nicht vielmehr das Vordrängen eines anderen, 
Schlüsse erlaubte und das ihn zu einer Station für ein unausgesetztes 
185
lighting the sources for Descartes’ dualism of subject and object-world – which
s is a distortion of the scholastics and their own misuse of Aristotle
 
mphasis. 
183 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.128. 
184 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.128. 
185 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.128. My e
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proposes, in contrast, an ontological, grounded experience of world in λέγειν. Λέγειν 
evokes, for Heidegger, an immanent relationship of subject and object, although such 
categories do not apply in the pre-Socratics, in the disclosure of things. Such coming-
into-presence is in contrast to the detached observing subject proposed by Cartesian 
metaphysics. As Heidegger writes in Sein und Zeit: 
Das λέγειν […] das schlichte Vernehmen von etwas Vorhandenem in seiner 
wärtigens’ 
von etwas. Das Seiende, das sich in ihm für es zeigt und das als das 
Gege or Heidegger denotes the originating ontological condition for the 
Strauß develops the notion of Gewärtigen and the relationship of ‘Er’-figure to world 
with reference to another term: Zwischen, which in turn denotes the manner of the 
experience of Fleck. Describing the progress of the Sondenexperiment and move toward 
Fleck, Strauß has recourse to terms that are unmistakably Heideggerian: 
wie ‘gefaßt sein auf’ bedeutet, jedenfalls etwas zwischen ‘erwarten’ und 
dem Ereignis.  
Strauß signals how the Wahrnehmung of Fleck lifts the constraints of Cartesianism and 
Linie. As he notes in parenthesis in relation to Gewärtigen: ‘Es ist daher wichtig auf das 
Versp end, 
 
puren Vorhandenheit […] hat die […] Struktur des reinen ‘Gegen
eigentliche Seiende verstanden wird, erhält demnach seine Auslegung in 
Rücksicht auf – Gegen-wart, d.h. es ist als Anwesenheit begriffen.186 
nwärtigen, then, f
experience of world as Anwesenheit by Dasein. 
Er selbst hielt sich an das Wort ‘gewärtigen’, das dem Gebrauch nach soviel 
‘vergegenwärtigen’, eine besondere Form der Präsenz, eigentlich die Aura vor 
187
rengte […] zu achten, auch wenn sie scheinbar noch so kausal, zusammenhäng
                                                
6. 
phases: terms in quotation marks in original. 
186 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, pp.25-2
187 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.128. My em
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schlüssig sich darbietet’.188 Instead, in this alternative the ‘Er’-figure moves towards 
what is delineated as: ‘Die gemeinsame Her-vorbringung eines Gegenübers’.189 
was ist der ‘Mond im Wasser’, der vollkommene 
Widerschein – zwischen den Dingen. Denn der ‘Mond im Wasser’ ist weder 
der Mond selbst noch ist, wo seine Phantomschicht aufliegt, Wasser.190 
The present exegesis of Strauß’ Fleck, of related terms Zwischen and Gewärtigen, brings 
into consideration characteristics defining for Strauß’ prose writing. 
adopted directly from Heidegger’s late thought and in order better to define this difficult 
The resonance of Zwischen, in turn, is extended in a fragment that lies at the centre of the 
prose work. It shows the ‘Er’-figure overcoming the Abwas of Linie: the absence of thing 
in the object-world. Thus, at the heart of Beginnlosigkeit, subject and world are 
immanently united: 
Etwas ist oder et
Zwischen, as Strauß conceives it, has a topographic dimension, an association conveyed 
too by Gewärtigen.191 It is not, however, a tangible place. The former term is also 
constellation of terms around Fleck it is necessary briefly to highlight the philosopher’s 
own notion of Zwischen. 
                                                 
188 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.129. 
189 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.96. 
190 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.50. 
191 Interestingly, the etymological root of Gewärtigen (Gegenwart) denotes a spatial dimension rather than 
one of time. ‘Denn der Begriff der Gegenwart wurde nicht immer im zeitlichen Kontext verwendet. Noch 
im 18. Jahrhundert wurde der Begriff der Gegenwart “in räumlichen Bezügen zu Orten und Personen als 
Anwesenheit (praesentia), als physisch und psychisch gefasstes räumliches Befinden, als Wirkung an 
einem Ort verwendet”’, in Osterle, I. ‘Innovation und Selbstüberbietung: Temporalität der ästhetischen 
Moderne’, in Vietta, S. and Kemper, D. (eds.) Ästhetische Moderne in Europa. Grundzüge und 
Problemzusammenhänge seit der Romantik (Munich, 1997). Cited in Thomas, Botho Strauß und die 
‘Konservative Revolution’, p.216. 
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Of course, in Heideggerian thought, the term retains manifold suggestions bringing 
together disparate elements of his philosophy.192 The treatment of the term is most 
detai ent, 
thoug Like 
Strau  of nature, for Heidegger 
durch ihn hindurch zu den Himmlischen aufzuschauen. Das Aufschauen 
Das Aufschauen durchmißt das Zwischen von Himmel und Erde. Dieses 
em Wohnen des Menschen zugemessen.194 
It is worth noting that Heidegger’s term Zwischen brings to the fore two elements or 
characteristics that are given emphasis in Beginnlosigkeit: first, mankind and world, and 
second, the site of their immanent relationship. For Strauß, Wahrnehmung associated 
with Fleck necessitates mankind, just as it requires a site where the possibility of Fleck is 
to be experienced. 
                                                
led in his readings of Hölderlin’s poetry.193 For the focus of the present argum
h, the limited discussion of Zwischen in Vorträge und Aufsätze is instructive. 
ß’ example of moon and water, Zwischen signals the union
of earth and sky specifically, where mankind experiences this conjunction. As Heidegger 
writes of this topographic dimension: 
Aber dem Menschen ist zugleich verstattet, in diesem Bezirk, aus ihm her, 
durchgeht das Hinauf zum Himmel und verbleibt doch im Unten auf der Erde. 
Zwischen ist d
 
192 Pattison notes: ‘This “Between” can be envisaged in various ways. As the site where mortals and gods 
pressing. […]. The middle of Being might also be spoken of as the “Between” of Being and non-Being, and 
not exist in the manner of objects but has the potential to be realised in and through the freedom of action. 
[…]. World as world and thing as thing are retained in the unity of world-thing, yet each comes to its own 
nature through the separation and unification circumscribed by the between’, in White, Heidegger and the 
Language of Poetry, p.64. The idea is developed in conjunction with Strauß’ views on language and 
 Aufsätze, pp.188-189. My emphasis. 
meet, it also marks the boundary that separates them, the extreme point of human possibility occupied by 
the poet, a point at which the question concerning the gods, the question of transcendence […] becomes 
as such equivalent to possibility, the “possibility that belongs to actuality” in the sense of that which does 
[…]. The idea of possibility also points to the role of the “Between” as the middle of time, the point of 
transition between past and future. What is to be shown forth in poetry is historicity in the sense of 
becoming in the midst of transiency’, in Pattison, The Later Heidegger, pp.176-177. White describes the 
immanent essence of Zwischen well: ‘We must first think the relation between world and thing as a unity. 
invocation of the notion of Dämmern in the next chapter. 
193 See, in particular, Heidegger, M. ‘Hölderlins Erde und Himmel’, in Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins 
Dichtung (Frankfurt-am-Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 6th Edition, 1996), pp.152-181. 
194 Heidegger, ‘dichterisch wohnet der Mensch’, in Vorträge und
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Before exploring how these two elements of Fleck, mankind and site, culminate in the 
work, and showing how Strauß thus re-inscribes the notion of Anfang, it is worth 
touch n of 
Fleck  Heidegger and augment 
As part of the Sondenexperiment Strauß suggests that the ‘Er’-figure sets aside the 
conventional Wahrnehmung of Linie. This retains the classificatory attributes made by 
Verleugnung seines einzig wirklich fähigen, aktiven, zuverlässigen Organs: 
                                                
ing briefly on the other Heideggerian terms that are alluded to in the descriptio
. These demonstrate Strauß’ further indebtedness to
understanding of the term. One, in particular, is notable: Gehorchen and its cognates Ohr 
and Hören.195 
the subject of the object-world enshrined in dualism: ‘Überzeugungen, Gesinnungen, 
ideelle Bekenntnisse, Programme und Weltbilder, all die provisorischen 
Abgeschlossenheiten, die aus dem Ungleichgewicht des Geistes resultieren’.196 Instead, 
the ‘Er’-figure seeks refuge in another of his senses, that of Hören. 
Er ließ sich nicht lumpen und begann wider seine natürliche Skepsis, unter 
seines Ohrs, den alles verbindenden Mund zu öffnen.197 
But Strauß does not mean by Ohr the ‘Er’-figure’s auditory system. Rather, the term 
suggests the two characteristics defined above as central to Fleck; namely mankind and 
world. To understand better the ‘Er’-figure’s Gehorchen, one of his ‘zwei 
Verhaltensweisen’, it is necessary to consider again Heidegger’s Λόγος essay.198 
 
195 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.46. Space prevents consideration of Heidegger and Strauß’ respective use of 
Ereignis, for example. This is developed in detail in relation to consideration of Strauß’ portrayal of 
ng in Chapters Four and Five. 
. 
language and the poetics of dwelli
196 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.44. 
197 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.33. 
198 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.46
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Heidegger claims of Heraclitus’ fiftieth fragment that Λόγος is bound with Hören, as 
shown in the preceding chapter. In the essay he asks after ‘das eigentliche Hören’ in 
Λόγος and argues that Hören denotes the manner in which things in the world come-into-
presence for mankind. Chapter Two considers this in relation to the making manifest of 
world in the art work. Now though, the implications run deeper and extend to the present 
suggested suspension of dualism, and posited immanence of mankind and world. Hören 
and its cognate describe how originally in pre-Socratic thought mankind had a different 
experience of world. As he claims: ‘Das Hören ist erstlich das gesammelte Horchen. Im 
It is just this involvement of mankind and world, their respective immanence, that Strauß 
suggests of Fleck. He defines it negatively: devoid of the immanent relationship to the 
world, relating only in terms of its object-status, he notes that the ‘Er’-figure is: 
‘(untrammelled, ganz entbunden), gehorcht keinem Einzigen, sondern der Unzahl’.201 
Fleck is denoted according to terms that hint variously, in their indeterminability, at the 
proposed alternative Wahrnehmung. The originary experience though – Strauß’ response 
retically endless and origin-less teleology of 
Horchsamen west das Gehör. Wir hören, wenn wir ganz Ohr sind’.199 Mankind, he 
suggests, originally attended to things, to the world, rather than defining or grasping them 
as he comes to do in all subsequent philosophical or mathematically-based theory. Such 
attending necessitates mankind’s immanent belonging to things under consideration. As 
he writes: ‘Wir haben gehört, wenn wir dem Zugesprochenen gehören’.200 
But to return to Fleck: what is it that the ‘Er’-figure experiences and how is it described? 
to the condition of ‘Beginnlosigkeit’, the theo
                                                 
199 Heidegger, ‘Logos’, p.206. 
200 Heidegger, ‘Logos’, p.207. Emphasis in original. 
201 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.23. 
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Linie – is less clear from the terms Gewärtigen and Zwischen. To bring this closer, Strauß 
introduces a third narrative motif to those of the ‘Er’-figure and Sondenexperiment, 
highlighted in the opening to this chapter: that of the child, Nanos. The motif of 
childhood is important in uniting Fleck and the re-experience of origin. Interestingly, 
Sloterdijk in his Frankfurt lectures too highlights the experience of birth as central to the 
philo
The t ogy 
over the course of the work. The child is, thus, first mentioned when it is developing into 
that Wahrnehmung redolent of Linie, which already constrains the ‘Er’-figure. In the 
child’s acquisition of language, for example – an, as yet, unconsidered characteristic of 
both Linie and Fleck – the ‘Er’-figure reflects how the child loses its early experience of 
world sly 
close ring 
a childhood development constrained by Linie. Strauß writes: 
Es zeigte sich, daß die einsetzende Sprache dem kleinen Sohn, seinem Nanos, 
man mochte sogar annehmen: diese Sprache des Widerscheins war bereits die 
nur unendlich vermittelt und stückhaft wiedergeben läßt.  
The constraint of Linie is the inevitable default state: the world comes to be structured 
according to Linie and mediated both by parents and, Strauß suggests, the general 
environment. As he goes on to describe: 
                                                
sophically enigmatic delineation of a ‘Poetik des Anfangens’.202 
hree fragments in Beginnlosigkeit dealing with Nanos occur in reverse chronol
, which he himself can no longer sense. Moreover, the child is already precariou
 to becoming detached from this Wahrnehmung, which inevitably diminishes du
etwas Schönheit geraubt hatte. Das Auge war weniger geworden. […]. Ja, 
vollendete Passung überhaupt, der ganze Ausdruck für etwas, das sich später 
203
 
nmöglichkeit, mit dem eigenen Anfang anzufangen, der 
h” ist das erzählende Tier, weil er das zum Anfangen 
er Welt orientieren muß, ohne am “wirklichen” Anfang als wacher Zeuge 
202 Sloterdijk notes: ‘Vielleicht liegt in der U
Ursprung der mythischen Tätigkeit […]. Der “Mensc
verurteilte Wesen ist, das sich in d
dabeisein zu können’, in Sloterdijk, Zur Welt kommen – zur Sprache kommen, p.39. 
203 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.73. My emphasis. 
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Sein Lernen, das ihm zunächst eine Welt vermittelt, die seinen Eltern vertraut 
Passungen
scheint, verfolgt bereits den Aufbau von Dispositionen, Rezeptoren, 
 für eine Welt nach den Eltern, Zurüstungen, die aus der Entelechie 
der allgemeinen Lebensbedingungen […] Module der Bereitschaft erstellen, 
The s rast 
to wh childhood, he sketches instead 
ed though is not, as some commentators 
argue, a sentimentalisation of childhood in a state of pre-lapsarian naivety.206 The child 
figure, like the depiction of scientific and technological theory, is a conceit that brings to 
light something philosophically more fundamental. Nanos portrays emblematically the 
Wahrnehmung of Fleck now lost to mankind. The child, ‘in den ersten Lebensmonaten’, 
it is suggested, in contrast to the adult world of the ‘Er’-figure, is still able to have such 
an experience. 
Die Augen wurden groß, der Mund schleckte, er wollte näher an die 
beiseite, lachte freudig oder fürchtete sich greinend. Er stand offenbar mit 
Gemütskräfte der Person zusammengefaßt waren.  
It invokes an alternative relationship to world. 
The f ent 
of his in union in the work. 
nach denen Ich und Zukunft sich gemeinsam bilden.204 
econd portrayal shows the child back at an earlier developmental stage. In cont
at Strauß terms the ‘lange Reise der Sublimation’ of 
Nanos’ ‘erstes Begreifen’.205 What is propos
Erscheinung heran, wich dann aber auch plötzlich zurück oder sah verschämt 
dem Scheitel-Geist, in dem alles Wesentliche, Fühlbare, die gesamten 
207
inal fragment in Nanos’ reverse chronological development describes the mom
 birth, his own beginning. In this, Fleck and the originary are 
It is also, significantly, the penultimate fragment in Beginnlosigkeit before the 
culmination of the ‘Er’-figure’s own fleeting experience of Fleck. The birth of the child 
                                                 
204 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, pp.93-94. My emphasis. 
205 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.74. 
his charge at Strauß during a review of Die Feher des Kopisten in the 
, Das literarische Quartett, broadcast in late 1997. 
206 Marcel Reich-Ranicki levels t
popular ZDF television programme
207 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.94. 
 172
temporarily suspends the established structures of Wahrnehmung. For the ‘Er’-figure: 
‘Der Anblick war so unwahrscheinlich, so fremdweltlich, daß ihm vor Ehrfurcht Zeit und 
Raum entschwanden’.208 Similarly, the first moments for the child – ‘wo war der 
Beginn?’ he asks – evoke an experience of world outlined in discussion of the term 
Gehorchen. Strauß describes the child’s response to the world as one of continual 
manifestation or  creation: 
Übte, sonderte, sondierte, schaffte, ob im Traum oder im Wachen. Kein Spiel 
Achtsamkeit auf inneres wie äußeres Geschehen bedeutete.  
At the instance of birth, the defining terms for mankind and of the prose work, Fleck and 
Linie, are contrasted. As Strauß writes: ‘Es ist das Alles-auf-Einmal, aus dem wir 
kommen, um uns zum Ende zu fädeln. Erst ist das Knäuel, und zuletzt der gerade Faden, 
der irgendwann abreißt’. Birth is the brief instance of beginning where Fleck is sensed by 
man in its originary form. Thereafter, the child, like the ‘Er’-figure, emerges into a world 
dominated by Linie. The child is, Strauß writes: ‘aus unendlicher Weisheit vertrieben’.  
He describes the inevitability of subsequent development of Linie-structured 
Wahrnehmung: ‘Von solchem Rund zu Rund schreitet man später weiter, etwa: von einer 
Illusion zur nächsten’.  
occurrence. Fleck, by implication, is not a unitary phenomenon: it is not a 
one-off event or a single thing and is denoted and invoked by a range of different, 
                                                




The possibility of an alternative Wahrnehmung that Strauß proposes to the dominion of 
Linie and its instrumentality is a re-inscription of an originary experience and, as such, is 
a manifold 
 
208 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.131. 
209 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.33. My emphases. 
210 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.132. 
211 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.133. 
 173
sometimes antagonistic, terms. The present argument notes some of these but many are 
left for the readings of different works that follow. Each contributes, though, to the 
diffuse, enigmatic nature of Fleck and is shown to unsettle the dominance of 
Cartesianism and dualist metaphysics: the schism between mankind and world – subject 
and object – is suspended and their respective immanent relation evoked. Moreover, this 
immanence is conceived as a site at which mankind again experiences that alternative 
Wahrnehmung as Fleck. The argument shows the affinity of these terms and difficult, 
often intangible ideas with Heidegger’s thought and idiolect, and how Strauß adopts these 
to offer his own searching renewed revision to science and technology precepts in late 
modernity. 
Niemand anderes. These offer 
intere otifs 
throu
The final passage of Paare, Passanten, for example, which most commentators view as 
confirmation of Strauß’ departure from Adorno’s dialectic, is marked by the same 
characteristics. The figure portrayed in the fragment has an experience, which like the 
encou t on 
New Year’s Eve, evoking the end and beginning of both day and year. The figure stands 
t von einem Fleck’ where he previously saw the figure of 
The conjoined characteristics manifest by and in Strauß’ Fleck – mankind and site – 
culminate in the final passage of Beginnlosigkeit. The fragment presents an instance, a 
moment in the work for dynamic engagement, an epiphany with equivalents in other 
Strauß prose works, including Paare, Passanten and 
sting comparisons and indicate both the continuity and development of these m
ghout Strauß’ prose writing. 
nter with Karl Popper in Beginnlosigkeit, takes place in Venice. It is midnigh
‘nur wenige Meter […] entfern
 174
Adorno.212 The conventional experience of surroundings – of place, time, space – is 
temporarily suspended; the boundaries are blurred: 
Der gewohnte Schutzraum der Bewegungen, die charakteristische Proportion, 
die der Gänger zu seiner Umgebung, zu Häusern und Passanten, Straße und 
Inste ller 
Gesang’.  The sound reverberates: aus einem kindlichen Mund steigen unter 
Atemdampf diese reinen Töne’.  An alternative sense of experience is glimpsed: 
‘Ja […] es ist bekannt genug; und gewiß aus dem einfachen Grund, daß wir 
dann Unbekanntes, Unsichtbares in uns selbst zum Vorschein’.  
Likewise, Strauß describes a passage in the ‘Odeon’ section of Niemand anderes, which 
shares many characteristics with Beginnlosigkeit. The critique of technology is more 
explicit in this work: 
die nackte Sorglosigkeit versetzt. Seine Not, sein Mangel zieht aber auf sich 
dem Vorhandenen angemessen ist.  
Amongst the cycles of scientific and technological innovation that are described, ‘Odeon’ 
– an uer, 
verfa ruin 
sugge eon 
        
Verkehr bildet, ist hier aufgehoben oder mindestens gestört.213 
ad, ‘ein heimlicher Riß tut sich auf’, as he hears a woman sing, ‘ein starker, he
214
215
hier ungleich verwunderter blicken müssen als anderswo, und davon kommen 
216
Die engerichtete Ding-Welt hat unser Bewußtsein schokkiert, gelähmt oder in 
das Nu, den Blitz, der es umordnet plötzlich zu nächster Überlegenheit, die  
217
 image of a building in ruins – remains a constant: ‘Odeon, Leeres Gemä
llene Säle’.218  Like Fleck though, in spite of the transformations around it, the 
sts the site for alternative experience. Strauß concludes the Odeon series: ‘Od
                                         
auß, Paare, Passanten, p.203. 212 Str
213 Strauß, Paare, Passanten, p.202. 
214 Strauß, Paare, Passanten, p.203. 
215 Strauß, Paare, Passanten, p.203. 
216 Strauß, Paare, Passanten, p.204. 
217 Strauß, Niemand anderes, p.139. 







Er ging hinaus und beobachtete die großen Verwehungen am Himmel, 
Spiegelbild, auf den Kopf gekehrt, von einem anderen erschien, den man nicht 
zum Beginn der großen Sprengung ziehen. […]. 
Schweigefinger, so daß auch im Unruhigsten der Tag sanft ausklingen mußte. 
Land der jungen Mandelblüten ganz unter rosa Rauhreif lag. […]. Da trat der 
gleichermaßen kühl und fahl beginnt, und man hätte gerade erwacht sein 
ten Weg gezogen. 
Im aufblassenden Grau des Himmels erschien die lange Dünung, kleine 
Wellenfalten, die gleichen, die das Wasser in den Schlick gräbt, der Wind 
zart und ungestalt wie farbige Cremes ineinanderliefen, mattblau und silbernes 
die wiederum zum Keil verwehten, einer Phalanx angehaltener Stare ähnlich 
… Aber welcher Himmel wäre so grau, daß er nicht am Ende noch errötete, 
einmal erhöhte sich die Tönung, verdickte, wurde kobaltblau, bunt begann die 
                                                
 nicht: Ideen. Nicht nur der Streit, sondern das Überwindende auch in allen Ding
steht auf unterste Stelle und hebt den Kopf zum Hören. Und zum Gesang’.219 
nlosigkeit ends with a vivid, fragmentary portrayal of the ‘Er’-figure’s imma
ience of Fleck combining terms and characteristics delineated above. It is w
ng at length: 
ungeheure Fahrten kurz vor Sonnenuntergang, ein Himmel, der wie das 
sah, und die langen Wolken, Schleifen, Schlieren, Federn mußten rückwärts 
Friedlich wie vordem lag der Abend auf den Uferhöhen, das Licht hob seinen 
Die Dämmerung sank in die Ebene ein, alle Farben wurden fahl, bis dann das 
rauchige Abend auf einmal in die Symmetrie zur Morgenfrühe, die 
können, wäre die Sonne nicht den verkehr
über den Sand wirft, so sanft, so tuchen und gedämpft, mit Maserungen, die 
Türkis … der lange Sog des Sonnenuntergangs löste Fetzen aus den Wolken, 
oder wie ein einziger aus Dampf geformter Riesenvogel, der reglos schwebte 
den freundlichen Ocker, ein irdenes Licht aufsteigen ließe? Danach noch 
Nacht.220 
The fragment shows the union within the alternative Wahrnehmung as Fleck of the 
otherwise fragmented and irreconcilable: mankind and world; earth and sky; day turning 
to night and night returning to day; beginning and end. In Beginnlosigkeit, Strauß thus 
offers – far from a treatise on technology or science – the beginnings of an understanding 
 
. Emphasis in original. 219 Strauß, Niemand anderes, p.156
220 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.134. 
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of the poetic, based on Heidegger’s fundamental revision of the Western philosophical 
tradition, that is the focus of the present thesis. 
How tic – 
its portrayal of such ideas and inscription of its own philosophical status – it is first 
necessary to highlight another characteristic, briefly mentioned but as yet unconsidered, 
in the ‘Er’-figure’s Wahrnehmung and crisis. The final fragment with its evocative 
conjunction of the irreconcilable – ‘irdenes Licht’ and ‘bunte Nacht’ – gestures towards 
its nature. Willer, for example, cites these two oxymorons to conclude, rightly, that they 
present the underlying ‘Widersprüchlichkeit’ to Strauß’ whole creative œuvre. But the 
implications of such apparent opposites are more far-reaching than describing a principle 
of literary contradiction as Willer appears to suggest.221 Strauß himself parallels the 
conceit of an oxymoron with that alternative Wahrnehmung in Fleck. He notes of the 
device: 
da lebt das Oxymoron, das Untier des Geistes. […]. Das Oxymoron – 
wörtlich: der stumpfe Scharfsinn – ist der in unsere Vernunft eingeschlagene 
nominalism of Strauß’ position. As Strauß has the ‘Er’-figure reflect: ‘Aber ist Sprache 
ever, before moving on to a more detailed examination of this notion of the poe
Lichtstein der Offenbarung.222 
Critically, for the present thesis, the ‘Er’-figure’s experience of Fleck is in language. This 
is not, however, simply to relay the tautology that a character’s experience in a prose 
work must necessarily be described in language. The relationship between language, the 
‘Er’-figure and the experience of Fleck is more fundamental, and picks up the counter-
                                                 
221 See, Willer, Botho Strauß, p.141. 
222 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.119. 
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dem Unsichtbaren nicht wesensnah verwandt?’.223 Language is, thus, for Strauß, itself 
intimately bound up with Fleck. 
3.4 ‘In the beginning was the Word’  
trauß stresses language’s particular 
status  the 
epiph sed 
in language. But Strauß posits language, by implication, as more profound, as a 
substantiated realm (a realm, of course, suggests a site invoked in the experience of 
Fleck) in which man is, and in which he experiences the possibility of world. In language, 
there is that Wahrnehmung associated with Fleck. As Strauß claims: ‘In der Sprache geht 
        
224
If the argument of the previous two chapters is accepted – first, that Strauß’ Anwesenheit 
shares affinity with Heidegger’s Λόγος (Anwesenheit, of course, like Fleck, evokes the 
Wahrnehmung of world lost to mankind); second, that Fleck is concerned with such an 
originary experience – then it follows that Fleck must also be intimately bound up with 
language. Strauß points to just this similarity between the diffuse Wahrnehmung of Fleck 
and language, noting of the latter: ‘In der Sprache ist Verstehen der unterdrückte Anklang 
tausendfältigen Verstehens. […] Aller Beginn ist Widerhall’.225 
Throughout Beginnlosigkeit, language is portrayed in terms that suggest its intractability 
and resistance to the dominating effects of Linie. S
. This raises the more substantial point noted at the end of the last section:
anic experience of Fleck in the final fragment, at one level, is obviously expres
                                         
Beginnlosigkeit, p.67. This image of Nähe in relation to language is developed in Chapter Fo223 Strauß, ur 
and the presentation in Wohnen Dämmern Lügen of an absent experience of originary langauge. 
hn, v.1, The Bible. Authorized King James Version (Oxford: OUP, 1997), 224 The Gospel according to St. Jo
p.114. 
225 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.36. 
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es, w wie 
bei d n oder biologischen Formenwelt’.226 
Language, for Strauß, manifests the characteristics that the argument above attributes to 
Fleck. As he claims in direct reference to Heidegger: 
Ältere Sprache befördert ein komplexeres Verstehen als neuere, technisch 
 einfach reicher, nicht unbedingt im Vokabular, sondern  
reicher in der ‘Vernetzung’ des Verstehens. Besitzt mehr ‘Anklang’, wie 
So, fo
imag ard 
trajectory of Linie. 
Gerade dort, wo sie gewahrt, […], wo sie auf eine prinzipielle Fremd-Sprache 
Steigerung ihrer internen Spannkräfte. Das komplikative Verstehen, das 
Ältere Sprache also im Entstehen […].  
This older, originary language acts, Strauß suggests, using an analogy of a windmill 
resonant of Heidegger in ‘Die Frage nach der Technik’, contrary to the technological 
Überlieferungsbestandteilen, um ihre Konventionen zu sichern. Es bleibt beim 
Schwung und Betrieb ist. Vielleicht ist Vergleichen ursprünglich so sehr ans 
Entsprechung mehr findet.  
                                                
as den Zuwachs an Komplexität betrifft, geschichtlich offenbar umgekehrt zu 
er Entwicklung des Wissens, der technische
angepaßte. Sie ist
Heidegger sagen würde.227 
r Strauß, there is that in language, which moves back to an originary condition: it is 
ed in regression toward an unspecified past, in direct contrast to the forw
stößt, […], reagiert sie mit einer Verdichtung von Bild und Gedanke, mit einer 
eingefaltete, anstelle des explikativen, wird dann zu ihrer ‘Neuheit’. 
228
perogatives of modernity. Language is restorative of the relationship between subject and 
thing. Strauß contends: 
Es ist, als benötigte die Sprache […] ein gewisses Maß an Anachronismen und 
Vergleich mit dem Mühlrad, auch wenn dieses schon seit Generationen außer 




226 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.78. 
227 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.78. 
228 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, pp.78-7
229 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.93. 
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Importantly for the present argument, language is characterised, like Fleck, as a site 
offering potential refuge. However, it is also constrained by the technologically Linie-
structured Wahrnehmung of world. Writing of language, Strauß claims: ‘Ihr “heiliger 
Bezirk” wird um so stiller und anziehender, je ohnmächtiger draußen in der Breite mit ihr 
operiert, herumgewörtert wird’.230 
Thus, notwithstanding the possibility of language – as Strauß notes in an interesting 
imag  
Kom and the provisional, 
ms of instrumental use and value. Furthermore, in a 
notab the 
Tract deuten die Grenzen meiner Welt’ – Strauß 
sugge  the 
hypo
fühlung und der 
Grenzbestimmung. Wie der Gesang den Walen, das Klickgeräusch den 
auch menschliche Sprache, die horcht, indem sie verlautet.  
                                                
e resonant of the argument in ‘Der Aufstand’, ‘die Sprache soll keiner
munikation “dienen”, sie soll communio sein jederzeit’ – 
contingent epiphany of the final fragment in Beginnlosigkeit, Strauß contends that the 
relationship to language remains deeply problematic.231 As he remarks of the ‘Er’-figure: 
‘Er wurde der Abgleiter – sein Ohr fand keinen Halt mehr, es schlidderte […] von Sätzen 
und Wörtern hinab’.232 Language continues to be constrained by Linie and is thus 
viewed, like the object-world, in ter
le fragment that alludes to one of Wittgenstein’s central premises from 
atus – ‘Die Grenzen meiner Sprache be
sts that the established view of language precludes the description, let alone
thesised existence, of a world beyond the limits that it denotes.233 Strauß writes: 
Man spricht […] auch zum Zweck der gemeinsamen Stimm
Delphinen dazu dient, die Grenzen ihrer Umgebung abzutasten, so gibt es 
234
 
230 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.108. 
-109. 
ico-Philosophicus (London: Routledge, 2002), p.148. 
231 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, pp.108
232 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.21. 
233 Wittgenstein, L. Tractatus Log
234 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.32. 
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 – is utterly irreconcilable with 
the enigma denoted by Fleck, and which Strauß inscribes in the work and proposes to 
bring to light. Strauß describes mankind’s problematic, but defining, relationship to 
language in a further telling image: 
In der Sprache klingen die Signale nach, wie in der Wohnung des gerade 
Verstorbenen das Telefon noch hin und wieder läutet. Doch der (in der 
Sprache) Angerufene ist nicht mehr da. 
[…]. 
Das Wesen des Sprechenden besteht nun aus Flucht. […]. Da man in kein 
Zimmer hineingehört, sondern in diesem unsäglichen Haus nur laufen kann, 
nicht wohnen, einem unbekannten Ausgang zustrebt, während Haut und Geist 
schon verderben und nur der Flur sich unabsehbar verjüngt, […], wird man, 
wenn’s einer bezeugen müßte, hier auch nie gewesen sein.235 
Just as language and Fleck are conceived respectively as offering a site for a possible 
alternative Wahrnehmung, mankind’s current relationship to language is described as one 
of homelessness. It is this important motif in Strauß’ prose work, as yet unconsidered in 
the literature, that is the focus of the penultimate chapter. 
                                                
A view of language based on the philosophical precepts of that Wahrnehmung associated 
with Linie – whether Cartesianism, Platonic or Popperian
 
235 Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, pp.42 and 43. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
GROUNDS OF POSSIBILITY: LÜGEN DÄMMERN WOHNEN 
4.1 Originary language: die Sprache des Dritten 
The previous two chapters consider Strauß’ adoption of aspects of Heidegger’s thought 
through linguistic allusion and affinity in the structure of argumentation. The prose work 
that most obviously evokes such parallels is Wohnen Dämmern Lügen published in 1994, 
which comprises a series of fragments.1 The invocation through the tri-partite title of 
Heidegger’s 1951 essay ‘Bauen Wohnen Denken’ both in denotation and structure – three 
verbal nouns conjoined by no grammatical relation – appears overwhelming.2 It is, 
however, an allusion that remains largely unremarked, at least amongst critics delivering 
literary reviews of the work immediately following publication: perhaps, in part, due to 
the continuing rumbling disquiet and critical pre-occupation with the ‘Anschwellender 
Bocksgesang’ debate. Such is certainly the suggestion Strauß makes implicitly in an 
interview accompanying the release of his later prose work, Das Partikular.3 He 
expresses surprise at the generally favourable reviews of a work that for him is 
thematically similar to Wohnen Dämmern Lügen. Critical response to Das Partikular 
was, he notes, ‘jedenfalls anders als ich befürchten musste. So verscheiden sind meine 
                                                 
1 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.192. 
2 Heidegger, ‘Bauen Wohnen Denken’, in Vorträge und Aufsätze, pp.139-156. 
3 Strauß, B. Das Partikular (Munich/Vienna: Hanser, 2000). 
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vorangegangen Bücher ja nicht, dass es Grund gäbe, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen in den 
Orkus zu stoßen, wie es ja geschehen ist’.4 
The failure to recognise the allusion of Strauß’ title also goes some way to explaining 
Korte’s representative response to the work. In one of the few serious critical 
commentaries he succumbs to a reaction familiar from those noted of Beginnlosigkeit and 
other Strauß writing. He highlights the apparent lack of continuity or recognisable 
narrative integrity in Wohnen Dämmern Lügen: just as the fragments are made up of 
‘heterogenstem Material’ so there is also ‘keinen erkennbaren roten Faden, der die 
Sequenzen miteinander zu einer sinnkonstituiernden Gesamtkomposition verbindet’.5 
The present reading challenges this notion and argues for a deep, underlying concern with 
language in Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, about which the allusion to Heidegger in the title 
gives an important indication. Moreover, it is the philosophical nature of this concern that 
gives important guidance to Strauß’ poetics of dwelling. 
Even among the selected critics who note the allusion it remains almost always 
undeveloped. For example, Wiesberg declares that, ‘die Assoziation, die mit dem Titel 
des Buches Wohnen Dämmern Lügen verbunden ist, verweist auf Martin Heideggers 
Arbeit’, without going on to consider either the nature of the connection for Strauß’ 
writing overall, or its significance for this particular prose work.6 Thomas too postulates 
a connection to Heidegger but not to the essay ‘Bauen Wohnen Denken’. Instead, she 
claims Wohnen Dämmern Lügen is pre-occupied with ‘der tragische Kampf um die 
                                                 
4 Strauß, ‘Am Rand. Wo sonst’. 
5 Korte, H. ‘Auf dem Weg zur “Tagesordnung des Ewigen”? Botho Strauß’ Prosa “Die Widmung” und 
“Wohnen Dämmern Lügen”’, in Arnold, H. L. (ed.) TEXT+KRITIK 81 Botho Strauß: Neufassung 
(Munich: text + kritik, 1998), p.18. 
6 Wiesberg, Botho Strauß. Dichter der Gegen-Aufklärung, p.115. 
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Heidegger’sche Eigentlichkeit’ developed through what she rather generally calls the 
intertextual referencing of Wohnen Dämmern Lügen.7 The inclusion in her argument of 
the authenticity of Dasein, central to Sein und Zeit, which is explicitly absent from the 
essay ‘Bauen Wohnen Denken’ and overall in the late thought, and the specific 
connotations of the term in relation to Strauß’ prose work are left unexplained by Thomas 
other than in reference to a loose notion of Strauß’ proposed ‘radikal humanistisch 
motivierte Kritik an der Jetztzeit’.8 
To confuse reception of the allusion to ‘Bauen Wohnen Denken’ further, Willer picks up 
the main themes articulated by Heidegger in the essay and suggests that these are 
developed by Strauß not in Wohnen Dämmern Lügen but in another work altogether: 
namely in ‘die Einstiegssätze der Fehler des Kopisten’.9 The opening sentences of this 
biographical prose work of 1997 in which Strauß sketches the construction of his new 
house in the Uckermark present Willer with, he claims, ‘einen entscheidenden Hinweis: 
Es handelt sich um das “Bauen”’.10 The linguistic echo and structural correspondence 
between Wohnen Dämmern Lügen and Heidegger’s essay are then mentioned by Willer 
as an aside as ‘dessen offenkundige Parodie in der Verzeichnung des Titels’ without, for 
example, considering further the significance of the shift in terms between both titles.11 If 
Strauß is offering a parody of the Heideggerian essay, it would be as well to know of 
what and to what end. 
                                                 
7 Thomas, Botho Strauß und die ‘Konservative Revolution’, p.186. 
8 Thomas, Botho Strauß und die ‘Konservative Revolution’, p.186. 
9 Willer, Botho Strauß, p.119. 
10 Willer, Botho Strauß, p.119. Strauß opens the work: ‘Auf einem Hügel in der Uckermark baute ich ein 
weißes Haus, und eigentlich sind es zwei, ein größeres mit dem Blick in eine weite Wiesensenke, begrenzt 
vom Wald im Süden, dem Jakobsdorfer Forst. Und ein kleineres in seinem Rücken für Gäste, die nie 
kommen, mit einem Heizungsraum und einem Zimmer fürs Klavier’, in Strauß, Die Fehler des Kopisten, 
p.7. 
11 Willer, Botho Strauß, p.120. 
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Hage, a commentator personally closely associated with Strauß, particularly as editor of 
two of his prose works and through the latter’s publications and interviews in Der 
Spiegel, does raise the question of how Strauß has amended the three-fold designation of 
Heidegger’s essay.12 He not only mentions the specific allusion to ‘Bauen Wohnen 
Denken’ but also intriguingly raises the question of the changes Strauß introduces. He 
refers to ‘die semantische Verschiebung zwischen den Titeln’: but although these appear, 
as he says, ‘aufschlußreich’ he fails to develop this further.13 
The significance of the transformation in terms – notably the continuity of Wohnen and 
the absence of ‘Denken’ and ‘Bauen’ and their replacement by Lügen and Dämmern – as 
well as their relative prioritisation is an important consideration in this chapter. The 
reading suggests that the shift in two of the terms and retention of Wohnen signal 
important further characteristics for mankind’s – distorted – ontological relationship to 
world and its experience outlined in the preceding chapter, and the involvement of 
language for both. Moreover, Strauß’ particular understanding of the terms Lügen, 
Dämmern and Wohnen, as the argument shows, deepens the view of his incorporation of 
Heideggerian thought, specifically in relation to language. 
Aside from the persistence of the single designation Wohnen and Strauß’ introduction of 
two different terms, the other obvious connection between both titles is the structural 
relationship between the three words: this is retained in Strauß’ title exactly as in 
Heidegger’s. The absence of commas, dashes, colons or any other grammatical signifier 
                                                 
12 The Strauß works with a postscript by Hage include, Strauß, B. Über Liebe. Geschichten und 
Bruchstücke (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1989) and Strauß, B. Gedankenfluchten (Frankfurt-am-Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1999). His main interviews with Strauß include Hage, ‘Schreiben ist eine Séance’, in Radix, 
(ed.) Strauß lesen, pp.188-217 and Hage, ‘Der Dichter nach der Schlacht’, pp.179-189. 
13 Hage, ‘Nachwort’, in Strauß, Gedankenfluchten, p.92. 
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denoting a specific relation between the verbal nouns suggests their relative inter-
dependence. In Strauß’ title, just as Wohnen invokes a particular experience for mankind 
with language as the present chapter concludes, it also evokes an association with the 
other two designations, Dämmern and Lügen. Each term stands alone yet is bound with 
the others in relation to the suggested absent and forgotten experience with language.14 
Moreover, importantly, the trilogy does not signal a movement from one designation, 
Wohnen, to another, Lügen, by way of a third, Dämmern, each suggesting either a 
regression or progression from one state to another. Thus, Strauß’ title is not, for 
example, a tri-partite descriptor of decline. Nor, in keeping with the argument developed 
in respect of Linie-structured Wahrnehmung in Beginnlosigkeit, does it represent a 
dialectic leading towards a synthesis in Wohnen of concerns associated with Lügen or 
Dämmern. The heading for this chapter, therefore, pointedly inverts the trilogy of Strauß’ 
work with a view to considering the relationship of each term to the underlying thematic 
concern of the fragments of the work, namely mankind’s relationship in late modernity to 
language, its impoverished philosophical status and the possibility for an originary 
alternative. 
                                                 
14 The present argument uses the more evocative, if opaque, notion of an ‘experience with’ language, rather 
than the more conventional formulation, namely to have an ‘experience of’ something. This is intended to 
invoke characteristics of mankind’s retrieval and immanent experience with an originary, forgotten and 
absent sense of language, derived from Heideggerian thought, that comes to be associated by Strauß with 
the term Wohnen. Heidegger describes this as: ‘Mit etwas, sei es ein Ding, ein Mensch, […], eine 
Erfahrung machen heißt, daß es uns widerfährt, daß es uns trifft, über uns kommt, uns umwirft und 
verwandelt. Die Rede vom “machen” meint in dieser Wendung gerade nicht, daß wir die Erfahrung durch 
uns bewerkstelligen; machen heißt hier: durchmachen, erleiden, das uns Treffende empfangen’, in 
Heidegger, M. ‘Das Wesen der Sprache’, in Unterwegs zur Sprache, p.159. As the argument shows, like 
the experience with Fleck, it is not experience in the Faustian sense of greifen described by Goethe, 
conceived as definitively understanding something, but rather as being open in understanding to that which 
is. 
 186
Amongst critics, Windrich provides the most detailed consideration of Strauß’ 
relationship to Heidegger, charting the development of his thinking from an early 
involvement with Critical Theory through to a debt to the ‘Freiburger Philosoph’.15 The 
analysis, as it is highlighted in Chapter One, charts this transition from Strauß’ Paare, 
Passanten through the play Ithaka and onto Wohnen Dämmern Lügen. Windrich, 
however, in contrast to the argument just outlined, does contend that Strauß envisages a 
progressive movement through the title’s three-fold designation in the different figures of 
the prose work. This change, he reasons, results from the figures’ respective relationships 
to language and each other. Thus, while he rightly posits that Strauß’ aim in the work is 
to hypothesize as he puts it, ‘ein neues Sprechen’, Windrich’s is a conception of language 
viewed directly as communication.16 As the following discussion shows, this is 
antithetical to Heidegger’s thinking on language and Strauß’ adoption of such ideas. 
The desire amongst Strauß’ figures for a change to language arises, Windrich suggests, 
from a failure to create meaningful relationships through establishment of a new code of 
lingistic conventions and uses. Windrich locates this semantic crisis – namely the 
inability to create a sustainable, collectively agreed notion of meaning and, therefore, of 
communicability – in the philosophical breach arising from structuralist arguments on the 
arbitrary linguistic relation of signifier to signified. This is, of course, an argument central 
to Steiner’s conception of the crisis of real presences and the status of the word in 
modernity after Mallarmé. Windrich argues that in the different episodes in Strauß’ work: 
deutet sich an, inwiefern Wohnen Dämmern Lügen die […] Konzeption der 
Bipolarität aufgreift. […] darin spiegelt sich aber der Appell, die 
                                                 
15 Windrich, Das Aus für das Über, p.106. 
16 Windrich, Das Aus für das Über, p.105. 
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innersprachliche Bedeutung nicht mit dem wirklichen Gegenstand zu 
identifizieren, sondern deren Auseinander zu unterstreichen.17 
Thus, what he classifies as the absence of meaning in language – of ‘die Struktur der 
konkreten Benennung’ – acts as the defining influence on Strauß’ figures and their sense 
of language in Wohnen Dämmern Lügen. 
Furthermore, Windrich describes figures in the work trying to re-connect to a lost form of 
language, the source for which he identifies in Heidegger, and posits that Strauß is 
searching instead for ‘sprachliche Enklaven’ within which to constitute meaning and 
meaningful relationships.18 Critically, after advancing the idea of limits to signification of 
contemporary language, Windrich contends that the search for a new language – although 
it ultimately remains unclear wherein its novelty lies – is to be found in the way 
exchanges between the figures in the work are portrayed. Thus, he argues of certain 
fragments that: ‘Die Erforschung der neuen Sprache gestaltet sich also als Frage nach 
[…] dem intentionalen Bereich des Gegenübers’.19 Windrich contends that the 
conversational exchanges between Strauß’ figures variously function ‘als Beispiel für das 
neue Sprechen’.20 
However, it is precisely in these dialogues and the attempt to ground a new language that 
Windrich is forced to concede that Strauß signals his departure from Heideggerian 
thought. He thus argues for Strauß’, ‘Abweichung gegenüber Heideggers Konzeption von 
                                                 
17 Windrich, Das Aus für das Über, p.74. 
18 Windrich, Das Aus für das Über, p.96. 
19 Windrich, Das Aus für das Über, p.99. 
20 Windrich, Das Aus für das Über, p.99. 
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wahrem Sprechen’ in favour of an idea of the other found in Lévinas’ l’Autre.21 Based 
specifically on Lévinas’ philosophical rejection of Heidegger’s conception of Ereignis – 
which for this thesis is fundamental, or foundational, for Strauß’ writing as the following 
two chapters show – Windrich claims that Strauß projects the idea of a new order of 
language, as ‘das authentische Sprechen’, only in conjunction with the other, in ‘die 
Berührung mit dem Anderen’.22 
The interpretive significance and value of Windrich’s thesis lies not only in initiating 
critical moves to resist the fatalism charge against Strauß, highlighted in Chapter One, 
but also in the attempt to address the specific Heideggerian allusion of Strauß’ Wohnen 
Dämmern Lügen. He makes the first case in the secondary literature for showing the 
philosophical provenance of the terms in Strauß’ work, which goes some way to 
clarifying the apparent lack of continuity that troubles critics such as Korte. For 
Windrich, Strauß intends the title ‘als Huldigung’ to Heidegger notwithstanding what he 
sees as his major ‘Änderungen und Abweichungen’ from the philosopher.23 
However, this chapter argues that Windrich overlooks the philosophical imperative of 
Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, given the proximity of Strauß’ portrayal of language to 
Heidegger’s thought not only in adoption of terms but also in the exploration of his ideas 
in the narrative fragments. Strauß does not extricate himself from such thinking on 
                                                 
21 Windrich, Das Aus für das Über, p.103. He links Lévinas’ l’Autre to structuralist arguments on language: 
‘Da […] die Überschreitung hingegen auf die diesseitige Alterität verweist, kann man die […] 
Veränderungen (in respect of Heidegger [MJ]) als zwei Gesichtspunkte ein und desselben Prozesses 
begreifen. Das in Wohnen Dämmern Lügen entwickelte sprachphilosophische Modell hat vom 
Ausgangspotential – dem mit Lévinas’ Gedankengut aufgeladenen Komplex der ursprünglichen 
Wortstiftung – also eine klar bestimmte Schicht abgestoßen, nämlich all das, was mit der Möglichkeit zur 
binären Verständigung korrespondiert’, in Windrich, Das Aus für das Über, p.103. 
22 Windrich, Das Aus für das Über, p.105. 
23 Windrich, Das Aus für das Über, p.106. 
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language with recourse to an ethics found in Lévinas’ other. Central to the contention 
presented here is an understanding of the significance of Strauß’ portrayal of couples in 
the different episodes as the site both for the overt symptoms of a crisis in language and 
the prospect of communicative exchange – or rather, the lack of it – in overcoming this. 
Strauß shows the crisis of language in late modernity through a portrayal of the failure of 
dialogue – in a riposte to Habermasian notions of communicative language – thereby 
limiting the prospect of any meaningful, founded communion between individuals. He 
does not, therefore, suggest a basis for salvation, be it linguistic or otherwise, in the 
potential exchange with the other as Windrich maintains. Strauß’ views on language have 
a deeper philosophical reach. 
Instead, the argument contends, it is the individual severed from the corroding 
conventions of social and dialogical intercourse, and a corresponding normative view of 
language, that enables Strauß to portray the figures glimpsing or retrieving a now absent 
experience with what is termed originary language. Furthermore, it is specifically the 
monological characteristic – and not the dialogical conventions – of language that 
manifests the possibility of such an experience. The monological nature of such language, 
in turn, is deeply connected to Strauß’ thinking on the poetic. 
The extent of Strauß’ indebtedness to Heidegger, thus, leads to an interpretive divergence 
from Windrich. As Windrich re-inscribes a Steinerian view of meaning on the basis of 
dialogue or the encounter with the other he needs to introduce the Lévinasian ethical 
relation and the notion of l’Autre to his argument even though he acknowledges the 
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contradictory philosophical foundation of his position.24 Moreover, although Windrich 
rightly notes that Strauß’ main pre-occupation in Wohnen Dämmern Lügen is with 
language, the precise connection to Heidegger’s ‘Bauen Wohnen Denken’ remains 
unformulated, just as it is amongst those other commentators that identify the allusion of 
prose work to philosophical essay. Critically, this turns on Heidegger’s notion of 
Ereignis. This is largely because, on a casual reading, the two works appear concerned 
with quite distinct ideas. 
Amongst commentators of Strauß, Wiesberg is typical in offering a synopsis of the 
opening, explicit intent of Heidegger’s essay. He summarises this as asking after ‘was das 
Wohnen sei und inwiefern das Bauen in das Wohnen gehöre. Das Hören auf das Wort 
Bauen erschließt dieses als eine Grundbefindlichkeit des Menschen’.25 According to 
Wiesberg, Heidegger goes on to argue that: 
Bauen ist nicht nur Mittel zum Wohnen, sondern in sich selber bereits ein 
Wohnen. Bauen markiert die Weise, in welcher sich der Mensch […] 
einrichtet. Das Bauen als Wohnen verstanden entfaltet erst ein Bauen, das 
pflegt, und ein Bauen, das Bauten errichtet.26 
While this is certainly acceptable as a cursory summary of the overt transformation in 
terms through which Heidegger’s exposition moves – although it does not illuminate 
much of its philosophical import – what it leaves out of consideration is the important 
emphasis Heidegger makes at the outset of the essay. ‘Bauen Wohnen Denken’ does not 
just offer either an etymological exegesis of three words that brings to light their mutual 
                                                 
24 See section 1.5. See, also, Davis’ considerations on the notion of Lévinas’ l’Autre and the implication for 
the philosophical relationship to Heidegger in Davis, Levinas, pp.34-62. 
25 Wiesberg, ‘Botho Strauss’, p.115. Heidegger himself sets out the direction of his argument: ‘Wir fragen: 
1. Was ist das Wohnen? 2. Inwiefern gehört das Bauen in das Wohnen?’, in Heidegger, ‘Bauen Wohnen 
Denken’, p.139. 
26 Wiesberg, ‘Botho Strauss’, p.116. 
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inter-connection or a manifesto for the right life as Wiesberg appears to claim.27 The 
propensity to attribute an ethics to Strauß, as both Wiesberg and Windrich do, whether 
directly or through inference, appears irresistible. The affinity between Strauß’ prose 
work and Heidegger’s late essay, though, resides elsewhere. 
Rather, the argument of Heidegger’s essay is developed around more fundamental 
concerns and in this draws closer to thinking about or on language. Critically, Heidegger 
continues, to reflect on the questions that signal his intent –‘Was ist das Wohnen?’ and 
‘Inwiefern gehört das Bauen in das Wohnen?’ – is actually to engage in and reflect on 
language. Heidegger thereby inflects the focus of the essay away simply from ‘Bauen’ or 
‘Wohnen’ as conventionally conceived: 
Der Zuspruch über das Wesen einer Sache kommt zu uns aus der Sprache, 
vorausgesetzt, daß wir deren eigenes Wesen achten. Inzwischen freilich rast 
ein zügelloses und zugleich gewandtes Reden, Schreiben und Senden von 
Gesprochenem um den Erdball. Der Mensch gebärdet sich, als sei er Bildner 
und Meister der Sprache, während sie doch die Herrin des Menschen bleibt. 
[…]. Unter allen Zusprüchen, die wir Menschen von uns her mit zum 
Sprechen bringen können, ist die Sprache der höchste und der überall erste.28 
The passage raises a number of issues in relation to language central to Wohnen 
Dämmern Lügen and the question as to how Strauß adopts and adapts Heidegger’s 
thinking. Strauß’ treatment of language and its portrayal in the form of narrative vignettes 
or poetic fragments not only shows the limits of mankind’s current language use and 
corresponding state of exile. It also raises what in Chapter Two is called ontological 
                                                 
27 ‘Dieser Zusammenhang von Bauen und Wohnen bestimmt das Wohnen als einen Grundzug des Seins. 
[…]. Aus dem Wohnen ergibt sich eine Aufgabe. Sie besteht darin, das Wohnen in das Volle seines 
Wesens zu bringen. Das Wohnen in das Volle seines Wesens bringen heißt, aus dem richtig verstandenen 
Wohnen bauen und für das Wohnen denken’, in Wiesberg, ‘Botho Strauss’, p.116. 
28 Heidegger, ‘Bauen Wohnen Denken’, p.140. Emphasis in original. The passage is repeated almost 
verbatim in Heidegger’s other essay dealing with Wohnen, ‘ … dichterisch wohnet der Mensch … ’, in 
Heidegger Vorträge und Aufsätze, pp.181ff. This suggests the importance for Wohnen for poetry and the 
poetic, a motif and characteristic of originary language and its experience developed fully in Chapter Five. 
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concern for how the world is disclosed for mankind in language: and how mankind stands 
in a particular relationship of openness to and withdrawal from this originary experience 
with language. It is, of course, a claim central to this thesis and leads to a sense of a 
poetics of dwelling in Strauß’ works. 
Before considering further Heidegger’s thinking on language as it is raised in ‘Bauen 
Wohnen Denken’ – how ‘das Wesen einer Sache zu uns aus der Sprache [kommt]’ – and 
reflecting how Strauß incorporates this in Wohnen Dämmern Lügen it is worth illustrating 
those terms already highlighted of the experience with language, the relationship between 
language and mankind and how these are manifested through Strauß’ figures. It will then 
become clearer how the enigmatic fragments in Wohnen Dämmern Lügen are best 
understood in the light of Heideggerian thought. 
Of the thirty-eight episodes making up Wohnen Dämmern Lügen one in particular is 
emblematic for Strauß’ underlying thematic and philosophical concern with language. It 
is a shorter fragment and shows an elderly couple waiting alone in a café, removed from 
any recognisable social context or milieu. They are described by Strauß as ‘alte 
Übersetzer’ who sit during twilight hours ‘auf der abendlichen Straße’: they are imaged 
as ‘Gestelle der Dauer’.29 In a further simile, they are portrayed as statues permanently 
united by a joint endeavour: ‘Aufgeschlossene, Ragende. […] des gleichen Schritts, der 
runden Beugung über das gemeinsame Tagwerk’.30 What is it that this ‘Paar allein’ is 
doing or hoping to experience? 
                                                 
29 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.32. 
30 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.32. 
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As they wait in a condition of passivity – what is shown over the coming reading to be a 
vital characteristic of attempts to retrieve an experience with a now absent, originary 
language – they are described as listening out for, or rather attending to, something 
unconventional: ‘etwas […] aus der sich ständig entziehenden Sprache’.31 Strauß deepens 
the enigma surrounding the couple. He writes: ‘Die lange in die Sprache lauschen, 
schweigen, verhoffen wie das Wild auf der Lichtung […]’.32 The simile is evocative. The 
manner of attending to language lacks the recognisable parameters of human cognition, 
for example, sight. Sound, as in Beginnlosigkeit, is the important sense for experiencing 
language as they hope to enact it. Their response is not mediated first or exclusively by 
reason. As Strauß notes later in the fragment, the couple wait in a state of ‘animalischen 
Schweigens’, a preparatory, anticipatory way of being for the experience with language.33 
The couple attempt what is described as ‘einen neuen Versuch’: it is implied that 
previous failed efforts precede the beginning of the vignette.34 In total, the fragment 
portrays two such attempts. As noted, Windrich claims this as paradigmatic of the search 
for new orders of language based on the couple’s encounter. But this is to misunderstand 
Strauß’ delineation of language, which is developed with greater circumspection. As he 
writes of the couple’s mysterious efforts: 
Sie suchen beide das zu erreden, was fehlt, spärlich zwar, unzufrieden mit 
jedem zu früh ergriffenen Wort.35 
Significantly, their attempt at retrieval is neither dialogue nor a joint or collaborative 
articulation. Strauß declares this unambiguously: ‘Nicht er spricht zu ihr, nicht sie zu 
                                                 
31 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.32. 
32 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.32. 
33 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.33. 
34 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.32. 
35 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.32. 
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ihm’.36 The couple is most definitely not trying to speak to one another in a way that 
could be characterised as conventional communication. Language is imaged as absent 
and withdrawn from the couple and, therefore, it is suggested, from mankind. Their 
agency over it is lost: language is, thus, something not directly linked to mankind, 
although some connection or relation prevails.  
In the attempt to approach this absent language the couple seek a transformation of their 
conventional language uses. Strauß notes of their efforts: ‘es handelt sich um 
Übersetzung’.37 Transformation is a good rendering of ‘Übersetzung’, suggesting both a 
spatial character to their endeavour and unsettling of habituated linguistic categories, and 
pointedly for the present reading evokes Heidegger’s transformative method briefly 
described in relation to his essay on Heraclitus’ ‘Logos’. As there, so in this fragment, 
Strauß clearly differentiates the couple’s attempt to regain this missing language from a 
rationally-based exercise in linguistics or philology. He notes emphatically that their 
efforts are ‘nicht die eines literarischen oder wissenschaftlichen Werks’.38 
Transformation also evokes the flash, or momentary sense, of the experience.39 
                                                 
36 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.32. 
37 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.32. 
38 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.32. 
39 Strauß’ writing is replete with similar examples, including: ‘Zwei Gänger, der eine schmächtig und 
mittelgroß, der andere aber hager und leicht gebeugt, nickend beide, wie immer, wenn einer den anderen 
nur bestätigen konnte. Sie gingen vernunftbetont und in sich gekehrt. Doch unversehens, ohne sich 
gegenseitig an den Ärmel zu greifen, jeder aus dem ureigenen Entsetzen heraus, blieben sie gleichzeitig 
stehen. Da sagte zuerst der schmächtige Mann: “Das ist er! Der sprichwörtliche Zusammenbruch. Der 
Fausthieb der Gewißheit, plötzlich die Welt nicht mehr zu verstehen. Das Hereinbrechen von 
Weltfremde”’, in Strauß, ‘Wollt ihr das totale Engineering?’. The extract repeats many motifs of the ‘Alte 
Übersetzer’ fragment.  
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The old couple move in their transformation of certain words towards what Strauß terms 
‘die Sprache des Dritten’.40 This is the first of three delineations from the fragment that 
the present argument contends are central to understanding the presentation of language 
in Wohnen Dämmern Lügen. This Sprache des Dritten is the term for that absent 
language, long forgotten, enigmatic and without recognisable form. However, despite its 
absence, for the old couple it still resonates with significance. As Strauß writes: ‘Was 
sein unbarmherziger Nachhall den beiden Alten zu verstehen gibt, ist dunkel, schwer zu 
ordnen’.41 Like the characteristics of Fleck described in the previous chapter the sense of 
this absent language is of something numinous and dark. 
The fragment relays two moments when the couple try to experience and attend on this 
elusive language.42 A number of words, significantly each classical in origin, arise during 
their silent vigil. Each evokes an indeterminate meaning before prompting another 
equally suggestive but imprecise uttering. The manifestation of this language in the form 
of ancient Greek suggests its originary source: elsewhere in the episode Strauß refers to 
its ‘Urweise’. The couple’s first attempt is described: 
In den Katalekten … heißt soviel wie … im Aufhörenden überliefert … 
άνθήρος … ein blühend Ende … άνθεμιζομαι γοεδνα … soviel wie des 
Jammers Blüte pflücken … .43 
Importantly, aside from the idea of a final and inexorable end to life suggested by 
άνθήρος, each successive word evokes the sense of an erosion to fixed and stable 
meaning: each phrase and subsequent revision is an approximation of the last. As Strauß 
                                                 
40 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.32. 
41 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.32. 
42 Strauß ,Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.33. 
43 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.32. See the related roots, άνθέω: to bloom or burst into flower; 
άνθημόεις: flowery, flowered; γοερός: lamentable, mournful, of persons mourning, in Liddle & Scott An 
Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon. Founded upon the Seventh Edition of Liddle and Scott’s Greek-
English Lexicon. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1889). 
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goes on to reflect of the couple’s first failed attempt, conjuring up the arguments 
advanced in relation to Anwesenheit in ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’: ‘Dii 
verba invertunt. Wörter, die neinen, was sie nennen …’.44 The language that the old 
couple attempts to retrieve cannot be articulated by conventional linguistic measures. 
Once this absent, originary language is formed into words by either one or other in the 
couple, and is spoken in accordance with the normal precepts of conventional language, 
understood as dialogue, it negates the naming – das Nennen – of language. Strauß has the 
couple reflect: ‘Si comprehendis non est Deus. Nicht sagen, wovon man redet’.45 The 
distinction made here between language as speaking, and Reden understood as uttering is 
the second characteristic of this originary language and forms an important consideration 
in this chapter, unifying each of the three terms of the title. It is the latter experience with 
language, as uttering – as Strauß puts it, language ‘erreden’ – that has a particular force 
for Strauß and the figures in Wohnen Dämmern Lügen. 
The approach taken by the old couple in their search for the Sprache des Dritten bears 
direct comparison with the ‘Er’-figure in Beginnlosigkeit. Forming part of the 
Sondenexperiment, the experience of Fleck is not mediated by conventional physical 
sensation. As in Jones’s poem ‘Anathémata’, mankind’s response originally is one of 
being receptive to world and things; of belonging to them, hence the emphasis by Strauß 
on Heideggerian notions of Gehören and Hören. So too in Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, the 
Sprache des Dritten manifests itself in certain words that defy conventional mechanisms 
for conceptualising language. Strauß writes: 
                                                 
44 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.32. 
45 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.32. 
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Das Wort wird auf den Lippen, im Ohr, im Sinn, in der Fügung geprüft – und 
von beiden verworfen. […]. Sie sinnen stundenlang auf ein gemeinsames 
Wort. Welchen Hof, welchen Beiklang, welche Urweise, welch verschollenen 
Ruf streift das Wort?46 
Instead, the old couple respond in a particular way to each manifestation of this originary 
language. 
The old couple wait for the second of the attempts to draw near to and experience the 
enigmatic manifestation of language. Notions of causation and volition are suspended in 
trying to isolate the source of the experience. The couple do not initiate it but wait. All 
they do is sit passively, occasionally making small hand movements and gestures: ‘die 
alten Finger berühren sich in der Mitte des Tischs, tippen sich an, wenn etwas zu 
kommen scheint’.47 But importantly, the absent language – ‘die sich ständig entziehende 
Sprache’ – is not the source for contact between the couple either.48 The Sprache des 
Dritten is not imaged as a hypostasized subject in its own right, deciding on its presence 
or absence, its proximity and removal from the couple and mankind. Instead such 
language is shown as a constant: ‘die Sprache des Dritten, der so lange mit ihnen war und 
sie plötzlich verließ’.49 
Under these circumstances the couple attempt the second experience with originary 
language. Words manifest themselves from an unknown source and draw near for the 
couple. As Strauß describes: 
                                                 
46 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.32. 
47 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.32. The repeated motif of how originary experience with language is 
granted to mankind is considered briefly in section 4.4.3 below. 
48 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.32. 
49 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.32. My emphasis. 
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Sie klauben’s einander von den Lippen, den umherirrenden Blicken, den 
tappenden Fingern. Und während der eine vielleicht im Zustand des innersten 
[…] Schweigens verharrt.50 
One of the couple sinks into a deep lassitude just as the other briefly glimpses, or rather 
utters, the third designation important for Strauß’ presentation of language in Wohnen 
Dämmern Lügen, which along with die Sprache des Dritten and Reden underpins the 
present reading. Just as one part of the couple waits silently: 
streift gerade die andere ein Wind von Stimmen, so daß es ihr leicht, ohne 
Zutun, zweisilbig von den Lippen fliegt … ‘Laßkraft!’ ruft sie schnell und 
zieht eine neue Grenze, ‘soviel wie Laßkraft’, es beginnt eine neue 
Versuchsanordnung.51 
Laßkraft, appears to denote the manner in which mankind retrieves the possibility of 
originary language. Moreover, the designation – Laßkraft, a union of passivity and 
activity in the imperative of the verb lassen and noun Kraft – is similar to the culmination 
of the experience of Fleck in Beginnlosigkeit in certain oxymorons: in the conjunction of 
the rationally irreconcilable in certain words.52 However, at the moment the word is 
uttered, it is qualified. Just as in the couple’s first attempted experience with originary 
language and the indeterminate revision of the ancient Greek, άνθήρος and άνθεμιζομαι 
γοεδνα, so this particular manifestation is sensed as failing. The old couple’s second 
attempt falls short like the first. Concluding his portrayal, Strauß reflects: ‘Aber auch 
dieses Wort, erzeugt von einer Unzahl vermiedener, trifft es nicht’.53 
                                                 
50 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.33. 
51 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.32. Emphasis in original. 
52 In Grimms’ Wörterbuch ‘lasz’ is defined as: ‘müde, matt; die eigentliche Bedeutung zurückstehend, […] 
ist nhd. auf das schlaffwerden der körper- und geisteskräfte eingeschränkt worden’, in Grimm, J. & W. 
Deutsches Wörterbuch, Vol.VI (Leipzig: Hinzel, 1885). 
53 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.33. 
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The failure, though, is not absolute. In an image resonant of Beginnlosigkeit, the 
manifestation of die Sprache des Dritten as Laßkraft shines some light on the darkness 
associated earlier in the fragment with the withdrawal of language. As Strauß describes, 
while the word does not directly manifest originary language, in the attempt the word 
‘funkelt [ein wenig] wie das Positionslicht der Fähre auf dem nächtlichen Fluß’.54 
However, the word Laßkraft, as the conclusion to this chapter shows, offers a sounding 
for, and is brought by Strauß in the final longest fragment of the work into a momentary 
conjunction with, an experience of the originary Sprache des Dritten as uttering, in turn, 
itself invoked as Wohnen. 
Nevertheless, in this particular fragment, the individual words άνθήρος and Laßkraft, 
partial manifestations of an originary language, uttered in isolation by one of the couple, 
contrary to what Windrich claims, offer no sustainable insight into or communicative 
praxis for the Sprache des Dritten. As Strauß concludes the short vignette on the ‘Alte 
Übersetzer’ and their experiences: ‘Doch es gelangt nicht über sich selbst hinaus, führt 
nicht zu einer Aussage, die dem Wesen der Vergangenheit des Dritten im mindesten 
entspräche’.55 
In this final observation by Strauß lies an important suggestion as to the nature of the 
underlying concern with language in Wohnen Dämmern Lügen. Herein lies the 
fundamental allusion to and affinity with Heidegger’s essay. At issue is a reflection on 
what is termed das Wesen of the Sprache des Dritten: a reflection that – and Strauß’ 
choice of the verb entsprechen is further significant – denotes both a relationship to 
                                                 
54 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.33. See also Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, pp.126-127. 
55 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.33. My emphases. 
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originary language and also suggests that it is this Sprache des Dritten that speaks. What 
does Strauß propose by this? With each of his fragments, which are often startlingly 
similar both in motifs and terms used, an attempt is made in his writing to bring out or 
make manifest the characteristics of this originary language. 
It is the contention of this chapter that these difficult, allusive and elusive terms in 
Wohnen Dämmern Lügen can only be understood as references to Heideggerian ontology, 
in particular his thinking about and on language. Once recognised, only then can a better 
attempt be made, in what is a mirroring of the old couple’s experience of drawing near to 
language, to offer a reading of what Strauß himself proposes thereof in Wohnen 
Dämmern Lügen – its originary forms, contemporary conventional uses and mankind’s 
relationship to both – and what he means by the Sprache des Dritten, language as Reden 
as uttering and Laßkraft. The argument, therefore, initially returns to Heidegger’s 
‘Logos’ essay. 
4.2 Heidegger and language: Das Wesen der Sprache (des Dritten) 
The attempt to draw out how Strauß has taken up Heidegger’s thinking on language is 
made problematic by the absence of a discrete set of ideas or system in Heidegger’s later 
writings that can be described as a philosophy of language conceived, for example, in the 
analytical or positivist traditions. There is no single exposition on language that can be 
viewed as a categorical statement of a position. Rather, language remains a continual 
concern, from Sein und Zeit to the later works. As the collection of essays most overtly 
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concerned with this issue makes clear: in his writing Heidegger’s thinking on language 
remains Unterwegs zur Sprache. 
The reflections, however, do undergo a distinctive shift as the emphasis of thought moves 
away from a primary consideration of Dasein as the basis for reflecting on die Frage 
nach dem Sinn von Sein. Although interpretations differ as to the motives of this 
transition in relation to language the import of the change is not in dispute.56 The 
transition can be described as a movement from certain problems in the language of 
philosophy towards a reflection in language of the concerns of his philosophy, the 
distinction between the content of the arguments and the form of their presentation in the 
later writings becoming almost impossible to determine. As Thomä notes: ‘Was 
Heidegger von der Sprache hält, wird nicht einfach mitgeteilt, sondern zeigt sich in seiner 
philosophischen Sprache selbst’.57 
To bring thinking on language close to the guiding philosophical question, Heidegger 
brings into consideration terms that touch on the relationship between language and 
mankind. These include; Sage(n), Nennen, Heißen, Ruf(en), Ge-Hör(en), Rede(n), 
Läut(en) and Ge-schick(en). Each is understood both as noun and verb and all are refined 
and inflected across the later lectures and essays. The adoption of some of these terms by 
                                                 
56 Rorty, for example, claims of the changing emphasis on language: ‘the stock of language rises as that of 
Dasein falls, as Heidegger worries more and more about the possibility that his earlier work has been 
infected with the “humanism” characteristic of the age of the world picture, […], and that Husserl had had 
a point when he said that Being and Time was merely anthropology’, in Rorty, R. ‘Wittgenstein, Heidegger 
and the reification of language’, in Guignon, C. The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp.350. 
57 Thomä, D. ‘Die späten Texte über Sprache, Dichtung und Kunst. Im “Haus des Seins”: eine 
Ortsbesichtigung’, in Thomä, D. (ed.)  Heidegger Handbuch. Leben-Werk-Wirkung (Stuttgart: Metzler, 
2003), p.308. Emphasis in original. 
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Strauß is already noted in the brief exegesis of the ‘Alte Übersetzer’ fragment. Others, as 
the reading comes to show, arise elsewhere in Wohnen Dämmern Lügen. 
Any attempt that seeks to re-tread the path of Heidegger’s thinking on language, then, is 
fraught with expository lacunae. Bruns, for example, in his seminal study on language 
and poetry in the late lectures remarks that his thought ‘is impossible to explicate 
coherently because it is, structurally, a wayward mixture of metaphors. Heidegger’s 
language doesn’t cohere into a self-interpreting system. It is language that confounds the 
reader’.58 The following excerpt taken from the lecture ‘die Sprache’ illustrates both the 
intimate connection between certain terms or notions – the complex inter-relation of 
language and mankind suggested by, for example, sprechen, Sage, Stille, Ereignis and 
das Wesen der Sprache – and the expository tensions that inhere in such thought: 
Die Sprache spricht als das Geläut der Stille. […]. Das Geläut der Stille ist 
nichts Menschliches. Wohl dagegen ist das Menschliche in seinem Wesen 
sprachlich. Das jetzt genannte Wort ‘sprachlich’ sagt hier: aus dem Sprechen 
der Sprache ereignet. Das so Ereignete, das Menschenwesen, ist durch die 
Sprache in sein Eigenes gebracht, daß es dem Wesen der Sprache, dem Geläut 
der Stille, übereignet bleibt. Solches Ereignen ereignet sich, insofern das 
Wesen der Sprache, das Geläut der Stille, das Sprechen der Sterblichen 
braucht, um als Geläut der Stille für das Hören der Sterblichen zu verlauten. 
Nur insofern die Menschen in das Geläut der Stille gehören, vermögen die 
Sterblichen auf ihre Weise das verlautende Sprechen.59 
Delineating the dense involvement of such thinking, as the introduction to this thesis 
notes, can easily lead to a pastiche that does not convey the iteratively formed 
distinctions or philosophical import of the original.60 However, for some commentators 
                                                 
58 Bruns, Heidegger’s Estrangements, p.83. 
59 Heidegger, M. ‘Die Sprache’, in Unterwegs zur Sprache, p.30. Emphases in original. The further 
significance of the excerpt is considered in the following chapter. 
60 See, for example, Barbaza, R. E. Heideger and a New Possibility of Dwelling (Frankfurt-am-Main: Lang, 
2003). For a helpful contrast in English see Pöggeler’s discussion of the distinction between speaking, 
saying, silence and stillness, in Pöggeler, Martin Heidegger’s Path of Thinking, p.225. 
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such passages, in which Heidegger attempts a re-inscription of language, its profound 
involvement with silence and stillness, its fundamentally different ways of saying and 
speaking, and the manner of its disclosure – engagements with language that are echoed 
by Strauß – are not the triumph of linguistic solipsism or philosophical nihilism but 
present a radical engagement with the Western tradition, or collapse previously upheld 
distinctions between poetry and philosophy, at least as the latter is traditionally 
conceived.61 
Heidegger’s aim is to bring language as language into consideration. This necessitates, as 
he notes in ‘Das Wesen der Sprache’, to attempt ‘mit der Sprache eine Erfahrung zu 
machen’. However, in immediate qualification of this idea of experience, he reflects in 
parenthesis on the impossibility of simply retreading the same path: 
Sobald wir versuchen, dem nachzusinnen, haben wir uns schon für einen 
Denkweg entschlossen. Hier gelingen uns jetzt nur wenige Schritte. Sie führen 
nicht fort, sondern zurück, dahin, wo wir schon sind.62 
Between Heidegger’s original and any subsequent exposition resides an irreconcilable 
tension. 
Nevertheless, in the spirit of Heidegger’s methodological aside, the following re-
examines the ‘Logos’ essay, familiar from Chapter Two, in light of selected positions 
advanced in the collection of essays on language in Unterwegs zur Sprache. The 
                                                 
61 For example, Bruns who writes of this particular passage: ‘“The peal of stillness”, he says, “is not 
anything human”. We ought to allow this line to sink in. […]. So it is no wonder that we are in the dark. 
[…]. It is just possible that all that Heidegger has to say about language is contained in (the passage [MJ]). 
What is it, after all, for us to belong to language? What is belonging when gehören is a pun on listening? 
What is it for us to be taken up […] to language in the event called Ereignis? What does the expression das 
Wesen der Sprache mean when it is characterized as “the peal of stillness”?’, in Bruns, Heidegger’s 
Estrangements, pp.96 and 97. The passage and relation of language to silence and stillness is developed in 
relation to Strauß’ most cryptic work, ‘Sigé’ in Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit in the following chapter. 
62 Heidegger, ‘Das Wesen der Sprache’, p.208. 
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particular defined focus of the present thesis necessitates a degree of selective excerption, 
identifying those terms adopted by Strauß and showing their underlying philosophical 
concern while passing over others. Such an exposition, it is hoped, demonstrates the close 
parallel between aspects of Heidegger’s thought and the ideas suggested by Strauß in the 
‘Alte Übersetzer’ fragment. At that point the argument returns to Wohnen Dämmern 
Lügen to consider how Strauß himself transforms the language of Heidegger’s thought in 
the literary vignettes or poetic fragments of the work. 
4.2.1  Logos as Ereignis: das Wesen der Sprache 
The exegesis of Strauß’ ‘Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’ and Heidegger’s ‘Logos’ 
essay shows the import of Anwesenheit and Logos for both writer and philosopher. 
Moreover, after establishing the distinctive emphasis that Strauß makes for these terms in 
his examples of real presences, particularly in deepening the philosophical resonance to 
Steiner’s hypothesis of a correspondence relationship between word and world, Chapter 
Two sets out the premise to this thesis by suggesting the affinity to Heidegger of Strauß’ 
particular inflection of these terms. Although Strauß’ and Heidegger’s essays are 
ostensibly engaged with distinct enquiries – Strauß primarily considers the work of art 
and Heidegger the word Λόγος – the argument delineates the affinity around what is 
called ontological concern with the making manifest or the coming-into-presence, 
variously, of world, word, poem or painting. However, the chapter also highlights the 
issue of language, and broadly shows how this is bound to the main questions of 
Heidegger’s thought. The present aim is to develop these ideas and deepen their import. 
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Heidegger often begins his essays with simple questions that raise an issue with 
apparently little philosophical resonance. The comments already made of ‘Bauen 
Wohnen Denken’ point to Heidegger’s deployment of just such an approach. The 
apparently naïve interrogatives – for example, ‘was ist das Wohnen?’, ‘was sagt die 
Formel A=A […]?’ or, elsewhere, ‘wie steht es mit der Nähe?’ and ‘was ist ein Ding?’ – 
all serve as the starting point for investigations of what come to be fundamental concerns 
of ontology.63 Thus, the essay, ‘Bauen Wohnen Denken’, far from just a narrow 
consideration on the nature of Bauen and Wohnen as Wiesberg suggests, also reflects on 
‘den Zuspruch der Sprache’ as the observations above make clear. To get close to 
answering the question of what Wohnen is, it is necessary to attend also to language: in 
posing the question of Wohnen as related to language the essay reflects the erosion of the 
distinction between content and form in his thinking.64 
It is primarily a consideration of the simple opening interrogative in the ‘Logos’ essay 
that guides the exegesis in the earlier chapter. At the outset Heidegger asks: ‘Inwiefern 
gelangt der eigentliche Sinn von λέγειν, legen, zur Bedeutung von sagen?’.65 On the 
surface the essay considers the transformation in meaning of certain words. 
Heidegger’s intent is, of course, to experience again Heraclitus’ fragment. As the 
argument shows, he re-thinks ό Λόγος, from λέγειν, as ‘die lesende Lege’: first taking 
λέγειν as sagen, then – more originally as he puts it – as legen and lesen, and the latter 
                                                 
63 See, for example, Heidegger, M. ‘Der Satz der Identität’ in Identität und Differenz (Stuttgart: Günther 
Neske, 11th Edition, 1999), p. 9, and Heidegger, M. ‘Das Ding’ in Vorträge und Aufsätze, pp.157-179. 
64 Heidegger, ‘Bauen Wohnen Denken’, pp.143ff. 
65 Heidegger, ‘Logos’, p.201. 
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two as forms of Sammeln.66 Thus, λέγειν evokes how the world discloses itself, in pre-
Socratic thought, to mankind, ‘als gesammelt-vorliegen-lassen’.67 Similarly, Heidegger 
reconsiders Hören: Hören is not, as it is now conceived in the Western tradition, the 
‘Auffangen und Weiterleiten von Lauten’ but conveys attunement to λέγειν, as ‘das 
eigentliche Hören im Sinne der Horchsamkeit’.68 Thus, Hören, in turn, shows how 
mankind originally relates to the disclosure of world in λέγειν: ‘Solches Liegenlassen legt 
das Vorliegende als ein Vorliegendes’.69 On the basis of his exegesis on these terms, 
prompted by the initial question of how the original sense of λέγειν comes over the 
course of the Western tradition to denote language, Heidegger reaches his interim 
conclusion: 
Der Λόγος ist die ursprüngliche Versammlung der anfänglichen Lese aus der 
anfänglichen Lege. ό Λόγος ist: die lesende Lege und nur dieses.70 
Thus far the emphases of and argument in relation to the ‘Logos’ essay are familiar from 
the earlier chapter. 
However, for Heidegger, the re-interpretation of Heraclitus’ Λόγος brings to light 
something more fundamental than the ancient, original sense of the word and fragment. 
As he writes, in the transformation of ό Λόγος: ‘sind [wir] vielmehr auf ein Ereignis 
gestoßen, dessen Ungeheures sich in seiner bislang unbeachteten Einfachheit noch 
verbirgt’.71 The present argument proposes that it is a fundamental characteristic of this 
Ereignis – of the enownment of the truth of das Sein in and through language – that is 
                                                 
66 See Heidegger, ‘Logos’, p.200f. 
67 Heidegger, ‘Logos’, p.218. 
68 Heidegger, ‘Logos’, pp.205 and 206. 
69 Heidegger, ‘Logos’, p.207. 
70 Heidegger, ‘Logos’, pp.207-208. 
71 Heidegger, ‘Logos, p.204. My emphasis. 
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important for an understanding of Strauß’ Wohnen Dämmern Lügen.72 For Heidegger, 
‘das unausdenkliche Geheimnis’ that attends the Ereignis of Heraclitus’ fragment is the 
making manifest in Λόγος of ‘das Wesen der Sprache’. As he writes of his transformation 
of Λόγος as ‘die lesende Lege’: ‘Ό Λόγος  […] ist die lesende Lege. […] Ό Λόγος wäre 
dann der griechische Name für das Sprechen als Sagen, für die Sprache’.73 In order to 
trace this characteristic of Ereignis it is necessary to consider Heidegger’s lectures 
relating to das Wesen der Sprache collected in Unterwegs zur Sprache. The argument is, 
thereby, taking the next step towards its central thesis in relation to Strauß. 
4.2.2 Absent and proximal language: die Sprache spricht 
At the conclusion of the ‘Logos’ essay, Heidegger makes the claim that the originating 
experience mankind has with das Wesen der Sprache is lost from the period of ancient 
Greek civilisation onwards. Thereafter, language is conceived over the course of the 
                                                 
72 The notion of Ereignis is developed further in Chapter Five, specifically in respect of the truth claims 
that Strauß makes for poetic language and the work. In the present chapter, the discussion concentrates 
instead on the wider portrayal of language. 
The use of the English ‘enownment’ for das Ereignis reflects the most current translation of Heidegger’s 
Beiträge zur Philosophie. (Vom Ereignis), which breaks with the conventional rendering of the defining 
idea of Heidegger’s late thought as ‘the event of appropriation’. See Emad, P. & Maly, K. Contributions to 
Philosophy (From Enowning) (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999). For a discussion see the 
introduction in Scott, C. E. & Schoenbohm, S. M. et alia (eds.) Companion to Heidegger’s Contributions to 
Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001). Alternatives include Wood’s rendering of the 
term as Eventuation, see Wood, D. Thinking after Heidegger (Cambridge: Polity, 2002), pp.153ff. 
The resonance and scope of Ereignis is described by Seubold: ‘Wie kann man Ereignis in 
nichtheideggerischer und nichtheideggernder Sprache definieren? – Es ist nicht zu definieren. Welche 
charakteristischen Eigenschaften kommen dem Ereignis zu? Es hat keine Eigenschaften, wie ein Ding, eine 
Substanz Eigenschaften hat. Welche Funktion hat es dann? Es erfüllt keine Funktion in der Weise, wie eine 
Sache oder ein Mensch eine Funktion übernehmen kann. Was macht es dann, dieses ominöse Ereignis? 
“Das Ereignis ereignet”. Eine schöne Tautologie also, die uns Heidegger da wieder einmal zuzumuten 
scheint. […]. Läßt sich nichts weiter darüber sagen? Doch – und das ist das Problem: fast alles. […]. Also 
ist das Ereignis der ‘grundlegendste Begriff’, den man sich überhaupt denken kann’, in Seubold, G. 
‘Stichwort: Ereignis. Was immer schon geschehen ist, bevor wir etwas tun’, in Thomä, D. (ed.)  Heidegger 
Handbuch. Leben-Werk-Wirkung, p.302. 
73 See Heidegger, ‘Logos’, p.220. 
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Western tradition as expression, as an activity undertaken that designates objects and 
things in the world. For the Greeks: 
wurde die Sprache […] von der Verlautbarung her vorgestellt als φωνή, als 
Laut und Stimme, phonetisch. […]. Die Sprache ist φωνή σημαντική, 
Verlautbarung, die etwas bezeichnet.74 
It is this conceptualisation of language that still dominates, regardless of which idiom, 
convention, style, theory or idiolect is used. As Heidegger goes on to note of this 
transition in the relationship to language: ‘Sprache gilt als Ausdruck und umgekehrt. Jede 
Art des Ausdrückens stellt man gern als eine Art von Sprache vor’.75 It is such forms of 
language, however they present themselves, that Heidegger wishes to distinguish from 
his attempts to experience language as language. As Thomä notes: ‘die Auffassungen von 
der Sprache als “Mitteilung” oder “Mittel zur Verständigung”, als “Tätigkeit” als 
“Aussage” über etwas “Wirkliches oder Unwirkliches”’, are to be differentiated from the 
experience that the pre-Socractics had with language.76 
Heidegger thus makes a distinction between the cumulative, habituated 
conceptualisations and corresponding conventional uses of language and a deeper, 
originating experience of Sprache. The distinction, though, is not formally of register or 
an order of semantic profundity. As he writes in the opening lecture of Unterwegs zur 
Sprache, in a formulation intended to bewilder just these established conventions in 
relation to language: ‘Die Sprache selbst ist: die Sprache und nichts außerdem. Die 
Sprache selbst ist die Sprache’.77 Language, regardless of the theoretical or linguistic 
system within which it is inscribed, is always still language. There are not different types 
                                                 
74 Heidegger, ‘Logos’, p.220. 
75 Heidegger, ‘Logos’, p.221. 
76 Thomä, ‘Die späten Texte über Sprache’, p.310. 
77 Heidegger, ‘Die Sprache’, p.12. 
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of language.78 Instead what is key in Heidegger’s understanding is the relationship that 
mankind – who is a linguistic being through and through – has to language and the 
different experience attendant on that relationship.79 
However, mankind clearly retains an ongoing relationship to language through current 
uses: self-evidently language remains something familiar from everyday experiences. Yet 
paradoxically, and critically for the present reading of Strauß, it is also something strange 
and remote. Heidegger encapsulates the relationship thus: 
Wir sprechen die Sprache. Wie anders können wir der Sprache nahe sein als 
durch das Sprechen? Dennoch ist unser Verhältnis zur Sprache unbestimmt, 
dunkel, beinahe sprachlos.80 
As the argument below substantiates and the above excerpts make clear, Heidegger’s 
delineation of the complex relationship between mankind and Sprache resonates with 
terms and the portrayal of language that Strauß adopts in the ‘Alte Übersetzer’ fragment 
from Wohnen Dämmern Lügen. 
In spite of the contention that in its current uses language is something close to mankind, 
for Heidegger, the conventions of language as they are inscribed in the Western tradition 
do not offer the basis for an experience with das Wesen der Sprache. It is just this 
experience that is attempted in the opening essay in Unterwegs zur Sprache. In it he 
describes the approach to re-experiencing the originating nature of language. Heidegger 
writes: 
                                                 
78 In discussing his attempt to experience ‘die Sprache als die Sprache zur Sprache’ Heidegger writes: 
‘Dies klingt wie eine Formel. Die Formel gebraucht das Wort “Sprache” dreimal, wobei es jedesmal 
Anderes und gleichwohl das Selbe sagt’, in Heidegger, ‘Der Weg zur Sprache’, p.242. 
79 Heidegger writes of mankind’s relationship to language: ‘Der Mensch spricht. […]. Wir sprechen ständig 
in irgendeiner Weise. Wir sprechen, weil Sprechen uns natürlich ist’, in Heidegger, ‘Die Sprache’, p.11. 
80 Heidegger, ‘Das Wesen der Sprache’, p.160. 
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Wir wollen nicht die Sprache überfallen, um sie in den Griff schon 
festgemachter Vorstellungen zu zwingen. Wir wollen das Wesen der Sprache 
nicht auf einen Begriff bringen, damit dieser eine überall nutzbare Ansicht 
über die Sprache liefere, die alles Vorstellen beruhigt.81 
To do this Heidegger needs to break with established conceptualisations of language. 
Central to this is the convention of language understood as expression, evidenced of 
course, in conversation and dialogue. Again, the echoes of the idea resonate in Strauß’ 
fragment where the sense of a lost, originary language is not to be experienced in 
exchanges between people. Heidegger, unsurprisingly, dispenses with conventions that 
view language as the expression of internal states of mind (relating to the subject), the 
articulation of conditions between individuals (inter-subjectivity) or as a system of 
reference to things (relating to the object-world).82 Whilst such different theoretical 
systems are in themselves ‘richtig’ they don’t allow mankind to draw near to language as 
language. 
Rather, for Heidegger – and herein lies the break with conventional linguistic theory – it 
is language itself and not mankind that speaks.83 He deploys an infamous tautology 
                                                 
81 Heidegger, ‘Die Sprache’, p.12. My emphasis. 
82 Heidegger writes: ‘Niemand wird wagen, die Kennzeichnung der Sprache als lautliche Äußerung innerer 
Gemütsbewegungen, als menschliche Tätigkeit, als ein bildhaft-begriffliches Darstellen für unrichtig zu 
erklären oder gar als nutzlos zu verwerfen. Das angeführte Betrachten der Sprache ist richtig; […]. 
Dennoch lassen sie die älteste Wesensprägung der Sprache völlig unbeachtet. So geleiten sie denn trotz 
ihres Alters und trotz ihrer Verständlichkeit niemals zur Sprache als Sprache’, in Heidegger, ‘Die Sprache’, 
pp.15-16. The particular significance of Heidegger’s description of conventional language as ‘bildhaft-
begriffliches Darstellen’, the form of language necessary for the technologically-enframed era of the 
Weltbild, is developed below in section 4.3 in relation to Strauß’ notion of Lügen. 
83 ‘Für [Heidegger] spricht primär die Sprache, nicht der Mensch. Das menschliche Sprechen ist nur ein 
Ent-sprechen. […]. Damit kehrt sich das Verhältnis von Mensch und Sprache um: Der Mensch ist nicht 
länger der Beherrscher der Sprache, sondern die Sprache die Herrin des Menschen. In eins damit erweist 
sich sowohl die instrumentale als auch die anthropozentrische Deutung der Sprache als hinfällig’, in 
Kettering, E. NÄHE. Das Denken Martin Heideggers (Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1987), p.280. 
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intended to unsettle ‘der logisch geschulte, alles durchrechnende und darum meist 
hochfahrende Verstand’.84 But this reflects his approach. Heidegger writes: 
Wie west die Sprache als Sprache? Wir antworten: Die Sprache spricht. Ist 
dies im Ernst eine Antwort? Vermutlich schon; dann nämlich, wenn ans Licht 
kommt, was sprechen heißt.85 
How, though, is mankind supposed to draw near to language if it is, after all, language 
that speaks? This involves attending to the Sage, or saying of language. The experience 
with language as saying – in the manner in which mankind be-speaks this (die Sprache 
ent-sprechen), or as Strauß terms it ‘erreden’, as uttering – is distinct from language 
conceived as expression. Heidegger writes: 
Aber spricht denn nicht die Sprache selbst? […]. Indes die Sprache spricht. 
Sie befolgt zuerst und eigentlich das Wesende des Sprechens: das Sagen. Die 
Sprache spricht, indem sie sagt […]. Ihr Sagen entquillt der einst 
gesprochenen und bislang noch ungesprochenen Sage, die den Aufriß des 
Sprachwesens durchzieht. […]. Im Sprechen als dem Hören auf die Sprache 
sagen wir die gehörte Sage nach.86 
If it is language and not mankind that speaks, now understood as saying or uttering, how 
does this manifest itself? 
To answer this Heidegger develops the sense of language as Sage, as saying. Based on a 
reading of the Stefan George poem entitled ‘Das Wort’ and, in particular, the line ‘Kein 
ding sei wo das wort gebricht’, Heidegger claims saying as it occurs in and through 
language is, in fact, also ein Nennen, a naming,.87 Strauß, of course, adopts this very 
designation in the ‘Alte Übersetzer’ fragment where the couple’s attempt to articulate the 
                                                 
84 Heidegger, ‘Die Sprache’, p.12. For a discussion of Heidegger’s use of tautologies specifically in relation 
to language see Scheier, C. A. ‘Die Sprache spricht. Heideggers Tautologien’, in Zeitschrift für 
philosophische Forschung 47, (1993), pp.60-74. 
85 Heidegger, ‘Die Sprache’, p.12. 
86 Heidegger, ‘Der Weg zur Sprache’, pp.254-255. Emphasis in original. 
87 See Heidegger, M. ‘Das Wesen der Sprache’, pp.162ff and ‘Das Wort’, pp.219ff, in Unterwegs zur 
Sprache. 
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Sprache des Dritten ends in failure. He comments of their efforts to transform this absent, 
originary language into a language that they can both comprehend: ‘Wörter, die neinen, 
was sie nennen’.88 Nennen for Strauß is, then, inextricably associated with the uttering of 
originary language. Importantly, for both Strauß and Heidegger, Nennen is distinct both 
from Steiner’s view of a correspondence between word and thing and structuralist claims 
for the ultimately arbitrary relationship between signifier and signified. Rather, the 
naming of language, as saying, calls world – understood ontologically – into language: it 
calls that which is – whether thing, object, poem or painting – into presence: ‘Im Nennen 
sind die genannten Dinge in ihr Dingen gerufen’.89 The exegetic contortions are 
unavoidable. Nennen and Anwesenheit are, unsurprisingly, intimately bound. As 
Heidegger writes: 
Das Nennen verteilt nicht Titel, verwendet nicht Wörter, sondern ruft ins 
Wort. Das Nennen ruft. […]. Der Ruf ruft zwar her. So bringt er das Anwesen 
des vordem Ungerufenen in eine Nähe. Allein, indem der Ruf herruft, hat er 
dem Gerufenen schon zugerufen. Wohin? In die Ferne, in der Gerufenes weilt 
als noch Abwesendes. 
[…]. Das Rufen ruft in sich und darum stets hin und her; her: ins Anwesen; 
hin: ins Abwesen.90 
The argument in respect of language and an acceptance of its ontological status as 
Heidegger proposes and Strauß develops it in his poetic fragments is central to this thesis. 
It is a vital idea for their respective views on language and intimately bound to the 
conjunction of the presencing and absencing, or disclosure, of truth. The full implication 
of the saying of language, its truth, is developed in the final chapter on Strauß’ poetics of 
dwelling. 
                                                 
88 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.32. My emphasis. See section 4.1. 
89 Heidegger, ‘Die Sprache’, p.22. 
90 Heidegger, ‘Die Sprache’, p.21. 
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Given the complexity and obscurity of these ideas it is easy to dismiss the thought as 
either a tortuous retreat into empty mysticism or, worse still, embarrassing intellectual 
errancy. Though lightly made, such judgements fall short of recognising the substantive 
engagement – its highly unconventional approach acknowledged – with key precepts in 
the Western tradition. As well as seeking to resist the dominating influence and legacy of 
established, conventional theories of language and the distortions arising from these, the 
thought also presents a challenge to the philosophical assumptions underpinning that 
tradition. 
Thus, the saying and naming of language proposed here counters the representational 
character and presuppositions of the tradition. In the discussion of how it is that language 
speaks as naming, using the example of the Trakl poem ‘Ein Winterabend’, Heidegger 
questions, in the iterative neology of his reading, how mankind comes to speak at all in 
the stanzas. As he writes of one particular couplet: 
Doch wir fragen: Inwiefern spricht der Mensch? Wir fragen: Was ist 
Sprechen? 
Wenn der Schnee ans Fenster fällt, 
Lang die Abendglocke läutet, 
Dieses Sprechen nennt den Schnee, der spät am schwindenden Tag, während 
die Abendglocke läutet, lautlos das Fenster trifft. Bei solchem Flockenfall 
währt alles Währende länger. Darum läutet die Abendglocke, die täglich ihre 
streng begrenzte Zeit hindurch ertönt, lang. Das Sprechen nennt die 
Winterabendzeit. Was ist dieses Nennen?91 
Heidegger inverts what he contends is the orthodox philosophical bias that names are 
arbitrary or independent of the thing named. Rather, for mankind to be able to name these 
things, the things must first speak to mankind before they can, in turn, be named. In this 
example, the snow, window and vespers-toll speak as saying so that their presence 
                                                 
91 Heidegger, ‘Die Sprache’, p.20. 
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comes-into-being, which can then be named in and through mankind’s own speaking 
(Ent-sprechen). Thus, what is argued for is the ontological priority of language and its 
attendant disclosure for mankind. Such a line of argumentation attempts to establish 
conventional, philosophical arguments for Heideggerian precepts in relation to language. 
Although possible, as White for example shows in greater detail, such an approach is to 
overlook the more profound and unsettling nature of the ideas.92 
For the moment, though, central to the reading is the way in which Strauß’ views on 
language are portrayed: how the absent originary language speaks to mankind as saying, 
and mankind in turn momentarily be-speaks language, in a continuing movement of 
proximity and removal; nearness and distance. 
As well as Strauß’ debt to the deep structures of Heideggerian thought he continues to 
echo other terms. For example, in a related notion from the ‘Logos’ essay that invokes 
the conceit of language Heidegger writes: ‘Das menschliche Denken erstaunte weder 
jemals über dieses Ereignis, […], das eine wesenhafte Schickung des Seins an den 
Menschen verbirgt’.93 The Ereignis in and of language is also a sending – or as the term 
is usually translated, a destining – of Sein. The notion of a Schickung is repeatedly 
incorporated by Strauß into the vignettes of Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, including its 
cognates as Geschickte and Geschick, and is considered in the following section. 
The originating experience with das Wesen der Sprache is conceived by Heidegger as 
absent for mankind – absent from current, conventional uses – but also possibly present 
                                                 
92 For a fuller discussion of the relationship between saying, speaking and naming see White, Heidegger 
and the Language of Poetry, pp.35ff. 
93 Heidegger, ‘Logos’, p.205. 
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as saying. The adoption by Strauß of this conceit in relation to originary language seems 
clear. The summary account of aspects of Heidegger’s thinking on language highlights 
two elements described in Strauß’ ‘Alte Übersetzer’ fragment. First, the orthodoxies and 
conventions surrounding conceptualisation of language have diverged at a fundamental 
philosophical level from a sense of ‘die anfängliche Wesensprägung der Sprache’.94 
While Strauß, of course, does not identify a specific moment for this as Heidegger does 
in the pre-Socratics, his sense of originary language is always sourced from a lost past. 
Second, although originary language is, as it were, absent as a result of this divergence, it 
can also be retrieved on certain grounds. Mankind is still able to overcome prevailing and 
dominant language uses to draw near and open the possibility of an experience with 
language; of an originary language. How else does Strauß portray these ideas and go on 
to adapt such thinking in Wohnen Dämmern Lügen? 
4.2.3 ‘einem ewig sich entziehenden letzten Wort’95 
Before discussing the trilogy of terms in Wohnen Dämmern Lügen – die Sprache des 
Dritten, erreden and Laßkraft – and the teatment of the underlying concern with language 
it is worth considering another fragment from the work. This serves to illustrate some of 
the characteristics by which Strauß portrays language and the suggested possible retrieval 
of its deeper origins; in particular the emphasis on couples and the respective limitations 
of their conversational exchanges for such an experience. 
                                                 
94 Heidegger, ‘Logos’, p.204. 
95 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.135. 
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Just as with the ‘Alte Übersetzer’ vignette, the following equally short fragment portrays 
a couple; the opening sentence raising the issue of language, its uses and felt constraints. 
Am Geräumten Tisch unter dem blassen Strahler, gestützt auf seine 
Unterarme, hing der stille Mann zwischen den eigenen Schultern wie ein 
schweres nasses Kleid.96 
The man is evidently unable to communicate with his wife: he is imaged as silent and 
immobile. Aware of a breach between the two, although this is not explicitly articulated, 
the woman is described as preparing to overcome the barrier between them: her aim, to 
release him from silence. 
Auf ihrer Stirn leuchtete der Wunsch, daß sie dem Harrenden, Ausharrenden 
eine Erheiterung verschaffte, daß ihr Mann zwischen seinen Schultern endlich 
auftauche und sie sehe.97 
Like the ‘Alte Übersetzer’ couple, the attempt to establish contact beyond conventional 
means comes not, in the first instance, in the form of dialogue, but rather through 
alternative senses. Strauß describes the woman’s actions: 
Also ging sie um seinen Tisch herum. Tock tock tock. Tock tock tock. Setzte 
sich dem Niederblickenden gerade gegenüber auf einen Stuhl. Dann griff sie 
mit ihren Händen so passend unter die seinen, daß alle vier einen fest 
verschlossenen Kreuzgriff bildeten.98 
Strauß’ choice of terms for the wife’s gesture is significant: ‘So trat sie vor ihn als die 
Geschickte und auch die Ungeschickte’.99 Although, at one level, this denotation 
suggests the woman’s behaviour, the comment also invokes Heidegger’s term Geschick 
and its cognates noted above from the ‘Logos’ essay.100 What does Strauß propose by 
                                                 
96 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.133. 
97 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.133. 
98 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.133-134. 
99 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.133. 
100 Heidegger writes of his transformation of ‘σοφόν έστιν’ part of Heraclitus’ 50th fragment: ‘So bedeutet 
denn σοφόν dasjenige, was sich an das Zugewiesene halten, in es sich schicken, für es sich schicken (auf 
den Weg machen) kann. Als ein schickliches wird das Verhalten geschickt. […]. So treffen wir eher die 
eigentliche Bedeutung von σοφόν, das wir durch “geschicklich” übersetzen. Aber “geschicklich” sagt im 
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this? For Windrich the designation, ‘liest sich indessen als Aufforderung, ihre Darbietung 
als eine Art von stummer, gleichwohl dem Sein entsprechender Rede zu verstehen’.101 
Leaving aside the question of the viability of a personification or representation of 
language corresponding to, or hypostasisation of, Heidegger’s Sein, Windrich’s comment 
is plausible, at least in as far as it suggests the man’s problematic relationship to 
conventional language uses and the role his wife plays in overcoming this. The same 
term, Geschick, is invoked again by the man as he recovers from his initial physical 
lassitude. As he begins to articulate a previously absent language he comments of his 
wife: 
‘Doch einzig das ist das Wunder, daß du nie aufgabst und ungeschickt eine 
von fern Geschickte darstellst, die sich mit unbegreiflicher Schönheit und 
Güte mir nähert …’.102 
However, the woman’s success in her husband’s physical restoration does not necessarily 
also signal an unqualified experience of a retrieval of language. After all, as Strauß 
initially suggests, the woman comes before her husband both as ‘die Geschickte’ and as 
‘die Ungeschickte’. The movement that the man thus makes towards a re-connection with 
language is clearly described by Strauß as occuring in isolation or as an individual, not as 
part of the couple. A retrieval of originary language is, then, not to be regarded as a 
collective act: a communal or social basis for accessing such absent language is 
unequivocally denied. 
                                                                                                                                                 
vorhinein mehr als “geschickt”. Wenn das eigentliche Hören […] ist, dann ereignet sich Geschickliches, 
dann schickt sich das sterbliche λέγειν in den Λόγος’, in Heidegger, ‘Logos’, pp.209-210. The density of 
the passage, even for Heidegger’s later writing, resists the extrapolation of anything resembling 
propositions in relation to language. 
101 Windrich, Das Aus für das Über, p.86. 
102 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.135. 
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Importantly, in support of this interpretation, at the close of the fragment the woman is 
shown as repulsed by her husband. As his language develops, so his isolation increases. 
He pays no attention to ‘ihrem erschrockenen Zurückweichen’.103 Finally, as he 
continues to talk she removes herself completely from him: 
                                                
Da nahm sie ihren Hut in die eine […] Hand und schlich ungesehen unter 
seinen verdrehten Augen ins Nebenzimmer, um ihr Kostüm abzulegen und 
ihre Füße zu cremen.104 
The banality of her action conveys the suggested limits of language as dialogue and, 
more importantly, the failure of dialogical exchange as the basis for a retrieval of 
originary language. 
However, the man’s isolation does suggest a breakthrough. Once his monologue begins, 
he is described as overwhelmed by language, a motif that occurs over and again in 
Wohnen Dämmern Lügen and elsewhere in Strauß’ writing. It is an idea that dates back in 
his prose works to Rumor and Bekker’s antipathy toward the idioms and clichés of public 
language and his yearning, instead, for ‘Sprachballungsräume’; a condition in which he is 
exempted from everyday language and its uses. As he exclaims, a desire for a place 
exempted from convention where he is ‘Raus aus der Sprache’.105 
In Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, Strauß describes the man’s response to overcoming his 
‘Stille’: ‘Nun konnte er nicht mehr einhalten in seinem Lob, fand […] immer neue 
Wörter und Wendungen und wiederholte sie in immer höherem Ton’.106 It is as though 
the man is connected to a groundswell of language; is overwhelmed by it. Strauß’ 
 
103 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.135. 
104 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.135. 
105 Strauß, Rumor, p.76. The spatial characteristics of language suggested here are picked up in the notion 
of Wohnen. 
106 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.135. 
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characterisation of this experience with language is significant and again connects the 
argument back to the ‘Alte Übersetzer’ fragment: 
So redete er ohne Unterbrechung, aber auch ohne Ende und Ziel, strebte 
vielmehr einem ewig sich bildenden, ewig sich entziehenden letzten Wort 
entgegen, dem nie endgültigen … .107 
Notably, Strauß breaks off the excerpt in silence: the uttering of language returns to a 
condition of stillness. In moving towards this ewig sich entziehenden letzten Wort – 
echoing directly the old couple’s attempt with ‘der sich ständig entziehenden Sprache’ – 
Strauß proposes some of the characteristics of mankind’s retrieval of originary language. 
This is experienced, in part, as Reden or uttering, and as the argument develops, also as 
silence. 
Before considering how Strauß shows and develops these characteristics and the 
possibility for a retrieval, the argument continues setting out the portrayal of some of the 
dominant conventions of everyday language uses in the first of the inverted trilogy of the 
title: Lügen. 
4.3 Weltbilder and language: ‘Die Lüge des Lebens selbst’108 
Strauß’ view on the pervasiveness of a debased, collective use of language in late-modern 
society is long recognised. Moreover, since ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’ it has 
become a commonplace in the literature and in discussion of his writing. The essay 
invokes an unspecified period of what is called ‘verschwätzten Zeiten, in Zeiten der 
                                                 
107 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.135. My emphasis. 
108 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.183. 
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sprachlichen Machtlosigkeit’: of a waning in the creative force of language regarded as 
defining of the current age.109 Furthermore, Strauß claims ‘heute benutzen Majorität und 
Minderheit, gleich welcher Sparte, durchweg dasselbe konforme Vokabular der 
Empörungen und Bedürfnisse’, asserting a uniformity of use and ubiquitous 
disenfranchisement from the possibilities seen in language. Though forcefully and 
dramatically expressed, such views on the poverty of contemporary expression, taken in 
isolation and only as a critique of its uses in modern society and culture, are far from 
original in post-war German letters and thought. They are variously shared by diverse 
sets of thinkers, including Böll and Grass, or Enzensberger and Habermas, none of whom 
are usually associated with a writer such as Strauß. 
However, in contrast to claims by most commentators of ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’, 
such views on contemporary language use have a long background in Strauß’ writing. 
Already in Die Widmung, Richard Schroubek’s isolation and detachment are described as 
based on estrangement from language as he initially, briefly emerges into the wider social 
world. For example, at the opening of the short novel Schroubek leaves the isolation of 
his flat and overhears various conversations going on around him. During one of these a 
hairdresser comments on a news report on middle-eastern politics, a story Schroubek also 
reads in the newspaper. Strauß describes the faltering attempts of the figure to articulate 
an independent viewpoint: 
Sie erregt sich und findet im politischen Eifer die treffenden Worte des 
Abscheus nicht. […]. Man spürt, es ist nicht ihr eigener Eifer, der sie packt. 
[…] Sie redet ihm nach dem Mund, und zwar um so ausfälliger, je länger 
dieser ruhig bleibt und schweigt.110 
                                                 
109 Strauß, ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’, p.17. 
110 Strauß, Die Widmung, p.6. 
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The remarks are described as not her own: the thoughts entirely derivative of an 
unspecified collective. It is no coincidence that the conversation reflects what Schroubek 
reads in the paper. Public consumption of views and their continual mediation – whether 
by individuals or the established channels of mass communication such as television or 
newspapers – is the background for Strauß’ thinking on contemporary language and its 
use. His experience prompts a more general reflection. 
Nun beginnt wieder, am frühen Morgen, um ihn herum das allgemeine 
Sprechen, das in Wahrheit ein vielfaches Durcheinandersprechen ist, worin 
sich das meiste wechselseitig bedeutungslos macht, […], denn es wird ohne 
Einhalt weitergesprochen und der Chor eines nicht abreißenden Geredes steigt 
über den Köpfen auf und es hallt, wie in einer mächtigen Kuppel, auf deutsch 
über Deutschland.111 
The excerpt not only points to the longevity of Strauß’ overt suspicion of the status 
accorded language in contemporary society but is also emblematic of a view he 
articulates repeatedly including, for example, in ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre 
Welt’ noted earlier, with his designation of an all-pervasive, persistently mediated culture 
of the secondary.112 For the remaining argument of this chapter such language is termed 
as conventional in its uses. However, Strauß’ engagement with language runs deeper than 
such a position immediately suggests. As he writes in Gedankenfluchten: 
Wenn ich mich frage, was ich überhaupt in der Sprache zu suchen habe, so ist 
es gewiß nicht die Sprache selbst und noch viel weniger ihr schöner Zweck, 
                                                 
111 Strauß, Die Widmung, p.6. 
112 There are numerous such instances. For example, in the ‘Odeon’ fragment in Niemand anderes Strauß 
writes: ‘So wie sie redeten, hört man den ganzen Markt tönen. Sie sprachen eigentlich nicht, sie schalteten 
sich ein in die laufende Sprache. Sie sprachen nicht, sie tauschten Schibbolethe der Befindlichkeit. […]. Sie 
sandten sich Zeitzeichen. […]. Sie sprachen nicht, ihre Stimmen wurden bewegt wie Puppen an den 
Schnüren nur noch als volksweite Absprache darüber, was verständlich und sagbar wäre. Sie sprachen 
nicht, sie streiften durch die verlassene Öde des ausgesprochenen Sprechens’, in Strauß, Niemand anderes, 
p.154. See also Strauß, Paare, Passanten, pp.86-90 and from the later writing Strauß, Die Fehler des 
Kopisten, pp.74ff. 
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den sie etwa beim Erzählen verfolgt. Mir macht Sprache […] etwas, das uns 
letztlich aus ihr heraus- und hervortreten läßt.113 
The status of language is philosophically more problematic. 
Intriguingly, the last term of the title under consideration in this chapter, Lügen, is only 
occasionally explicitly raised over the course of the work. This suggests that Lügen is 
perhaps not, as Schomann rather unimaginatively maintains, to be understood as the 
dissembling between individuals in a society denigrated by the effects of such behaviour, 
but rather a much deeper, latent condition.114 Not surprisingly, none of the three 
designations is intended by Strauß to be understood literally, either as prescriptive for or 
denotative of specific actions.115 The urge to attribute an ethics needs resisting. 
Of the thirty-eight fragments in Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, it is the longest and last of 
these that offers the most evocative and provocative delineation of Lügen. In the episode 
Strauß’ background critique of language, its ubiquity, uniformity and unrelenting 
mediation, as described above, prompts an unnamed figure, the ‘Schimpfer’, to launch 
into a sustained tirade. It is this outburst, or rather as this argument characterises it, the 
monological uttering, that eventually brings about a manifestation or experience, albeit 
heavily qualified, of Laßkraft and the absent Sprache des Dritten. 
                                                 
113 Strauß, Gedankenfluchten, p.60. 
114 Schomann, S. ‘Hie noch Feindbild, da noch Gewohnheit’, in Berliner Zeitung, 2 December, 1994, cited 
in Windrich, Das Aus für das Über, p.97. 
115 In the same vein, Korte claims that Wohnen denotes the practices of living and habitation in modern 
society: ‘“Wohnen” fixiert den typischen Umraum, verweist auf die zivilisatorische Sphäre der 
Handlungsorte und deren Spektrum, das von der Sterilität postmoderner Wohnstätten bis zum 
unbestimmten Hochglanz exotischer Ferne reicht’, in Korte, ‘Auf dem Weg zur “Tagesordnung des 
Ewigen”?’, p.19. Rather, as section 4.5 below contends, Wohnen denotes the manner in which mankind 
relates to a retrieval of originary language and its experience. As the argument then shows in Chapter Five, 
the term Wohnen is ultimately concerned with the status and nature of poetic writing. 
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The Schimpfer, who is described by his female counterpart – Strauß again presents a 
couple undergoing some kind of crisis in their normal routines of communication – as 
‘ein philosophischer Streithammel’, storms out of a film arguing with his partner.116 
Although it is not made explicit what the film shows, it is the overall levelling depiction 
of its subject-matter that offends the Schimpfer. The film is, he exclaims: ‘Alles Reklame, 
nur noch ein Fetisch, […], nur selbstgenügliche Reklame für ein Handelsgut, das es nicht 
mehr gibt: Die Sinnenfreude!’.117 Moreover, after leaving the screening, the Schimpfer 
stops briefly at a small bar, where he ends up in another fractious exchange. As his 
companion notes: ‘“Wo wir auch hinkommen, schimpfst du”’.118 What further 
antagonises the man beyond the film is that the people in the bar are talking about and 
praising precisely those aspects of the film he finds contemptible. The Schimpfer 
exclaims: ‘“Und diese Barbaren dort in der Spelunke loben genau den Film, den wir 
beide fluchtartig verlassen mußten”’.119 Thus, just as Schroubek laments the universality 
and undifferentiated nature of public opinion and the language in which it is expressed, 
so too does the ‘intellektueller Vagabund’ of the concluding fragment of Wohnen 
Dämmern Lügen. 
However, the polemic on the film and the exception he takes against his compatriots are 
not the main focus of his outburst. As his monologue gets underway, he pointedly 
dismisses ‘die Frage der Sinnenfreude’ and questions over the nature and legitimacy of 
the sensory experience elicited by the film. Such pre-occupations, though current and 
                                                 
116 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.179. 
117 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.179. 
118 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.178. 
119 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.179. Emphasis in original. 
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dominant for the majority, for him fall short. He is not interested in such trivial 
sensationalism: 
Die Frage der Sinnenfreude, die für uns die zentrale und lebendigste ist, muß 
gegen die ungeheure Masse an sozialer Zeit erwogen werden, in der sie 
keinerlei Bedeutung besitzt, in der die nackte Unsinnlichkeit den Alltag […] 
beherrscht.120 
In his monologue, the Schimpfer articulates deeper-lying concerns. 
At the heart of these are what Strauß has the Schimpfer term ‘Weltbilder’ by which he 
means the whole range of intellectual epistemologies, frameworks and methodologies 
devised and deployed by mankind to conceive of and understand the object-world. 
Strauß’ invocation of ideas from Beginnlosigkeit and choice of term are not coincidental. 
Underscoring the central premise of this thesis, Heidegger, in a parallel to the argument 
developed in ‘Die Frage nach der Technik’, maintains that the manner in which mankind 
relates to the world in metaphysics and modern technology – die Stellung des Menschen – 
in particular his search for novelty, is through construction of Weltbilder. Heidegger 
writes: 
Was ist das – ein Weltbild? Offenbar ein Bild von der Welt. Aber was heißt 
hier Welt? Was meint da Bild? Welt steht hier als Benennung des Seienden im 
Ganzen. Der Name ist nicht eingeschränkt auf den Kosmos, die Natur. Zur 
Welt gehört auch die Geschichte. […]. Doch Weltbild besagt mehr. Wir 
meinen damit die Welt selbst, sie, das Seiende im Ganzen, so wie es für uns 
maßgebend und verbindlich ist. 121 
Mankind is compelled towards such epistemological constructs. As Strauß notes: ‘Die 
Natur des Menschen ist eine bildnerische’.122 The particular sense of Weltbilder in the 
final fragment of Wohnen Dämmern Lügen is, of course, further comparable with that of 
                                                 
120 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, pp.180-181. 
121 Heidegger, M. ‘Die Zeit des Weltbildes’, in Holzwege (Frankfurt-am-Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 8th 
Edition, 2003), p.89. 
122 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.183. 
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Linie-structured Wahrnehmung, which the ‘Er’-figure seeks to overcome in 
Beginnlosigkeit. 
The Schimpfer denigrates the efficacy of the different Weltbilder engendered to explain 
the object-world. Such epistemological structures necessarily lead to a distortion of 
things. Specifically, it is the very adaptive and cumulative progression of each such 
Weltbild that he calls into question: ‘Aber was, frage ich, ist ein Weltverstehen wert, das 
im Lauf der Geschichte fortwährend schwankt, sich korrigiert und widerspricht’.123 
Moreover, in spite of mankind’s best efforts, there remains a fundamental disconnection 
between the postulated Weltbilder and the underlying actual ontological nature of world. 
The significance for Strauß of Lügen now begins to become apparent. As he notes in the 
fragment: ‘Hirn und wirkliche Welt stehen sich näher als Weltbild und Welt oder das 
Hirn und seine Vorspiegelungen’.124 
Moreover, Strauß’ proposed era of Weltbilder described in the concluding monologue 
bears the characteristics of Linie-structured Wahrnehmung, in the increasing speed and 
frequency of change in scientific and technological theories in late modernity. As he 
writes, ‘die Welt [wird] immer gewandter, geschickter, technisch-behelfsmäßiger’.125 
The various revolutions in the structure of scientific and technological discovery span all 
disciplines as Heidegger proposes in the essay.126 So, for example, the Schimpfer 
                                                 
123 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.182. 
124 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, pp.182-183. 
125 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.189. Strauß has the Schimpfer describe this as the frenetic change in 
Weltbider ‘vom Hundertsten ins Tausendste’ (p.200) exactly as the ‘Er’-figure does in Beginnlosigkeit. 
There Strauß writes: ‘Der Geist besteht aus Entgleiten. Wo er an etwas festhält, verstößt er gegen seine 
Natur, das ewige glissando der Erkenntnisse. Seine einzige und urprüngliche (sic) Leidenschaft ist es, vom 
Hundersten ins Tausendste zu gelangen’, in Strauß, Beginnlosigkeit, p.48. 
126 See Heidegger, ‘Die Zeit des Weltbildes’, pp.77ff in which he broadens understanding of what counts as 
Wissenschaft and Forschung. 
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highlights the ‘sogenannten Retikulisten’ whose theories in the history of neurology are 
overturned by Cajal’s discoveries – a revision of a prevailing epistemology described in 
Beginnlosigkeit – as well as the incumbent paradigms of August Mach, Louis Agassiz or 
Margaret Mead.127 The exclusivity of such theoretical Weltbilder for mankind’s 
understanding of the world now leads, the Schimpfer conjectures, to a period where his 
Wahrnehmung is dominated by a new stranglehold: ‘die Überblicker […] die Gedächtnis-
Zyklopen, die eiskalten Mutanten der Mnemosyne, die aus der Kreuzung von 
technischem und kollektivem Gedächtnis entstehen’.128 In a suggestive analogy, he 
describes the fundamental effect of this intensified period of scientific and technological 
innovation on the relationship between mankind and world. The monologue continues: 
Gefäße, die nichts wiedergeben, statt […] der Krüge, die einst überliefen. An 
ausgewählten Gemarken stehen Köpfe auf der Erde, die inwendig hohler 
werden vom Behalten. Die endlos zu sich nehmen und nichts wiedergeben. 
[…]. Womit man die geizenden Gefäße auch füllt, es steigert nur die Dichte 
ihrer Leere.129 
The present period is one of an unprecedented disruption to the relationship between man 
and thing: in this example, a jug. Strauß’ invocation of original ‘Krüge, die einst 
überliefen’: things free from the distorting effects of science and technology, can best be 
understood as a direct allusion to Heidegger’s ‘Das Ding’, in which he develops an 
alternative understanding of the thing. There he provides the example of a jug as the 
coming-into-presence of the thing as thing and not object, which gathers in the manner of 
λέγειν. Heidegger writes: 
                                                 
127 Mach, Agassiz and Mead are each associated with past dominant paradigms in their disciplines – 
physics, biology and anthropology respectively – before these were overturned by subsequent theoretical 
innovations. For a discussion of Mead see Ridley, M. The Origins of Virtue (London: Viking, 1996), 
pp.256ff. 
128 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.198. 
129 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.199. Interestingly, Strauß repeats this passage almost verbatim in 
Strauß, Die Fehler des Kopisten, p.56. 
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Der Krug west als Ding. Der Krug ist der Krug als ein Ding. Wie aber west 
das Ding? Das Ding dingt. Das Dingen versammelt. […]. Wir geben dem so 
erfahrenen und gedachten Wesen des Kruges den Namen Ding.130 
As Strauß has his Schimpfer-philosopher exclaim against the age of Weltbilder, in a 
formulation again inherited directly from Heidegger, on this occasion from Über den 
Humanismus: ‘Im Haus des Seins werden polternd die Möbel gerückt.131 
In mankind’s continual impetus to construct novel Weltbilder – what Strauß describes as 
‘seine rastlose Emsigkeit’ – he is in thrall to an approach to world constrained by 
‘Apparate der permanenten Täuschung’.132 Lügen, therefore, describes what for Strauß is 
a state, not of falsehood but rather of un-truth, of ontological distortion in which mankind 
necessarily finds himself as a result of the constrained relationship to the object-world.133 
This is, as he has the Schimpfer go on to claim: ‘Das Geschwätz des Lebens selbst! Die 
Lüge des Lebens selbst … die eine und ganze Rodomontade!’.134 Strauß’ association of 
the condition of un-truth with Lügen and Geschwätz raises the question of how the 
dominant Wahrnehmung relates to language. 
However, as Strauß has the Schimpfer describe, like the ‘Er’-figure in Beginnlosigkeit, 
things are differently for mankind in the present age under the structures arising from 
imposition of Weltbilder. The relationship to the world is: ‘von einer nicht abreißenden 
Geschäftigkeit des Herstellens beherrscht, […] der Fabrikation von Farbe, Form, Sinn, 
                                                 
130 Heidegger, ‘Das Ding’, p.166. 
131 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.182. See Heidegger, Über den Humanismus, pp.48ff. 
132 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.183. 
133 Korte is broadly on the right track with his delineation but still locates Strauß’ thinking on language at 
the level of an overt social or politically-based critique, therefore missing the philosophical significance of 
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134 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.183. My emphases. 
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Gestalt und Zusammenhängen’.135 Critically, and unsurprisingly, it is in and through 
language that the charged relationship to things becomes most apparent. The two threads 
of the present argument are running together. 
Es ist da, es ist vorhanden, nahe, dingvoll, konkret, plastisch, aber nicht mehr 
berührbar, nicht mit Begriffen zu bennenen oder, wenn benannt, dann nicht 
mehr in seiner Eigentümlichkeit, nicht mehr so, wie es zu uns ‘spricht’ […] … 
wir besitzen nicht mehr die geheime furchtsame Art der Benennung […]. 
Wenig Wort für viel Ding. […] … die Dinge zu glänzend, zu neu, ständig 
erneuert […] … diese Dinge strahlen nur noch, sie sondern einen hellen, 
kalten Glanz ab, den man nicht berühren-beschreiben kann […] die Wolke 
von Chromglanz und Abstraktion rückt gegen das Innerste vor, um es 
unbenennbar zu machen, unbenennbar für den Betrachter, Erleider, was 
empfindet er noch? Blitzblank, Blitze ohne Feuer … Ich kann es wohl sehen, 
es hebt sich ab von der roten Straße, aber das Auge ist nicht das messende 
Organ. Ich kann es erleiden, das ist das messende Organ … Alles entfallen … 
an diesen Dingen … Wie heißt das? Wie nennt es sich? Was ist das? An 
diesen Dingen fehlen die Namen … die Dingwörter … wie kann ich es 
nennen? Was ist daran überhaupt nennbar? Fast nichts … Du wirst sehen, es 
wird immer schwieriger, die Dinge bei ihrem Namen zu nennen.136 
In language mankind is currently no longer able to experience the naming of things in the 
object-world, understood in the sense suggested above by the ‘Alte Übersetzer’ fragment 
and in the delineation of Heidegger’s thinking of the originating saying of language as 
Nennen. Rather, as the Schimpfer describes, language is presently conceived, in 
accordance with an era of ever-increasing scientific and technological innovation, within 
the conventions deployed for relaying such different theoretical conceptions of the world. 
Strauß notes: 
Ein Universum des Sichherausredens … Das Ziel, das zwanghaft und hilflos 
angestrebte, aller Sprache ist der eine Laut des Verständigtseins zwischen 
Himmel und Erde und aller Kreatur.137 
                                                 
135 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.183. 
136 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, pp.190-191. Emphases in original. 
137 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.192. Emphasis in original. 
 229
The ontological distortions of science, technology and language as conventionally used 
are finally bound together: ‘das Sprach-Biest und das Menschen-Gestell … So furchtbar 
es  scheint, es gibt keinen Ausweg aus der anagogischen Sinnennatur’.138 
The present argument deepens the resonance of the overt critique that Strauß makes of 
the levelling and universalizing tendency in the conventions of language and its 
mediation. In accordance with the earlier premise of an absent originary experience, 
Strauß suggests that mankind is cast out from an immanent relationship to world and such 
language. Mankind is, he writes: ‘von Anbeginn auf der Flucht, im Verstoßensein-, 
Vertriebensein. […] Die Sprache verlautet das Schicksal des Verstoßenseins’.139 The 
ontologically distorted relationship to world shows itself, therefore, in mankind’s 
homelessness from originary language and current state of exile in its conventional 
forms. 
However, the Schimpfer-figure senses the constraints and impoverishment of such 
conventional and established language uses. Accordingly, under the conditions of late 
modernity, mankind’s language remains inadequate to its originary possibility. As the 
monologue continues: ‘Wir hätten […] in der Sprache nichts Ent-Sprechendes zu 
bieten’.140 This, of course, invokes the Heideggerian notion of mankind’s (in)ability to 
be-speak the saying of language: ‘Der Mensch spricht, insofern er der Sprache 
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entspricht’.141 Thus, the Schimpfer wants to move nearer to that experience with language 
now lost. 
Like the ‘Er’-figure in Beginnlosigkeit Strauß has the Schimpfer push beyond the 
boundaries of the dominant scientific and technological structuring of object-world. The 
choice of the Schimpfer’s description is suggestive, highlighting the spatial characteristics 
of a possible experience with originary language. Having described the exile and 
homelessness of the majority of mankind – with their ‘gelenkige Schablonen voyeurhaft-
technisch’ – he denotes the alternative towards which he is striving: 
Nahsprache suche ich, nicht das ferne Geräusch unter den Menschen. Frei und 
nah dem Unbegreiflichen … . […] Der einzige, der über die Sprache etwas 
Rechtmäßiges sagen kann, ist der, der sich von ihr ergreifen, stoßen […] 
erschüttern läßt – der von ihrer ganzen Größe angefallen wird … von ihrer 
Unmenge.142 
The purpose of this search for a retrieval and experience, an intent notably not expressed 
in the previous fragments considered, is here directly articulated. The move towards 
originary language is, the Schimpfer extols, the creative counterpoint to a compulsion to 
fabricate, and the rationality of modern Weltbilder. His aim is to unsettle the 
philosophical underpinnings assumed by such theoretical constructs, namely event, 
meaning and causality. The Schimpfer states his approach: ‘Ich bin tat-tilgend, sinn-
lösend, zusammenhang-spaltend’.143 
Just as in Beginnlosigkeit, Strauß’ use of water imagery is suggestive. The Schimpfer 
does not follow normal precepts: rather, his thinking halts or diverts the established 
forward momentum of reason and associated language manifested by scientific and 
                                                 
141 Heidegger, ‘Die Sprache’, p.33. 
142 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.192. Emphasis in original. 
143 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.199. 
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technological theories and their corresponding Weltbilder. As he notes: ‘Ich bin das 
Staubecken: in mir enden […] die stürmischen Handlungsverläufe. […] Ich sage dir, 
alles, was mich erreicht, mündet in ein stehendes Gewässer … ’.144 
Having highlighted what it is the Schimpfer hopes to achieve in respect of language – the 
resonances of Heideggerian thought in the monologue extend to the experience of time 
and memory; the allusion to Hölderlin’s ‘Mnemosyne’ is particularly suggestive – the 
question remaining open is how, or rather on what grounds, Strauß proposes that this be 
accomplished. How, if at all, is an experience with originary language in Wohnen 
Dämmern Lügen shown? 
At this juncture, the issue of the limits of conventional language in the efforts of couples 
to communicate by dialogue and agree on meaning comes to the fore. After the initial 
trigger for his outburst, the Schimpfer begins the lengthy monologue. Whilst the overall 
significance of such a monologue and its structure for Strauß’ understanding of the 
characteristics of originary language must wait for the conclusion to the chapter, it 
nonetheless enforces the contention that relationships in Wohnen Dämmern Lügen fail, as 
do the opportunities for dialogical exchange. Thus, any social nexus and corresponding 
language uses are not regarded by Strauß as sufficient grounds for overcoming the 
distortions in mankind’s Weltbilder and, therefore also, for a retrieval of originary 
language. 
A brief look at another fragment shows the emphasis Strauß places on the portrayal of 
couples and in particular the failure of dialogue. The fragment also points towards the 
                                                 
144 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.199. 
 232
significance of the second term in the trilogy of the title, Dämmern, for Strauß’ thinking 
on language. 
The relationship between the figure, here characterised only as ‘der Mann’, and his wife 
is in difficulty in the ‘Bordstein’ fragment, just as it is in others considered. The man is 
described leaving for work into a dystopian and featureless urban environment with a 
physical lassitude resonant of the adjective lasz: 
Aus der Eisentür einer bewohnten Fabriketage tritt ein Mann mit seinen 
Fachbüchern unter dem Arm auf die Brüstung der Feuerwehrtreppe und 
verabschiedet sich von seiner Frau mit alltäglicher Bedrückung.145 
As he goes downstairs to street level it is with ‘hängendem Kopf, beschwertem Herzen. 
Unten, auf ebenem Weg, geht er wieder langsamer, gebeugt und zerstreut’.146 The 
couple’s daily routine has become that of habituated estrangement with little, if any, 
connection remaining between them. As Strauß writes: 
Er wendet sich nicht noch einmal hinauf zu seiner Frau, die am 
Treppengeländer steht und ihn davongehen sieht, ohne auf einen 
abschließenden Gruß zu warten, der nie erfolgt, der Regel entsprechend.147 
The man’s physical exhaustion is mirrored in the woman’s own sense of numbness. It is 
the everyday experience of the man’s departure that engenders what is described as her 
‘aufsteigende Benommenheit’.148 However, Strauß goes on to relate the exception to their 
eternally recurring morning ritual. 
First, for the woman, the cognitive certainties of her everyday, habituated experience of 
her environment – as they are highlighted above in discussion of the philosophical 
                                                 
145 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.67. 
146 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.67. 
147 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, pp.67-68. 
148 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.68. 
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underpinnings to scientific and technological theory, namely event, meaning and 
causation – are shown to loosen their hold. Strauß portrays the breakdown in accrued 
experience as the sound of her departing husband’s footsteps recedes: 
… wenn seine Schritte sich von ihr entfernen … diese Vermehrung von 
selbstläufigen Prozessen, die jede Ursache und Wirkung, jeden Antrieb und 
Einhalt ineinander verschlingen, […] so viel Zusammenwirken so vieler 
Kräfte – in niemandes Hand! … Man sieht, was man tut, nicht wieder als 
Getanes […] es steigert die Dichte der Flechte.149 
The change to her normalised experience has a parallel in the transformation of her 
husband’s familiar world. As he walks down the stairs from the apartment as usual the 
ground opens up and he descends into a darker, hitherto unknown place. The boundaries 
of experience for the man and woman are blurred from anything recognisable as an 
everyday reality. 
As the man continues down the steps into the earth, he is met by a woman ‘der seinen 
zum Verwechseln ähnlich’.150 The issue of language and Lügen and their inter-relation is 
raised. The woman asks the man: ‘“Lügen Sie nie?”’.151 
If the preceding account is accepted, in which Lügen denotes the condition of un-truth in 
the relationship between mankind and world and corresponding conventional language 
uses, then the woman’s question and the man’s response are significant for what they 
suggest of the possibility of a retrieval of originary language. 
The man’s reply alludes to the so-called Epimenides paradox where the philosopher, 
citizen of ancient Crete, declares all his compatriots to be liars. He appears not to accept 
                                                 
149 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.68. 
150 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.68. 
151 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.69. 
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the implied characterisation, Lügen, of his normal relationship to and use of language. In 
response to the question, he says: ‘“In dem Augenblick, da ich mir die geringste Lüge 
gestatte […] beginne ich der Wahrheit […] eine besondere Bedeutung beizumessen”’.152 
His reply – as Strauß describes it, ‘diese eitle Antwort’ – must, however, confirm the 
validity of the woman’s implied designation of his language use. If he does not give 
credence to truth, as he concedes, then he must, when speaking, always be in thrall to 
Lügen. 
Moreover, at the moment he retorts that his language is not so distorted, Strauß portrays 
the woman making a fleeting connection to an alternative language denoted as the 
Sprache des Dritten. 
Doch kaum war seine kleine abgezirkelte Anmerkung heraus, da erwiderte 
ihm die Frau, die zwar das reine Ebenbild der seinen war, jedoch eine 
vollkommen andere Sprache im Mund führte, unverzüglich, […], so schoß es 
aus ihr heraus: “… – – – …”.153 
Strauß’ invocation of the experience is even more opaque than in the other fragments 
considered. The originary Sprache des Dritten, on this occasion, is not even formed into a 
word. It is manifest as silence. 
The man, unable to conceive of the un-truth of his habituated use of language, has a very 
different experience. At the same instant that the woman utters an enigmatic, silent, 
wordless language, he, in contrast, is engulfed by ‘ein Wirbel von Stimmen wie Staub, 
[…], laute Gesprächsfetzen, alles schallende Hin und Her’.154 He is consumed by a 
language, which he recognises as constituted from his own words and everyday 
                                                 
152 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.69. My emphasis. 
153 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.69. 
154 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.69. 
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conventional idioms and expressions, like Schroubek’s wakening sense of being 
inundated by the mediated spoken word in Die Widmung. As Strauß continues: 
Er […] bemerkte, daß das ganze Palaver, das er da von fremden Stimmen 
hörte, aus seinen eigenen Worten bestand, die er irgendwann, zu den höchsten 
und niedrigsten Gelegenheiten, in allen möglichen Lebenslagen 
ausgesprochen hatte.155 
The man is thus forced, as part of his experience in the recesses of the earth, to re-live 
every conversation and dialogue had in the past with his wife: ‘er mußte noch einmal von 
vorn beginnen, sich ihr zu erklären, und alles wiederholen, was er die langen Jahre über 
zu ihr gesprochen hatte’.156 
The ‘Bordstein’ fragment illustrates again some of the motifs on which Strauß develops 
his thinking on language. At the centre is the breakdown in conventional language uses in 
the form of dialogue and the necessary isolation of mankind, the sole experience of an 
absent originary language. Moreover, the fragment introduces a further characteristic to 
the possibile retrieval of such language. For the couple, this takes place outside 
recognisable physical space or at the outer boundaries of familiar environments.157 
As the Schimpfer sets out in his monologue, such a breakdown of established physical 
parameters is a necessary characteristic of an experience of ‘Nahsprache’: 
Aber so wird es immer sein: die einen schaukeln sicher am Tag und stürzen ab 
in der Nacht, die anderen fallen durch den Tag und steigen in der Nacht.158 
                                                 
155 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, pp.69-70. 
156 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.70. 
157 Strauß, of course, develops this motif, particularly in his essays, in relation to the position of the poet. 
See the following Strauß essays and interviews: ‘Die Distanz ertragen’; ‘Isolationen’; ‘Am Rand. Wo 
sonst’ and ‘Der Erste, der Letzte’. This crucial characteristic for the poetic is considered further in Chapter 
Five. 
158 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.192. Strauß’ imagery provides a further suggestive echo of 
Heidegger’s description of the attempt to bring die Sprache als die Sprache zur Sprache. Heidegger writes: 
‘Die Sprache ist: Sprache. Die Sprache spricht. Wenn wir uns in den Abgrund, den dieser Satz nennt, fallen 
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The analogy between the blurring of night and day – of course, noted in the culminating 
fragment of Beginnlosigkeit – the move towards the margins of recognised space, all 
grounds making possible an experience of originary language, provide a good basis to 
consider Strauß’ evocation of the related term, second in the title of the work, Dämmern. 
4.4 Die Sprachen-Dämmerung? 
The argument so far contends that in the stories of Wohnen Dämmern Lügen Strauß 
portrays different experiences of language, here delineated as conventional and originary 
respectively. The former covers the range of habituated discourses, structured and 
constrained by an underlying distorted metaphysical relationship to world. It is such 
everyday language, its vagaries and limits arising in the familiar communicative idioms, 
particularly between couples, that are stressed as a motif in the works. Most of the 
fragments in Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, for example, portray vignettes between couples. 
It is through the couples’ attempts at and negotiation of conversations – the permutations, 
evolutions and, ultimately, always the failure of communication between such figures – 
that Strauß sets out the philosophical grounds of his own thinking on language, and 
ultimately, as this chapter begins to suggest, for his writing. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
lassen, stürzen wir nicht ins Leere weg. Wir fallen in die Höhe. Deren Hoheit öffnet eine Tiefe. Beide 
durchmessen eine Ortschaft, in der wir heimisch werden möchten, um den Aufenthalt für das Wesen des 
Menschen finden’, in Heidegger, ‘Die Sprache’, p.13. 
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4.4.1 Dämmern: limits of conventional language as dialogue 
The comparatively lengthy episode ‘Monotropie’ in Niemand anderes provides an early 
example of an encounter between two individuals, the shortcomings that Strauß suggests 
reside in the associated dialogical exchange, and the implications for language and its 
uses. 
The fragment describes two strangers passing one another, but a fleeting, chanced glance 
breaks ‘die Schleier des feinen Desinteresses, der zivilen Bemerkensscheu, die zwei 
fremde Menschen umgibt’.159 Can the couple experience something beyond the apparent 
absolute constraints and veneer of social intercourse? Both individuals become aware of 
the other’s presence: 
Es öffnet sich, es entblößt seine Gegenwart, seinen wehrlosen Ernst und 
dunkle Frage, deren Antwort nur eine lange Geschichte geben kann, das 
Fragen-Entsetzen: ‘Wer bist du?’.160 
As the fragment continues, the possibility of an experience beyond social conventions 
and dialogical exchange appears to be sanctioned. It is initially described as ‘das schöne 
Gespräch’, which it is suggested has a particular power in contrast to ‘kunstvoller 
Dialog’.161 Strauß describes the characteristics of such an exchange in terms already 
familiar. It is: 
eine offene Komposition ohne Ziel und Absicht. Es wird von Rhythmen, 
Wellen, Reizen hingetragen, von nächstem Widerhall, wie sie nirgends sonst 
in der Geselligkeit vorkommt. Schweigen, Hören, Fragen, Sprechen. 
Verschiedene Arten der Stille können entstehen: das aktive Schweigen 
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während des Zuhörens. […]. Der Anblick ist einender als das Wort, aber 
entgegnender als Schweigen. Geeintes Schweigen sieht nicht. 162  
Nevertheless, in spite of its apparent promise, the attempt by the couple to ground such 
language fails. Strauß goes on to describe the constraints within which the couple use 
language generally and articulate themselves. 
Das viele Reden, das langsam versiegt. […]. Sie haben den ganzen Atem der 
Sprache ausgehaucht, sie haben ihn verbraucht. Der Hauch, […] 
Menschensprache, verbraucht, verpufft, vergeudet. Nach der Beschwörung 
wurde das Wort Gesetz. Nach dem Gesetz wurde das Wort Gespräch. Nach 
dem Gespräch wurde das Wort Kommunikation. Nach der Kommunikation 
wurde das Wort – ausgestoßen […]. Sinnlos irrt es nun von Mund zu Mund 
[…]. Wir vergehen in Ausgesprochenheit.163 
The couple in the ‘Monotropie’ fragment cannot ultimately delimit or overcome the 
influence of conventional language uses. These are simply overwhelming. 
Strauß’ focus on couples in his writing is long recognised. The titles of the prose works 
themselves convey, either implicitly or explicitly, the importance of relationships, even if 
only notional, with other people, although significantly these are always conveyed as 
failing or absent.164 Meyer’s comment on Paare, Passanten is representative of critics for 
whom the inter-personal relationships of Strauß’ figures are most important and dominate 
interpretive perspectives: 
                                                 
162 Strauß, Niemand anderes, p.46. The passage directly parallels the inter-relation of language as Sage and 
Stille, and Sprechen and Schweigen described by Heidegger. The relationship in Strauß’ writing between 
silence as one manifestation of the experience of originary language is developed in section 4.4.2 below. 
Heidegger, in turn, writes: ‘Wie aber sind Sprechen und Gesprochenes in der […] Erzählung des 
Sprachwesens gedacht? Sie zeigen sich schon als solches, wodurch und worin etwas zur Sprache, d.h. zu 
einem Vorschein kommt, insofern etwas gesagt ist. Sagen und Sprechen sind nicht das gleiche. Einer kann 
sprechen, spricht endlos, und alles ist nichtsagend. Dagegen schweigt jemand, er spricht nicht und kann in 
Nichtsprechen viel sagen’, in Heidegger, ‘Der Weg zur Sprache, p.252. Emphasis in original. The 
relationship between stillness, silence, language and poetry is developed in Chapter Five. From this 
emerges Strauß’ poetics of dwelling. 
163 Strauß, Niemand anderes, pp.46-47. 
164 For example, Die Widmung is a dedication by Richard Schroubek of his diary to his absent partner 
Hannah. Paare, Passanten evokes the fleeting connection and inevitable impermanence of couples. Lastly, 
Niemand anderes suggests the necessity of social and linguistic isolation. 
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In dem […] Buch von Botho Strauß sind die […] Geschichten bloß Teile für 
das Mosaik. Ihr metaphorischer Charakter ist unbestritten; nicht weniger 
wirklich ist die Aura des Alltags, dem sie gehören. Liebe und deren 
Erschöpfung, Verzweifelung, und was sie auslöst.165 
For many critics, the works, their difficult, fragmentary form and underlying engagement 
with sexual politics present a commentary on the moral condition of either post-war or 
post-unification Germany, and as the introduction contends, thereby inevitably place him 
in some relationship to ethics and politics. As Blöcker notes: ‘Strauß bleibt nie im bloß 
Stimmungshaften hängen, so vollkommen ihm das auch zu Gebote steht. […]. Das 
sprechende Detail weitet er zum Sittenbild, aus wenigen Sinnesdaten entwickelt er den 
Charaktertypus’.166 But as the opening interpretation of the fragment from Wohnen 
Dämmern Lügen and the specific remarks in respect of Lügen show, this overlooks the 
philosophical significance of Strauß’ proposal for an alternative, here described in terms 
of an experience with originary language. 
The ‘Monotropie’ excerpt from Niemand anderes highlights the ambiguous, complex 
relationship in Strauß’ work between language and mankind. The figures in each 
fragment are constrained by its conventional, everyday uses, but critically, in spite of this, 
an ongoing, barely perceivable continuity with originary language prevails. The 
possibility of its retrieval, as the opening section in this chapter claims, is both absent and 
proximal for mankind as shown in the ‘Alte Übersetzer’ fragment. It is worth 
underscoring that conventional and originary language are both still conceived here as 
language. They are not to be understood as different forms, e.g., one prosaic and the other 
                                                 
165 Meyer, M. ‘Vergeblichkeit des Orts. Zu Paare, Passanten’, in Radix, (ed.) Strauß lesen, p.263. 
166 Blöcker, G. ‘Zwei Fußbreit über der Leere. Zu Paare, Passanten’, in Radix, (ed.) Strauß lesen, p.261. 
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poetic. Instead, it is their experience – how the relationship between mankind and world 
manifests itself philosophically in and through language – that differs. 
Strauß outlines this deep tension early in his writing in the ‘Schrieb’ section of Paare, 
Passanten. There he writes: ‘Es schafft ein tiefes Zuhaus und ein tiefes Exil, da in der 
Sprache zu sein’.167 It is this tension in the nature of the relationship, and the ambiguous 
grounds upon which an experience with originary language and corresponding 
overcoming of the constraints and distortions of its conventional uses are manifest, that 
informs Strauß’ notion of Dämmern. 
A number of fragments from Wohnen Dämmern Lügen illustrate the deep ambiguity 
suggested by the term. One, for example, portrays the epilogue to a one-off sexual 
encounter between a young woman, Myriam, and an older, unnamed man, and shows the 
faltering attempts by the former to establish some communication or bond between them. 
Myriam tries repeatedly to create common ground with the man throughout the course of 
their night together whilst yearning for, and repeatedly checking to establish, ‘ob nicht 
der erste Faden des Morgens zu glühen beginne’.168 Myriam’s desire for a connection 
beyond social convention mirrors that described from the ‘Monotropie’ episode in 
Niemand anderes: to address the challenge posed by the presence of someone else and 
associated question ‘Wer bist du?’. 
The man meanwhile avoids what he views as the clichéd form and inevitable movement 
of their conversation, which is restricted to the conventional banalities of psychological 
sensationalism. As he comments: ‘Nur nicht in die Nähe des von ihr ersehnten 
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“Erfahrungsaustauschs” kommen!’.169 Strauß remarks elsewhere in Wohnen Dämmern 
Lügen of another of his figures who is portrayed in similar circumstances: 
Natürlich mußte man sich, wie es üblich ist, aussprechen über alles, was 
vorgefallen war. Aber da dies mit Worten und auf eine Weise geschah, die 
grundvernünftig und einsichtig war, wurde das eigentliche machtvolle Dunkel 
gar nicht berührt.170 
The expectations, formalities and compulsion arising from social intercourse are 
unavoidable in the encounters Strauß describes in Wohnen Dämmern Lügen. 
Myriam, however, persists in her efforts to engage her partner of that one night. Despite 
his reluctance he is drawn into her insistence upon conversational intimacy: ‘Ich erwachte 
schließlich unter ihrer eintönigen Stimme, die mich leise anredete und nicht mehr 
versiegen wollte’.171 The man eventually succumbs and offers a few personal 
observations to the partner. But Strauß makes clear, through the stress of the narrative, 
that the man’s comments, far from a genuinely founded exchange, are rather a pointed 
obfuscation. Nevertheless, they raise the issue of language: the man’s offer of dialogue is 
confirmation of both its failure and its limits. 
Sie hörte zu, als erzählte ich eine intime Geschichte. Dabei waren es nur ein 
paar abstrakte Bemerkungen, die mir dazu dienten, mein Herz fest zu 
ummanteln. Ich fürchtete, sie habe sofort die zerschlissene Stelle, das Loch in 
meinem Redemantel entdeckt, durch das sie nun stumm vor Entsetzen auf 
meine Blöße, meine ungeheure Verdorbenheit und Herzensleere starrte.172 
Myriam’s response underscores the final elision of any connection between the couple. 
As the fragment continues she reconciles herself, after all, to silence: ‘Ohne ein Wort zu 
                                                 
169 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.91. 
170 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.24. 
171 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.88. 
172 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.91. 
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erwidern, nachzufragen oder hinzuzusetzen, legte sie sich zu Bett und streckte sich […] 
aus’.173 
Significantly, Myriam’s efforts at establishing dialogue and conversational exchange 
through everyday discourse are associated at each juncture with Dämmern. As Strauß 
describes: ‘Sie schritt wieder, […] schritt wieder am Fenster vorbei, hob den Vorhang, 
suchte den Morgen’.174 Finally, as the fragment concludes, at the point when 
conversation between the couple stalls irretrievably, the first light of dawn breaks 
through: ‘Nicht lange, nachdem sie das Nachtlicht gelöscht hatte, entdeckte sie draußen, 
nun endlich … “wie der erste Faden des Morgens zu glühen begann”’.175 The breakdown 
of language as dialogue and the isolation of the individual is here inimitably associated 
with Dämmern. 
The suggestion that Dämmern evokes a site – through the indeterminacy and ambiguous 
status of daybreak and nightfall – where conventional forms of language break apart is 
supported by numerous other episodes from Wohnen Dämmern Lügen. Moreover, the 
idea has a long continuity in Strauß’ writing. Thus, one fragment in Paare, Passanten in 
the section entitled ‘Dämmer’ anticipates this denotation in the later prose work.176 
The episode describes a similar fleeting sexual encounter, although in this earlier work it 
is more explicit, between a young unnamed woman and equally uncharacterised older 
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176 Anz, of course, declares the notion of Dämmer in Paare, Passanten as one of many ‘veredelten 
Abweichungen von der Normalsprache’ and in this critique underscores the charge of fatalism, in Anz, 
Modern, postmodern?, p.407. However, this is to mistake the deep ambiguity and enigma suggested by the 
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originary retrieval. 
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man.177 Having picked up the woman, the pair is described as driving into, 
‘Morgendämmerung am steingrauen Himmel’.178 On this occasion, there is no attempt at 
communication or dialogue. Their sexual encounter provides the only connection, which 
is socially defined and shown as artificial: 
Wir sprachen nicht. Verschlossen sah sie zur Seite, legte das Kinn auf ihr 
Knie. Die Schweißperlen des einsamen Sich-überlassen-Seins. […]. 
Verschlossene Menschen, tief versonnen, weit woanders in ihrem ganzen 
Wesen, tauchen ruhig und schwerelos an die Oberfläche des Menschlichen, 
[…] tauchen auf, nur um ein vorgespiegeltes Bild, ein reizvolles Figurenspiel 
zu erfüllen, und tauchen dann wieder hinunter.179 
As well as illustrating Dämmern as the condition of linguistic breakdown between 
couples, the fragment from Paare, Passanten deepens the significance of the motifs 
considered from Wohnen Dämmern Lügen by associating the couple’s encounter with an 
overwhelming mental and physical lassitude for one another and themselves. As the man 
in the ‘Myriam’ fragment repeatedly describes his fatigue and passivity in respect of his 
failure to respond in dialogue to his female companion, similarly, the equivalent figure in 
Paare, Passanten ends his encounter reflecting: ‘Die menschliche Sexualität und ihre 
Kultur waren das Mythenreservoir – die stumme Götterwelt dieser untergetauchten, 
geheimnisvollen Wesen. Ein müdes Bedürfnis zu lieben und dabei müde zu bleiben, hob 
sie dann und wann zu uns empor’.180 
                                                 
177 Such fragments have prompted accusations of misogyny in Strauß’ work. See, for example, Adelson, L. 
A. ‘Der arme Mann und “diese solidarischen Löcher”. Zu Begriff und Funktion von Weiblichkeit bei Botho 
Strauß’, in Stephan, I. & Weigel, S. (eds.) Weiblichkeit und Avantgarde, (Hamburg: Neue Folge, 1987). 
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contemporary political dimension absent from the original works and, therefore, places his writing in a 
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178 Strauß, Paare, Passanten, p.127. My emphasis. 
179 Strauß, Paare, Passanten, p.127. 
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The work is replete with invocations of this state of individual lethargy. As the argument 
in the final section of this chapter shows, it is the inversion of such passivity, as Laßkraft, 
that comes to be associated by Strauß with a retrieval of originary language and also with 
Wohnen. For example, Strauß describes another group about to recognise the irretrievable 
dissolution in their relationship: 
Wie man einem elektronischen Bild die Farben entziehen kann, so hatte hier 
den dreien ein schützender Dämmer, der aber aus der Mitte ihrer 
unschlüssigen Lage über sie kam, jede Kraft zu beschließen und zu handeln 
entzogen.181 
Dämmern and lassitude are intimately bound for Strauß. 
But the term Dämmern, notwithstanding its association with conventional language, 
breakdown between couples, sense of emptiness and physical inaction evokes more in 
Strauß’ writing than Korte suggests by ‘die Transformation des Realen in die “Dämmer”-
Sphäre des Undeutlichen und Rätselhaften’.182 The ambiguity, indeterminacy and enigma 
invoked by the term also holds out – contradictorily – the promise of a retrieved 
experience of originary language.183 
                                                 
181 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.13. 
182 Korte, ‘Auf dem Weg zur “Tagesordnung des Ewigen”?’, p.21. 
183 The development of Strauß’ ideas on language in respect of the term Dämmern in his poetry bears 
suggestive comparison with a number of Heidegger’s poems to Hannah Arendt, in its association with 
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ambiguity of Dämmern in his exegesis of Trakl’s poem ‘Geistliche Dämmerung’, in Heidegger, M. ‘Die 
Sprache im Gedicht’, in Unterwegs zur Sprache, pp.48ff. The constraints of the present thesis prevent 
further consideration of this evocative conjunction of poetic forms and ideas. 
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4.4.2 Dämmern: retrieval of originary language in silence? 
The profound equivocation of Dämmern and the condition it denotes are suggested by the 
fragment relaying the vignette of ‘Dr. Gertraude Laszek, Orientalistin, und ihr 
Lebensgefährte Armin Rust, Heizungsinstallateur’.184 Unusually, both figures are named. 
Their story draws the present interpretations back to the motifs raised in the ‘Alte 
Übersetzer’ fragment. The couple is shown deeply divided, the man as physically 
expended. Strauß writes: 
Der Mann geht torkelnd hinter der Frau, die ihm nicht den Arm leiht. Der 
Vorschwapp des sich umstülpenden Magens springt aus seinem Mund. Die 
Frau, die nur das Geräusch hört, dreht sich nicht um, sie fragt in einem 
harschen, spöttischen Ton: ‘Geht es schon los?’.185 
However, the animosity and division between the couple contrasts with the description 
Gertraude Laszek offers to an old acquaintance in conversation immediately following 
the opening. As she exclaims: ‘“Einen besseren Mann hätte ich gar nicht finden können!” 
sagt sie tags darauf zu einer Freundin, fast in einem Jubelruf, jedenfalls in einem 
Ausbruch von Frohsinn, der sie selber überrascht’.186 Strauß shows the constraints on 
individuals, on this occasion the pressure of social conformity, arising from the 
conventions of dialogic language and exchange. 
Frau Laszek läßt, bis auf die oberflächlichste Erkundigung, keinerlei Interesse 
an den Lebensumständen der anderen erkennen. Sobald diese ein wenig vom 
Auf und Ab der vergangenen Jahrzehnte einstreut, schweift der Blick […] ab 
und offenbar auch ihr Gehör, sie gibt ein falsches Lächeln bei und fragt nicht 
nach. In die Unterhaltung verirrt sich kein einziger unbefangener, warmer 
Ton.187 
                                                 
184 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.36. 
185 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.36. 
186 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.36. 
187 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.37. 
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This is, however, the prelude to a terminal fissure in this language and between the 
woman, Laszek and man, Rust. 
The fragment continues as the man returns home drunk – ‘Am Abend öffnet sie ihrem 
betrunkenen Mann die Tür’ – the woman leaving him in his stupor: ‘Seine Frau nimmt 
mit einer durch Gewohnheit nicht geschwächten Geste des stummen Ekels ihr Buch von 
der Kommode und zieht sich zurück’.188 As in previous fragments the circumstances are 
not exceptional but recount their normal habits and experience. The woman sits apart 
from her partner but becomes aware of and senses a change. She calls to him but he does 
not hear, and returns to find him about to launch himself off the balcony. With supreme 
effort she pulls him back from the abyss: ‘Es gelingt ihr, ihn aus dem gefährlichen 
Überhang zurückzureißen, auf den Boden zu zerren’.189 Strauß describes the man lying 
semi-conscious and her barely able to speak. At this point, when they are no longer able 
to communicate, there is a transformation in their experience with language. 
Until this change the woman’s only contact with her partner is, ‘mit einem Mann, der 
nicht anwesend, der nur noch in ihrer Erinnerung ein mit ihr sprechender Mensch war’.190 
She is reconciled ‘nie mehr mit ihm redenkönnen! Laß Gott, ihn noch ein einziges Mal zu 
mir sprechen!’.191 They can clearly not communicate by any normal, recognisable 
measure. However, as she brings him back into the room the couple undergoes the 
transformation. Strauß’ description is as enigmatic as previous fragments considered. The 
man utters a silent scream: 
                                                 
188 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.38. 
189 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.38. 
190 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.39. 
191 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.39. 
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Die angewinkelten Arme waren wie erstarrt und ließen sich nicht bewegen. 
Sie sah seine verzerrten Gesichtszüge, die geschlossenen Augen, nur der 
Mund war aufgerissen: er schrie. Er schrie lautlos, mit aller Kraft, aber er 
schrie aus einer Entfernung, in der seine Stimme für niemanden mehr zu 
hören war.192 
It seems at first that the man’s voiceless exhortation is merely confirmation of the 
breakdown in conventional language. But this is to overlook Strauß’ pointed suggestion 
made in linking his silent uttering with Dämmern. 
Sie ging in die Küche und füllte Kaffee in die Maschine. Der Morgen 
dämmerte schon am Himmel. Plötzlich hörte sie, wie er nach ihr rief. Ganz 
deutlich hörte sie ihren Namen, den er rief. […]. Er lag aber unverändert, das 
Gesicht erfüllt von dem […] stillen Schrei, der keinen Raum für ein Wort, 
einen Namen mehr ließ. Dennoch war es unmöglich, daß sie sich getäuscht 
hatte.193 
Dämmern is here shown as fathomless and indeterminate. Although it does not denote a 
reconciliation of the couple’s division or an irrevocable overcoming of conventional 
language, it shows a possibility of a retrieval of an absent, deeper experience of originary 
language beyond the constraints of a normative linguistic order, its conventions, grammar 
and syntax. The fragment though, critically, remains baffling and enigmatic. How else 
does Strauß portray the possibility of such a retrieved experience? 
                                                 
192 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.40. 
193 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.40. The work is replete with other examples. Strauß offers a similar 
conjunction of silence and Dämmern, describing a scene of a man walking alone at an indeterminate site, at 
the boundary between sea and land, to which he is inexorably drawn: ‘die ungeheure Ebene, die kahle 
Fläche […] an meinem räumlichen Körper, meine Kleinheit und Einsamkeit stemmte sich gegen den Sog, 
der meinen Körper in die unermeßlichen Fläche hineinziehen wollte’. The man encounters a woman with 
whom he attempts to converse. Strauß writes: ‘Es war aber eine Frau in vierfarbigem Jogginganzug, Farben 
der Dämmerung, […], und sie folgte mir auf dem leeren Strand’. But their exchange fails by any 
conventional standard. She utters a sound that is animalistic and silent. Moreover, the fragment suggests 
that this uttering of language was given her, or that she is, in fact, merely the site for its expression, 
invoking the dynamic, absent-proximal movement of the Sprache des Dritten: ‘Ihr Mund ging auf im 
selben Augenblick, und das langgezogene “Miääää”, Ruf der Möwe, kam aus ihrem Hals. […]. Vielmehr 
war sie eigentlich stumm. […]. Er war ihr anstelle der Stimme – ja gegeben worden? Eher doch wohl: in sie 
eingeschlagen’, in Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, pp.30-31. Emphases in original. 
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4.4.3 Dämmern: retrieval of originary language in uttering? 
In the ‘Bordstein’ and the ‘Laszek’ fragments the dissolution of conventional language 
for the figures corresponds with a glimpse of an absent Sprache des Dritten that 
manifests itself in an enigmatic silent articulation. However, in other episodes from 
Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, not least in the ‘Schimpfer’ monologue, the momentary 
retrieval of absent originary language is associated with a torrent of words, equally 
beyond recognisable rational linguistic precepts, as though the individual is overwhelmed 
and barely able to formulate the experience. What both share is the enigmatic nature of 
that experience, and the sense that language is somehow given or granted rather than 
being appropriated for use. 
In some episodes, the words, manifestations of such language, have a long etymological 
heritage that directly invokes Heidegger’s method. For example, in one mysterious 
fragment, an unnamed documentary filmmaker makes contact again with a subject of an 
earlier film, ‘Loredana de Waard’, a ‘Beauftragte der holländischen Regierung für 
Zivilschutzfragen’.194 During their meeting, in which they exchange ‘die üblichen 
Erkundigungen’, the producer raises a suspicion that the figure he originally knew and 
the person whom he later meets ‘auf gar keinen Fall ein und diesselbe Person sein 
konnten’.195 It becomes clear to the journalist that the woman has, in fact, murdered her 
erstwhile namesake. As she finally confesses her crime Strauß relays how she is ‘von 
einem Sturzbach hagiographischen Plunders überschüttet, den ich nicht zu durchdringen 
                                                 
194 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.55. 
195 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.56. 
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vermochte’.196 There is a breakdown in the normal parameters of communication and 
understanding. The choice of word to describe her crime is notable: 
Ich fragte mich, ob sie auch geschwitzt hatte, als sie Loredanas Fleischhemd 
auftrennte. […]. Sie sagte Fleischhemd statt Leiche, Leichnam, und es kam 
vom althochdeutschen lih-hamo, hamo gleich Hemd. Weiß der Teufel, wie es 
in ihr aufgetaucht war.197 
The words, manifestations of the Sprache des Dritten, are imaged as given or granted to 
the individual to enable the possibility of its experience. 
In Strauß’ early prose work Rumor, one of Bekker’s many senses of this absent 
experience with language highlights again the profound ambivalence that Strauß intends 
by the condition of Dämmern. Bekker is both afflicted by a torrent of words and by 
silence: he is a ‘Mann, der an einem Tag einen fürchterlichen Redeschwall ausschüttet, 
um dann an den folgenden den Mund gar nicht mehr aufzumachen’.198 
Faced with an impending return to his former employer, Zachler’s ‘Institut’, a quasi-
commercial research organisation labelled ‘ein Scheißhaus des Geistes und eine 
Züchtstätte des Idiotismus’, Bekker experiences a widening fracture in his everyday, 
normal spoken language.199 The characteristics are recognisable from other fragments 
considered. He becomes physically debilitated as the relationship to objects in his 
environment deteriorates. His daughter, Grit, with whom he is staying notices: 
[…] wie in seinem Gesicht Veränderungen sich abzeichnen, wie die Haut 
fahler und faltiger geworden ist. […]. Die Augen haben einen seidigen Glanz, 
scheinen offen für alles Ferne, müde fürs Greifbare, auch im übrigen für die 
nächstliegenden Pflichten. […]. Manchmal redet er unklar und 
                                                 
196 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.59. 
197 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, p.58. Emphasis in original. 
198 Strauß, Rumor, pp.94-95. 
199 Strauß, Rumor, p.9. Some critics suggest Zachler’s institute as symbol for Horkheimer’s Institut für 
Sozialforschung, centre for Critical Theory, in Frankfurt-am-Main. 
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zusammenhanglos auch, wenn er gar nicht betrunken ist. Dann schleicht, was 
er sagt, dicht an der Grenze zu Dämmer […]. Das Seltsame ist nur: in solchen 
Augenblicken meint man einen Verfall seiner gewohnten ebenso wie zugleich 
einen Aufstieg bisher noch unbekannter Kräfte des Geistes wahrzunehmen.200 
The experience is imaged, in conjunction with Dämmer, as a place at the margins or outer 
boundaries of normal behaviour, but also in obvious contradiction to his physical decline 
and expression of apparent non-sense, as a powerfully creative force. Rumor does not, 
then, as Laemmle suggests of the work’s title, denote ‘mit einem in unser Leben, in unser 
Denken hineinwirkenden allgemeinen Diskurs, den Foucault das “unendliche Murmeln” 
genannt hat, obwohl es mehr ein unaufhörliches Plappern zu sein scheint’, but rather 
language as Reden, an uttering of the absent Sprache des Dritten.201 
The examples from Strauß’ prose work are numerous but all inflect the ambivalence of 
mankind’s experience, in and through language, of a distorted relationship to world, 
whether in respect of objects or other people. One further lengthy fragment from Wohnen 
Dämmern Lügen serves to highlight another important characteristic to this relationship. 
It shows the couple ‘Helty’, a failed ‘Baugeschichtler’, and Stella, an impecunious single 
mother and divorcee, ‘Psycholinguistin, promoviert’, whose academic training and 
approach to language is certainly not without a suggestion of irony.202 They begin a 
relationship that quickly runs into difficulties. Like Bekker in Rumor, Helty takes flight 
from the worsening situation, seeks sanctuary in isolation and, similarly, undergoes a 
transformation in his use and experience of language. In this state of apparent mania he 
can no longer conceive previously recognisable objects or familiar views of language. 
                                                 
200 Strauß, Rumor, p.54. My emphases. 
201 Laemmle, P. ‘Von der Notwendigkeit, böse zu sein. Zu Rumor’, in Radix, (ed.) Strauß lesen, p.256. 
202 Strauß, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, pp.15-16. 
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Morgens saß er brettgerade am Tisch und nahm die Zeitung vor. Lange nichts 
gelesen. […]. Teilweise begriff. Zusammenhänge verfolgen konnte. Dann 
wieder gab’s nichts, was zusammenhing. Es waren nur Lücken, eine Strecke 
mit unberechenbar vielen Lücken, durch die man woandershin denken 
mußte.203 
His response is instinctively to withdraw further, this time into nature and there, away 
from social contact, he experiences a different sense of meaning. Significantly, this is 
imaged in terms of an origin. 
[…] wo einst keinerlei Sinn für die Schönheit der Landschaft bestand, wurde 
diese Schönheit jetzt zu einem hegenden Versteck der Anfänge, die er 
zwischen den Zweigen überall flüstern hörte. Und plötzlich in dieser tiefen 
Vereinsamung der Rückkehr, schien es fast gleich, ob er damals mit der einen 
sprach oder heute mit einer anderen: man sprach jeweils aus Gelüsten, die 
nichts mit den Wörtern, dem Sprechen zu tun hatten, und sie allein ließen 
einen übermütig werden, […] mit ihrem viel schnelleren, aufgeregteren 
Geräusch.204 
Language as Geräusch here parallels the indeterminacy associated with Rumor. 
The different experience with language inevitably signals the irreconcilable breakup of 
the relationship with Stella. The two are no longer able to communicate. As Strauß 
writes: ‘Als seine neue Geliebte ihn nach tagelanger Suche […] erreichte, redete er […] 
und lallte nur in dumpfen Brocken. Stella konnte ihn nicht wiedererkennen’.205 
However, although the selected examples show how Strauß conveys a crisis of language 
in the limits and constraints of its conventional uses, and an alternative, occasionally 
glimpsed absent originary language, it is clear that no resolution is offered. The different 
figures in Wohnen Dämmern Lügen do not overcome the all-pervasive state denoted by 
Lügen. Claims by critics such as Windrich or Lämmerman that Strauß presents a 
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synthesis to the crisis in language are misplaced, fall short of Strauß’ intent and limit the 
implications of the form or presentation of his ideas.206 
Each of the fragments considered thus far shares similar characteristics in respect of the 
Sprache des Dritten: of isolation, spiritual and physical lassitude, either silence or 
maniacal uttering and a corresponding displacement to the margins.207 However, all deny 
the encounter between couples – or with an other – as the basis for its experience. Each 
attempt to near or retrieve originary language appears ultimately to fail. This, the 
argument contends, is inherent to the indeterminate condition invoked by Dämmern. 
However, the question previously raised remains: whether Strauß ever shows an 
experience of the originary Sprache des Dritten, like the glimpse he proposes elliptically 
of Fleck in the culmination of the Sondenexperiment in Beginnlosigkeit, and by the 
epiphany in the ‘Odeon’ section in Niemand anderes, both considered at the close of the 
previous chapter. Perhaps, unsurprisingly, to delineate this, the present reading of 
Wohnen Dämmern Lügen returns to the concluding ‘Schimpfer’ monologue to consider 
the significance of the last term in the trilogy, Wohnen, for Strauß’ thinking on and 
portrayal of language. 
                                                 
206 Lämmerman, for example, claims: ‘‘Somit ist eigentlich die “Sprachkrise” als solche erledigt: denn zwar 
ist immer Krise – bei den allermeisten Benutzern der Sprache; aber die Sprache selbst und der kleine Kreis 
derer, die mit ihr wirklich umgehen können, hat sich von dem Schock der Jahrhundertwende erholt und 
neue Ausdrucksmöglichkeiten gefunden’, in Lämmerman, Für unser Werk mein Liebster, p.355. 
207 The constraints of the thesis prevent a consideration in Wohnen Dämmern Lügen of the related motif of 
music and its relationship to language raised briefly at the close of the previous chapter and its conjunction 
with these characteristics. 
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4.5 Wohnen: dwelling in originary language? 
In addition to showing the distorted relationship between mankind and object-world and 
associated conventional language uses as Lügen, the ‘Schimpfer’ monologue is also 
readily identifiable with one of the manifestations of originary language set out above, 
namely the experience with language by the individual as uttering. 
Following his initial disagreement with both partner and compatriots in the bar, the 
Schimpfer’s monologue continues uninterrupted for almost thirty pages. But to describe 
this stream of words only as uttering is to mistake its structure, and consequently to 
overlook that other manifestation of the Sprache des Dritten as silence. The Schimpfer’s 
tirade is continually broken up; halts, moves forward again – is interrupted by digressions 
and tangential remarks – lingers over a particular idea before continuing with the 
relentless outpouring of words. It is important to consider the way Strauß has structured 
the concluding narrative of Wohnen Dämmern Lügen. It does not flow ceaselessly like 
Molly Bloom’s concluding stream of words in Joyce’s Ulysses. The interchange between 
categorical assertions and uncertain digressions, the exclamations and interrogatives, 
uttering and silence, offer a disrupted rhythm to the fragment. 
The reading given here of Wohnen Dämmern Lügen shows the motifs that are covered in 
the Schimpfer monologue: the initial disdain for the sensual pleasures of mass 
entertainment culture; his positioning on the margins of such a collective; the deepening 
of a critique of language in relation to the ever more dominant and pervasive scientific 
and technological systems of thought; and the attempt to overcome these constraining 
influences to retrieve an experience with originary language. Finally, in the tension 
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between the Schimpfer’s sense of an eruption in language and frequent silences, Strauß’ 
conceit of the deep-lying ambiguity, the indeterminacy at the retrieval of originary 
language is structurally made manifest. 
It is the very status of the fragment as monologue that signals its proximal relationship to 
originary language. The present argument takes issue with interpretations of Wohnen 
Dämmern Lügen that posit Strauß as seeking to transcend the impoverishment of 
conventional language uses either through dialogue or social or linguistic encounters. By 
these measures, each attempt to experience or retrieve originary language is shown to 
fail. Rather, it is the very monological character of the Schimpfer’s language that 
distinguishes it in the prose work. What is meant by this? The philosophical source for 
Strauß’ characterisation and structuring of the Schimpfer fragment as monologue is again 
to be found in Heidegger’s thinking on language. 
In his concluding lecture in Unterwegs zur Sprache, Heidegger attempts to show an 
experience with language as Sage, as saying: die Sprache als die Sprache zur Sprache 
bringen. He begins his lecture with an excerpt by Novalis bearing the title ‘Monolog’.208 
For Heidegger, the essay denotes a possible path towards an experience with language. 
As he writes of Novalis’ work: ‘Der Titel deutet in das Geheimnis der Sprache: Sie 
spricht einzig und einsam mit sich selber’.209 As might be expected in light of earlier 
comments on Heidegger’s approach, the exegesis around Novalis’ fragment does not 
proceed by formal propositions. This would merely lead to an experience succumbing to 
                                                 
208 Heidegger, ‘Der Weg zur Sprache’, p.241. Heidegger is concerned with a single sentence from Novalis. 
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209 Heidegger, ‘Der Weg zur Sprache’, p.241. 
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the dominant formal conceptualisations of language. Heidegger’s exegesis deepens the 
notion of language understood as Sage to Zeige; language as showing.210 This, in turn, is 
the way in which the Ereignis in and of das Wesen der Sprache comes-into-presence. 
Heidegger writes: 
Die Sage ist Zeigen. In allem, was uns anspricht, was uns als Besprochenes 
und Gesprochenes trifft, was sich uns zuspricht, was als Ungesprochenes auf 
uns wartet, aber auch in dem von uns vollzogenen Sprechen waltet das 
Zeigen, das Anwesendes erscheinen, Abwesendes entscheinen läßt. 
[…]. 
Die im Ereignis beruhende Sage ist als das Zeigen die eigenste Weise des 
Ereignens. Das Ereignis ist sagend.211 
The implications of this difficult conflation of terms and ideas are developed in the 
following chapter in considering the truth claims made by Heidegger – and following him 
Strauß – for language and, in particular, the poetic. For the moment what is of concern is 
his delineation of language as monologue. As Heidegger concludes: ‘Aber die Sprache ist 
Monolog. Dies sagt jetzt ein Zwiefaches: Die Sprache allein ist es, die eigentlich spricht. 
Und sie spricht einsam’.212 The monological character of language as saying denotes both 
the distinctive originating experience in which things or world come-into-presence or are 
disclosed in and through language, and the manner in which mankind must attend on this 
if he is to retrieve an experience with it. 
The formulation, though unavoidably opaque, if accepted, opens up the sense of Strauß’ 
final fragment and the apex of the Schimpfer monologue. The different ideas in relation 
                                                 
210 Heidegger writes: ‘Der Wesende der Sprache ist die Sage als die Zeige’, in Der Weg zur Sprache, p.254. 
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to contemporary culture, science and technology gradually recede as the Schimpfer’s 
halting stream of language builds to what can be termed a vision – although this does not 
adequately capture the excerpt, and pre-supposes a bias towards the clarity of perceptual 
senses: if it is vision, it is as enigma – resonant of the culminating experiences shown in 
Paare, Passanten, Niemand anderes and Beginnlosigkeit. The monologue, on this view, 
far from a ‘Brechung der dialektischen Struktur’ and ‘eine Relativierung des Verstehens 
an sich’ as Thomas for example claims, presents instead the delta from where 
conventional language, and all its metaphysical association, is shown to be overcome as 
possibility.213 In the fragment the characteristics noted here and in earlier chapters – of 
site, Laßkraft and Zwischen – culminate as the excerpt moves paratactically between 
originary language as uttering and silence. 
Bin mit den Ästen in die Dürre gezogen … Aufrecht steht das Land im 
Winter. Aufrechtes Weiß. Pantomime alles, was ruft. Und die Krähe, ein 
Drohfinger der Nacht … Es kommt keine Sonne. Wir sind ganz allein, Weiß 
und Schwarz … Das Gerüst strebt in die Höhe, das Kopfhaar zu Berge. Alles 
vergeht aufwärts. Selbst der Schnee steigt, sobald wir ihn nicht sehen … 
Gemarkungen, Brandzeichen, Ketten und Pfähle: was hat man nicht alles 
erfunden, um die furchtbare Ununterscheidbarkeit, das Grundblatt des 
Himmels von der Erde zu tilgen! … Die große Glocke kniet ins Tal … Die 
Erde nur Startplatz. Anagoge alles, was lebt. Von hier steigt es hinauf. 
Laßkraft. Allem, was sich entzieht, reglos nachziehen. Heute will ich mich 
auswohnen! … So, gegen die eigenen Wände gepreßt, halb vor Entsetzen, 
halb vor ekstatischem, prassenden Wohnen … Es ist alles anders, als ich es 
sehe … Nur ein Tropfen kosmischer Zeit, der sich in unseren irdischen 
Stundennapf mischte, und es würde, nur zum Beispiel, etwa alle zehn bis 
fünfzehn Minuten (irdisch) ein Bild vor unseren Augen vorbeischweben, […] 
ein Bild, einsam, lautlos, vielgestalt, zöge im Bogen herauf und sänke wieder 
ins Leere, ohne Folge. Nichts vorher, Nichts nachher. Ereignisleere, Schwarz 
minutenlang (irdisch). Dann wieder der schwache Hof, der schimmernde 
Halo, aus dem schließlich gestochen scharf, einmalig und undurchdringlich, 
das Bild heraufzöge … zwei Hände, eine Obstschale … Galavision. Ikone des 
Tages. Ein Brocken aus der unendlich langsamen Sprengung. Und – genau 
hinsehen! – es kehrt nie wieder. Unaufhaltbar und unwiederbringlich verfliegt 
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der Körper, das Bruchstück einer einzigen unermeßlichen BILDSTÄNDIGKEIT 
… O das Weiterreden!214 
The excerpt gestures towards the last of Strauß’ trilogy, Wohnen, as well as the structural 
significance of the terms and spaces in the work’s title. In that elusive instance in which 
originary language is manifest and experienced – in which the momentum of ever-
renewing Weltbilder is momentarily suspended by ‘BILDSTÄNDIGKEIT’ – Strauß has the 
Schimpfer declare this as Wohnen, dwelling. 
Finally, then, Wohnen invokes the retrieval of originary language and its experience, 
suggested as possibility by Dämmern. For Strauß it puts into words an understanding of 
the relationship to language that presents the possibility of overcoming mankind’s 
continuing state of exile in the accrued habits of its conventional uses, invoked in turn, by 
Lügen, and corresponding ontological homelessness in a scientific and technological 
structuring of object-world. 
Of course, in trying first to articulate the philosophical antecedents of such ideas in 
Heidegger and second to develop an understanding of Strauß’ thinking on language and 
transformation into a complex of inter-related fragments, both in Wohnen Dämmern 
Lügen and from across his prose works, it is important also not to forget that these are 
ultimately examples of poetic writing. In other words Strauß’ prose, whilst obviously 
spanning a range of tones, styles and registers, is ultimately made up of works of 
narrative. The poetic is not philosophy: at least not by traditionally understood measures. 
A distinction, therefore, needs to be made between the poetic nature of these works on 
the one hand and what is claimed for them and on the other the precepts of the 
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established philosophical tradition and its discursive practice. Thus, the ideas that Strauß 
advances in respect of language, of its conventional uses, as it is here defined, and its 
originary experience and ambiguous, enigmatic absent and proximal status, cannot be 
subject to tests of validity, or enclosed by the strictures of logical induction or deduction. 
The truth value – if it is that – or the intellectual force of Strauß’ ideas, this thesis 
contends, cannot be ascertained by appeals to empiricism. This is to overlook the 
ontological tenor of the works. This, of course, in no way leaves the argument relative or 
judgement-free. Such an approach would anyway be entirely antithetical to the 
motivating impulse of Strauß’ work, which demands judgements be made and positions 
taken. An assessment can, indeed must, be reached of the poetic characteristics of his 
writing, central to which is the validity of Strauß’ distinctive views on the particular 
philosophical nature of the poetic; and for that matter, an understanding of the poetic 
nature of such philosophical thought. But this is to anticipate the overall conclusion of the 
thesis. 
To return to the initial line of thought: the claim that Strauß proposes a retrieval of 
originary language – with its philosophical provenance in and ontological understanding 
from Heidegger – and his association of this with Wohnen, raises the question as to the 
particular status, or otherwise, that he ascribes to the poetic. This is the ultimate 
consideration of this thesis and subject of the concluding chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
A POETICS OF DWELLING: FRAGMENTE DER UNDEUTLICHKEIT 1 
5.1 The poetic work and truth 
The poetic work, however manifest, whether as poem, play or prose, and its relationship 
to the real and thereby to the true, remains an ongoing philosophical problem in the 
Western tradition. The original inflection given to this question in The Republic by Plato 
retains enduring influence and acts as a perennial reference point in its consideration. So, 
for example, Erich Auerbach’s defining engagement with the question of mimesis 
acknowledges the impetus of the Socratic dialogue with Glaucon on ‘Art and Illusion’ for 
his exhaustive discussion of ‘the representation of reality in Western literature’, even 
though he seeks to resist the conclusion and philosophical implication of the dual platonic 
constellations of truth, appearance, representation, and creator, artisan, artist.2 In these 
related heirarchies, the work and its creation by the poets – so strongly contrasted with 
the utility and, therefore, the philosophical priority accorded the work of the artisan – are 
described as nothing more than imitations of that which is already a re-creation of the 
truly real. As Plato has Socrates surmise: 
‘And what about the artist? Does he make or manufacture?’ 
‘No’. 
‘Then what does he do?’ 
‘I think that we may fairly claim that he represents what the other two make’. 
‘Good’, said I. ‘Then you say that the artist’s representation stands at third 
remove from reality?’ 
                                                
1 Strauß, B. Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit (Munich/Vienna: Hanser, 1989). 
2 Auerbach, E. Mimesis. The Representation of Reality in Western Literature (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2003), p.554. In the epilogue, in a discussion of his methodology and selection of literary 
works, Auerbach writes: ‘My original starting point was Plato’s discussion in book 10 of the Republic’. 
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‘I do’. 
‘So the tragic poet, if his art is representation, is by nature at third remove 
from the throne of truth; and the same is true of all other representative 
artists’.3 
On this line of reasoning, assuming that the work of art represents the appearance of the 
real, it must always remain, in what it presents, separated from truth or any form thereof. 
However, for Auerbach the totemic works of the tradition do reveal, either in their 
depictions of the personal and social condition of their creation, or in reflection of the 
cultural, historical and political dynamics and upheavals of their age, insight into the 
reality of each period of their creation. For example, of the modern realist novel, he 
writes that this presents to the reader ‘the elementary things which men in general have in 
common’.4 There is, for Auerbach, a truth about the way in which the external 
occurrences of individuals’ lives in literature are presented and yet felt somehow to be 
universally valid. The presentation of events and themes – for example, the unbridled 
catastrophe of war in Thomas Mann or the inherent uncertainty of such external 
circumstances in Virginia Woolf – provides a correspondence in literature to truths about 
each age, even though the idea of the real differs during the unfolding of the Western 
tradition. With this argument, Auerbach circumvents a stratum of the platonic tier, 
bringing the work closer to an idea of truth than the constellation in The Republic allows. 
Nevertheless, notwithstanding its inversion of the activities of artisan and artist and their 
respective creations, Auerbach’s analysis of each of the many aesthetic artefacts and 
works he includes, whether from late antiquity, the Middle Ages or modern realism, 
                                                
3 Plato, The Republic (London: Penguin, 2003), p.339. 
4 Auerbach, Mimesis, p.552. 
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remains bound to the structure of the platonic notion of truth. Truth remains always at 
one remove from work. 
It is this conception of truth and its legacy for the philosophically impoverished status of 
the poetic that this thesis contends Strauß is trying to engage with critically – and 
overturn – in his writing. Such a claim suggests an explanation for the title of the work, 
Die Fehler des Kopisten, in which a range of theoretical positions on the nature of the 
aesthetic are portrayed, in particular those emphasising its social and political 
imperatives. Such conceptualisations are shown wanting. By contrast, in this 
autobiographical prose work, which reflects the changes and movement of the seasons in 
its four-part structure, Strauß offers to bring out in language what he describes as: ‘das 
Unvermittelbare, für An-Spruch und An-klang’.5 
On the proposal of this thesis, an intention that runs counter to the imperatives of 
contemporary theory, Strauß is opening a re-connection to a long-established view of the 
poetic described, for example, of the poet Gerard Manley Hopkins as enactment of an 
‘ancient philological imagination’.6 In and through the language of the work, Strauß 
suggests, some thing resides that resonates and sounds. Notably, it cannot be manifest as 
any version of communicative practice. The poetic work is more linguistically enigmatic. 
                                                
5 Strauß, Die Fehler des Kopisten, p.98. Strauß’ engagement with precepts of realism go back to his earliest 
publications. For example, already in Die Widmung he has the central figure reflect: ‘Zum anderen kann ich 
kaum das Wort “Realismus” aussprechen oder “realistische Methode”, ohne dabei als erstes schreckhaft an 
die Wahrnehmungspflichten zu denken’, in Strauß, Die Widmung, p.67. See also Paare, Passanten in 
which Strauß is more explicit, denegrating mimetic conceptions of the work of art: ‘Die Unsitte aber, ein 
Kunstwerk ausschließlich auf seinen kritischen Gebrauchswert hin durchzumustern, es auf dem Prüfstand 
entweder einer subjektiven “Betroffenheit” oder eines flachen Sozialkritizismus zu messen, untergräbt 
gewissermaßen die freiheitliche […] Grundordnung der Kunst’, in Strauß, Paare, Passanten, pp.109-110. 
6 See Bruns, Heidegger’s Estrangements, p.40. 
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The work, then, is not first concerned with the truth or otherwise of representation, 
understood as mimesis. As the earlier discussion in this thesis of the term Anwesenheit 
begins to set out, Strauß’ writing seeks to establish a different philosophic claim for 
certain works, whether poem, prose or painting, namely ontological concern. 
The conclusion to Strauß’ portrayal of language in the previous chapter pointedly raises 
the question as to the status of the poetic work and the relationship between such 
manifestations of language – and, thus, of his own writing – and the understanding of 
truth. The implications of this portrayal, of the proximal and absent experience of 
language, the un-truth of its conventional and established uses, particularly arising from 
the distortion of things in the structuring of object-world (and, therefore, the 
corresponding distortion implicit in mimesis), the outline of a deep ambiguity of its 
originary retrieval both as silence and uttering and, finally, the characteristics of such an 
experience with language, albeit only momentarily sensed, are now coming to the fore of 
the argument. The concern of the poetic, which Strauß therefore is claiming for his work, 
is ultimately concern for the manifestation of truth. The main hypothesis of this thesis, a 
poetics of dwelling, is its momentary, occasional and dynamic experience in and through 
the work. 
However, Strauß’ writing develops such a designation – the truth of the poetic – with 
great circumspection, so qualifying the appearance of any absolutizing claims. In 
accordance with those characteristics and gestures associated with, for example, Fleck, 
Dämmern and Wohnen, a poetics of dwelling is not comparable with the inductive or 
deductive certainties of classical, idealist and analytical philosophical system building, 
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nor with the assurances derived from the empirically repeatable and verifiable positivism 
of, for example, scientific and technological theory and practice. Rather, the truth of the 
work, when manifest, is always provisional, contingent upon some element in and of 
language that always remains absent. Critically, truth is always and only manifest as 
enigma. 
The ‘Alte Übersetzer’ fragment in Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, which shows Strauß’ views 
on the relationship between language and mankind as a vignette, is emblematic also of 
the way he inscribes this enigma in his writing. Just as the couple barely, fleetingly 
retrieve an experience with originary language, so too the manifestation of truth in the 
poetic is only ever sensed before it becomes withdrawn. Truth, for Strauß, is always in 
movement, always dynamic: it is never a static matter of correspondence. A poetics of 
dwelling in Strauß’ work, as the chosen designation for the barely glimpsed experience of 
truth, therefore, also necessarily involves being open to, being able to retrieve, and attend 
on and to the enigma of the work, its structure and language. It is to experience the 
dynamic nature of truth as engagement. It is this notion of dynamic engagement that 
offers the counterpoint to the charge of fatalism. 
However, the designation – the truth of the poetic – is therefore perhaps also a misnomer, 
suggesting as it does a definable idea or tangible experience that is to be either abstracted 
from Strauß’ works, or recovered through its language. It remains, however, always 
elusive. A more appropriate way of approaching the truth of the poetic is maybe, 
therefore, to reflect the inherent unfathomability of the work, its enigma, in its 
consideration. 
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It is apposite then, that the focus for this chapter is Strauß’ most obscure and suggestive 
work, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit. It is a publication critical to understanding his 
intent: indeed, the title suggests itself as a descriptor for all Strauß’ writing. It not only 
alludes to the structure of his prose works – even Der junge Mann, while not physically 
fragmented, is disjointed at the formal level of narrative continuity – but also formulates 
the nature of the enigma, or as the discussion of various critical responses to other works 
notes, what is felt to be the bewildering obscurantism of his writing. This is certainly the 
view of Lämmerman who declares that Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit ‘enthält einen 
großen Teil der Dichtungstheorie von Botho Strauß – versteckt in poetischen, zum Teil 
kryptischen Bildern und Gedankensplittern’.7 
Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit is formed from two very different works: it opens with 
‘Jeffers-Akt’ and closes with ‘Sigé’. The former is the first part of a longer play, which 
Strauß has published elsewhere in its entirety.8 ‘Jeffers-Akt’, as it appears in Fragmente 
der Undeutlichkeit introduces the American poet of the title, Robinson Jeffers. It does so 
through prose passages narrating details of his biography, interspersed with quotations 
from Jeffers’ long prose poems. The second work, ‘Sigé’, is constructed from five 
discrete, apparently unrelated episodes that offer fragmentary observations and 
reflections on the figure of the poet, who is not necessarily Jeffers, language and the 
poetic. It is this latter work that is vital to and decisive for understanding Strauß as it is 
                                                
7 Lämmerman, Für unser Werk mein Liebster, p.45. 
8 The full play appears in the third volume of Strauß’ collected dramas. See Strauß, B. Theaterstücke III 
(Munich/Vienna: Hanser, 1999), pp.153-205. The first part, ‘Jeffers-Akt’, as it appears in Fragmente der 
Undeutlichkeit, is not structured as a drama at all but a prose work and presents substantive theatrical 
difficulties were it to be performed. The second part, ‘Jeffers-Akt II, Mara. Szenische Fassung des 
gleichnamigen Gedichts von Robinson Jeffers’, follows a more conventional theatrical structure, for 
example in presentation and use of characters and dialogue. 
 266 
here proposed. However, the two – ‘Jeffers-Akt’ and ‘Sigé’ – are intimately bound as the 
argument below on the relationship between the poet’s life and poetic work makes clear. 
For Lämmerman Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, published at the same time as the essay 
‘Bemerkungen zu einer Ästhetik der Anwesenheit’, is certainly amongst Strauß’ most 
demanding and difficult. She makes the claim that its structure places it beyond all 
interpretive understanding: ‘Der Titel ist dabei bereits Programm: das Buch liefert 
Fragmente, also Bruchstücke, kein geschlossenes Ganzes’.9 Interestingly, the premise 
upon which she classes the work beyond literary coherence and unity is its lack of 
adherence to precepts of mimesis. As she sets out in respect of the work’s structure: 
Eingestreut […] sind stets noch allgemeinere Reflexionen, die gar keinen 
Erzähler mehr zu haben scheinen; so entsteht durch die Rücknahme aller 
realistischeren Bezüge auf Figuren, Ort oder Zeit das Bild überzeitlich 
gültiger Weisheit’.10 
Lämmerman is not referring to a periodizing use of the term ‘realism’, but rather an 
implicitly platonic constellation of work to truth. Although she tries to construct some 
meaningful correspondence, or rather correspondence of meaning, between ‘Jeffers-Akt’ 
and her thesis on the theme of ‘production’ by considering the presentation of the poet 
Jeffers, the nature of the second work, ‘Sigé’, is left entirely unconsidered. Her 
conclusion that Strauß ultimately develops a ‘sehr poetisch formulierte “Theorie”’ – in 
other words, a work that reflects only its own production and, therefore, status as work – 
feels as though it falls short of the enigma, as it is suggested above, that is manifest in and 
through Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit.11 
                                                
9 Lämmerman, Für unser Werk mein Liebster, p.46. 
10 Lämmerman, Für unser Werk mein Liebster, p.48. 
11 Lämmerman, Für unser Werk mein Liebster, pp.166-167. 
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In the first of the five episodes of ‘Sigé’, which is made up of seventeen fragments, some 
no more than a short sentence in length, Strauß does raise the question of interpretive 
method in respect of the poetic; of the legitimacy and distortions of approaches to works 
of art that view them purely as artefacts or objects, for example, from a particular culture 
or time.12 It is particularly ironic, then, that Lämmerman leaves the second work from 
Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, ‘Sigé’, languishing in the interpretive cul-de-sac of self 
reference, which she herself suggests leads some critics to a presumption of fatalism in 
Strauß’ seeming neglect of mimetically-grounded themes.13 The opening episode raises 
arguments familiar from discussion of the status of the aesthetic object in Chapter Two 
and the consequences arising from application of positivist theory to every aspect of the 
object-world in Chapter Three. In these fragments of ‘Sigé’ Strauß attempts, in the poetic, 
to make manifest a different relationship to world in the sense of ontological concern. 
The episode relates the story of ‘Arne und Jora’ who are possibly archeologists who 
appear engaged in excavation of an ancient city. Strauß introduces them thus: 
Arne und Jora in der Stille der Reste messen, verzeichnen, zählen. Ihre 
Wanderung entlang der halben Mauer, der geschichteten Scheiben einer 
gestürzten Säule. Entlang der Fundamente der ausgegrabenen Stadt. Città-
memoria, città-desiderio.14 
The doubt over their professional status and activity is intended to resist the tendency to 
read the poetic fragments of ‘Sigé’ exclusively in terms of realism. Attributing 
functionality to both figures, whilst necessary to show the context of the fragments, is not 
                                                
12 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, pp.35-39. 
13 Lämmerman notes: ‘“Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit” zeigt also verschiedene Beispiele für 
Selbstbezogenheit und Wiederkehr’. However, she maintains: ‘Trotzdem entsteht letztlich kein 
fatalistisches Bild einer fortschrittslosen Welt’, in Lämmerman, Für unser Werk mein Liebster, p.54. 
Although she does not finally countenance the charge of fatalism it is not clear on what basis she rejects it. 
14 Strauß, Fragmente  der Undeutlichkeit, p.35. My emphasis. 
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really alone adequate to show the basis of the enigma of the opening episode in ‘Sigé’. 
Declaring the two figures to be archeologists and leaving it at that does not go any way to 
explaining the poetic nature of the work.15 The argument in this chapter proposes that the 
fragments of Strauß’ work are instead to be sensed as are the outlines of the ancient city’s 
ruined buildings: as enigma and with circumspection. 
Strauß describes an approach that the figures Arne and Jora adopt towards the city, and 
thereby raises the philosophical question over the status of the poetic. The echoes of the 
Almut episode in Der junge Mann are manifold. As they wander through the deserted 
edifices and structures he describes how their method is premised upon trying to control 
the site. In a crucial term, which the subsequent argument contends is vital for Strauß’ 
view of the poetic and is emphasised in the previous citation, he suggests the pair attempt 
to understand the city through application of measures associated with scientific theory. 
Strauß describes their approach: 
Sie wechseln den Blick nur, um sich Maße – Elle, Fuß und Handbreite – 
anzuzeigen. Und Zahlen, Winkel für Bögen und Radien. Die Vertiefung einer 
Kannelüre, die Stärke einer Bodenplatte, die Kämpferlinie einer Torlaibung.16 
The key word is Maß and its cognate Messen, which occur throughout the work, and 
describe the manner of their response to the object-world of the city. For Arne and Jora, 
the approach is empirical and practical, a taking of measurements underpinned by a 
desire to control or re-create the ruins. 
Arne bleibt stehen. Langsam, […], breitet er die Arme aus, um Jora die 
Spannweite einer Tonnenwölbung anzugeben – aber zeigt er nicht das Maß 
einer leeren, schmerzhaft leeren Umarmung, […] ?17 
                                                
15 See Leal, J. ‘The End of Fiction: Botho Strauß’ Kongreß. Die Kette der Demütigungen and Fragmente 
der Undeutlichkeit’, in Seminar 35 (1999), p.135. 
16 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, pp. 35-36. My emphasis. It is noteworthy that all these 
measurements refer to types of dwelling. 
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It is an approach based on methodologies that believe in mankind’s ability to equate his 
actions with original creation, and one motivated by a desire for domination. 
Er sagt: Wenn wir es wiederhergestellt haben, so werden wir allein 
entscheiden, was davon bleibt und was für immer zerstört werden muß.18 
However, in making himself the equal of God, through Arne and Jora mankind is shown 
wanting. The similarity to Steiner’s postulate of mankind’s counter creation is instructive. 
The results of the figures’ activities are not commensurate with the object of their 
enquiry. The sheer presence of the ancient city’s structures, which they are trying to re-
constitute, is imaged, on the basis of such methods alone, as irretrievably lost. Strauß 
writes: ‘Die Ausgräber antiker Städte haben nur eine Verlassenheit zutage gefördert, 
niemals eine Vergangenheit’.19 Bischof correctly identifies that the episode shows 
Strauß’ renunciation of empirically-grounded interpretive approaches, which is precisely 
the unsettling direction the argument contends that his writing proposes, although she 
equates this wrongly with a fatalistic mien.20 
However, although Jora remains wedded to the idea of a re-creation of the ancient city as 
fidelity to the original, in this way adhering to the precepts of mimesis – as Strauß has her 
declare: ‘Ich bin auf der Such nach dem zweiten Mal’ – the limitations of such an 
approach are sensed by Arne.21 Arne is shown resigning himself to loss of sight, the 
physical sense that is, of course, practically and symbolically associated with the 
certainties of scientific method and practice. Strauß writes: ‘Er hatte ihr nicht wieder bis 
                                                                                                                                               
17 Strauß, Fragmente  der Undeutlichkeit, pp. 36-37. My emphasis. 
18 Strauß, Fragmente  der Undeutlichkeit, p.37. 
19 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.35. 
20 Strauß’ depiction of the failure of modern methodologies, Bischof argues, leads him to seek refuge in the 
anachronisms of the literary work, wherein, for her, ‘liegt ja zugleich seine (Strauß’ [MJ]) Fatalität’, in 
Bischof, R. ‘Das Buch nach dem Buch – Figuren des Widerrufs’, in manuskripte 32, Vol. 115, (1992), 
pp.122. 
21 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.38. 
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ins Auge geschaut’.22 In its stead, in a compelling parallel to the monological experience 
with originary language of the ‘Alte Übersetzer’ fragment and the reliance on touch, 
Strauß shows the first instance in the work of the indeterminacy, the enigma associated 
with the title Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit. Arne fleetingly glimpses the experience. 
Er aber spürte die Bewegung des Zerrinnens, die durch ihre neuerliche 
Umarmung lief. Ein unbezwingliches Nachgeben, eine Milde, deren sie nicht 
mehr Herr wurden, das Greifen war Lassen.23 
The characteristic of passive renunciation and attunement that, it is suggested, is 
appropriate for a true retrieved experience of the city is an equivalent of that portrayed in 
the previous chapter as Laßkraft. The full implications of this alternative gesture – ‘das 
Greifen war Lassen’ – are developed in the concluding section below. However, such an 
experience is inevitably only momentary and partial. As Strauß notes: 
Das Paar taucht die wiedergefundene Ortschaft in neue, unwandelbare 
Dunkelheit. Die Wiedererwecker verhüllen ihr Gut, Schöpfer des Schwarz. 
Das reine Schwarz, der Ruß der Verlassenheit.24 
The ‘Arne-Jora’ episode not only raises doubts over an approach to works of art that view 
them as readily definable aesthetic objects and, therefore, as subject to control. Such 
methods are, of course, an extension of the logical precepts associated with the dominant 
Wahrnehmung of Linie as delineated in Chapter Three. The fragments also show the 
possibility of an alternative Wahrnehmung seemingly realised by ‘Arne’ at the close of 
the section, of a gesture that offers the possibility of engagement with things or world – 
in this episode, the ancient city – that are otherwise lost or forgotten. Moreover, it 
underlines the claim of this thesis that such experiences are always contingent – are only 
                                                
22 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.39. 
23 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.38. My emphasis. 
24 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.36. 
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ever sensed as the inherent Undeutlichkeit of enigma – before the inevitable relapse into 
the void of established paradigms and conventional measures. 
The opening observation to the above discussion introduces a suggestive idea: it 
parenthetically equates the partial ruins of the city with the fragments of the ‘Arne-Jora’ 
episode in Strauß’ work. It contends that the actual fragments of the work are to be 
sensed as the outlines of the ancient city’s ruined buildings: namely as enigma. This 
parallel, though, runs deeper than formal allegory. Strauß invites just such a comparison 
through the motifs of Stille and silence invoked, of course, by the title of the work ‘Sigé’, 
and which are repeatedly manifest throughout Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit. It is on an 
acceptance of this provocative and contentious idea regarding the status of ‘Sigé’, Strauß’ 
most enigmatic notion, that this thesis ultimately turns. But, in and through this, the force 
of the poetic, the unsettling of established approaches to interpreting work and world, is 
coming into view. 
The ‘Arne-Jora’ episode begins with a fragment that sets out the nature of the absolute 
Stille that surrounds the two figures. The excerpt invokes silence as an all-encompassing 
condition from out of which the world is manifest and comes to be sensed. Clearly, this is 
a ridiculous idea by any normal standard. But this is not a question of empiricism but of 
ontological concern: it cannot be proven by normal standards. Strauß wants to bring into 
language, in the poetic, a different measure of the world. For the moment, therefore, the 
idea is to be understood as a claim made of the poetic – in other words, it is expressed 
poetically and needs to be accepted simply as metaphor – before its validity is assessed 
by charting its intellectual provenance, and a view is reached on its philosophical validity 
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and ontological scope. Strauß describes a conceit whereby every thing in the world – in 
the following excerpt it is a tree – emerges from out of stillness. 
Zwischen den Fingern das kaum hörbare Fauchen […], ein unendlich zartes 
Gebrüll aus der Welt der Stille, aus der Welt der anderen Eile. […]. 
Todesangst treibt die Stille über die äußerste Grenze zum Laut. Irgendwann 
ganz leise, aus dunkelster Entfernung, aus Chaos fast, brüllt auch der Baum.25 
The passage adopts those arguments made in the preceding chapter about the ontological 
priority of language as saying and naming.26 Things are in the world for mankind 
because they are first named in and through language. Significantly, the stones that make 
up Arne and Jora’s ruined city themselves originate from stillness; are then manifest as 
words and are formed from language. Strauß writes: 
So wie Licht zu uns dringt aus maßlosem Einst, erreicht uns der Schall aus der 
Urgründen der Stille, aus der Wahnzeit der Dinge, und selbst der Stein 
umschließt einen heiseren Hauch. Auch er ist aus Stimme verwittert.27 
The words of the fragment in the work are thus the same – in the sense that they have the 
same status – as the stones of the ruined city do for Arne and Jora. Important claims are 
being put forward for the ontological significance of language. 
The ‘Arne-Jora’ episode is defining for the argument of the present chapter because it 
strikes a note of caution in relation to received understanding of, or normal approaches to, 
the work, in this example ‘Sigé’. In showing the distortions and dangers of adhering to 
methodologies that try to re-present the city – to re-create the original – in conjunction 
with the oblique, yet unmistakable, claim for the status of words in the work, Strauß is 
proposing a radical and unsettling understanding of the poetic. It is a distinctive 
hermeneutic of the work. 
                                                
25 Strauß, Fragmente  der Undeutlichkeit, p.35. My emphasis. 
26 See section 4.2 above. 
27 Strauß, Fragmente  der Undeutlichkeit, p.35. My emphasis. 
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The above initial brief consideration of the early fragments points towards the experience 
of a poetics of dwelling. Its delineation is in complete contrast to interpretation of a work 
of art that seeks to establish a definitive correspondence between the particular work and 
referent, no matter how broadly this is understood. Its experience is not about 
establishing a meaning that is then grasped and understood. As Strauß clearly inscribes in 
the ‘Arne-Jora’ episode: ‘Ist die Inschrift entziffert, so wird sie für immer unkenntlich 
gemacht’.28 There is no single interpretive key that unlocks the enigma of the work. The 
writing is inscribed with a profoundly de-stabilising view of language that allows its deep 
enigma to remain and for it to be experienced as just that; not in order that it is resolved 
or explained away through reference, but rather to endure in its very indeterminacy. 
Before developing this argument and exploring in further detail the complex relationship 
of language to silence, the alternative measure of the poetic compared to scientific 
methodologies, and the experience of a poetics of dwelling, it is necessary first to outline 
the sense of language that Strauß is thereby attempting to overcome. 
If the supposition is correct, namely that Strauß proposes an ontological basis to the 
poetic, then such a position must also be reflected in his views on language. Furthermore, 
should this philosophical alternative have validity it must be clearly contrasted with an 
existing, dominant and, – as far as Strauß is concerned – impoverished understanding of 
language. Such views are considered in the preceding discussions both of Beginnlosigkeit 
and Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, but the basis of the differing positions on language is 
already anticipated and starkly contrasted in Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, the 
                                                
28 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.37. 
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chronologically earlier prose work. In ‘Sigé’, Strauß distinguishes this unequivocally. He 
writes: 
Kein härterer Wechsel, kein tieferer Gegensatz als der zwischen Treiber und 
Wächter. Taraché oder Sigé.29 
The second work in Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, ‘Sigé’, is then clearly conceived as 
itself the manifestation of the alternative: in this sense, ‘Sigé’ the work is the poetic. The 
reading returns in detail to this vital characteristic of the poetic in the following section. 
For now, it is worth re-visiting the views of language against which Strauß composes his 
alternative as this is given scant consideration in the secondary literature.30 For example, 
Lämmerman gives no due attention to the possible implications or senses of ‘Taraché’: 
and of its counterpart, Sigé, she defines exclusively in the very terms set out by Strauß in 
the work. 
The term ταραχή (taraché), from the ancient Greek, is delineated by Strauß against the 
assumption of a certain relationship to language.31 Notably, however, ταραχή is not the 
designation for this relationship, but rather, evokes its consequence. In Fragmente der 
Undeutlichkeit, significantly, it denotes the condition of homelessness. Strauß writes: 
‘Die Worte sind die Treiber, Quelle von ταραχή taraché, Verwirrung und Ortlosigkeit’.32 
The idea is familiar from the reading of Wohnen Dämmern Lügen. What, then, is 
suggested of the relationship between mankind and language, and its current uses? Strauß 
writes: 
                                                
29 Strauß, Fragmente  der Undeutlichkeit, p.44. 
30 See Lämmerman, Für unser Werk mein Liebster, pp.45-54. 
31 Liddle & Scott’s definition of ταραχή suggests a de-stabilising relationship to language: ‘ταραχή ή: 
trouble, disorder, confusion, commotion, tumult’, in Liddle & Scott, An Intermediate Greek-English 
Lexicon. 
32 Strauß, Fragmente  der Undeutlichkeit, p.43. 
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Jede Epoche hat ihre Ausgesprochenheit, ihr geschicktes und erschöpfendes 
Sich-Selbst-Benennen. Dieser herrschsüchtigen Ausgesprochenheit, die die 
Gesamtheit der Begriffe kontrolliert, […].33 
But, as the argument in respect of Linie-structured Wahrnehmung highlights, it is a 
relationship devoid of significance more fundamental than its maintenance. On this view, 
language is constructed and used to enable the perpetual renewal of the grounds that 
make such language possible. Strauß alludes to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, which is, of 
course, also again picked up in Beginnlosigkeit.34 
Man spricht nur, […]. Wie der Wal singt, um im Echo Grenze und Widerstand 
seines Raums zu erfahren.35 
Language is thereby conceptualised as acts of speech whereby the world comes to be 
defined: its motive is the determination of facts about the real. Language incorporates that 
which is in the object-world and comes, therefore, to be intimately connected to questions 
of utility and instrumentality. Significantly, according to the dramatic concluding 
proposition of this line of reasoning, it admits no place for silence. For example, as the 
Tractatus famously concludes: ‘Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man 
schweigen’.36 Silence, by this argument, denotes all that lies outwith mankind’s 
experience and, therefore, defines the limits of the knowable: a position in marked 
contrast to Strauß’ thinking where stillness and silence manifest the originary possibility 
of the poetic. 
For Strauß, the compulsion of such conceptualisations of language and its uses is absolute 
and binding: 
                                                
33 Strauß, Fragmente  der Undeutlichkeit, p.46. 
34 See, section 3.4 above. 
35 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.43. 
36 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, p.188. 
 276 
Wir wissen, daß wir nichts sagen. Daß alle Sätze vollkommen hauchdicht 
untereinander verbunden sind und sich in dunkler Abgeschlossenheit ohne 
jeden Reflex von außen bewegen. Wir sagen nichts: wir spechen weiter.37 
Despite the occasional sense of its ontological vacuity, its un-truth remains the defining 
condition for mankind from which there is no obvious recovery. Its logical endpoint is in 
the abbreviations and conclusions of scientific and technological knowledge. As Strauß 
notes, the ‘Hetze und Hitze der Feststellungen und deren Verkürzungen sind kaum noch 
zu steigern’.38 For the individual, there is little possibility for experience with any 
alternative, of language or Wahrnehmung. For example, as the unnamed figure in the 
third section of ‘Sigé’ abruptly declares, again anticipating Wohnen Dämmern Lügen: 
‘Ich wache auf und weiß, ich werde lügen, lügen, lügen’.39 There is no obvious respite 
from or overcoming of ‘der Überfluß der Rede’, at least not conceived in terms of 
practical action, empirical methodologies, conventional discourses or other associated 
measures.40 
The aim of this chapter and, therefore, also of the thesis, having delineated some of the 
characteristics and grounds of the possible experience with the alternative, whether as 
Anwesenheit, the Wahrnehmung of Fleck or originary language, is to establish the 
philosophical basis for these in the poetic work and the intellectual origins and 
implications of such claims. In Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, this is to be found in 
consideration of the difficult and elusive notion of Sigé: of Stille or stillness, and 
Schweigen or silence. As the reading develops, in this, Strauß’ indebtedness to and 
adaptation of Heideggerian thought is at its most provocative. 
                                                
37 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.45. 
38 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.46. 
39 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.45. 
40 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.46. 
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5.2 Σιγή: the disclosure of ontological truth41 
Despite the dominance of language uses corresponding to scientific and technological 
practice and theory, and constitutive of a distorted relationship between mankind and 
world, Strauß does not absolutely preclude the possibility of an alternative. This is 
relayed variously in the fragmentary writing, for example as Anwesenheit, Fleck or 
originary language, which bring into focus the question of the status of the poetic. Given 
the totalising claims made of the conventional uses of language and the universalising 
constraints under which mankind operates, it is difficult to conceive how this alternative 
can be manifested. In order to assess the claims Strauß makes for certain works, including 
of course his own, it is necessary, before considering the nature of the poetic, to 
determine its origin or source. Since the social collective, as Strauß portrays it, appears 
unable to overcome the trajectory associated with the dominant structures of language, if 
the alternative is to have any substantial foundation, or hope of retrieval, he must 
necessarily exempt some individuals or groupings from the absolute binds within which 
the majority of mankind is left constrained. 
Strauß offers a counterpoint to the conceit where words are postulated as the source for 
the state of un-truth in which mankind finds itself; instead words are the Treiber of 
mankind’s Ortlosigkeit.42 This is invoked by the contrasting notion of Wächter; although 
Strauß interchangeably adopts the less antiquated synonym Wärter and verbal cognate 
Warten. As cited, there is ‘kein tieferer Gegensatz als der zwischen Treiber und 
                                                
41 Σιγή denotes both nominal and verbal conditions of worldly stillness and mankind’s silence. Both senses 
are vital to the following argument: ‘σιγή, σιγα ή: silence, a being silent; σιγήν έχειν: to keep silence; σιγήν 
ποιεισθαι: to make silence’, in Liddle & Scott, An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon. 
42 ‘Die Worte sind die Treiber, Quelle von ταραχή taraché, Verwirrung und Ortlosigkeit’, in Strauß, 
Fragmente  der Undeutlichkeit, p.43. See section 5.1 above. 
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Wächter’.43 In opposition to the ontological emptiness of ταραχή, the Wächter point 
towards the alternative. 
Die Wächter aber strecken die Arme aus und weisen über die Runde hinaus: 
Dort ist etwas anderes! 
Dort herrscht der Unterbrecher! 
Alles umtaufen!44 
Strauß’ conception of the poets here assumes critical importance. 
5.2.1 Robinson Jeffers: man, poet, work 
The shadow of certain individual poets, and from this a more abstract conception of the 
poet-figure, looms large throughout Strauß’ writing, quite aside from the wealth of 
citations and referencing of specific authors and their works. In Niemand anderes, this 
includes individual fragments showing his own fictional creations such as the artists 
‘Littwang und Woyte’; other characters from within the Western canon, for example, 
Flaubert’s ‘Bouvard et Pécuchet’ and actual writers and thinkers from different cultures 
and traditions, including Montaigne, Senancour and Buber.45 
The particular importance that Strauß ascribes to the poets, the most explicit 
identification of Wächter, is not really at any point worked out or argued for 
systematically in his writing. Their status remains an underlying assumption and is never, 
if it ever could be, proven.46 This is not, however, necessarily a limitation in Strauß’ 
                                                
43 Strauß, Fragmente  der Undeutlichkeit, p.44. 
44 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.44. 
45 See Strauß, Niemand anderes, pp.175ff., 121ff. and 191ff. respectively. 
46 Strasser, for example, questions the status accorded the Wächter: ‘Es scheint, als ob die Gestalt des 
Wächters einzig von den Treibern beschworen werden kann. Und die Treiber sind ganz unter sich. Bedeutet 
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position if it is accepted that he does not, in delineation of the poets, subscribe to 
aesthetic postulates, which claim for certain individuals alone either greatness of 
character or brilliance of insight. In selecting a group of individuals, the poets, he is 
rather making a number of specific philosophical claims, which are often misunderstood 
solely as forms of aesthetic, political or social élitism. As the earlier exegesis of ‘Der 
Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’ argues, he does not adhere to ideas of the creative or 
individual genius, a conceit reaching its apotheosis in the Romantics. The work of art or 
poetic work, and critically the possibility mankind has to approach such works, are not 
manifest through the trials and tribulations of a rarified subject. This, in turn, raises the 
issue of the manner in which poet-figures are exceptional – in other words, exempted 
from the condition of ταραχή – or, of what they are emblematic. 
It is worth also revising another widely held view of Strauß’ conception of the poets. The 
essay ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’, as so often with Strauß, is again the source of 
misconception or ill will. One of the principal reasons for the felt provocation of the 
essay lies in the specific examples of so-called ‘Dichter-Philosophen’ that Strauß 
provides from the German tradition.47 As a corrective, it is worth emphasising the overall 
breadth of the poet-grouping. The poets are never alone promoted on grounds of 
nationality. Heidegger and Jünger are singled out not so much as exclusive 
representatives of an ideal but rather as examples of a wilful and unwarranted neglect that 
follows from interpretive approaches to the poets that conceive their intellectual and 
philosophical importance by political and social criteria alone. 
                                                                                                                                               
dies etwa, daß es gar keine Wächter gibt, nirgendwo?’, in Strasser, P. ‘Treiber und Wächter – die Welt des 
Botho Strauß’, in manuskripte 32, Vol. 115, (1992), p. 93. 
47 ‘Sie haben Heidegger verpönt und Jünger verketzert’, in Strauß, ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’, p.16. 
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Strauß is deliberately broad in his delineation of who might constitute the poets, and as 
poet or Wächter, open further the grounds of possibility for exemption from a dominant 
and normative language use and its consequences. These, Strauß suggests in 
‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’, range widely, indeed somewhat vaguely, ‘von Homer 
bis Hölderlin’, a delineation that is equally broad in earlier essays.48 Elsewhere he writes 
of the poet-figure: 
Er spricht folglich – […] – am liebsten zu Entfernten, zu seinesgleichen, so 
wie er stets auch von ihnen gesprochen wurde. Sein Volk erstreckt sich von 
Dante bis Doderer, von Mörike bis Montale, von Valéry zurück zu Hamann 
und zu Seneca – ein zählbares Volk […].49 
The particular emphasis on the figure of the poet, Jeffers, and the way in which he is 
portrayed in the first of the works from Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, ‘Jeffers-Akt’, 
suggests that Strauß seeks to raise a number of very specific concerns about this group. 
Strauß draws particular attention to Jeffers’ biography. ‘Jeffers-Akt’ opens with a 
summary of the personal life of the poet and general understanding of his writing, which 
precisely reflects the tenets of both Jeffers’ reception by his contemporaries and pre-
occupations of later critics.50 Stress is laid first on his self-imposed physical isolation. 
Strauß introduces Jeffers thus: 
Robinson Jeffers, Dichter der amerikanischen Westküste, lebte von 1887 bis 
1962. Mit seiner Frau Una verließ er in jungen Jahren die Städte und siedelte 
abgewandt auf einer Klippe vor dem pazifischen Ozean.51 
                                                
48 Strauß, ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’, p.13. 
49 Strauß, B. ‘“Die Erde – ein Kopf”. Dankrede zum Georg-Büchner Preis’, in Büchner-Preis Reden 1984-
1994. (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1994), p.131. 
50 See the collection of articles and essays on Jeffers’ published works in Karman, J. Critical Essays on 
Robinson Jeffers (Boston, Massachusetts: Hall & Co., 1990), for example ‘Hunt, T. ‘Robinson Jeffers: The 
Modern Poet as Antimodernist’, pp.245-252, as well as, more recently, Chapman, S. ‘“De Rerum Virtute”: 
A Critical Anatomy’, in Jeffers Studies 6 (2004), pp.1-14. 
51 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.9. 
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The opening fragment goes on to note the varying fortunes of his work: from early 
success – ‘Berühmt wurden seine frühen Erzählgedichte’ – rejection by the then 
mainstream of twentieth century American letters to final opprobrium. Strauß ends the 
fragment: ‘Der intellektuellen Moderne des New Criticism galt er als der verächtlichste 
Poet des Landes’.52 On the basis of the way Jeffers’ life and work and their inter-
dependence are shown in this first part of Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit Strauß makes his 
specific claims for poets and their relationship to dominant and normative language uses. 
The personal biographical details of Jeffers’ life are developed, in part, through the 
projected narrative perspective of his wife, Una. Following an excerpt from one of his 
poems, the figure of Una describes the history of their lives: their original meeting, her 
first marriage, their eventual union, the birth of their children, construction of their home 
(Tor House and the evocative Hawk Tower) on the remote west coast and the habits of 
their daily lives in old age. All the examples are scrupulously faithful to biographical 
detail.53 Apart from a brief interlude of dialogue, a scene between Jeffers and Una in 
keeping with the classification of ‘Jeffers-Akt’ as a drama, throughout the remaining 
fragments Strauß has the poet speak almost exclusively in the first person, frequently 
interspersed with ‘wörtlichen Jeffers-Zitate aus Gedichten, Briefen, Vorworten’.54 Strauß 
repeatedly deploys this narrative approach of citation to have Jeffers’ own voice emerge 
directly. (Of course, at the level of biography, their physical isolation and experience with 
the implied mainstream, the parallels between Jeffers and Strauß are themselves 
extremely suggestive. It is as though Jeffers is emblematic of all poets). 
                                                
52 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.9. 
53 See, amongst others, Powell, L. C. ‘The Double Marriage of Robinson Jeffers’, in Karman, Critical 
Essays on Robinson Jeffers, pp.206-212. 
54 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.9. 
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Over the course of Jeffers’ monologue, Strauß has the figure reflect on the main views 
attributed to the poet during his lifetime. It is suggested: ‘“Er will ja, daß alles untergeht! 
Die Städte, die Erde, die Menschheit!”’.55 So, for example, one fragment refers to Jeffers’ 
seeming anti-modernism in his disavowal of the growth of the twentieth-century 
phenomenon of the city. Similarly, Strauß has the imputed figure refer to his ostensible 
rejection of social and political precepts, for example, those making up the consensual 
beliefs and value systems during the Second World War, embodied in his so-called 
philosophy of ‘inhumanism’.56 Again, Strauß reflects closely the critical views published 
during Jeffers’ own lifetime. Strauß writes incorporating citations from Jeffers: 
Man hat meinen Pessimismus verurteilt. […]. Man haßte mich, weil ich nicht 
an den menschlichen Menschen glaubte. Die Sozialen verdammen den, der zu 
sagen wagt, daß Gottes Welt schön ist außer dem Menschen. Und daß die 
ohnmenschliche Schönheit der Dinge keiner Verbesserung bedarf […]. Denn 
ich sagte nicht: Liebt euch um des Friedens willen. Sondern ich sagte: Laßt 
euch in Frieden, turn away from each other. Und ich sagte: It would be better 
for men/ To be few and live far apart, where none could infect another … .57 
What emerges from the portrayal of Jeffers is an insistance on the absolute intimacy of 
biography with writing. In this Strauß counters the critical tendency in contemporary 
literary theory to excavate the man from the work, noted in his paean to Steiner’s polemic 
against the parasitic nature of the academic, a fate that he elsewhere laments has befallen 
other poets.58 
                                                
55 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.22. 
56 See, for example, Kunitz, S. ‘The Day is a Poem’, in Karman, Critical Essays on Robinson Jeffers, 
pp.143-147, originally published in Poetry 49 (1941), pp.148-154. 
57 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.23. Strauß describes a similar critical response in the post-war 
period to Ernst Jünger. See Strauß, ‘Refrain einer tieferen Aufklärung’, p.324. 
58 Strauß also makes an identical argument in respect of critical approaches to the dramatist Georg Büchner. 
He writes: ‘… ausgiebig hat man Büchner, den Dichter des Vormärz, im Spiegel der Gegenwart betrachtet 
und für die Jugendlichkeit der eigenen Epoche in Anspruch genommen. Ein Seminar-Idol ist er geworden, 
Held einer beispiellosen Editionsgeschichte, Heiliger des kritischen Literaturunterrichts, man kann ihm 
kaum noch selbst begegnen …’, in Strauß, ‘“Die Erde – ein Kopf”. Dankrede zum Georg-Büchner Preis’, 
p.127. 
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Moreover, Strauß blurs any simple distinction between life and the work. In a sense, 
Jeffers’ life – at least in the way it is manifested in Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit – is like 
the work. Thus, in the work ‘Jeffers-Akt’, the two become indistinguishable: through 
Strauß’ writing the life of Jeffers becomes poetic work. The sense of this is underscored 
in the final fragment when Strauß has Jeffers reflect on the construction of his home: 
Was kann ein Mann allein auch schaffen angesichts der Schönheit des Seins! 
Nichts. Absolut nichts. Aber ein Haus habe ich gebaut. Und einen Turm dazu. 
Una und ich haben hier gelebt. Eine Frau und ein Mann. […]. Ich denke, wir 
haben den Raum, den man uns gab, anständig ausgefüllt. Was können 
Menschen Besseres tun, als ihren Raum […] gut zu nutzen?59 
The fragment by Strauß ends by seamlessly merging into a fragment from Jeffers’ poetry. 
The suggestion of the indeterminacy between poet’s life and poetic work highlights again 
the philosophical breach with mimetic conceptions of the creative object. It suggests that 
the portrayal of Jeffers in the work cannot be understood solely in reference to the actual 
facts of his life. It is a question of hermeneutical limits. Rather, the life – made up of 
certain gestures and characteristics – comes in Strauß’ work to be part of the poetic. 
Thus, he writes of Jeffers’ cultivation of the land around his home: 
Die Zypressen, […] die das Haus schützen vor Seewind, werden 
hinauswachsen über unsere Zeit, wie sein Werk, seine Verse, seine Stille.60 
Strauß is thereby tentatively offering a radically alternative approach to the work: in this 
instance it just happens to be Jeffers’ poetry. It is not an interpretive hermeneutic founded 
on Dilthey’s or Schleiermacher’s presumptions of regression through authorial personae 
to an ultimate meaning of the work, whether intended or not. Nor is it an analysis of 
                                                
59 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.32. 
60 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.13. My emphasis. 
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writing endlessly lost in the postulate of work as text.61 It is, instead, a proposal for the 
poetic that encompasses characteristics and gestures invoking the relationship between 
mankind – in this example a poet – and world. Strauß then inscribes these within the 
poetic. 
Notwithstanding this claim, the poet Jeffers appears entirely unexceptional. As noted, the 
figure of ‘Jeffers-Akt’ is not a poetic genius in the Romantic tradition. If the poet’s 
biography is actually a life of normality – in other words, that no differentiation can be 
made between the poet and the rest of mankind, at least not on the overt level of action – 
how, does Strauß suggest, is the poet distinguished from the social and political collective 
and the rest of mankind and, more particularly, is he able to invoke the grounds of 
possibility for an alternative experience with language? What does the poet bring to light 
or exhibit in his life and work through which the poetic is manifest? 
Here the characteristics and gestures associated with the figure of Jeffers come to the 
fore. In this he is emblematic of all Wächter, the poet-figures and what it means for the 
rest of mankind to be a poet: in other words, in and through the characteristics and 
gestures shown. The aspect of Jeffers’ biography and work most stressed is the separation 
from an implied collective. As Strauß’ introductory fragment emphasises, the poet’s 
physical removal, his retreat and self-imposed exile, becomes a defining characteristic of 
his life. The house, which he constructs himself, is its physical manifestation. 
Ja, wir kamen zurück, […], das Tor House stand in der Sonne, am Hawk-
Tower flatterte eine Fahne zur Begrüßung: wieder zuhaus! Mehr als gerettet! 
Wir, […], haben dieser Erde, auf sie hörend, ein Leben abgetrotzt.62 
                                                
61 See, for example, Leal, ‘The End of Fiction: Botho Strauß’ , pp.134-154. 
62 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.26. 
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The house stands as counterpoint to ‘die Städte’ and ‘die Städter’. 
Jeffers’ physical removal has its equivalent in an antipathy towards the dominant 
intellectual, political and social movements of his age, all of which are defined 
collectively in contrast to his marginal position as poet. Strauß has the figure intone 
against critics: 
Darauf fielen sie wieder mit ihren rastlosen Aufgeregtheiten über mich her 
und von allen Seiten entlud sich prasselnd Intelligenz. Die 
Gesellschaftsgläubigen stritten mit den Wissenschaftsgläubigen, die 
Entropisten fielen den Naturanbetern ins Wort.63 
The only way suggested that it is possible to overcome ‘diesen Basar der 
Erkenntnismoden’, a designation for a state where ‘what fills men’s mouth is nothing’, is 
from the intellectual and physical margins.64 This is the characteristic or gesture upon 
which all the poets and thinkers are to be evaluated. For example, in respect of those 
poets whom Borchardt lauds, Strauß writes: 
Dies Volk ist gewiß ein sagenhaftes und nicht unter der Bevölkerung zu 
finden, auf Straßen und Sportplätzen nicht, die die beschäftigte Menge füllt; 
es ist vielmehr mit seinen Königen tief in den Berg gesunken und schlummert 
dort, bis seine Stunde kommt.65 
Similarly, of Büchner and related figures, significantly picking up on the motif of site and 
home, Strauß notes: 
Sie suchen die Asyle da und dort, suchen Unverletzliches. Unverletzliches 
Einst, das auf der langen Wanderung, auf der Suche nach Wohlsein verloren 
und vergessen wurde: Dichtung, Land, das nie faßlich, aber doch da ist, 
bewohnbar, fruchtbar, […], lebenschützend, lebenspendend. […]. Der Dichter 
ist die schwache Stimme in der Höhle unter dem Lärm. […]. 
                                                
63 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.30. 
64 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.31. Emphasis in original. The citation is from Jeffers. 
65 Strauß, ‘Die Distanz ertragen’, p.108. 
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Am Rand der einzigen allgewaltigen Terrapolis bietet er den verborgenen 
Auslaß […]; aus der Stadt gelangt man nur durch ihn.66 
The characteristics of the margins and marginal gestures are defining of the poetic and 
the poet. 
These considerations help to explain the claims laid out in ‘Anschwellender 
Bocksgesang’ in which one of the reasons offered for the projected diagnosis of an 
elision to originary language in late modernity is the ever-increasing homogenisation of 
the political and social, centralisation around consensus norms and values and erosion of 
the possibility of residing at the margins. Widening the potential group beyond just the 
poets, Strauß claims: 
Der Abgesonderte war immer und ständig von den Gewalten des Blödsinns, 
die in seiner Zeit entfesselt waren, umgeben und bedrängt. Heute sind die 
Kräfte nur appellativer geworden, es schallt aus allen Ecken – […].67 
However, the site at the margins is not to be understood in terms of realism. As the 
reading makes clear in arguing for a blurring in distinction between biography and 
writing in respect of the portrayal of Jeffers, it is not specifically the actions of individual 
poets that explain their proximity and relationship to the poetic. In other words, Jeffers’ 
position vis-à-vis the mainstream is not to be understood literally: his physical isolation is 
only one characteristic of the marginal that Strauß conveys as essential for mankind to 
overcome the dominant and dominating conventions of language. 
Poeta otiosus. Der zurückgetretene, der nutzlos gewordene, der in 
Vergessenheit geratene Ursprüngliche. 
Seine Muße ist die ganz entbundene, ruhend-ruhlose Wache. 
Seine Ataraxie: die Wörter sich finden zu lassen und nicht einzugreifen. […]. 
Der Untätige jetzt.68 
                                                
66 Strauß, ‘“Die Erde – ein Kopf”. Dankrede zum Georg-Büchner Preis’, p.130. 
67 Strauß continues: ‘Der Außenseiter-Heros wird aber heute und künftig andere Züge tragen als der 
verdiente poète maudit […]’, in Strauß, ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’, pp.15-16. 
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It is now clearer how the poets are Wächter. Not only do they reside at or on the margins, 
a site ‘der unveränderten Lage der Dinge’ but they wait for ‘die Schönheit des Seins’.69 
They attend or are open to the occurrence of this alternative. The gestures of the poets are 
not, though, intended as a litany of prescribed actions and behaviours. 
It follows, therefore, that the writing of the poetic work is not conceived by Strauß as an 
activity either: being a poet is not something that an individual person does. Again, this is 
a disconcerting notion but, as the argument shows in defending Strauß against the 
fatalism charge, it points towards the idea of dynamic engagement attendant on a poetics 
of dwelling. Rather, the poets, including Strauß himself, only ever continue to make 
manifest a poetic work that is always already written. This equally elusive idea guides 
Strauß throughout his writing. Already in Paare, Passanten he sets out: ‘Man schreibt 
nicht über etwas, man schreibt es. […]. Man schreibt unter Aufsicht alles bisher 
Geschriebenen’.70 Later, in ‘Sigé’ the same motif is shown: 
Nach der Lehre der Poetisten waren alle Werke von Anbeginn bereits 
geschaffen, und der Dichter konnte nur ihr Umräumer sein.71 
The question, of course, remains how such language – the poetic, Fleck or originary 
language – is made manifest. 
Having pushed the parameters of received ideas of the poet and writing, and their 
relationship to the poetic, to the limit of traditional conceptions and understanding, it is 
                                                                                                                                               
68 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.45. Emphasis in original. 
69 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, pp.32 and 44. 
70 Strauß, Paare, Passanten, pp.102 and 103. Emphasis in original. The emphasis is an allusion to 
Heidegger’s ‘Es gibt’. 
71 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.46. Strauß invokes the idea frequently. In his Büchner lecture he 
writes of the poet: ‘Er ist zuerst und zuletzt ein marginales Vorkommnis eines längst gefüllten Buchs. Sein 
Werk begleitet randabwärts eine Weile jene immerwährende Schrift, aus der er hervorging und in die er 
wieder einmünden wird’, in Strauß, ‘“Die Erde – ein Kopf”. Dankrede zum Georg-Büchner Preis’, pp.131-
132. 
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now possible to return to those reflections outlined above, namely how Strauß’ 
understanding of the status of the poetic, of its language, is informed by a different 
conception of philosophical truth. 
5.2.2 ‘Σιγή Sigé ist das Schweigen der Ideen’72 
The previous chapter, through a reading of Wohnen Dämmern Lügen, develops a view of 
Strauß’ portrayal of language: its established conventions and impoverished uses, and 
explores grounds of possibility for an alternative experience with originary language. The 
fictional fragments, the argument suggests, adopt key elements of Heidegger’s thinking 
on language. The exegesis thus presents a series of distinctions arising from the 
philosopher’s inversion of the originating source of language. It is not mankind that 
speaks but rather language itself. The orthodoxies of traditional conceptualisations, of 
how langauge is understood in the plurality of idioms and discourses making up the 
modern world are conceived as examples of language as expression. In turn, the speaking 
of language originates as Sage, as saying, in and through which the ontological plenitude 
of world comes-into-presence. White summarises the significance of this defining term: 
language as saying becomes the ‘relation of all relations’, that relation from 
which all derivative relations draw their linguistic and ontological 
significance. […] saying is the basic coordinator of those ontological features 
inherent in language which Heidegger wishes to make visible.73 
Of course, for language as saying to be present at all – i.e., to name all the things in the 
world as White describes – mankind must itself reside in some sort of relationship to 
                                                
72 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.44. My emphasis. 
73 White, Heidegger and the Language of Poetry, p.41. 
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saying. This experience with language Heidegger designates as Ent-sprechen, as be-
speaking. Mankind speaks language – not as expression – inasmuch as he be-speaks 
language as saying: mankind’s speaking is, Heidegger writes, ‘ein sagendes 
Entsprechen’.74 Critically, the site of such speaking is in and through the language of the 
poetic. 
However, as the brief discussion of the ‘Arne-Jora’ fragment proposes, the deep affinities 
that undoubtedly exist between Strauß’ writing and Heidegger’s thought, whether in 
respect of certain terms, technology or language, whilst interpretively fruitful, do not 
alone address the deeper ontological claims that the former makes for the poetic work and 
its philosophical significance. Resolution to this question is, therefore, bound to the 
postulate made in the preceding section, namely that the work ‘Sigé’ – and therefore, the 
argument contends, all manifestations of the poetic – like the ruined city in the fragment, 
emerges from Schweigen and Stille. The motifs of silence and stillness, of course, are 
long established, and are important topoi in literature and poetry treated by a number of 
the poets in the Western tradition, not least Celan, Mallarmé and Rilke, all of whom 
Strauß includes in the exceptional poet-grouping. But these notions in Heideggerian 
thought and as Strauß invokes them, are not just a literary topos. Strauß’ conceit in the 
work ‘Sigé’ and of the term Σιγή – of silence and stillness – have ontological 
connotations. 
The earlier delineation of Heideggerian thinking on language shows the originating 
notion of saying whereby the ontological coming-into-presence of things and world in 
                                                
74 Heidegger, M. ‘Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache. Zwischen einem Japaner und einem Fragenden’, 
in Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache, p.151. 
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and through language is invoked. The argument returns to the dense excerpt cited in the 
preceding chapter in which the saying of language is bound to stillness: language sounds 
from out of stillness.75 The fundamental idea is recast with yet further associations in 
another lecture: ‘Wir nennen das lautlos rufende Versammeln, als welches die Sage das 
Welt-Verhältnis be-wëgt, das Geläut der Stille’.76 Bruns notes of this mysterious 
delineation a particular inflection critical for the present argument: 
The question of what the stillness is takes us into, or toward, the essence of 
truth – […] – of language. Stillness is not, it turns out, simply the absence or 
negation of sound. […]. The question, ‘What is stillness?’ is not empirical.77 
The rich, allusive complexity of Heidegger’s thinking is utmost here in respect of the 
question of truth. 
The saying of language denotes every thing that comes-into-presence for mankind: 
understood ontologically as thinging ‘das Ding dingt’. However, and this is crucial for a 
poetics of dwelling, saying is only ever provisional or contingent. The saying of language 
is never thought without also thinking its counterpart, stillness. As White, for example, 
notes: ‘stillness names the prelinguistic mode of existence of all those entities insofar as 
they are linked together within the limits of saying’.78 In theological terms – perhaps, 
after all, the most instructive analogue – such an idea might present itself as: before 
saying, there is stillness. It is, of course, a claim that is not meant to, nor could it ever, be 
proven by an appeal to evidence. 
                                                
75 ‘Die Sprache spricht als das Geläut der Stille’, in Heidegger, ‘Die Sprache’, p.30. See section 4.2 above. 
76 Heidegger, ‘Das Wesen der Sprache’, p.215. 
77 Bruns, Heidegger’s Estrangements, p.94. My emphasis. 
78 White, Heidegger and the Language of Poetry, p.47. Emphasis in original. 
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The implications of the earlier postulate regarding the comparable status of the ruins in 
the ‘Arne-Jora’ episode and the fragments of the work ‘Sigé’ are becoming more defined. 
Given the relationship between saying and mankind’s ability to be-speak this it is not 
surprising that there is also, therefore, an affinity between mankind’s own speaking of 
language and silence.79 Again, the idea is already briefly alluded to, although at that stage 
pointedly left undeveloped, in analysis of Strauß’ term Dämmern and ‘das aktive 
Schweigen’.80 There the reading cites Heidegger’s cryptic formulation, based on the 
differentiation of saying and speaking, that it is possible to speak nothing – i.e., be silent 
– and yet still say something: ‘Einer kann sprechen, spricht endlos, und alles ist 
nichtssagend. Dagegen schweigt jemand, er spricht nicht und kann im Nichtsprechen viel 
sagen’.81  
The ideas are bordering on the very limits of intelligibility in relation to language but this 
is appropriate both to Heidegger’s and Strauß’ respective philosophical ambition. 
Following this idea to its extreme, Heidegger draws the conclusion that the only true 
speaking possible for mankind is to be silent about silence.82 Nonetheless, the import of 
silence is not a denotation for a regressive movement to a point of absolute resignation 
                                                
79 White notes of this parallel: ‘Heidegger infers that stillness and silence serve as essential counterparts to 
their complement, […] language, just as rest is complementary to motion. […]. The notions of silence and 
rest must be understood in conjunction with one another and in complementary relation to their respective 
opposites. The intended correlation is that stillness (and, in its own way, silence) is to saying and speaking 
as rest is to motion’, in White, Heidegger and the Language of Poetry, pp.47-48. 
80 See section 4.4.1. above. 
81 Heidegger, ‘Der Weg zur Sprache, p.252. See section 4.4.1 above. 
82 Heidegger relays the following: ‘Fragender: “Geschwiegen vor allem über das Schweigen … ” Japaner: 
“weil das Reden und Schreiben über das Schweigen das verderblichste Gerede veranlaßt … ” F: “Wer 
vermöchte es, einfach vom Schweigen zu schweigen?” J: “Dies müßte das eigentliche Sagen sein … ” F: 
“und das stete Vorspiel zum eigentlichen Gespräch von der Sprache bleiben” J: “Ob wir so nicht das 
Unmögliche versuchen?”, in Heidegger, ‘Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache. Zwischen einem Japaner 
und einem Fragenden’, p.152. The dismantling of the structure of dialogue conceived in the platonic 
tradition within this exchange, where each participant completes the other’s sentence as though partaking in 
a monological stream of thought is, of course, immensively suggestive given the earlier arguments made of 
Strauß’ Wohnen Dämmern Lügen. 
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invoking the charge of fatalism. In suggesting that mankind can speak and yet say 
nothing Heidegger draws attention to impoverished uses of language that overlook the 
ontological depth of an originating alternative.83 Conversely, silence can be active in the 
manner of its relationship to the ontological force of saying. Heidegger writes: ‘Das 
Schweigen entspricht dem lautlosen Geläut der Stille der ereignend-zeigenden Sage’.84 
This sense of an engagement in the dynamic nature of mankind’s attunement to saying is 
central to a poetics of dwelling. 
More importantly, Heidegger underscores an idea critical to this thesis, that even when 
mankind be-speaks language, namely is true to language as saying, for example in the 
poetic work, there always remains that in language which is absent or concealed. 
Language can never reveal all that there is about a thing or the world. This is not to be 
understood, however, as White rightly notes, as ‘a structual imperfection’ in and of 
language that could ‘somehow be rectified’ by further clarification or use.85 An additive 
approach to language does not beget the ontological reach of saying. Rather, in the 
relationship of silence to speaking, and its counterpart in stillness and saying, there is 
always absence in coming-into-presence, concealment in disclosure. Strauß, of course, 
deploys just this conceit throughout Wohnen Dämmern Lügen in relation to the 
possibility of experience in the portrayal of the absent and proximal movement of 
originary language. 
                                                
83 Despite a critique of Heidegger’s views on truth, in turn based on Tugendhat’s objections (see section 5.3 
below), Bowie accepts the import of the relationship of silence and stillness for an understanding of 
language. ‘[…] the growing sense in Heidegger’s later work that silence is the only real answer to the 
attempt not to slip back into a ‘metaphysical’ language of entities should not be dismissed out of hand. 
[…]. In […] language […] the very possibility of articulation is dependent, […], upon the – silent – gaps 
between the moments of the articulation’, in Bowie, A. From Romanticism to Critical Theory. The 
Philosophy of German Literary Theory (London: Routledge, 1997), pp.186. 
84 Heidegger, ‘Der Weg zur Sprache’, p.262. 
85 White, Heidegger and the Language of Poetry, p.45. 
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The significance of this portrayal of language is now becoming clearer and, crucially, 
aligned with Heidegger’s re-thinking of truth as άλήθεια. It is this radical interpretation 
that is the implicit assumption guiding the readings of Strauß’ prose works in the 
preceding chapters, in discussion of his ideas on Anwesenheit, Fleck and originary 
language. 
While a full evaluation of Heidegger’s interpretive transformation of the ancient Greek 
term falls outside the defined argument of this thesis, there are a number of 
characteristics to the notion of truth as un-concealment that warrant consideration.86 
Firstly, Heidegger elides the static basis of the platonically-inspired conception of truth. 
The truth of a proposition, on such accounts, is assessed on the basis of its 
correspondence to a situation or state of affairs. Similarly, truth in the work of art, based 
on the measure of mimesis, involves its fidelity or otherwise to its subject matter. In 
contrast, truth as un-concealment remains always dynamic, is never fixed or certain. 
Secondly, and intrinsically related to the first, the disclosure of truth as άλήθεια is always 
moving back to concealment: un-concealment is always concealment, or more 
dramatically as Heidegger writes: ‘Die Wahrheit ist in ihrem Wesen Un-Wahrheit’.87 
Truth is, therefore, never simply present but is always coming-into-presence. Yet in this 
                                                
86 For differing views on the changes to and continuities in Heidegger’s understanding of άλήθεια see 
Frede, D. ‘Wahrheit. Vom aufdeckenden Erschließen zur Offenheit der Lichtung’, in Thomä, D. (ed.)  
Heidegger Handbuch. Leben-Werk-Wirkung (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2003), pp.127-134; Lafont, C. Heidegger, 
Language and World-Disclosure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp.109ff and Biemel, 
W. Martin Heidegger. An Illustrated Study (London: Routledge, 1977), pp. 172-177. 
87 Taken as a proposition, ‘the truth is un-truth’ is clearly inflammatory (although it highlights the sense of 
the unfamiliar and unsettling at stake in this discussion). However, it is not intended to be understood 
propositionally. Heidegger writes: ‘So sei es gesagt, um in einer vielleicht befremdlichen Schärfe 
anzuzeigen, daß zur Unverborgenheit als Lichtung das Verweigern in der Weise des Verbergens gehört’, in 
Heidegger, Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, p.53. 
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presencing there is that which is absent. Truth is also, then, always already withdrawing-
into-absence. Gadamer describes this memorably: 
Denn Wahrheit ist als Unverborgenheit stets ein solches Gegeneinander von 
Entbergung und Verbergung. Beides gehört notwendig zusammen.88 
Importantly, in Heidegger’s late thought the concealment in and of άλήθεια is given 
greater emphasis so that the disclosure of truth is always secretive in concealment.89 
Again, the adaptation of these ideas in Strauß’ Dämmern, the inherent indeterminacy and 
enigma of the term, forms one of the proposals in the previous chapter, and is vital too for 
the present reading of Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit. Strauß describes just this dynamic 
movement in relation to the shifting intelligibility in understanding of the relationship 
between mankind and world. He writes: 
[…] weder mit Weisheit noch mit der Alraune […] ist zu entschlüsseln die 
nochmals veränderte Welt. Aus Undeutlichkeit trat sie hervor und wird sich 
zurückziehen in die Undeutlichkeit.90 
On this thinking, truth becomes an occurrence: an unsurprising contention given the 
previous argument in respect of the central role of Ereignis in Strauß’ presentation of 
language. 
Critically, how are all these terms and inter-related notions – of silence, stillness, truth, 
Dämmern, Undeutlichkeit and Ereignis – brought together, and how, in turn, are they 
bound to the overriding question under consideration, namely the philosophical status of 
the poetic work and Strauß’ own writing? The various unavoidable digressions charting 
                                                
88 Gadamer, in Heidegger, Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, pp.110-111. Emphasis in original. 
89 Heidegger emphasises the withdrawing secret of άλήθεια, its ‘entziehenden Verbergung’. Kettering notes 
of this characterisation: ‘Diese Betonung des bergenden Charakters der άλήθεια […] gewinnt im Spätwerk 
zunehmend an Bedeutung. “Geheimnis”, “Versagen” und “Vergessen” entsprechen im großen und ganzen 
einander; sie bezeichnen die λήθη, die am Anfang der άλήθεια steht’, in Kettering, NÄHE, p.354. 
90 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.60. The significance of Strauß’ notion of Undeutlichkeit is 
explored in section 5.3 below. 
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the affinity of different terms offer the necessary backdrop to the final reading on which 
the main argument of the thesis turns. 
The Ereignis in Heideggerian thought forms the unifying term for his thinking on 
language, truth and, of course, Being.91 The enownment of Ereignis is the happening of 
world, understood ontologically, from which all that is becomes manifest. Young in his 
work on Heidegger and the work of art captures the breadth of its resonance: 
Ereignis is, for Heidegger, the happening of, as he variously calls it ‘truth’, 
‘the clearing’, ‘being’, ‘the being of beings’, ‘presence’ or ‘presencing’. It is, 
in other words, the happening of that ultimate horizon of disclosure which 
defines the ‘world’ […].92 
The most involved of Heidegger’s works dealing with the happening of Ereignis is the 
controversial, posthumously published work, Beiträge zur Philosophie. (Vom Ereignis), 
which is still relatively unknown outside Heidegger scholarship; his so-called other 
magnum opus.93 The work not only offers interesting parallels in terms of its structure to 
Strauß’ Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit – a series of episodes each grouping together a 
collection of fragmentary writing – which it is not possible to explore further within the 
constraints of this thesis, but it also offers defining support for Strauß’ indebtedness to 
Heideggerian ideas on language, truth and the poetic work. 
In Beiträge zur Philosophie, in its content and structure, Heidegger attempts to bring 
truth as the enownment of Being to language, in this work denoted by the antiquated 
Seyn, as Beyng. Heidegger writes in the preface of his attempt: 
                                                
91 See section 4.2.1. above. 
92 Young, J. Heidegger’s Philosophy of Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p.106. 
93 Pöggeler makes this claim in Pöggeler, O. ‘Heidegger und die hermeneutische Theologie’, in Jüngel, E. 
(ed.) Verifikationen: Festschrift für Gerhard Eberling (Tübingen: Mohr Verlag, 1982), p.481. 
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Nicht mehr handelt es sich darum, ‘über’ etwas zu handeln und ein 
Gegenständliches darzustellen, sondern dem Er-eignis übereignet zu werden, 
[…]. Die gemäße Überschrift lautet daher Vom Ereignis. Und das sagt nicht, 
daß davon und darüber berichtet werde, sondern will heißen: Vom Ereignis er-
eignet ein denkerisch-sagendes Zugehören zum Seyn und in das Wort ‘des’ 
Seyns.94 
The first of the seven parts that make up this bewildering work, the ‘Vorblick’, 
establishes the parameters of this attempt.95 Of critical importance for the present 
argument is the section concerned with language, silence and the truth of Beyng. This 
Heidegger terms ‘das Seyn und seine Erschweigung’, which brings-into-presence the 
contingent nature of Beyng in and through language as saying. Heidegger writes of this 
ambivalence: 
Wir können das Seyn selbst, gerade wenn es im Sprung ersprungen wird, nie 
unmittelbar sagen. Denn jede Sage kommt aus dem Seyn her und spricht aus 
seiner Wahrheit.96 
As the discussion of Sage shows, saying always emerges from out of stillness, as does 
mankind’s speaking from silence and, given the dynamic nature of truth as άλήθεια, 
always returns to, is concealed in, stillness, here termed die Erschweigung. Heidegger 
finishes the fragment: ‘Die Erschweigung entspringt aus dem wesenden Ursprung der 
Sprache selbst’.97 
Critically, Heidegger furnishes the fragment with a subtitle: Beyng and Erschweigung and 
their inter-relation, the dynamic movement from and to concealment and disclosure, in 
this work, is termed ‘die Sigetik’. The Erschweigung, a word or term invoking the 
                                                
94 Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie. Vom Ereignis, p.3. Emphasis in original. 
95 Schoenbohm writes: ‘In the “Preview”, Heidegger also points in an abbreviated way to the fugal 
character of the text’s structure and lists certain basic organizing words […]. Each of these words says – or 
means – the very coming-to-meaning of the question of the truth of beyng’ in, Schoenbohm, S. M. 
‘Reading Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy: An Orientation’, in Scott, & Schoenbohm, et alia (eds.) 
Companion to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, p.17. 
96 Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie. Vom Ereignis, p.79. 
97 Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie. Vom Ereignis, p.79. 
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dynamic attempt to experience truth is, for Heidegger, die Sigetik. Heidegger describes 
the Sigetik thus: 
Sie (die Sigetik [MJ]) sucht die Wahrheit der Wesung des Seyns, und diese 
Wahrheit ist die winkend-anklingende Verborgenheit (das Geheimnis) des 
Ereignisses (die zögernde Versagung).98 
The Sigetik is, then, the term for the attempt to bring to language the happening of truth 
as the event of un-concealment. This is the turning point for the thesis. 
The reading is now closer to an understanding of the significance of Strauß’ claims for 
the poetic work through his adoption of the cognate Σιγή and adaptation of Heideggerian 
ideas on language. However, in accordance with the indeterminate nature of άλήθεια, 
Heidegger immediately elides the applicability of the term ‘Sigetik’ for philosophy, to 
say nothing of literary interpretation or hermeneutics. As Heidegger notes: ‘Aber 
“Sigetik” ist nur ein Titel für jene, die noch in “Fächern” denken’.99 Nonetheless, a sense 
of its suggestive force endures. Only in thinking on the philosophical reach of Sigetik, 
and by engaging with the ontological significance of associated ideas, can mankind hope 
to retrieve the happening of truth and its coming-into-presence in language. Pöggeler, one 
of the first interpreters of Beiträge zur Philosophie, claims: ‘Whoever develops Sigetics 
as the “logic” of the truth of Being is “on the way towards language”’ and, therefore, ‘the 
truth as un-concealment’.100 
The outline of the intellectual provenance and philosophical implication of the notion of 
stillness, silence and Sigetik in Heidegger lends vital support to the postulate in respect of 
Strauß’ own invocation of Σιγή and the work. On the most basic level, Σιγή denotes the 
                                                
98 Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie. Vom Ereignis, p.78. Emphasis in original. 
99 Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie. Vom Ereignis, p.79. 
100 Pöggeler, Martin Heidegger’s Path of Thinking, pp.224 and 225. 
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ontological plenitude of stillness and silence; an ontological condition in contrast to that 
of ταραχή, a state of un-truth where the endless prattle of words and discourses 
dominates. Strauß’ proposed alternative could not be more marked. He writes: 
Σιγή Sigé ist das Schweigen der Ideen. Die Stätte. Der Schweigende, der 
Wächter.101 
The threefold characterisation of Σιγή – as site, as being silent and as the poet and work – 
is the heart of the hypothesis of a poetics of dwelling. Notably, there is no verbal 
relationship between the three. All three are each themselves, and in union, manifestation 
of Σιγή. 
There is, however, a seeming tension between delineation of Σιγή as the condition of 
ontological silence and the actuality of the work ‘Sigé’, the fact that there are fragments 
in which such a denotation can be written; that there is a work entitled ‘Sigé’ at all. It is 
in this apparent paradox that a hint as to the philosophical status of the poetic is 
grounded. The postulate in the reading of the ‘Arne-Jora’ fragment suggests that the 
fragments are like the ruins of the ancient city; they are manifest out of, are created from 
stillness. The subsequent analysis of Heidegger’s thinking on language and the notion of 
saying and mankind’s speaking brings into consideration the ontological reach and 
significance of the relationship of such language to stillness and silence. Strauß locates 
the force of language in just this inter-relationship. For example, of Borchardt’s 
admiration for the language of Hölderlin he writes about ‘wenn Macht in der Sprache 
sich davon herleitet, […], aus ruhloser Noch-nicht-Sprache gewinnt’.102 The argument 
returns to ideas only tangentially raised in the earlier exegesis of Strauß’ understanding of 
                                                
101 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.44. My emphasis. 
102 Strauß, ‘Die Distanz ertragen’, p.101. 
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Anwesenheit and later in discussion of Ereignis. The contention here, supported in the 
deep-lying affinity of Strauß’ Σιγή with Heidegger’s reluctant definition of Sigetics, is 
that the former shares with the latter ontological concern regarding the manifestation or 
coming-into-presence respectively of truth and its dynamic, indefinable nature. 
This is not to claim, though, that Strauß, like Heidegger, is concerned specifically with 
the meaning of the question of Being. The present thesis does not suggest that Strauß’ 
writing is identical to Heidegger’s thinking, or as suggested in Chapter One that Strauß is 
an exclusive Heideggerian in his philosophical views. However, it advances the 
contention that the poetic – in this example the work ‘Sigé’ – as a series of fragments, 
manifestations of language from out of ‘das Eisig-Stille’ and the speaking of a poet-
figure, is for Strauß the manifestation of truth. Moreover, the thesis claims that this sense 
of the truth of the work is profoundly indebted to Heideggerian thought.103 
However, as the thesis comes to show in the concluding section in delineating a poetics of 
dwelling and given everything that Strauß writes about the contingent nature of Fleck and 
originary language the declaration is less absolute and hubristic than it at first appears. 
Thus, considered in this light, the first exhortation in Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit – 
‘Wißt Scherben … !’ – becomes a proportionate uttering that privileges the philosophical 
status of the fragment argued for here.104 It is the absolute antithesis of the endlessly 
flickering ephemera that defines modern culture and society of which television, for 
Strauß, is the representative par excellence.105 In contrast, what is offered in and by the 
work is an ontologically-conceived alternative – whether as Anwesenheit, Fleck, 
                                                
103 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.43. 
104 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.56. 
105 See, for example, Strauß, ‘Anschwellender Bocksgesang’, pp.17-18. 
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Dämmern, originary language as die Sprache des Dritten or, as this chapter concludes, 
Undeutlichkeit – to the proliferation of scientific and technological facts and theories that 
continue to encroach into every area of the natural world and mankind’s place therein, 
and so define the late-modern. As a result of such epistemologies, as Bowie cogently 
argues of much contemporary theory, ‘the philosophical question of truth can […] 
become reduced to the attempt to give an adequate explanation of how it is that we can 
generate valid evidence for ever more […] theories’.106 Or as Strauß notes: ‘Wir wissen, 
wie man weiß, und wachen im Vergessen’.107 However, the measure Strauß proposes, 
truth, manifest as the poetic in and through the language of the work, offers a site for, or 
prospect of, Wahrnehmung not pre-occupied with the calculation, determination and 
verification of the object-world for instrumental and quantifiable ends alone. 
Nevertheless, the philosophical status of the poetic work, the priority given to the notion 
of Stille, the dark enigma of Strauß’ Σιγή and the limits of the expressible suggested by 
the stricture of the written word all appear to confirm the perspectives of commentators 
that implicitly or explicitly charge him with fatalism. Lämmerman certainly reaches just 
such a conclusion, interpreting the motifs of Stille and Schweigen literally and within the 
parameters of mimesis, suggesting a final nihilism to Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit. 
Weit abseits von jedem Gedanken an echte Publikumswirksamkeit findet sich 
die Dichtung an der Grenze zur Stille und zum Schweigen in einer fast 
vollendeten Selbstbezüglichkeit wieder. Poesie wird zu einem hermetischen 
Gebilde, das seine Dunkelheit in diesem Fall nicht nur bespricht, sondern auch 
im fragmentarischen Charakter des Textes inszeniert.108 
                                                
106 Bowie, From Romanticism to Critical Theory, p.164. 
107 Strauß, Diese Erinnerung an einen, der nur einen Tag zu Gast war, p.59. 
108 Lämmerman, Für unser Werk mein Liebster, p.55. 
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The present reading of ‘Sigé’ does indeed lead to a position, if the argument of the 
necessity of stillness for any true saying is accepted, where the former plays a significant, 
and for Strauß currently neglected, role in an understanding of the uses of language and 
the particular importance of the poetic. He writes: ‘Und was ich noch sage, bringt redlich 
die eigene Stille hervor’.109 (It is perhaps interesting to reflect whether such an 
interpretation of Strauß’ writing offers any explanation of his steadfast refusal to speak 
directly about his work). It seems tempting, therefore, to misrepresent Heidegger’s 
observation, cited above, that it is perhaps best not to speak at all about silence as 
confirmation of a deep fatalism. This is too easy, however. To make such an inference of 
a renunciation in communicative practice and, therefore, collective agreement – and, in 
turn, the consequences of certain gestures – is entirely to overlook the wider context and 
implications of Strauß’ understanding of the poetic and its continual offering in each new 
work, just as taking Heidegger’s isolated observation on the (im)possibility of speaking is 
to misunderstand the dynamic nature of truth. Strauß is taking anything but an absolute or 
fatalistic position as shown in the final section of this chapter, in which the hypothesis of 
this thesis, a poetics of dwelling, its scope and implication of dynamic engagement, is 
developed. 
5.3 ‘Mein Haus ist nur eine Warte’110 
The previous section develops the philosophical claim that Strauß ascribes to the poetic 
through a cumulative exegesis based on elucidation of the term Σιγή and its status in the 
                                                
109 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.63. 
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work of the same name. In conjunction with his views on language, the portrayal of its 
absent and proximal status, as well as the echo of Heideggerian terms, the argument 
shows the deep, underlying indebtedness of Strauß’ writing to the philosopher’s 
ontological concern for and postulate of the un-concealment of truth. This argument 
partly explains the emphasis on the notions, replete through the work, of Stille and 
Schweigen. The seeming mysticism of these ideas, the profoundly elusive notion of truth, 
in light also of the other priority he accords the necessary marginal characteristics and 
positioning of the poets, all raise the question of Strauß’ putative fatalism. Is his writing 
really the obscure self-referential musings of a poet who renounces any relationship 
between his works and any sense of a real world beyond? Or put in the terms that this 
thesis develops from readings of Strauß’ works, does concern for manifestation of 
ontological truth proscribe the possibility of the alternative experience being understood 
at all, at least by accepted standards? Key to this question is the manner in which truth is 
manifest as the poetic and, in turn, how the experience thereof is inscribed within Strauß’ 
works. 
The inspiration for the main hypothesis of the thesis, a poetics of dwelling in Strauß’ 
writing, comes perhaps unsurprisingly from the Heidegger essay of 1954, ‘… dichterisch 
wohnet der Mensch …’, in which the philosopher extends his thinking on language 
around an exegesis of couplets from the Hölderlin prose poem ‘In lieblicher Bläue …’.111 
                                                
111 Heidegger, M. ‘… dichterisch wohnet der Mensch …’, in Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze, pp.181-
198. Heidegger excerpts the following fragment from the poem: ‘Darf, wenn lauter Mühe das Leben, ein 
Mensch aufschauen und sagen: so will ich auch sein? Ja. So lange die Freundlichkeit noch am Herzen, die 
Reine, dauert, misset nicht unglücklich der Mensch sich mit der Gottheit. Ist unbekannt Gott? Ist er 
offenbar wie der Himmel? dieses glaub ich eher. Des Menschen Maß ist’s. Voll verdienst, doch dichterisch, 
wohnet der Mensch auf dieser Erde. Doch reiner ist nicht der Schatten der Nacht mit den Sternen, wenn ich 
so sagen könnte, als der Mensch, der heißet ein Bild der Gottheit. Gibt es auf Erden ein Maß? Es gibt 
keines’, in Hölderlin, F. Gedichte (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 2003), p.120. Interestingly, Heidegger 
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A consideration of the essay shows, in line with the approach taken to readings in earlier 
chapters, Strauß’ adoption of terms and ideas from Heideggerian thought. 
However, the hypothesis of a poetics of dwelling goes further than just broadening 
understanding of the extent and range of Strauß’ allusions and references to Heidegger. 
More importantly, the thesis argues that in adaptation of such ideas Strauß attempts, in 
his prose works, to enact their philosophical import. In other words, for Strauß the work 
is not merely an object by which to narrate motifs or relay ideas. Rather, the poetic is the 
site for the manifestation of ontological truth: it is itself the happening of truth. But to 
wrest this claim from the heights of abstraction – his writings, after all, are works and can 
and should be enjoyed as just that – a poetics of dwelling inscribes the manner of the 
experience of such truth. In this, the thesis stakes a claim for the dynamic engagement of 
his works and so proposes a counter to the charge of fatalism. 
Heidegger’s essay opens with the approach familiar from earlier chapters. An 
understanding of the Hölderlin epigram comes from language and how mankind be-
speaks its saying.112 He goes on to broaden the argument beyond the couplet of the title. 
In order to substantiate the interpretation of Hölderlin’s poem he needs to connect notions 
of Dichten and Wohnen with the ontological structure of world. He does this by invoking 
the idea of the place wherein and whereby the world is experienced for mankind. This is 
                                                                                                                                               
changes the original fragmentary form of the poem into verse and ignores question marks over its 
authorship. On this issue see Jamme, C. ‘“Dem Dichten vor-denken”. Aspekte von Heideggers 
“Zwiesprache” mit Hölderlin im Kontext seiner Kunstphilosophie’, in Zeitschrift  für philosophische 
Forschung 38 (1984), p.202. 
112 Heidegger notes: ‘Die Sprache winkt uns zuerst und dann wieder zuletzt das Wesen einer Sache zu. Dies 
heißt jedoch nie, daß die Sprache in jeder beliebig aufgegriffenen Wortbedeutung uns schon mit dem 
durchsichtigen Wesen der Sache geradehin und endgültig wie mit einem gebrauchsfertigen Gegenstand 
beliefert. Das Entsprechen aber, worin der Mensch eigentlich auf den Zuspruch der Sprache hört, ist jenes 
Sagen, das im Element des Dichtens spricht’, in Heidegger, ‘… dichterisch wohnet der Mensch …’, p.184. 
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the Dimension, mysteriously undefined, akin to the Zwischen or site considered in 
Chapter Three.113 The Dimension is that site from where every thing in the heavens and 
on earth is designated. Heidegger writes: 
Das Wesen der Dimension ist die gelichtete und so durchmeßbare Zumessung 
des Zwischen: des Hinauf zum Himmel als des Herab zur Erde.114 
Critically, the terms shift. According to the transformative interpretation, for Hölderlin, at 
least in this poetic work, mankind is ultimately distinguished by measurement of himself: 
in other words, how he conceives of or understands his being-in-the-world. Normally, 
Heidegger implies, mankind assesses himself against the heavens and the God-head. God 
is, thus, always the implicit measure in every encounter between mankind and world. 
Given this assumption, Heidegger re-configures Dichten and Wohnen – the terms of the 
Hölderlin epigram – in accordance with Messen: 
Die Vermessung des menschlichen Wesens auf die ihm zugemessene 
Dimension bringt das Wohnen in seinen Grundriß. Das Vermessen der 
Dimension ist das Element, worin das menschliche Wohnen seine Gewähr hat, 
aus der es währt. Das Vermessen ist das Dichterische des Wohnens. Dichten 
ist ein Messen.115 
Dichten, the poetic, is now understood as Messen. But Heidegger is not proposing this 
transformation in understanding of Dichten as Messen as a new standard of practical 
measurement. The notion of Messen is to be distinguished from established and 
conventional ideas underpinning scientific theory and practice, familiar from earlier 
                                                
113 See section 3.3. It is important to note again that neither Heidegger nor Strauß in sympathy with him 
conceives of this as a literal physical site. As Bruns’ rhetorical question in respect of the notion of site 
wryly notes (although he deploys the philosophical term space): ‘Would it sound too silly to say that 
Heidegger’s notion of space is no longer, strictly, ‘spatial’? […]. Space here has nothing to do with the 
logical space (topology) of the philosopher, which is to say, for example, the space of such indispensable 
concepts as extension […]. Space becomes an event, […] as a worlding and a thinging; literally, it is a 
taking place (Ereignis)’, in Bruns, Heidegger’s Estrangements, p.93. 
114 Heidegger, ‘… dichterisch wohnet der Mensch …’, p.189. 
115 Heidegger, ‘… dichterisch wohnet der Mensch …’, p.190. 
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discussions through which the object-world is made serviceable for instrumental ends. 
Heidegger describes an approach to the world similar to that suggested by Strauß in the 
‘Arne-Jora’ fragment: 
Da wird mit Hilfe von Bekanntem, nämlich den Maßstäben und Maßzahlen, 
ein Unbekanntes abgeschritten, dadurch bekannt gemacht und so in eine 
jederzeit übersehbare Anzahl und Ordnung eingegrenzt.116 
Hölderlin, Heidegger maintains, is suggesting a different conception of Messen in the 
epigram, where it is brought into association with the happening of truth. 
Im Dichten ereignet sich, was alles Messen im Grunde seines Wesens ist. 
[…]. Im Dichten ereignet sich das Nehmen des Maßes. Das Dichten ist die im 
strengen Sinne des Wortes verstandene Maß-Nahme, durch die der Mensch 
erst das Maß für die Weite seines Wesens empfängt.117 
Dichten, or the poetic, is thereby dramatically re-interpeted as the Maß-Nahme, the 
taking-Regard.118 
The poetic is not, though, understood as superior to the methodologies of the sciences and 
their related measures. Rather, it allows Heidegger to suggest, after introducing God as 
the implicit measure against which mankind always conceives of himself, a God that 
always remains unknown – ‘Gott ist als der, der Er ist, unbekannt für Hölderlin, und als 
dieser Unbekannte ist er gerade das Maß für den Dichter’ – that in taking-Regard, 
through the measure in and of the poetic, mankind experiences the unknown and 
indefinable.119 Bruns describes the implications of Heidegger’s interpretation well: 
                                                
116 Heidegger, ‘… dichterisch wohnet der Mensch …’, p.193. 
117 Heidegger, ‘… dichterisch wohnet der Mensch …’, p.190.  
118 Taking-Regard is a better rendering in English of Heidegger’s Maß-Nahme than the convention, which 
translates it as the measure. Taking-Regard not only suggests the ontological difference to Messen 
understood as the application of scientific practices, and thereby avoids unnecessary confusion arising from 
designating the two by the same word in English. It also invokes a sense of mankind’s immanent 
relationship to world in the poetic, for example, conveyed in the phrase ‘having regard for someone or 
something’. 
119 Heidegger, ‘… dichterisch wohnet der Mensch …’, p.191. Emphasis in original. 
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Poetry, […], takes the measure […] only it does so ‘with a different stress’ 
that takes measure strangely, turns it, so to speak, against itself so that 
measuring is no longer a project of familiarization, of making sense of the 
place, shedding light on it, mapping it out, […]; rather it is as if measuring 
were now a reversal of this process […]. For poetry measures the world not in 
terms of the familiar but in terms of what is alien and inaccessible.120 
The poetic, in taking-Regard, is concerned, then, with a sense of deep, unfathomable 
alterity. 
Heidegger invokes a sense of this alterity in the adverbial root of Dichten. There is a 
density to Dicht-en and its language, a closing down, that moves mankind in the opposite 
direction from the imperative of language’s conventional uses, pre-occupied with de-
mystification, explanation and elucidation. Where language is traditionally deployed to 
en-lighten mankind’s encounter with the object-world, thereby declaratory of his 
domination, for Heidegger, and Strauß with him, the sense of Dicht-en, underscoring the 
ontological priority of language, is of an en-veloping and points towards the manner of 
the experience of world. Bruns unsurprisingly finds an exegetical echo of this sense of 
Dichten in the concealing dynamic of truth: 
[…] the truth of poetry or Dichtung lies in its dichten. […]. Something 
essential to language (and, indeed, to poetry) – something not said, perhaps 
not sayable – can be heard in its sounding.121 
It is this sense of Dicht-en that Strauß offers when he writes about the condition of viel 
Sprache essential to the poetic work: ‘Viel Sprache ist kein Mengen-, sondern ein 
Dichtewert’.122 It is beginning to become clear how the language of the poetic, if it is the 
manifestation of truth, is actually deeply disconcerting to established understanding. 
                                                
120 Bruns, Heidegger’s Estrangements, p.184.  
121 Bruns, Heidegger’s Estrangements, p.3. My emphasis. 
122 Strauß, ‘Die Distanz ertragen’, p.117. 
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Importantly, Heidegger does not propose by Dichten a theosophy of poetry in the way 
that Steiner argues for in Von realer Gegenwart. Whereas for Steiner it is the mystery of 
the poetic that leads him to impute the existence of God, and therefore ultimately to 
explain the source of its secret and thus to enlighten the very enigma or secret here under 
consideration, Heidegger’s suggestion is resolutely ontological and is bound to the un-
concealment of truth as άλήθεια. Heidegger writes: 
Das Maß besteht in der Weise, wie der unbekannt bleibende Gott als dieser  
durch den Himmel offenbar ist. Das Erscheinen des Gottes durch den Himmel 
besteht in einem Enthüllen, das jenes sehen läßt, was sich verbirgt, aber sehen 
läßt nicht dadurch, daß es das Verborgene aus seiner Verborgenheit 
herauszureißen sucht, sondern allein dadurch, daß es das Verborgene in 
seinem Sichverbergen hütet.123 
God, as the measure of the poetic, remains unknown. It is, therefore, the unknowability of 
God that Heidegger suggests is the originating secret of the poetic, not the inverse. As he 
continues: ‘Der Dichter ruft in den Anblicken des Himmels Jenes, was im Sichenthüllen 
gerade das Sichverbergende erscheinen läßt und zwar: als das Sichverbergende’.124 
Moreover, it is the poet, in response to the unknown God, that lets the secret of the work 
come-into-presence as just that, as secret. What mankind is confronted with in the poetic 
work as the un-concealment of truth is, therefore, profoundly unsettling, rather than the 
soothing confirmation of a final theological sanction. 
It is just this conjunction of Messen and God in the work that Strauß proposes, albeit 
fleetingly, in Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit. The significance of the earlier description in 
the ‘Arne-Jora’ fragment shows the limitations of a conventional, scientifically-structured 
approach to measuring the ruined city. 
                                                
123 Heidegger, ‘… dichterisch wohnet der Mensch …’, p.191. Emphasis in original. 
124 Heidegger, ‘… dichterisch wohnet der Mensch …’, p.194. Emphasis in original. 
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Arne tritt neben einen leeren Sockel, auf den eine Statue oder Herme gehörte. 
Jora steht gut zwei Meter entfernt auf einer letzten Treppenstufe, um den 
gleichen Sockel aus einigem Abstand zu ermessen. […]. Den Bruch der Statue 
noch einmal brechen, die zerstreuten Teile noch einmal zerstreuen […].125 
 In another essay, Strauß underscores the prevalence of such conceptions of Messen and 
Maß as involving the control and domination by mankind of the object-world. 
Strauß writes: 
Vor allem Sein ein Maß. […]. 
Man kann heute den Hauch einer Kraftveränderung in der Maßeinheit 
Pictonewton messen. […]. So werden die Maße der Technik immer feiner und 
die des Geistes immer gröber.126 
In Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, Strauß proposes Σιγή as the alternative, ontological 
approach to the world. In the final fragment, the culmination of ‘Sigé’, he writes of the 
suspension of standardised conceptions of Messen: 
Was war? Was in der Zwischenzeit? […]. 
Wir sind […], Wesen ohne jede Ausdehnung, weniger als ein Punkt in die 
Dauer, und immer zu dritt und unzertrennlich […]. Es ist nichts geschehen; 
unser Leben – die Zwischenzeit – war ein Ereignis auf der untersten, 
unbestimmbarsten Szene der Materie. Ein Ich, ein Haus, ein Gast. Masselos 
und ungemessen.127 
In the conclusion to the work, the poet-figure raises the question of the manner in which 
the truth of the poetic is manifest. The issue is given further impetus by the referent of 
God in Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit. Thus, Heidegger’s reading of Hölderlin’s poem 
where it is the deity, as unknown, from which the poetic takes its unique measure, finds 
its counterpoint in ‘Sigé’. Strauß shows the poet-figure defining God as the source of the 
poetic: 
Ich kann nur vor Gott treten, nur vor die allergrößte mir versagte Gegenliebe. 
[…]. 
                                                
125 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.36.  
126 Strauß, ‘Wollt ihr das totale Engineering?’, p.12.  
127 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.65. My emphasis. 
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Was kann ich noch tun? Ich kann nur zu Dir sprechen. Haltlos, hemmungslos 
abfließend wie der Strom. […]. 
Du aber bist das unerweichliche Schweigen, dem der Begriff meiner 
Verworfenheit entsprang.128 
However, the conceit is not, as Bischof argues, the hubristic declaration of a self-
selecting elitist poet who compares himself with God, but rather a tentative expression of 
the provisional limits of the sayable in the poetic.129 For Strauß, the poetic work may well 
be the manifestation of ontological truth but its truth is never clear, obvious or 
transparent. The truth of the work is not ever directly intuited or grasped but, rather, is 
always oblique and remains finally impenetrable. It is manifest as the deepest enigma; in 
this sense, it resists being known. It is this suggestion that begins to explain, given the 
preceding argument and portrayal of the absent and proximal movement of language, the 
particular importance of Strauß’ title, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, for an overall 
understanding of his writing. 
The few critics that consider the significance of Undeutlichkeit take positions in direct 
relation to their view on Strauß’ fatalism. Görner, for example, asks rhetorically of the 
term: ‘Was signalisiert das? Eine Umkehr in den Traum? Bloßen Eskapismus als 
Ausdruck übersteigerter Subjektivität?’.130 Although he does acknowledge that ‘gemeint 
ist demnach eine andere Art der Wahrnehmung’, for him Undeutlichkeit is finally only 
‘eine Sammlung ästhetischer Unschärfebeziehungen […] die sich mit dem Dunklen 
begnüg[en]’.131 Lämmerman, in turn, is less willing merely to adduce gnostic abstraction 
to Strauß’ prose and is more open to the possible philosophical complexity of the notion, 
                                                
128 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.53.  
129 Bischof, ‘Das Buch nach dem Buch – Figuren des Widerrufs’, p.123. 
130 Görner, ‘Im Schatten des Mythos’, p.547. 
131 Görner, ‘Im Schatten des Mythos’, p.547. 
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although she overlooks the deeper ambition by describing the term only as a self-
referential textual strategem. She writes: ‘Die “Undeutlichkeit” durchzieht als Motiv […] 
– es wird die Absicht erklärt, den Text so zu formulieren, daß er nicht mehr 
interpretierbar ist in dem Sinn, daß ihm eine eindeutige Festlegung zu unterstellen 
wäre’.132 Finally, Bischof, in contrast, in a reading that gets close to a sense of the 
experience of the poetic for which this thesis argues, claims: ‘so entseht eine Welt, in der 
[…] die Wesen und Dinge im Ungefähren, Uneindeutigen gehalten werden. Und nicht so 
sehr Undeutlichkeit ist hier gemeint, als vielmehr bestimmte Unbestimmbarkeit’.133 
However, her elision of just that unsettlingly open and indeterminate understanding of 
Undeutlichkeit and its re-definition as ‘precise imprecision’, even if this is itself less than 
clear, suggests a propensity to attribute concrete meaning to or to formulate the term. In 
absolute contrast, this thesis contends that with Undeutlichkeit, Strauß, like Heidegger’s 
reading of Hölderlin and his own development of the idea of Fleck and the Sprache des 
Dritten, suggests that the manifestation of truth is always enigmatic, where the unknown 
enigma remains as unknown. He declares this intention as: 
Der Poet wird die Metaphern einer entzückten Nüchternheit nicht noch einmal 
übertragen. […] bis beide, Wissen und Schauen, mit ihren offenen Enden sich 
berühren, der Poet, […], um sie zu brechen, zu öffnen, wieder einschweigbar 
zu machen und den Geist vor einer abrupte, unergründliche Schönheit 
zurückzuführen – .134 
But, for Strauß, the Undeutlichkeit of the poetic is not a classification of or term for 
something else: it is not literature as allegory or symbolism. In other words, 
Undeutlichkeit does not simply mean the unknown, is not representive of an idea, at least 
                                                
132 Lämmerman, Für unser Werk mein Liebster, p.46. 
133 Bischof, ‘Das Buch nach dem Buch’, p.125. 
134 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, pp.47-48.  
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understood propositionally. In other words, it does not stand for any-thing. Rather, 
Undeutlichkeit for Strauß is the manner in which the truth of the poetic is manifest. 
Nicht, als wäre nur eine nächste Umschrift zu leisten; die abermalige 
Metapher zu finden. Es mußte schlechthin alles zurückübersetzt werden in die 
Undeutlichkeit. 
Das poetische Umlauten gedachte der widerständigsten Verborgenheit, aus 
der man nichts mehr würde ‘herausholen’ können.135 
Critically, Undeutlichkeit cannot be delineated by language that seeks to define or 
conceptualise: it resists the categorising impulse of dominant scientific and technological 
languages and idioms, to say nothing of literary theoretical or interpretive endeavour. 
Undeutlichkeit is not a proposal for a hermeneutics that seeks to define a meaning or the 
nature thereof. Moreover, the present reading does not imply either that the poetic 
presents a regressive instance of absolute or blinding illumination of truth. It is not 
possible to extract or experience single or multiple meanings and then conclude at a 
particular point. As the preceding argument establishes, for example, in discussion of 
Fleck, what Strauß claims for the work is only the necessity of the enigma. The truth of 
the poetic, therefore, is without limits: the evocativeness of terms such as Fleck and 
Dämmern here come into their own. 
It is in this sense that Strauß’ second fragmentary exhortation is to be understood: 
‘Zurück ins Nicht-Verstehen!’136 Despite its ostensible disavowal of principles of 
rationality – for Görner the exclamation does not represent ‘wirkliche Einsichten in das 
Dunkle, sondern […] die Kultivierung des Mythischen’ – it is not to be read as an 
abdication of thought, or declaration of an end it itself, but as a loosening of the distorting 
                                                
135 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.50. Emphasis in original. 
136 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.50. 
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strictures of reason alone.137 Thus, Strauß does not intone against understanding. On the 
contrary, through the injunction he advocates concern for the absolute condition of 
nothing: like stillness, the condition out of which what is, is manifest. Strauß identifies 
his inspiration for this sense of nothing and understanding from Eliot’s ‘Four Quartets’: 
Nichts – nichts wär in mir erklungen 
ohne die Vier Quartette von Eliot. 
‘hier nicht/ Nicht hier das Dunkel, 
in dieser schwirrenden Welt’ 
in dieser tiefsten Stille der Wege 
in diesem Unsinn des Herzens 
in diesem bergeversetzenden Staub. 
Nur Sand, Sand ist unser Verstehen, 
Darin mit deutendem Finger gemalt 
eines Fremdlings undeutbarer Krakel.138  
The terms of the allusion are resonant of the fundamental question first posed in 
consideration of the girl in the painting in ‘Der Aufstand gegen die sekundäre Welt’ in 
Chapter Two, namely the overwhelming fact of existence, of Anwesenheit, manifest in 
and through the work of art. The conjunction of terms in the exhortation – ‘Nicht-
Verstehen’ – is not, therefore, a terminus for, or end-state to, understanding but its 
beginning: an understanding that never attains the status of certainty. Strauß goes so far 
as to call it – albeit with a fair degree of provocation – an enlightenment. Citing Jünger 
on the truth of the work and its enigma as it is brought to language by certain poets he 
writes that its force ‘“beruht auf Offenbarung, nicht auf Erkenntnis, und auf Sprache, 
nicht auf Logik; ihr Stammvater ist Heraklit”’.139 Jünger’s suggestion of the originating 
source in Heraclitus, of course, is supportive of this thesis. For Strauß the emphasis on 
                                                
137 Görner, ‘Im Schatten des Mythos’, p.547. 
138 Strauß, Diese Erinnerung an einen, der nur einen Tag zu Gast war, p.61. Strauß cites in the quoted 
passage from the first part of Eliot’s poem, ‘Burnt Norton’. See, Eliot, T.S. Collected Poems 1909-1962 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1963), pp.189-195.  
139 Strauß, ‘Refrain einer tieferen Aufklärung’, p.323. 
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indeterminacy rather than conviction, on the open evocativeness of language rather than 
the binding strictures of logic forms, for him, the ‘Refrain einer tieferen Aufklärung’.140 
If the poetic is the manifestation of truth, yet as Undeutlichkeit is always enigma, the 
second part of the question noted above arises, namely how can it ever be experienced? 
Strauß, after all, writes in order to be read. In what sense is it possible, then, to know the 
experience of the truth of the work if it is only ever manifest as Undeutlichkeit: how is it 
to be understood? The further inspiration for a poetics of dwelling again comes from 
Heidegger’s essay on Hölderlin’s poem. 
The short discussion above shows how the essence of Dichten is thought as taking-
Regard, the measure whereby the unknown is made known as unknown in the poetic. But 
this is only one element of Hölderlin’s couplet. As Heidegger is at pains to emphasise: 
Das Dichten erbaut das Wesen des Wohnens. Dichten und Wohnen schließen 
sich nicht nur nicht aus. Dichten und Wohnen gehören vielmehr, 
wechselweise einander fordernd, zusammen.141 
Wohnen as a possibility for mankind arises only when the poetic, and its truth, is 
experienced. How is this apparent contradiction to be resolved? Heidegger writes: 
Das Wohnen aber geschieht nur, wenn das Dichten sich ereignet und west und 
zwar in der Weise, deren Wesen wir jetzt ahnen, nämlich als die Maß-Nahme 
für alles Messen. […]. Das Dichten läßt das Wohnen des Menschen allererst 
in sein Wesen ein. Das Dichten ist das ursprüngliche Wohnenlassen.142 
Wohnen when it is open to the poetic, then, invokes the grounds of possibility whence 
mankind is able to experience its truth. Dwelling is central, therefore, to establishing 
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141 Heidegger, ‘… dichterisch wohnet der Mensch …’, p.196. 
142 Heidegger, ‘… dichterisch wohnet der Mensch …’, p.196. 
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some understanding of the question raised regarding how the experience of truth is 
known. 
It is important to underscore that Wohnen is not conceived instrumentally. Such an 
interpretation is to misunderstand entirely the specific movement of the argument in 
relation to a poetics of dwelling, and this thesis contends, the entire direction in which 
Heidegger’s late thought takes ontological understanding of the poetic. To imagine 
Wohnen in practical terms explains why those few commentators of Strauß who do posit 
a connection to the philosopher highlight what appears to be the literal treatment of the 
motif and also of Bauen, for example, in Die Fehler des Kopisten.143 Focusing on the 
activities of Strauß’ homebuilding in the Uckermark and suggesting that the fragmentary 
descriptions of life in the depths of Brandenburg somehow simply mirror these 
Heideggerian motifs is, however, to overlook the philosophical claims of the work, to 
which the earlier suggestion of the title’s counter-platonic impetus alludes. Similarly, 
when Heidegger thinks on Wohnen he is not concerned with practicalities of human 
habitation. Indeed, what he hears out of the Hölderlin poem are ‘nicht Zustände des 
heutigen Wohnens. Es behauptet vor allem nicht, Wohnen bedeute das Innehaben einer 
Wohnung’.144 Those interpreters attempting to excavate ethical precepts that are then re-
evaluated to suggest latent prescriptions for either the deep-ecology movement or even 
architectural praxis, no matter how well-intentioned or imaginative, misconceive the 
                                                
143 See section 4.1 in particular the remarks by Wiesberg and Willer. 
144 Heidegger, ‘… dichterisch wohnet der Mensch …’, p.182. 
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nature of such thinking.145 As Kettering rightly argues in respect to such applications for 
his ideas: 
Weil Heideggers Seinsdenken kein zwingendes Wissen hervorbringt, hat es  
kein Ergebnis und keine Wirkung im strengen Sinne dieser Begriffe. Ebenso 
fällt es aus den Kategorien des ‘Nutzens’ und des ‘Zwecks’ heraus. […]. 
Offensichtlich kann bei Heidegger von einer ethischen Maßgeblichkeit im 
üblichen Sinne ebensowenig die Rede sein wie von einer logischen 
Verbindlichkeit.146 
Neither of the two encompassing categories of the philosophical tradition – ethics or 
logic – as conventionally conceived is appropriate for that understanding of ontological 
concern and, therefore, of the poetic. 
Heidegger never defines the conditions invoked by Wohnen.147 This absence is, for many 
critics, the principal structural flaw in such thought: no criteria are provided in the 
development or exposition of terms to enable its validity to be assessed. If there is no 
clear single determination of what Wohnen is, how is it possible ever to ascertain whether 
the condition is realised and the truth of Dichten experienced? Such an apparent lacuna 
parallels the influential critique by Marx, shared by Tugendhat, of truth as άλήθεια.148 
                                                
145 See, for example, the conclusion to Young entitled ‘Fostering the growth of the saving Power’, in 
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Modernity. Essays in Honour of Hubert L. Dreyfuss Volume 1. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 
2000). See also Kettering who interprets Wohnen against his overall postulate of ‘Nähe’, in Kettering, 
NÄHE, pp.257ff. 
148 See Marx, W. Heidegger und die Tradition. Eine problemgeschichtliche Einführung in die 
Grundbestimmung des Seins (Hamburg: Meiner, 1980) and Tugendhat, E. Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei 
Husserl und Heidegger (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1970), cited in Kettering, NÄHE, pp.352-367. 
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Marx argues that it is precisely in the relationship of concealment to disclosure in 
άλήθεια that such difficulties arise. Given the inherent secrecy of truth, Marx enquires as 
to how it is possible to ensure the truth of the secret, rather than its errancy. In other 
words, if Heidegger emphasises the ultimate secret in the dynamic movement of άλήθεια 
from concealment to disclosure, is there any basis upon which the nature of un-truth in 
un-concealment – whether it is in fact error – can be established? Marx writes of the 
need: 
[…] das ungeheuer Gefährliche von Heideggers Auffassung des Wesens der 
Wahrheit ans Licht zu rücken und zugleich die Frage aufs dringlichste 
hervorzurufen, ob Heidegger eigentlich richtig gesehen hat, als er nicht nur 
‘das Geheimnis’, sondern auch die Irre, den Schein […] als ‘ebenbürtige 
Partner’ innerhalb des Wahrheitsverhältnisses anerkannt hat.149 
However, seeking to identify such criteria is to repeat the same misunderstanding as 
extrapolating an ethics or other guidelines for action. The elaboration of Dichten and 
Wohnen, just as with άλήθεια, is instead to be sensed as a movement in thinking and 
through language where such thinking and language may not lead to truth at all but the 
continual prospect of concealment. Truth as άλήθεια does not, in the end, provide an 
inviolable set of propositions whereby its infallibility can be assessed and verified. 
Kettering reasons of such thought:  
Ebensowenig lehrt Heidegger eine nach festen Regeln lernbare Methode, 
sondern weist einen Weg, der stets in der Gefahr ist, ein Irrweg zu werden. 
Ein solches Denken, das bewußt auf alles Begründen und Ausweisen 
verzichtet, […], kann nur Möglichkeiten aufzeigen, keine Notwendigkeiten 
liefern.150 
All that is offered, then, are possibilities of the poetic rather than the necessity of logic for 
its identification. In this the argument returns to consider the implications of those 
                                                
149 Marx, Heidegger und die Tradition, p.247, cited in Kettering, NÄHE, p.355. 
150 Kettering, NÄHE, p.366. My emphasis. 
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characteristics associated by Strauß with the terms Dämmern and Wohnen and the 
grounds of possibility for an experience of the poetic. Kettering continues, these lie ‘an 
der Einübung der Achtsamkeit des Hörens […], der Besinnlichkeit des Nachdenkens 
sowie der Sorgfalt des Ent-sprechens’.151 
There are, then, still identifiable and recognisable characteristics that enable mankind to 
reflect on truth. They are, however, only ever gestures that point mankind towards its 
occurrence: for Strauß its manifestation in the poetic work as the enigma of 
Undeutlichkeit. The above digression considering certain critiques of such thought is 
important in respect of the observations on Wohnen and, therefore, for understanding how 
Strauß himself sets out the grounds of possibility for experiencing the truth of the work. 
Although Heidegger never defines Wohnen he does, however, propose – it is only ever 
suggested, not established as certainty – that mankind currently fails to dwell 
poetically.152 The only way out of this is by enacting certain gestures such as hearing, in 
considering Dichten and the nature of the poetic. 
Ob uns und wann uns eine Wende des undichterischen Wohnens trifft, dürfen 
wir nur erwarten, wenn wir das Dichterische in der Acht behalten. Wie unser 
Tun und Lassen und inwieweit es einen Anteil an dieser Wende haben kann, 
bewähren nur wir selbst, wenn wir das Dichterische ernst nehmen.153 
It is in thinking about the poetic, by being attuned, hearing it and attempting to be-speak 
it, that dwelling becomes possibility: such gestures, in turn, are the grounds from where 
the truth of such a poetic is experienced. To dwell poetically is to dwell on the poetic. 
The argument again nears the tautological. 
                                                
151 Kettering, NÄHE, p.366. 
152 Heidegger writes: ‘Wohnen wir dichterisch? Vermutlich wohnen wir durchaus undichterisch’, in 
Heidegger, ‘… dichterisch wohnet der Mensch …’, p.196. Emphasis in original. 
153 Heidegger, ‘… dichterisch wohnet der Mensch …’, p.197. 
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Strauß proposes a response to the question posed regarding the knowability of the 
experience of the truth of the poetic in sympathy with the reading of Hölderlin’s poem. 
As he, in turn, writes of Hölderlin’s ‘Patmos’, the poem from which Heidegger draws out 
the couplet on the potential salvation in understanding of τέχνη: 
Es gibt solche Worte, die machen dich wieder leer, zum hohlen Krug, der 
empfängt und wiedergibt, […]. Und keinen Abgrund oder Bauch. 
Wenn ich ihn (H.) in einer anderen Sprache lesen müßte, […]. Ich kennte ihn 
nicht. 
Nicht mehr die Sehnsucht ist die aufs äußerste gespannte Saite, sondern zu 
haben, was man nicht ist, […]. Sich vorzutasten zwischen Bergen ungeräumt 
Erinnertem.154 
Throughout Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit Strauß inscribes the characteristics or gestures 
by which dominating approaches to the object-world are suspended, albeit fleetingly. For 
example, in the fragments following the ‘Arne-Jora’ episode he offers a third, final 
exhortation: ‘Nicht sehen!’.155 The work ‘Sigé’ invokes the suspension of mankind’s 
sense of sight, replaced instead by a twilight dream-like condition. 
Traum ist nur ein unerschöpfliches Wort, […]. 
Jede Nacht legt nahe, daß du alles Erblickte umkehrst und Sehen an sich ein 
anderes wär. Jede Nacht geschieht Umwälzung bis zur Schöpfung. Und jeder 
Schlaf hinterläßt  einen Dichter, der sein Werk versäumte … und wie es in der 
Morgenfäule zerfällt. Denn die Nacht ist hell und trüb in den Tag.156 
Sight is understood as the sensation associated with scientific methods and practices: 
above all with repeatable and verifiable knowledge. Seeing, like Linie-structured 
Wahrnehmung, is pre-occupied with the cumulative appropriation of the object-world. 
                                                
154 Strauß cites the following excerpt from Hölderlin: ‘Und Freude war es/ Von nun an,/ Zu wohnen in 
liebender Nacht und bewahren/ In einfältigen Augen unverwandt/ Abgründe der Weisheit’, in Strauß, Der 
Untenstehende auf Zehenspitzen, p.57. See Hölderlin, Gedichte, p.91 and also section 3.2.4 above. 
155 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.41. 
156 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.50. 
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Mit jedem Augenaufschlag steigt die Unwissenheit, und das sonnenklare, 
erobernde Wissen steigt auf der Leiter der Unwissenheit empor, die sich um 
jede genommene Sprosse doppelt nach oben verjüngt.157 
The gesture that Strauß proposes – anticipating the contingent success of the 
Sondenexperiment ‘ins Herz der Unvernunft’ in Beginnlosigkeit – is through the senses of 
the heart. Rather than sight, mankind should be open: 
Das Herz ist das Ganze. 
Wessen Herz dann? Sind wir eines anderen Mitte? […]. 
Wenn man das Herz vollkommen erforscht zu haben glaubt, gehört es einem 
unbekannten, neu zu erforschenden Organismus. 
Die Mitte ist da, sie hält sich verborgen. Ausgesprochen, ist sie stets schon an 
anderer Stelle.158 
The spatial characteristics associated with Herz in the extract are again central to that 
gesture ultimately concerned with a non-rationally based approach to world. It resonates 
with characteristics inherent to the proposal of Fleck. 
These motifs in Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit coalesce around the same proposed 
alternative experience: it is not surprising that it is not defined or specified as a unitary 
term. So, the dream-like condition, similar to the emphasis on Hören, is concerned not 
with notions of correspondence, whether mimetically or positivistically conceived – 
Strauß writes, ‘kein Traum ist ein Gleichnis’ – but, rather, with a letting go of the 
structures of perception, an abandonment of the notion of an individual subject 
encountering the object world.159 
                                                
157 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.47. 
158 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, pp.47 and 48. Heidegger invokes the idea of Mitte for the 
opening Lichtung of the truth of Sein out of das Nichts: ‘Inmitten des Seienden im Ganzen west eine offene 
Stelle. Eine Lichtung ist. Sie ist, vom Seienden her gedacht, seiender als das Seiende. Diese offene Mitte ist 
daher nicht vom Seienden umschlossen, sondern die lichtende Mitte selbst umkreist wie das Nichts, das wir 
kaum kennen, alles Seiende’, in Heidegger, Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, p.51. 
159 Kaußen is the only commentator to note this dimension of the work. She writes: ‘Mit der “Entfernung” 
[…] ins Auge der Undeutlichkeit wird der Subjekt-Objekt-Gegensatz zwischen Text und Rezipient 
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Traum ist: Unterschlupf suchen in Umbildung und Umtaufe. Das sicherste 
Gelaß des Selbst ist der unfeste Raum.160 
The dream-like condition is, of course, akin to the indeterminacy of Dämmern. 
Importantly, the gestures of Hören, Herz and Traum are precarious, just as the truth of the 
poetic remains always enigmatic. The grounds of possibility that Strauß offers for the 
experience of truth are always in danger of inexorably turning back towards the 
conventions of language, its uses and abuses, and an objectifying approach to the world. 
Strauß writes of the figure in ‘Sigé’: 
Wacht er? Nein. Er döst. Durch ihn hindurch geht der Schlummer der 
unveränderten Lage der Dinge. Darin bemerkt er weder Raum noch Mensch 
noch Bild. Wird er aus diesem Schlummer gerissen, ist es stets schon zu spät: 
er erreicht es nicht, und wenn er noch so schnell auffährt, er wird es nie 
erreichen: ein Wächter gewesen zu sein.161 
If this is the default state within which mankind finds himself, earlier designated by 
Lügen, is there really any prospective to show how truth is to be experienced? 
In ‘Sigé’ it is the poets who are exemplary in this regard. It is now clearer why the 
discussion in the preceding section argues for an erasure of the difference in 
philosophical status between the biography of the poet and the work of the poetic. 
Through the lives of the poets mankind learns what it is to be a poet, to dwell and thereby 
open, and be open to, the possibility of an experience of the poetic. The characteristics 
and gestures of the poets are already familiar from earlier readings. For Strauß, they are 
those individuals who take up positions on the margins. This is not, however, a question 
                                                                                                                                               
eliminiert’, in Kaußen, H. ‘Der Sündenbock als Gärtner. Oder: Warum verstiegenem Blöken nicht mit 
Begriffe beizukommen ist’, in Weimarer Beiträge 2 (1994), p.292. 
160 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.49. 
161 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, pp.44-45. 
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of physical removal to be understood literally – or in terms of realism by asking to what 
extent or how the poets are isolated – but as a defining characteristic or gesture of 
ontological concern. Strauß writes in ‘Sigé’ of the poet-figure: 
er der langsam Andersredende, Fürsprecher weder des Chaos noch der 
denkbaren Ordnung, bewohnt entgegen der allgemeinen Annahme nicht das 
Reservat einer erlöschenden Spezies, sondern hält den verborgenen 
Vorposten, die Erwartungstille, […], da weder Wissen noch Wissenschaft sich 
bewegen […].162 
The role of the poet is to wait and, in waiting, to be open to language. These ideas echo 
the manner in which Strauß portrays individual figures in Wohnen Dämmern Lügen. 
Language, its originary experience, comes to the poet, is manifest in and through him. 
But he does not seize it or attempt to control it. The poet allows it to become manifest. 
[…] so sprach ich; 
nicht unverständlich, 
sondern so, daß Schall und Verstehen in mich zurückkehrten. […]. 
Es klang nicht anders als die Geräusche in jedem Hintergrund, in dem etwas 
Wichtiges undeutlich wird.163 
Such language is also, of course, manifest out of stillness and can be shown through the 
poet’s own silence. Strauß has the poet-figure reflect: 
Schweigen aus Gründen, Schweigen zu Zwecken ist etwas anderes. 
Aber dies stoßende Knien der Stimme ins Herz – 
worum schweige ich? Um mein Leben? […]. 
Stille, die vergaß, was sie fleht?164 
It is easy, however, in view of the shadow of fatalism that falls over Strauß, to dismiss 
these gestures as a celebration and advocation of a species of quietism, an abandonment 
of all resolute action and behaviour. It is an accusation long levelled at the perceived 
disruption of creating artists and poets from Plato to critics of the Romantics. But this is 
                                                
162 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.48. 
163 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.52. 
164 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.60. Emphasis in original. 
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to misunderstand the nature of the characteristics and gestures essential to the poets 
amongst whom Strauß includes himself. 
The manner of waiting, of seeming passivity, of being attuned to language – earlier 
delineated as Laßkraft – and, therefore, being open to the dynamic nature of truth is, on 
the contrary, this thesis contends, to propose a fundamental engagement. An acceptance 
of this hangs on allowing revisions to conventional, established philosophical positions 
regarding what constitutes the poetic or, at least, offering concessions in relation to the 
ontological understanding of truth. 
The truth of the work, of the poetic, is for Strauß always enigmatic: it is manifest as 
Undeutlichkeit. What this thesis proposes is that being a poet – in other words, the 
characteristics and gestures associated with his poet-figures – is emblematic for mankind 
and involves showing unconditional openness to the unreconcilable, the indeterminacy, 
the absolute alterity of the enigma that is the poetic. Strauß inscribes these characteristics 
in one of the fragments from ‘Sigé’: 
Sein Lebtag war er durch die Straße gewandert, ruhlos, abseits und gehorsam, 
als wäre ihm aufgegeben, nur ihm allein, ein Labyrinth auszuschreiten, das 
nur einen Ausgang hat, während alle anderen in Unkenntnis und Gleichmut es 
bewohnten, da sie alle Durchgänge für Ausgänge hielten und die unzähligen 
verschachtelten Bahnen, auf denen sie sich bewegten, für ihre Wege ins 
Freie.165 
Like the slow, circumspect movement at each stage of the Sondenexperiment towards 
Fleck, its sense of diffusion, non-linearity, purposelessness even, so too the fragments of 
Strauß’ works are to be experienced. Just as the poets, so too is mankind, if he is to 
experience the truth of the poetic, to give himself over to the work, not in order to 
                                                
165 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.40. 
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determine its meaning, describe its creation, elucidate its character, or narrate its form – 
or whatever interpretive methodology or theory is applied – but rather, to let the poetic be 
manifest. 
Ziellos wirbelt das Ex-Wort durch das Geraune der Flure, Kammern und 
Zimmer. An Stimmen stößt es, an Fenster und Lampen; unbündig prallt es von 
einem zum anderen, verläßt die Schwerkraft der Stiftung. 
Im Raum sein Eigenlauschen. 
und die Atemlast: 
hier gelebt zu haben und so still gehalten 
hier am dunklen Fuß der Sonne.166 
Strauß invites into the work. The work is a site in and with which to dwell. As he writes: 
‘Mein Haus ist nur eine Warte’.167 The fragments, erupting from the blank whiteness of 
the pages – this physicality, of course, enacts the ontological emergence of the poetic 
from stillness – offer a place where it is possible to pause, linger, listen, engage with 
language and the enigma of the poetic, as this thesis proposes it. It is thereby redolent of 
the paratactic movement of the final monologue in Wohnen Dämmern Lügen and the 
other equally circumspect portrayals of such an experience, whether Fleck, die Sprache 
des Dritten, Odeon, Dämmern or Undeutlichkeit encountered in the present delineation of 
Paare, Passanten, Beginnlosigkeit, Niemand anderes, Wohnen Dämmern Lügen and 
Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit. 
Any attempt to infer an ethics or interpretive praxis (even one premised on pure self-
reflexivity) in Strauß’ works is – as delineated in the three stages to the secondary 
literature in Chapter One – therefore, misplaced. Such readings serve only to re-establish 
a philosophical structure and interpretive hermeneutic premised on methods and intent 
invoked by Linie-structured Wahrnehmung. Such examples of the secondary run counter 
                                                
166 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.51. 
167 Strauß, Die Fehler des Kopisten, p.188. 
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to Strauß’ claims and intent. As the possibility of the experience of Fleck suggests, Strauß 
proposes a different Wahr-nehmung by and in the work: literally, an alternative taking-of-
truth where nothing is certain any more, where conviction is abandoned, or rather where 
it abandons mankind. Consequently, what is inscribed in and through the work is 
radically unsettling. The sense of this is again inscribed within the fragments. 
Sein lesen stieg, bis es dichter und dichter wurde, an Undeutlichkeit rührte 
und er mit lesendem Finger zu deuten begann. Er konnte nicht aufhalten, daß 
sich sein Auge entfernte bis ins Auge der Undeutlichkeit.168 
The established certainties through which mankind engages with the object-world, tries to 
understand – for example, as a reader of a work of literature – are suspended, or at least 
momentarily thrown over. 
This understanding of the poetic can easily be misrepresented as errant mysticism, a 
resignation from that very object-world. But this is to fall short of the profound 
philosophical force of Strauß’ works within contemporary letters. By inscribing certain 
ontological claims within his writing and proposing grounds of possibility for their 
experience through a complex series of allusions to and adaptations of Heideggerian 
thought, he is re-invigorating a long-standing and fundamental debate on the poetic: what 
is cast open are questions over the nature of the poetic and through this, issues of how to 
respond to what is thereby and therein made manifest. His writing is not a critique or 
oppositional in the sense of the established philosophical tradition, at least not by 
conventional measures. It is, though, radical still in proposing grounds for engagement 
with the dynamic nature of the poetic. 
                                                
168 Strauß, Fragmente der Undeutlichkeit, p.42. 
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There is, however, unsurprisingly no great revelation at the close of the experience of the 
poetic so understood; no culminating illumination or final insight akin to the subjective 
satisfactory recognition of a syllogistic sequence of deductive logic or inductive 
inference. What Strauß offers is inscribed early in his poetry: 
Darum bitte ich noch: daß mir das Wollen 
[…] nie vergehe, daß ich hören darf 
und aufleben, wenn ich schon lange 
ängstlich verstummt bin. Und daß mir 
in den Gedichten das große Nicht-Wissen 
niemals aufhöre zu klingen. 
 
Was alles zwischen der Stille des Sands 
und der Stille des Himmels bist du, Musik 
ohne Vergleich, Musik mit der Delta des 
Blitzes in die Wortnacht?169 
There is only ever the contingent, provisional manifestation of the poetic as 
Undeutlichkeit. In the end, a work such as ‘Sigé’ perhaps does not express anything, at 
least not discursively or propositionally, but proposes a site for truth to be experienced, 
no matter how enigmatic. To be open to this is, perhaps, a first step towards a poetics of 
dwelling. 
                                                
169 Strauß, Diese Erinnerung an einen, der nur einen Tag zu Gast war, p.62. 
ENDNOTE 
The implicit stricture accredited to the philosopher Stanley Cavell (1926-), and since 
repeated in various guises, namely the question of ‘what would constitute understanding 
Heidegger without a conversion to his way of thinking’ is applicable equally to Strauß.1 
It appears to follow from Cavell’s interrogative that any response to Strauß’ works is left 
on the wrong side of an insuperable intellectual chasm. Either the accusations – pace the 
charge of fatalism – of obscurantism and resignation prevail, in which case, according to 
corresponding premises of what is accepted as rationally understandable, Strauß’ work 
becomes at best the target of vitriol or at worst discarded as below consideration. 
Alternatively – the stricture appears to demand – responses acquiesce to the rhetorical 
allure and siren-call of each work, in which case they too fall outside the collective 
parameters of acceptable method and practice. The former operates on the assumption 
that the experience of a work or argument in philosophy results in an understanding in 
which something is necessarily extracted: subjective agreement is based on objective 
categories that are consensually pre-determined. The latter is then damned through a 
characterisation entirely in reference to the former. 
                                                 
1 Cavell, S. ‘Politics – As Opposed to What?’, in Mitchell, W.J.T. (ed.) The Politics of Interpretation 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), p.197, cited in Bruns, Heidegger’s Estrangements, p.7. 
Gadamer makes a similar observation: ‘Man hat Heideggers Begriffsbildung in seinem späteren Werk oft 
den Vorwurf gemacht, daß sie sich nicht mehr ausweisen lasse’, in Gadamer, in Heidegger, Der Ursprung 
des Kunstwerkes, p.108; while Wood makes the same point, but intriguingly opens the question in relation 
to philosophy and its history: ‘understanding another philosopher, […], is indispensable in becoming 
philosophically educated, as well as being educated about philosophy. What we are still unclear about is 
what it is to follow in the footsteps of other philosophers in the sense of doing what they did, by 
philosophizing’, in Wood, Thinking after Heidegger, p.62. 
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The implied critical bifurcation between rational thinking on the one hand and mystical 
excess on the other is, though, based on a distinction that does not accept the tentative 
nature of Strauß’ proposal regarding the poetic and its experience delineated here as a 
poetics of dwelling. Strauß is offering something else in and through the work. The sense 
of dynamic engagement grounded in a poetics of dwelling, is not understanding from 
which precepts, statements and theories can be projected. Understanding Strauß involves 
giving oneself over to the work with all its attendant indeterminacies and critically, the 
prospect of no resolution and no final agreed meaning. Of course, critics less willing to 
allow such concessions can reasonably respond that such a statement only confirms the 
suspicion that his works promote a disavowal of collectively agreed standards by which 
claims and proposals in relation to a work are followed and verified. Importantly, though, 
the understanding Strauß proposes does not lead inexorably to an interpretive narcissism 
where whatever is projected onto the works finds its echo. Not anything goes. The 
affinity with Heidegger is germane. 
The ideas that Strauß advances in relation to technology, language, the poetic and truth 
are not merely random musings without context. Each idea and term, its respective 
development and reciprocal iteration as originally delineated and inflected by Heidegger 
and adapted and re-inscribed by Strauß, offers a detailed and compelling engagement 
with the long history of Western thought: its traditions, art, artists, philosophies and 
philosophers, and beyond this with different cultures and movements not even considered 
here. The importance of this context is often overlooked in judgements that rush to 
condemn the isolationism of Strauß’ work and ideas. A poetics of dwelling in and of the 
work, and its experience, is in continuous engagement with that tradition. 
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Perhaps then, ironically, the question of critical legitimacy comes back again to language 
and its limits, namely to an understanding of what counts as understanding. It is a debate 
endlessly refracted in German thought and captured in Wittgenstein’s injunction that 
language, conceived philosophically as a series of propositions, ‘kann nur sagen, wie ein 
Ding ist, nicht was es ist’.2 The logic of the premise demarcates clearly where legitimacy 
of understanding begins and ends. 
The key to the question, then, seems to hinge on the position taken or deemed acceptable 
in relation to language, which is why the present thesis attempts at least to acknowledge 
traditional philosophical arguments for its ontological priority before delineating the 
claims for truth that are made of the poetic in the work. But, as is emphasised repeatedly, 
the proposal in respect of Strauß is not something that can be finally resolved with 
appeals to empiricism or logic. What is offered by and in the poetic is the possibility of 
an experience of truth that, accepting all the preceding qualifications, remains bound to 
the possibility also of un-truth and, of course, error. Undeutlichkeit is not certainty or 
conviction. The conceit is not only compelling intellectually, as the preceding argument 
and readings hopefully show, but also has implications for the present thesis. 
A hypothesis is here put forward for Strauß’ prose: whether it is sustainable in relation to 
future prose publications remains, fittingly, an open question. Its efficacy, or rather 
fruitfulness, in respect of the theatrical writing remains also a further interesting, 
                                                 
2 See Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, p.48. 
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unresolved issue: although Strauß’ own delineation of the theatre, which is developed and 
explored in each subsequent drama, perhaps points to the promise of such an approach.3 
Strauß’ works offer a site for a disconcerting and unsettling view of what is accepted as 
fiction, its relationship to what is acknowledged as philosophy and the inheritance of the 
tradition. Finally, in so much of the discussion surrounding Strauß – both the figure of the 
poet and his work – what is overlooked is an underlying tone of humility for the proposal. 
The works might be uncompromising but are always guided by a modesty regarding 
ontological concern. Perhaps like the poet David Jones, the example Strauß gives of real 
presences, his works are only ever ‘fragments of an attempted writing’. There are ways of 
approaching the relationship between mankind and world that are less circumspect and 
more certain in their understanding: but they are not necessarily always less fallible. 
 
3 Strauß writes: ‘Das Theater ist der Ort, wo die Gegenwart am durchlässigsten wird, wo Fremdzeit 
einschlägt und gefunden […] wird. […]. Wo es aber gelingt und das Fernste […] in unfaßliche Nähe rückt, 
gewinnt Theater eine verwirrende Schönheit und die Gegenwart Augenblicke einer ungeahnten 
Ergänzung’, in Strauß ‘“Die Erde – ein Kopf”. Dankrede zum Georg-Büchner Preis’, pp.136-137. 
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